Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2021
Publication
Stanford Law Review
Volume
73
Abbreviation
Stan. L. Rev.
First Page
1101
Abstract
The federal government is increasingly a commercial actor, providing retail services directly through its own agencies and indirectly through privatesector contractors. Government involvement with and in the private sector is intended to capitalize on the expertise and efficiency of businesses, benefit taxpayers, and promote public ends. Yet this involvement also confers advantages that benefit the executive branch and its contractor allies at the expense of consumers and states. Our prior work in these pages examined how a muddle of doctrines that form a sovereign shield can be exploited by contractors and the executive branch to evade civil liability and regulatory oversight. It tied the expansion of this sovereign shield to the relative empowerment of the federal government at the expense of the states, the executive branch at the expense of the legislative branch, and the private sector at the expense of consumers. In developing a doctrinal response to the risks identified, this Article draws on the insights of scholars who have studied federal–state relations, contractor–agency relations, and business–consumer relations, and it bridges the gaps between these literatures into which the sovereign-shield phenomenon falls.
This Article argues that the solution to the sovereign-shield problem lies in redefining the question. In determining whether an actor enjoys the sovereign shield’s protection from liability and regulation, this Article proposes that the analysis should turn on the nature of the activity performed, not the identity of the actor performing it. If the activity is fundamentally commercial, the actor — whether a government agency acting on its own or through its contractor — should not be protected. This Article outlines a protocol for courts to implement such a proposal, drawing on well-established doctrines dating back to Supreme Court decisions from the early nineteenth century. Shifting to this activity-based approach would help preserve balances of power between states and the federal government, between the executive and legislative branches, and between businesses and consumers.