Document Type
Response or Comment
Publication Date
2023
Publication
Texas Law Review Online
Volume
101
Abbreviation
Tex. L. Rev. Online
First Page
123
Abstract
This Response critiques Jeffrey Bellin’s argument that plea‑bargaining reform should focus solely on problems uniquely caused by plea bargaining and instead contends that the practice has fundamentally reshaped American criminal justice in ways that extend far beyond Bellin’s narrow framework. The Response argues that plea bargaining exacerbates systemic issues—including harsh sentencing, coercive leverage, and inaccurate convictions—by insulating legislative excess, weakening trial incentives, and pressuring even innocent defendants to plead guilty. It further maintains that Bellin understates how plea bargaining distorts legislative behavior, affects statutory design, and suppresses political pressure for reform. Most importantly, the Response identifies plea bargaining’s central harm as its displacement of constitutionally grounded adjudicative processes with an unregulated system of negotiation dominated by prosecutorial power, where defendants routinely waive discovery, trial rights, and appellate review in pursuit of leniency. Because prosecutors can demand that defendants bargain away any procedural protections, the piece concludes that Bellin’s uncertainty‑reducing reforms are unlikely to succeed without structural limits on prosecutorial leverage. True reform, it is argued, requires addressing how plea bargaining has transformed—and degraded—the rule‑of‑law foundations of the criminal justice system, not merely improving informational symmetry within negotiations.