Judging-Lite: How Arbitrators Use and Create Precedent

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Common wisdom has it that arbitrators neither follow nor make precedent, with potentially dire consequences. These include the failure to enforce individual rights and the possibility that, over time, widespread use of arbitration will result in the decay or destruction of the law itself. Although difficult to test directly, this common wisdom can be explored indirectly by analyzing arbitrators' citation practices. This Article conducts such an analysis using a unique dataset of published arbitration awards from four U.S. regimes: labor, employment, class action, and securities arbitration. It explores how arbitrators use precedent and where that precedent comes from, and it attempts a tentative comparison between the citation practices of judges and arbitrators.

Outside of securities and (to some extent) labor arbitration, the arbitrators in the sample routinely wrote lengthy awards that were substantially devoted to legal analysis and that made extensive use of precedent. The vast majority of cited precedent, moreover, came from published judicial opinions. Arbitrators did cite to past arbitration awards, but primarily to fill gaps in the law created by government actors. On the whole, the evidence provides little support for the view that arbitrators and judges engage in qualitatively different kinds of decision-making or opinion-writing.
INTRODUCTION

Widespread use of arbitration results in the wholesale transfer of disputes from public courts to private dispute resolution regimes, with serious potential consequences. Perhaps the most far-reaching potential consequence emerges from the belief that arbitrators neither follow nor create precedent. According to common wisdom, arbitrators’ decisions are fundamentally ad hoc—untethered from the rules and standards applied to resolve past disputes. And because judicial review is limited, arbitrators are free to misapply or even disregard the law without fear of correction.

If this vision is accurate, then arbitrators, unlike common law judges, “neither follow the law, nor contribute to it.”1 As the concern is sometimes expressed, arbitrators may ignore relevant precedent, and their awards have no value as precedent in future disputes.2 Worse, by removing cases from the judicial system, arbitration

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2. See, e.g., David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 490 (2011) (noting that “arbitrators need not follow precedent and thus can flout controlling law”).
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diminishes the supply of precedent available to the world at large.³ When combined with the fear that arbitrators often favor businesses in disputes with consumers and employees, the implication is stark: arbitrators often fail to enforce important individual rights, and arbitration will eventually result in the destruction of the law itself.⁴

These concerns are serious, but they rest on what has been called a “folklore” understanding of arbitration.⁵ The reality is that we know very little about how arbitrators behave, and much of what we do know comes from studies of international arbitration.⁶ This Article begins to fill that void. Drawing on insights developed in earlier work,⁷ and using a unique dataset of awards from four domestic arbitration regimes, I ask whether arbitrators use precedent in any meaningful sense, where that precedent comes from, and how their behavior compares to that of judges.⁸ I also ask whether and under what conditions arbitrators generate precedent of their own. To preview the primary findings—arbitrators who write reasoned awards behave much like judges, especially when hearing statutory (as opposed to contract) disputes. They write detailed awards that make extensive use of precedent, although perhaps to a slightly lesser degree than judges. Citations to judicial opinions also dominate the arbitration awards. Arbitrators occasionally cite to other arbitrators, but they usually do so only when there is not likely to be relevant judicial authority. These findings are subject to caveats discussed at length in this Article. On the whole, however, they undercut the view


6. See generally Drahozal, supra note 3 (evaluating empirical basis for claims of arbitral “lawlessness”).


that arbitration involves a qualitatively different kind of decision-making than judging. Call it "judging-lite."

Part I briefly introduces the debate over the role of precedent in arbitration and summarizes the limited available evidence. Part II describes the dataset, which consists of published awards drawn from the Bureau of National Affairs ("BNA") Labor Arbitration Reporter, awards rendered in employment disputes administered by the American Arbitration Association ("AAA"), awards rendered in AAA class arbitrations, and awards rendered in securities arbitrations administered by the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") or the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"), now known as the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA").

Part III analyzes the awards. I do not purport to describe the considerations that in fact drive arbitrators' decisions.9 Instead, I focus on citation practices—that is, on the extent to which arbitrators refer in their awards to past decisions by judges or other sources of legal authority, including arbitration awards.10 Part III begins by demonstrating substantial variance in citation practices across the four arbitration regimes. This variance cautions against making broad generalizations about how arbitration does or does not work. The reality is that arbitration regimes differ along a range of dimensions

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9. For example, this Article does not explore whether the characteristics of arbitrators influence dispute outcomes. See generally, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & A.C. Pritchard, Attorneys as Arbitrators, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 109, 138-40 (2010) (analyzing the influence of attorney arbitrators on arbitral outcomes, including the influence of the chair of the arbitration panel).

that may influence the extent to which arbitrators create and use precedent.\textsuperscript{11}

Part III then turns to analyze particular claims regarding the role of precedent in arbitration. First, it explores whether arbitrators in these four regimes make seemingly ad hoc decisions, instead of decisions that purport to be guided and constrained by precedent. As many would expect based on prior research,\textsuperscript{12} the "ad hoc" description best fits securities arbitration awards, most of which provide no explanation whatsoever for the result. Securities arbitrators may or may not in fact try to apply the securities laws or conform their decisions to those made in prior cases. If they do, however, their awards yield no trace of such a reasoning process.

But a very different picture emerges from the other three arbitration regimes, especially employment and class action arbitration. Arbitrators routinely write lengthy awards that are substantially devoted to legal analysis and that often make extensive use of precedent. Part III also demonstrates that precedent assumes a greater role in arbitration contexts where concerns about ad hoc decision-making are most acute, such as when consumers and employees seek to vindicate non-waivable statutory rights in so-called "mandatory" arbitration regimes.\textsuperscript{13}

Part III next explores the circumstances under which arbitrators assign precedential value to past arbitration awards. Here, too, there is significant variance across the four types of arbitration. Labor arbitrators cite past awards more frequently, and in greater numbers, than arbitrators in the other regimes, and labor arbitrators often justify their decisions by citing only other arbitration awards. The

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{11} Weidemaier, supra note 7, at 1914–49.
\item \textsuperscript{13} The employment, securities, and class action arbitrations addressed in this Article are “mandatory,” as that term is typically—if somewhat confusingly—used. See IAN R. MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH, FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT § 17.1.2.2, at 17:8–9 (Supp. 1999). Broadly speaking, “mandatory” arbitration agreements refer to those resulting from contracts characterized by information or other asymmetries, which suggests a greater need for regulation of these contracts. See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Uniform Arbitration: “One Size Fits All” Does Not Fit, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 759, 767–75 (2001). Note, however, that even mandatory arbitration regimes vary in ways that make it difficult to generalize. See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, The Arbitration Clause in Context: How Contract Terms Do (and Do Not) Define the Process, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 655, 660–63 (2007).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
data also suggest a role for arbitral precedent in other contexts, such as on questions of procedure and, perhaps, on questions of substantive law for which there is little judicial authority. At the same time, there is little evidence outside of labor disputes that domestic arbitration awards are widely assigned value as precedent. There is also no support for the commonly held view that a system of arbitral precedent will arise whenever arbitrators write and publish reasoned awards.

Finally, Part III compares how judges and arbitrators use precedent in one subset of disputes: statutory claims of employment discrimination. The comparison is complicated by a number of differences between arbitration and litigation, but it appears that precedent may play a somewhat lesser role in arbitration. Arbitrators tend to cite fewer precedents than judges, and they arguably engage in less depth with the precedents they do cite. As I will explain, however, it is not clear that these differences matter in terms of the functions served by precedent. It is an open question, for example, whether judicial opinions better inform litigants of the reasons for the decision or provide more stable rules to support private ordering.

Part IV concludes by linking these findings to debates over the role of precedent in arbitration and by exploring implications for judicial review. With the possible exception of securities arbitration, the evidence does not support the claim that arbitrators routinely disregard the law or decide cases in an ad hoc fashion. Arbitration is a service provided in a competitive market, which means that arbitrators will apply whatever rules the parties want (or whatever rules the party with the power to dictate the terms of the arbitration wants). Thus, the fact that citations to judicial opinions dominate the employment and class arbitration awards implies that, at least in these contexts, parties want judicial precedent to govern their disputes. Although that fact does not mean that arbitrators and judges always apply the law in the same way or that arbitration always produces equivalent outcomes, it does caution against drawing simplistic lines between arbitral and judicial decision-making.

Part IV closes with a discussion of judicial review of arbitral awards, focusing on the possibility for enhanced dialogue between

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15. For studies examining arbitration outcomes, see infra note 69.
arbitrators and judges. As a formal matter, judges have little power to review arbitration awards. But given the similarities between arbitral and judicial decisions, it is curious that judges do not engage with arbitration awards in less formal ways—as potentially persuasive, though certainly non-binding precedent. To the extent private law-making has value, judges might improve the quality of their decisions by explicitly considering how arbitrators have resolved similar questions. Given the seeming tendency of arbitrators to follow the law as articulated by judges, this kind of informal judicial “review” also might help judges to correct mistakes or outright abuses of the law-making authority that arbitrators in fact exercise.

I. ARBITRATORS AS DESTROYERS (OR CREATORS?) OF PRECEDENT

For starters, it is worth asking why arbitrators would use precedent any differently than judges. In theory, parties go to arbitration for the same reason they go to court: because they have not settled a dispute and need a third party to adjudicate it. Of course, one or both parties may prefer arbitration for a reason. They might want expertise, a faster result, privacy, lower process costs, or simply a more favorable result. But the service arbitrators provide to litigants—binding, third party dispute resolution—is essentially the same as that provided by judges. Just like courts, moreover, arbitration regimes often involve lawyers and even former judges as party representatives and arbitrators. So it is reasonable to suppose that arbitrators often will hear arguments founded on legal authority, and it is not clear why they would disregard these arguments.

Yet despite the similarity between arbitration and litigation, there remain grounds for skepticism about the role of precedent in arbitration. One such ground is that parties might choose arbitration because they wish to create a different kind of precedent, a body of

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rules better suited to their needs than government-created rules. In such a system, arbitrators would displace judges, legislators, and other state actors as producers of law. If the parties to the arbitration agreement are fully informed and the law relevant to their dispute consists of default rules that may be changed by contract, this would not necessarily be a problem. Most objections to arbitration, however, focus on arbitration agreements between businesses and consumers or employees and on disputes arising under mandatory law, such as securities, consumer protection, and anti-discrimination laws. If arbitrators develop their own rules in such cases, then arbitration "effectively converts what would otherwise be mandatory rules of law into default rules." Through such a process, laws designed to remedy employment discrimination, for example, could be replaced by a system of rules designed by private actors accountable largely to employers at the expense of employees.

A more common fear is that arbitrators will not follow or create precedent at all. Arbitral decision-making is sometimes characterized as involving the application of "Solomon-like principles of equity" rather than substantive legal rules. The implication is that arbitrators make ad hoc decisions that seek to do rough justice rather than rigorously enforce legal entitlements. This is a best-case scenario that assumes an unbiased arbitrator. As with the concern that arbitrators will create their own rules, the possibility that they will make ad hoc decisions is troubling primarily when disputes involve mandatory laws or parties of unequal bargaining power. In other cases, parties who wish to purchase this kind of ad hoc decision-making should be allowed to do so. But few would be pleased to

21. Id. at 744-47 (describing arbitration as creating a beneficial market for default rules).
23. Ware, supra note 20, at 727. The same is true if arbitrators try to follow mandatory law but apply it incorrectly, a fact that has led some to suggest de novo or otherwise heightened judicial review of arbitration awards in some cases. See infra note 215.
24. Brunet, supra note 5, at 42 (including this as part of arbitration "folklore").
26. Contracting parties cannot fully specify their rights and obligations in the contract, so it is inevitable that their chosen adjudicator will possess a great deal of discretion. See Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814, 835-39 (2006). If their contract includes vague substantive terms and an arbitration clause, it is fair to say that they have contracted for the exercise of arbitral discretion. Ware, supra note 20, at 745.
hear that an arbitrator resolved, say, a claim under federal anti-discrimination law by consulting a crystal ball, or the arbitrator’s inchoate notions of fairness, rather than statutes and case law. If such cases exist, then arbitration effectively displaces mandatory legal rules with a system of arbitrator discretion.

A final concern is that, as arbitration becomes more prevalent, the supply of precedent will gradually erode. The concern here is not (or not only) that arbitrators will disregard the law as announced by courts and other public actors. It is that arbitrators will not create law of their own—i.e., that neither arbitrators nor judges will view past arbitration awards as relevant precedent. The court system receives public subsidies, in part, because judges produce social goods like precedent. To the extent arbitration displaces litigation as a means of resolving disputes, the task of producing these goods increasingly falls to privately funded arbitrators. Because many believe that arbitration awards have limited precedential value, the implication is that the law will fail to evolve as it would in a common law system presided over by judges. As a result, the law may fail to develop to accommodate social, technological, and other changes.

If parties do not want to confer such unfettered discretion, they may specify their obligations more precisely, or they may delegate to arbitrators the task of fashioning an appropriate set of default rules and require compliance with those rules. Id. at 744–47. In such cases, both market forces and the law of vacatur will limit the arbitrator’s ability to “do justice” in a manner that conflicts with the parties’ express agreement. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2006) (providing for vacatur in cases where the arbitrators exceed their powers).

27. Or that the contract required the dispute to be resolved “by a panel of three monkeys,” Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 1994), or by “studying the entrails of a dead fowl,” LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1997) (Kozinski, J., concurring), overruled by Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003).

28. E.g., Carrington & Haagen, supra note 25, at 344–45 (asserting that, while arbitrators may follow the law, they often do not); Knapp, supra note 1, at 782–83 (same).


31. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 238–40 (1979) (explaining that private markets do not supply an optimal quantity or quality of precedent); McAdams, supra note 30, at 1114 (same).

32. The classic version of the argument, of course, is that private contracts will underproduce public goods like precedent. See Landes & Posner, supra note 31, at 238–40.

33. Cf. McAdams, supra note 30, at 1118 (“Better dispute resolution may mean worse dispute avoidance.”). For a skeptical view, see Hylton, supra note 3, at 243–47. There are other variants of this concern. One is that arbitrators will fail to generate clear rules because clear rules enable parties to resolve disputes consensually without needing to pay an arbitrator. See Landes & Posner, supra note 31, at 239–40. Another is that arbitrators will fail to apply legal
Although they are widely held, these concerns have limited evidentiary backing. In particular, claims that arbitrators ignore relevant precedent and do not produce precedent of their own take for granted that arbitration is an intrinsically "speedy, cheap, informal, and equitable" process. 34 The existing evidence paints a more nuanced picture. For example, some studies of international arbitration report that arbitrators often cite other arbitration awards. 35 There is not much evidence about domestic arbitration, and what evidence there is indicates that arbitrators' use of precedent varies depending on the context. 36 For the most part, then, our rules predictably, injecting uncertainty into previously-settled areas of law. See id. Note that, even if widespread use of arbitration erodes the supply of judicial precedent, this loss may be partially or entirely offset by the value of having competing producers of law. E.g., Hylton, supra note 3, at 245 (noting that arbitrators might develop "a superior stock of legal capital" in some contexts); cf. ERIN A. O'HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET 85–106 (2009) (examining arbitration's role in creating a market for law).

34. Brunet, supra note 5, at 42–45 (describing this as part of the folklore model of arbitration).


36. Securities arbitrators typically provide no explanation whatsoever for their decisions. See Johnson, supra note 12, at 144–45. Because unreasoned awards provide little meaningful information about the dispute or the arbitrator's decision, they are not likely to serve as precedent in future cases. See Amy J. Schmitz, Untangling the Privacy Paradox in Arbitration, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1211, 1244–48 (2006) (discussing transparency and publication requirements in cases affecting "important public interests"). In the labor arbitration context, some research indicates that arbitrators often cite other arbitration awards or arbitration-related treatises and even refer to judicial opinions when a party has asserted a claim under a federal statute. See Patricia A. Greenfield, How Do Arbitrators Treat External Law?, 45 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 683, 690–91 (1992); Philip Harris, The Use of Precedent in Labor Arbitration, 32 ARB. J. 26, 29–34 (1977); Margaret Oppenheimer & Helen LaVan, Arbitration Awards in Discrimination Disputes: An Empirical Analysis, 34 ARB. J. 12, 13–16 (1979). For an examination of the content of discipline and discharge decisions in labor arbitrations, see Laura J. Cooper, Mario F. Bognanno & Stephen F. Befort, How and Why Labor Arbitrators Decide Discipline and Discharge Cases: An Empirical Examination, in ARBITRATION 2007: WORKPLACE JUSTICE FOR A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 420, 448 (Stephen F. Befort & Patrick Halter eds., 2008); see also Christopher J. Bruce, The Adjudication of Labor Disputes as a Private Good, 8 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3, 9–10 (1988) (exploring the role of arbitral precedent in labor arbitration). For a study in the context of employment arbitration, see generally Chew, supra note 8.
understanding of the role of precedent in domestic arbitration remains stuck at the level of "folklore." 37

II. INTRODUCING THE AWARDS

To develop a better understanding of how arbitrators use precedent, I randomly selected awards from four different sources of published arbitration awards: the BNA Labor Arbitration Reporter database ("LRRLA"), available on LexisNexis; the AAA employment arbitration awards database ("AAAEMP"), also available on LexisNexis; the FINRA arbitration awards database ("FINRA-ARB"), available on Westlaw; and the docket of class arbitrations administered by the AAA and available on its website. 38 Because the awards are drawn from arbitration regimes that differ in ways that may influence arbitrators' use of precedent, I first describe the regimes and then turn to the composition and limitations of the dataset.

A. The Arbitration Regimes

1. Labor Arbitration

Labor arbitrators derive their authority from an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") between a union and an employer. Most CBAs require "cause" or "just cause" for any discharge or disciplinary action, and most labor arbitrations feature an employee challenging an employer's disciplinary or discharge decision under that standard. 39 These are essentially contract disputes. They are unique, however, in that these types of disputes rarely appear in court. 40 Relatively few non-unionized workers enjoy "just cause" protection from discipline or discharge, and fewer still file lawsuits alleging breach of contract under that standard. Most

37. Brunet, supra note 5, at 40 (using the term "folklore arbitration" to describe the orthodox view of arbitration).

38. I selected these sources in part because they were publicly available, which is not the case for many arbitration awards. This fact, of course, has implications for the representativeness of the sample, and I discuss these below. See infra text accompanying notes 58-66.

39. Discipline and discharge cases comprise two-thirds of the labor sample. See infra Table 1. The remaining claims involve a variety of disputes—for example, a union's challenge to the employer's decision to stop providing death benefits, see, e.g., In re Embarq Corp., 124 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1185, 1185-86 (2008) (Nolan, Arb.), or an employee's challenge to an employer's decision that falls short of discipline or discharge, see, e.g., In re Rochester Area Bd. of Educ., 124 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 114, 114-16 (2007) (Franckiewicz, Arb.).

grievance arbitrations, therefore, "involve[] claims that would not
have been asserted in litigation had the parties not agreed to
arbitrate."

Of the four arbitration regimes, labor arbitration features the
most robust publication practices. Labor arbitrators often issue
reasoned awards that are of great interest to unions, to employers,
and their lawyers. Legal publishers like the BNA have published
labor arbitration awards—albeit selectively—for many decades, and
reference texts attempt to distill the rulings of labor arbitrators into a
coherent set of principles to inform future disputes.

2. Employment Arbitration

Many contracts of employment include arbitration clauses. Because
these clauses are often broad in scope, employment
arbitration encompasses virtually any conceivable dispute that might
arise between employees and their employers. Thus, employment
arbitrators routinely decide state law contract and tort claims, as well
as claims under federal and state statutes (including civil rights
statutes). Note that, unlike in labor arbitration, employment
arbitration serves as a substitute—not as a replacement—for
litigation; that is, but for the arbitration clause, the claims resolved in
arbitration could have been resolved in court. This means that
concerns over ad hoc decision-making are heightened in the
employment context, especially when arbitrators hear cases involving
non-waivable statutory rights.

The AAA's employment arbitration rules provide that
arbitrators will provide "written reasons for the award unless the
parties agree otherwise." Since 2000, the AAA has published these
awards, and current rules require that awards be made available to
the public at cost. These awards are also available online through
LexisNexis in fully searchable format. Under current practice,

41. Id.
42. Nat'l Acad. of Arbitrators, The Common Law of the Workplace: The
Views of Arbitrators v (2d ed. 2005).
43. See Ware, supra note 40, at 107.
44. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Employment Arbitration Rules & Mediation
Procedure R. 39(c), at 36 (Nov. 1, 2009), available at http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty
?nodeId=/UCMJADRSTG_004362&;amp;amp;amp;revision=latestReleased.
45. Thus, except for its decision to redact party and witness names, see id. at Rule 39(b),
the AAA largely conforms to the transparency norms that many believe are appropriate in
cases implicating important public interests. See Schmitz, supra note 36, at 1244-48 (discussing
transparency and publication requirements in cases affecting "important public interests").
however, the names of parties and witnesses are redacted before publication.46

3. Class Action Arbitration

The disputes at issue in the class action arbitration sample are the most procedurally complex and substantively diverse of the four arbitration regimes. In class arbitration, an arbitrator selected and paid by the parties presides over a class action, making all the decisions that are typically entrusted to judges in such cases.47 The arbitrator decides whether to certify a class, determines the form and manner of notice to class members, resolves all issues of law and fact, and enters an award that may bind many hundreds or thousands of class members.48 Class arbitration may implicate a wide range of substantive disputes, including a great many that fall under mandatory public laws regulating employment, consumer, franchise, and securities transactions. The common theme is that the defendant has entered a large number of standardized transactions governed by contracts that include an arbitration clause.49

Recent Supreme Court cases have created uncertainty about the future of class arbitration.50 To date, however, AAA class arbitrations have generated a significant number of reasoned awards, which are required by AAA rule and made available to the public on a cost basis. The awards disclose the identities of the parties and can be


48. See id.


downloaded directly from the class arbitration docket on the AAA website.

4. Securities Arbitration

The securities arbitration sample consists of disputes administered by the NASD or the NYSE, now combined into FINRA. These include claims by customers against FINRA members or associated persons, such as claims alleging unauthorized trading, conversion, churning, or other violations, as well as disputes between or among FINRA members and their associated persons, including claims by or against employees. FINRA rules do not require arbitration of employment discrimination claims, but employees and brokerage firms may separately agree to arbitrate such claims. Thus, many claims resolved by securities arbitrators involve non-waivable rights under securities and anti-discrimination laws.

Securities awards are published, and securities arbitrators may and sometimes do issue reasoned awards. But historically, norms in securities arbitration have disfavored reasoned awards, and the available evidence suggests that securities arbitrators do not often issue them. For example, in an examination of customer cases closed by NASD arbitrators in 2003 and 2004, Professor Jennifer Johnson found that fewer than 5% of awards provided even a brief explanation for the result, and fewer than half of these included anything "that would be deemed an opinion by any stretch of the definition." The result is similar in the dataset I describe here, which spans the years 1995–2009: of the 203 securities awards analyzed, only ten (4.9%) offer any explanation for the result.

B. Composition of the Dataset

The class arbitration portion of the dataset consists of every award posted to the class arbitration docket on the AAA website as of January 1, 2010. The labor, employment, and securities samples consist of at least 200 awards randomly selected from each of the relevant databases. After excluding stipulated awards and

52. See Brunet & Johnson, supra note 12, at 489.
53. Johnson, supra note 12, at 144.
54. To create a sample, I generated a list of awards using the search term “arbitrat!” and limited the search by date range where this basic search produced too many awards. I then
duplicates, the resulting dataset includes 848 awards. Table 1 provides a brief breakdown of the awards, and the tables in the Appendix provides more detail.55

Table 1: Overview of Awards by System

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System</th>
<th>N (total)</th>
<th>Date Range</th>
<th>Claim Type (N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Securities</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>1995-2009</td>
<td>Broker-dealer (183)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Employment (20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>1980-2009</td>
<td>Employee discipline/discharge (137)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Other (71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class Arbitration</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>2003-2009</td>
<td>Class certification only (25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Class certification + settlement (21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Class certification + other (13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Clause construction (97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Other (50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>1999-2008</td>
<td>Attorney's Fees (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Contract claim only (49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Contract and other non-statutory claims (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Other non-statutory claims (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1+ statutory claim, including discrimination (159)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For each award, I or a research assistant coded a number of variables related to citation practices and other matters, including the type of dispute; whether the award cites to judicial precedent, arbitral precedent, or an arbitration-related treatise; and the number of arbitration awards (if any) cited.56 This portion of the coding did not capture citations to statutes (other than to note when a statutory claim was at issue), administrative regulations, or other potential

generated 240 random numbers between one and the total number of awards produced by the search. After eliminating duplicates, I downloaded the award corresponding to each number. Stipulated awards were excluded from coding.


56. For the labor, employment, and class arbitration awards, two research assistants each performed half of the coding. The variables reported here are straightforward, and coding them did not require difficult or subjective judgments. Still, I had each research assistant independently code twenty-five awards from each system and compute reliability statistics for each of the reported variables (using Cohen's kappa). The resulting kappa statistics range from 0.70 to 0.92, within the range generally considered acceptable. On the subject of inter-rater reliability generally, including acceptable ranges of Cohen's kappa, see Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 96 Calif. L. Rev. 63, 113-16 (2008). I later added the securities awards to the dataset and coded them myself.
sources of authority, such as books and scholarly articles. However, twenty-five awards were randomly selected from each arbitration regime for more detailed coding and for comparison to a sample of judicial opinions.\textsuperscript{57}

Note that the use of published awards introduces a potential source of bias: these awards may overstate the extent to which arbitrators cite all forms of authority—including past arbitration awards—in their decisions. There is some evidence, for example, that appellate judges cite fewer precedents when writing unpublished opinions.\textsuperscript{58} Similarly, it is possible that arbitrators cite to more authority when writing awards for publication. When awards are published, arbitrators may seek to gain prestige (and future business) by writing carefully reasoned awards that engage with relevant precedent.\textsuperscript{59}

If there is a relationship between citation practices and award publication, it may be more pronounced in the labor portion of the dataset. By rule, FINRA awards, AAA employment awards, and AAA class arbitration awards are made publicly available.\textsuperscript{60} By contrast, most labor arbitration awards are unpublished, and awards that are submitted to the BNA for publication are published only if the BNA decides the award is of sufficiently "general interest."\textsuperscript{61} Thus, labor awards are subject to several types of selection not present in the other arbitration regimes. First, the arbitrator must decide (with the parties' assent) to submit the award to the BNA. Second, the BNA must decide to publish the award. As a result, published BNA awards may not be representative of all labor

\textsuperscript{57} See infra text accompanying notes 100–111.

\textsuperscript{58} Niblett, supra note 10, at 265–67.

\textsuperscript{59} Published opinions may be unrepresentative for other reasons, including the fact that parties control which cases produce a published opinion. See Orley Ashenfelter, Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 259 (1995).


\textsuperscript{61} See 124 LAB. ARB. REPS. (BNA), at vii (2008); Cooper, Bognanno & Befort, supra note 36, at 42.
arbitration awards. For example, arbitrators might be more likely to submit, and the BNA to accept, awards that disagree with positions taken by other arbitrators or that attempt to synthesize existing awards. If that is so, one might expect published labor awards to cite arbitral precedent more frequently than awards published in other arbitration regimes (and they do). But the difference would result from selection bias rather than the different practices of labor arbitrators.

For several reasons, however, I am inclined to doubt that selection bias explains any difference between labor arbitration and the other arbitration regimes. First, just over half of the awards in the labor sample cite to no authority at all, suggesting that many awards are published for reasons having nothing to do with their relation to decisions rendered by judges or other arbitrators. Second, labor arbitrators who cited past awards or other sources of legal authority primarily did so to support the result; only a small minority cited precedent that conflicted with the arbitrator’s decision. Thus, the BNA’s publication practices do not obviously favor awards that create or purport to resolve conflict with other legal authorities. Finally, as Part III discusses, the differences between labor and the other arbitration regimes are substantial—so much so that it seems implausible to attribute them entirely to selection bias.

Lastly, readers should be aware of a source of sample bias inherent in any study of arbitration. Whether published or unpublished, large samples of arbitration awards tend to be available only from institutional providers of arbitration services. As I have described elsewhere, these providers inhabit a segmented marketplace, offering different arbitration-related services to different customers. Consequently, even a random sample of arbitration awards will support only limited inferences. The behavior of arbitrators in AAA employment arbitrations, for example, may not match the behavior of arbitrators hearing non-employment disputes or the behavior of employment arbitrators operating under different circumstances.

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63. This conclusion is based on a randomly selected subset of twenty-five labor awards, only two of which cited any authority that conflicted with the arbitrator’s decision.

64. This explains why I have constructed the sample from published awards. No comparable set of unpublished awards was available.

65. Weidemaier, supra note 13, at 660–63.
institutional rules. Nor is there clear evidence about the market share of the various arbitration providers, although NASD and NYSE, and now, FINRA, are thought to administer most securities arbitrations. Thus, although this Article will occasionally refer broadly to "employment arbitrators," say, or to "class arbitration," analysis is limited to published awards in the particular arbitration systems that comprise the sample.

III. HOW ARBITRATORS USE AND CREATE PRECEDENT

I have so far noted several concerns about the role of precedent in arbitration: that arbitrators will decide cases in a purely ad hoc, discretionary fashion; that arbitrators will not produce awards that have any precedential value; and that arbitrators will create legal rules that displace government-created mandatory law. Note that these concerns need not be linked to fears that arbitrators will be biased in favor of some litigants or that arbitration agreements will be forced on unwitting parties. If arbitration depletes the available stock of precedent, for example, then widespread use of arbitration might produce a net social loss, even if contracting parties always make perfectly informed decisions and choose unbiased arbitrators. For that reason, I do not attempt to determine whether arbitrators are applying the law in a biased fashion—a question that would be difficult to answer in any event. Instead, I focus on citation practices in arbitration.


68. See McAdams, supra note 30, at 1117 ("[A] public system of adjudication is superior at providing precedent[,].") Conversely, adjudicator bias may be present even in a system of binding precedent. Most disputes can be characterized in multiple ways, each of which brings the dispute within the ambit of a different legal rule and potentially leads to a different outcome. See Lynn M. LoPucki & Walter O. Weyrauch, A Theory of Legal Strategy, 49 Duke L.J. 1405, 1432-43 (2000). As a result, adjudicators have significant discretion to select preferred outcomes. That discretion also extends to the sequence in which issues are decided—a question that can have significant implications. See Peter B. Rutledge, Decisional Sequencing, 62 Ala. L. Rev. 1, 24-36 (2010). A system of binding precedent may or may not limit this discretion, but it does not eliminate it.

69. There is a growing body of research exploring arbitration outcomes. As one would expect given the range of legal and factual contexts in which arbitration takes place, the evidence is mixed. For studies or analyses of consumer debt collection arbitration, see generally,
Citations to precedent do not provide direct evidence of why an adjudicator reached a particular result.\textsuperscript{70} In theory, precedent might fully determine the results in future cases; it might only partially constrain future adjudicators, leaving them some but not complete freedom to decide cases in their ideologically-preferred manner; or it might provide no constraint at all, serving only to justify a decision driven purely by extra-legal factors.\textsuperscript{71} Citation practices do, however,
reveal important information. Citations shed light on how arbitrators justify their decisions. In the process, citation practices provide evidence about the rules the parties expect will govern their disputes. Arbitrators are market actors whose future income depends on litigant satisfaction. If arbitrators demonstrate a pattern of citing judicial precedent, it is reasonable to infer that parties want their disputes governed by the law as articulated by courts. By contrast, a pattern of citing to no precedent would provide some evidence that parties are content for arbitrators to resolve disputes in an ad hoc, discretionary manner.

Citation practices also shed light on the claim that arbitration awards have no precedential value. It is true that arbitrators are not bound to follow past arbitration awards. But to the extent citations signal that arbitrators try to achieve consistent results, they facilitate the kind of private ordering that is commonly viewed as a benefit of precedent. Arbitrators who cite judicial opinions, for example, signal that parties may settle disputes and structure contracts on the assumption that the rules announced by judges are binding. Arbitrators who cite past arbitration awards convey similar information about rules announced by arbitrators. In this way, citation practices offer insight into whether arbitration is capable of generating the public goods associated with precedent. For example, routine citation of arbitration awards would provide indirect evidence that rules announced by arbitrators facilitate the settlement of disputes outside of arbitration. For all of these reasons, studies of citation practices can inform debates over the role of precedent in arbitration. They also provide some basis for comparing arbitral awards to judicial opinions.

The next four Sections explore various aspects of arbitrators' citation practices. The first asks whether precedent plays any role in

and members of the other branches of government). A more meaningful distinction between arbitration and litigation focuses on the characteristics of the actor with the ultimate discretion to shape and apply legal rules. In arbitration, this is a private actor accountable to the litigants. In litigation, the actor is an elected or appointed judge with different incentives.

72. Citations to precedent serve a variety of functions, among them providing background information, demonstrating compliance with anti-plagiarism norms, and providing an authoritarian justification for a particular result. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of the Use of Citations in Law, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 381, 383–87 (2000).

73. Friedman et al., supra note 70, at 794; cf. Posner, supra note 72, at 385 (noting that citation to "previously decided cases provide[s] a reason independent of analytical power for reaching a particular outcome").

74. See supra note 10.

75. See infra text accompanying notes 181–85.
arbitration and, if so, whether arbitrators look exclusively to judicial precedent. The second takes a deeper look at how arbitrators use the precedent they cite. The third examines the use of past arbitration awards as precedent. Focusing on disputes involving claims of employment discrimination, the fourth compares a sample of arbitration awards to a sample of judicial opinions.

A. Is Arbitral Decision-Making Ad Hoc? A Preliminary Look

In this Section, I begin with two simple, binary measures of how arbitrators in the four arbitration regimes use precedent. The first is whether the arbitrator's award includes at least one citation to either a judicial opinion or an arbitration award. The second is whether the arbitrator's award cites only to judicial precedent. These are rough measures, but they reveal important information that usefully frames the more nuanced discussion to follow. The first variable, for example, sheds light on whether arbitrators resolve disputes in a purely ad hoc fashion rather than by applying substantive legal rules. The second variable indirectly measures the extent to which litigants want their disputes to be governed exclusively by judicial precedent. Together, these rough measures suggest that precedent plays a very different role in different arbitration regimes, that its role depends in part on the substantive claim at issue, and that judicial precedent often plays the dominant role.

For each of the four regimes, Figure 1 depicts the proportion of awards that cite to at least one judicial opinion or arbitration award in the section of the award that presents the arbitrator's decision. A sizeable majority of the class arbitration (71.8%) and employment (66.7%) awards cite to at least one prior opinion or award, as do nearly half (48.6%) of the awards issued by labor arbitrators. By contrast, only 2 of the 203 securities awards (1%) cite to even one judicial opinion or arbitration award. As noted previously, most of the securities awards are unreasoned, meaning the arbitrator also provided no narrative explanation whatsoever for his or her decision.

76. Some awards described the authorities cited by the parties in support of their respective positions. This was especially common among labor arbitrators. These were not counted as citations by the arbitrator.

77. A chi-square test revealed a significant relationship between the arbitration system and the proportion of awards that cited some form of precedent ($\chi^2(3, N = 848) = 19.2, p < 0.001$). Follow-up testing (employing Bonferroni's correction for Type 1 error) revealed that, in both class and employment arbitration, the proportion of awards that cited to precedent was significantly greater than in labor and securities arbitration, and also that the proportion of labor awards that cited to some precedent was significantly greater than the proportion of securities awards ($\chi^2s \geq 9.2, ps < 0.001$).
For the vast majority of securities awards, then, parties received nothing more than a brief statement identifying the claims at issue and the winning party. This is consistent with the findings of previous research.  

**Figure 1: Awards that Cite to One or More Judicial or Arbitral Precedent**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>仲裁类型</th>
<th>数量</th>
<th>百分比</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>证券仲裁 (N=203)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>劳动仲裁 (N=208)</td>
<td></td>
<td>48.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>集体仲裁 (N=206)</td>
<td></td>
<td>71.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>就业仲裁 (N=231)</td>
<td></td>
<td>66.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1 reveals only limited information. For example, it treats each award that cites one or more judicial or arbitral precedent equally, whether the number of citations totals one or one hundred. For now, however, I wish to make two straightforward points. First, as Figure 1 suggests, the role of precedent varies dramatically across different arbitration contexts. It therefore makes little sense to speak of "arbitration" as if all arbitrators and arbitration regimes were alike. Second, differences in citation patterns may reflect procedural differences in the arbitration or differences in the kinds of claims being adjudicated.

The securities awards illustrate how award writing and publication practices may affect the use of precedent. Recall that although securities arbitrators write awards for publication, they need not provide a reasoned award. In theory, a securities arbitrator might cite to precedent without providing any narrative explanation for the result. But it is not surprising that this rarely occurs. Citations to precedent implicitly offer an explanation for the result—a form of reasoning by analogy. In most securities arbitrations, however, the arbitrator has already elected not to write a reasoned award providing a narrative explanation for the result. In that case, it is not clear why

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78. See Johnson, *supra* note 12, at 144.

79. In part, the limited role played by reasoned awards can be explained by NASD’s historic ambivalence about whether arbitrators are required to apply securities laws. See Brunet & Johnson, *supra* note 12, at 474-86.

the arbitrator would choose to provide an explanatory analogy to a prior decision.

Arbitrators in the labor, employment, and class arbitration regimes do write reasoned awards, and their use of precedent varies. But the variance may be due in large part to the type of dispute at issue rather than to any fundamental difference between the regimes. Recall that labor arbitrators primarily hear contract disputes and that judges rarely preside over similar cases. Most labor disputes, moreover, are fact-intensive and turn primarily on whether the employer had just cause for its disciplinary decision under the applicable CBA. In such cases, it is not surprising that arbitrators often explain their reasoning but do not cite any precedent. The fact that courts rarely hear similar disputes means there will be little judicial precedent to cite. Likewise, past arbitration awards will be of limited relevance unless they interpret the same or a similar CBA or discuss the appropriate penalty for similar employee conduct.

By contrast, precedent is likely to play a greater role in disputes arising under state and federal statutes. Precedent interpreting a particular statutory provision will be relevant to all cases that implicate that provision. This may explain the difference between the labor arbitration awards and awards rendered in employment and class arbitrations, which often involve disputes arising under state and federal statutes. For example, in the AAA employment sample, the proportion of awards that cited to precedent was significantly higher when an employee asserted a claim under state or federal anti-discrimination law (76.2%) than in other kinds of disputes (51.1%). The latter category includes a large number of contract disputes. Indeed, after excluding discrimination claims from the AAA employment sample, the difference in the proportion of awards that cite precedent in labor and employment arbitration vanishes: citations appear in around half the awards in each system. The difference is that arbitral precedent plays a much greater role in labor arbitration.

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81. See supra text accompanying notes 39–41.
82. See supra note 39.
84. $\chi^2(1, N = 231) = 15.4, p < 0.001$.
85. Excluding discrimination claims, 48.4% of the labor and 51.1% of the employment awards contain at least one citation to judicial or arbitral precedent. The difference is non-significant ($\chi^2(1, N = 296) = 0.17, p = 0.69$).
This leads to the second rough measure of the role of precedent in arbitration: the extent to which arbitrators cite only judicial precedent. Recall that one concern is that arbitrators will create an alternative body of precedent, effectively displacing judges, legislators, and other public officials as producers of law. As noted earlier, this would be relatively unproblematic if the government-supplied law consisted of default rules, but it would be problematic indeed in disputes governed by ostensibly mandatory legal rules. As Figure 2 suggests, however, there is little evidence that arbitrators are engaged in any explicit effort to displace mandatory government-created law. The Figure focuses on the subset of awards in each arbitration regime that cite to at least one judicial opinion or arbitral award; thus, it excludes securities awards. Within that subset of awards, Figure 2 reveals that, outside of labor arbitration, the vast majority of awards cite only to judicial precedent.

Figure 2: Percentage of “Precedential” Awards Citing Only Judicial Precedent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arbitration Type</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labor Arbitration (N = 101)</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class Arbitration (N = 148)</td>
<td>83.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment Arbitration (N = 154)</td>
<td>98.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2 provides a rough but revealing look at the relative importance of judicial and arbitral precedent, showing that judicial precedent dominates both the employment and class arbitration regimes. In the employment disputes, arbitrators who cited to judicial or arbitral precedent nearly always cited only to judicial precedent. A possible implication of this finding, to which I return below, is that employment arbitrators overlooked arbitration awards as a potential source of authority, even when there was no relevant

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86. See supra text accompanying notes 21-23.

87. Only two of the securities awards cited any judicial or arbitral precedent. Thus, the securities arbitration category is omitted from Figure 2.

88. There was a significant relationship between the arbitration system and the proportion of awards that cited only judicial precedent ($\chi^2(2, N = 405) = 17.1, p < 0.001$). Follow-up testing (employing Bonferroni’s correction for Type I error) revealed that a significantly higher proportion of employment awards cited only judicial authority than was the case in either class ($\chi^2(1, N = 302) = 21.3, p < 0.001$) or labor arbitration ($\chi^2(1, N = 255) = 14.0, p < 0.001$), and also that a significantly higher proportion of class arbitration awards cited only judicial precedent than was true of labor arbitration ($\chi^2(1, N = 249) = 8.5, p < 0.001$).
judicial precedent available.\textsuperscript{89} For example, employment disputes often require arbitrators to discuss or interpret the employer's workplace policies or the documents it distributes to employees.\textsuperscript{90} These policies and documents will be relevant to multiple workplace disputes. Even if relatively few disputes reach arbitration,\textsuperscript{91} arbitrators should, over time, have multiple opportunities to interpret and apply the same policy or document.\textsuperscript{92} Much of the AAA employment arbitration caseload, in fact, arises out of employer-promulgated arbitration programs that apply to a wide range of employees, all governed by the same or similar workplace policies. In such a regime, it would not be surprising if parties and arbitrators looked to past arbitration awards as a source of guidance. Yet with one or two minor exceptions, this simply did not happen.\textsuperscript{93}

Although less pronounced than in the employment disputes, the class arbitration awards also evinced a tendency for arbitrators to cite only judicial precedent. Of the awards that cited to at least one judicial opinion or arbitral award, the substantial majority (83.8\%) cited only judicial precedent. I will return to these awards when I examine the conditions under which arbitrators assigned precedential value to past arbitration awards. For now, it is enough to say that arbitrators in class action disputes tended to cite arbitration awards only in connection with questions of contract interpretation or arbitral procedure—and not, say, in connection with questions of statutory interpretation.\textsuperscript{94}

\textsuperscript{89} Even among the employment awards, there are rare exceptions where arbitrators cite arbitral precedent, even as the sole authority for a decision. The employment sample includes two such cases. Overall, however, the employment awards cite overwhelmingly to judicial opinions. For further discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 153–162.


\textsuperscript{91} E.g., David Lewin, Dispute Resolution in Nonunion Organizations: Key Empirical Findings, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE EMPLOYMENT ARENA: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 53RD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 379, 386 (Samuel Estreicher & David Sherwyn eds., 2004) (estimating that, for nonunion employers with a dispute resolution program in place, only four to five percent of employee grievances are resolved in arbitration); Alexander J.S. Colvin, Adoption and Use of Dispute Resolution Procedures in the Nonunion Workplace, 13 ADVANCES INDUS. & LAB. REL. 69, 75–87 (2004) (finding for one manufacturing company that, of the seventy-two total disputes that went to mediation or arbitration between 1995 and 1997, only three resulted in an arbitration); Sherwyn, Estreicher & Heise, supra note 69, at 1587–88 (reporting that only five percent of the claims submitted to one employer's dispute resolution program went to arbitration).

\textsuperscript{92} See Weidemaier, supra note 7, at 1957.

\textsuperscript{93} Two awards cited only arbitral precedent. See supra note 87.

\textsuperscript{94} See infra text accompanying notes 136–38.
Thus, neither the employment nor the class arbitration awards reveal any evidence that arbitrators explicitly rely on arbitral precedent when deciding questions of mandatory law. The labor arbitration awards reinforce this point. Because most labor disputes involve questions of contract interpretation that are not often litigated in court, judicial precedent is less relevant for such disputes, so it is not surprising that only a small minority (14.9%) of the labor awards cite only to judicial opinions. In short, the only regime in which arbitral precedent plays a major role is labor arbitration, where arbitrators are engaged primarily in building a "common law of the workplace" rather than in interpreting and applying mandatory legal rules.

Taken together, Figures 1 and 2 suggest that arbitrators often make at least some effort to acknowledge relevant precedent and that this tendency is most pronounced when disputes turn on legal (as opposed to contractual) standards. In both the employment discrimination and class arbitration disputes, for example, a substantial majority of awards cited to precedent. Furthermore, arbitrators in the employment and class arbitration regimes typically cited judicial precedent to the exclusion of past arbitral awards. This occurred even when disputes turned on the application of default rules and even when there might have been arbitral precedent on point—as with employment disputes requiring interpretation of an employee handbook or other workplace policies. These patterns hardly demonstrate that judges and arbitrators decide cases the same way, but they are difficult to square with descriptions of arbitrators as ad hoc decision-makers. They also provide little reason to fear that arbitrators are explicitly replacing government-created, mandatory law with private legal rules developed through arbitration.

The outlier is securities arbitration, where arbitrators almost never cited to judicial or any other form of precedent. This is consistent with past research. Although that research focuses on whether securities arbitrators bother to explain their decisions, and not on citation practices, the pattern is clear. Few parties to securities arbitrations receive any indication—whether through narrative explanation or citations to analogous cases—of why they won or lost.

95. See supra text accompanying notes 39-41.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 89-93.
98. See supra note 12.
Again, this does not mean that the law plays no role in securities arbitration. Anecdotally, I understand that it is quite common for lawyers to submit detailed briefs on behalf of parties to securities arbitrations. But if securities arbitrators attempt to apply the securities laws, their awards reveal no trace of this effort.\footnote{The overall impression, therefore, is consistent with portrayals of securities arbitration as “lawless.” See Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up as They Go Along: The Role of Law in Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 1005–30 (2002) (discussing limits on the ability of securities arbitrators to apply the law); Brunet, supra note 12, at 1484 (noting that securities arbitration “remains lawless”); Brunet & Johnson, supra note 12, at 474–86 (documenting NASD’s historical ambivalence about whether arbitrators must follow the law); Johnson, supra note 12, at 159 (concluding that securities arbitrators often do not “fully comprehend the complexity of federal and state” securities laws).}

\section*{B. A More Detailed Inquiry: Depth of Engagement with Precedent}

Thus far, we have seen that arbitrators in three of the four arbitration regimes often cited some form of precedent and that, except for labor arbitrators, most cited only to judicial precedent. The findings indicate that precedent often plays at least some role in arbitration. But how significant is that role, and do arbitrators make a serious effort to engage with the precedent they cite?

\subsection*{1. Measures of Citation Quality}

To develop a more complete picture, I randomly selected twenty-five awards from each of the class and labor arbitration samples for more detailed coding.\footnote{I omitted the securities awards, only two of which cited either judicial or arbitral precedent.} I also randomly selected twenty-five employment arbitration awards, although here I restricted the sample to awards that addressed a statutory discrimination claim. I imposed this limitation to facilitate comparison to judicial opinions—a subject I address below.\footnote{See infra Part III.D.} For this subset of seventy-five awards, I coded:

- The nature of each citation, including whether the precedent was a judicial opinion, arbitral award, statute, administrative regulation, treatise, law review article, book, or other source;
- The issuing court (for citations to judicial opinions);
- The length in words of the complete award, and the length in words of the portion of the award dedicated to providing the arbitrator’s legal analysis; and
• The age of each cited judicial opinion, measured from the date the arbitrator issued the award.

These measures provide a more robust picture, but they do not tell us why the arbitrator cited each precedent. Not all citations are the same. Like judges, arbitrators might cite precedent they agree with or that influenced them, or they might cite precedent only to disagree with or distinguish it. Other citations might be less central to the arbitrator's explanation for the outcome. For example, an arbitrator might cite a precedent simply because it uses memorable language or might include the precedent as one of many entries in a long string cite.

To get a better sense of the role of precedent, I coded three additional variables. Adopting a definition used in other research, I first coded whether each cited precedent was a "strong" cite. I coded a citation as "strong" if it (1) quoted more than a single word or phrase from the cited source; (2) discussed the source for more than two sentences; or (3) explicitly indicated reliance on the source. Note that, as a proxy for "quality" citations, this variable is both under- and overinclusive. It is underinclusive because adjudicators may be heavily influenced by precedents that do not meet the definition (or that they do not bother to cite at all). It is overinclusive because adjudicators may devote several sentences to discussing relatively unimportant precedents. Nevertheless, the variable roughly measures the extent to which an arbitrator engaged with the cited precedent.

I also wanted to know how often arbitrators tried to distinguish potentially conflicting precedents or adopted rules that conflicted

102. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249, 251 (1976); Posner, supra note 72, at 383–87; see also Choi & Gulati, supra note 10, at 99 (noting that some citations are routine or pro forma); Frank B. Cross & Stefanie Lindquist, Judging the Judges, 58 DUKE L.J. 1383, 1391 (2009) (same); Niblett, supra note 10, at 263–65 (discussing different uses of citations).
103. Cross & Lindquist, supra note 102, at 1391.
104. Posner, supra note 72, at 385.
106. Cross & Lindquist, supra note 102, at 1391; Niblett, supra note 10, at 264.
107. See Walsh, supra note 10, at 342.
108. I adopt this definition from Walsh, supra note 10, at 342. Other research uses similar measures. See Niblett, supra note 10, at 263–64; Rorie Spill Solberg, Jolly A. Emrey & Susan B. Haire, Inter-Court Dynamics and the Development of Legal Policy: Citation Patterns in the Decisions of the U.S. Courts of Appeal, 34 POL'Y STUD. J. 277, 283 (2006).
with those applied in past cases. Thus, I coded whether the arbitrator explicitly adopted or rejected the rule or standard applied in each cited precedent. In addition, I asked whether the arbitrator explicitly described the facts or outcome of the cited precedent as consistent or conflicting with the outcome reached by the arbitrator.\textsuperscript{110} I use these measures primarily to learn how often arbitrators cited precedent only to distinguish or reject it.\textsuperscript{111}

The next Section discusses how arbitrators used precedent in this subset of seventy-five awards. At this point, the goal is not to compare the three regimes, which involve different substantive claims, litigants, and procedural contexts. Most of the class arbitration awards, for example, address a limited question of contract interpretation—whether the relevant contract permits a class action—whereas most of the labor and employment disputes resolve the merits of a dispute after an evidentiary hearing. Instead, the point is to assess whether any of the regimes conform to the folklore view of arbitration as an ad hoc process.

2. A Second Look: Arbitrators Act Much Like Judges

If the securities arbitration awards are inscrutable, most of the labor, employment, and class arbitration awards are quite the contrary. As illustrated in Table 2, most provide a detailed narrative explanation for the result and devote the majority of the award to legal analysis rather than to reciting the parties' arguments or reporting findings of fact. As an example, the median award length in the employment sub-sample was almost fourteen pages (at 500 words per page) and devoted two-thirds of this to legal analysis.\textsuperscript{112} To be sure, the awards vary. One employment award, for example, dispenses with an employee's statutory discrimination claim with less

\textsuperscript{110} Some of these citations, of course, would also qualify as strong cites and also were coded that way.

\textsuperscript{111} Note that I required explicit language adopting or distinguishing the cited precedent. Assume, for example, that an award stated, "to prevail, claimant must prove X," followed by a citation to a judicial opinion. Although the context signals that the arbitrator agreed with the cited precedent, I would code the arbitrator as neither adopting nor rejecting the precedent. Thus, I substantially undercount citations to "favorable" precedents—i.e., those with which the arbitrator agreed. The coding effectively captures distinguished precedents because it is difficult to distinguish a precedent without giving some explicit signal. "But see" citations are the exception; these were rare but were not coded as citations to distinguished or conflicting precedent. Note, also, that an arbitrator might simply choose not to cite precedent that conflicts with the arbitrator's decision.

\textsuperscript{112} See infra Table 2. I defined the legal analysis part of the award as the portion of the award that followed any discussion of the background and procedural history of the dispute, recitation of the parties' arguments, and findings of fact.
than a page of perfunctory fact-finding. As another example, labor arbitrators often recited the parties' arguments in detail but spent relatively less time on analysis. But in general, the awards describe the arbitrator's decision in some detail.

Table 2: Length of Award in Pages (at 500 words/page)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean (SD)</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Mean (SD)</th>
<th>Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>8.6 (4.1)</td>
<td>3.5-19.2</td>
<td>3.6 (2.3)</td>
<td>0.9-9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class Arbitration</td>
<td>10.2 (11.1)</td>
<td>3.4-42.8</td>
<td>8.8 (10.4)</td>
<td>1.7-39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>15.0 (10.2)</td>
<td>0.8-42.7</td>
<td>9.7 (7.3)</td>
<td>0.5-27.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Precedent featured prominently in most of the awards, although it did so to a lesser extent in labor arbitration. As Figure 1 made clear, a minority of the employment and class arbitration awards, and a slight majority of the labor awards, did not cite any judicial or arbitral precedent. In keeping with that pattern, in this seventy-five award sub-sample, nearly half of the labor (eleven) and four of the employment awards cited to no precedent at all. But the majority of awards that cited precedent did so extensively. For each regime, Table 3 reports total and unique (i.e., non-duplicative) citations to precedent as well as the types of precedent cited. The average employment award, for example, contained citations to 28.4 total and 21.6 unique precedents. For class arbitration, these figures were 24.8 (total) and 17.6 (unique), and for labor arbitration, they were 9.4 (total) and 8.7 (unique). The vast majority of these were judicial opinions, although the labor awards also cited to arbitration awards with some frequency.

113. 2003 AAA Employment LEXIS 187, at *1 (Dec. 2, 2003) (Latham, Arb.). The award leaves the impression that the claim had little factual merit, but, of course, I cannot confirm this.
114. See infra Table 2; see also Cooper, Bognanno & Befort, supra note 36, at 42 (noting this tendency).
115. See infra Table A-1. Presumably, this is due to the fact that the labor disputes tend to involve contract claims. See supra text accompanying notes 81-83.
116. See supra Figure 1.
117. Each of the twenty-five class arbitration awards cited to some form of precedent.
Table 3: Mean (SD) Citations, per Award, to Different Sources of Precedent (excludes awards that do not cite precedent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Precedent</th>
<th>Unique Citations</th>
<th>Total Citations</th>
<th>Judicial Opinions</th>
<th>Arbitration Awards</th>
<th>Statutes</th>
<th>Admin. Materials</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>8.7 (7.3)</td>
<td>9.4 (8.3)</td>
<td>3.9 (2.7)</td>
<td>4.5 (5.4)</td>
<td>0.1 (0.3)</td>
<td>0.2 (0.4)</td>
<td>1.9 (2.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class Arbitration</td>
<td>17.6 (19.1)</td>
<td>24.8 (32.5)</td>
<td>21.8 (29.9)</td>
<td>1.2 (3.7)</td>
<td>1.0 (2.2)</td>
<td>0.04 (0.2)</td>
<td>0.8 (1.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>21.6 (20)</td>
<td>28.4 (25.9)</td>
<td>25.1 (24.6)</td>
<td>0.2 (0.9)</td>
<td>2.4 (3.3)</td>
<td>0.5 (1.3)</td>
<td>0.2 (0.5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Once again, it is less helpful to compare the different arbitration regimes than to explore the role of precedent in each. Although there is no widely-held understanding of what role precedent should play in arbitration, it is clear that it plays more than a trivial role here. Certainly the awards do not remotely resemble what one would expect from a system of ad hoc, purely discretionary adjudication. Indeed, even in the labor arbitration awards, the relatively limited use of precedent revealed by Table 3 is largely due to the fact that the labor awards were shorter.118 In each arbitration regime, arbitrators cited, on average, two or more unique precedents per page of legal analysis.119

Across the three regimes, over one quarter (26.2%) of citations to judicial opinions or arbitral awards qualified as “strong” cites—meaning, again, that the award quoted or discussed the cited source in some detail or explicitly indicated reliance on the source.120 Table 4 provides more details for each regime. The strong citations measure is a proxy for citation “quality,”121 one that indirectly measures the extent to which arbitrators purport to rely on precedent or engage with it in a meaningful way. Like all proxies, it is imperfect, but it reveals, at a minimum, that the arbitrators in these regimes did more than pepper their awards with string citations. Although we cannot

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118. For purposes of this Article, only citations that were included in the arbitrator’s explanation for the award were coded. For example, in describing the parties’ arguments, arbitrators sometimes noted that a party relied on a particular judicial opinion or arbitral award. This was an especially common practice in the labor awards. However, unless the arbitrator cited or explicitly referred to the relevant precedent in explaining the decision, it was not coded as a citation to precedent.

119. On average, the labor awards cited 2.6 total and 2.4 unique precedents per page in the legal analysis section. The class arbitration awards cited 2.8 total and 2.0 unique precedents per page, and the employment awards cited 2.9 total and 2.2 unique per page.

120. For the full definition of “strong” citations, see supra text accompanying note 108. See Walsh, supra note 10, at 342.

121. Walsh, supra note 10, at 342.
make a direct comparison, it compares favorably to existing research into judicial practices. One study of wrongful discharge cases, for example, reported that, on average, only twenty percent of citations per judicial opinion were strong citations.122

Table 4: Strong Citations and Distinguished Precedents (excludes awards that do not cite precedent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean (SD) per Award</th>
<th>Percent of Total Citations</th>
<th>Mean (SD) per Award</th>
<th>Percent of Total Citations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>2.3 (3.2)</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>0.4 (1.1)</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class Arbitration</td>
<td>6.9 (7.5)</td>
<td>30.1%</td>
<td>2.1 (4.9)</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>5.2 (4.9)</td>
<td>20.7%</td>
<td>1.3 (3.1)</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nor did arbitrators only cite precedent that favored the arbitrator’s preferred rule or outcome or that directly supported the outcome. As Table 4 indicates, arbitrators sometimes cited precedent only to explicitly distinguish it. Across all three regimes, seven percent of the total citations were of this sort.123 There were no cases in which arbitrators simply rejected a precedent out of hand—for example, on the theory that arbitrators are not bound by legal rules announced by courts. Instead, the awards reveal a familiar pattern of common law reasoning in which the adjudicator explains why a potential precedent is not truly analogous.124 In one employment arbitration, for example, the employer defended against a Title VII retaliation claim by citing a judicial opinion rejecting a similar claim, in part, because the adverse employment action had occurred nearly a year after the employee filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.125 The arbitrator ruled in the employee’s

122. See id. at 343 (reporting that the average number of citations per case was 16.66 and that only 3.19 were strong citations); see also Niblett, supra note 10, at 264 (using a different definition, finding that 42.7% of citations were “meaningful”).

123. These citations were not evenly distributed across awards; of the awards that cited to judicial or arbitral precedent, nearly half (44.1%) made no effort to distinguish any of the cited precedents.

124. See, e.g., 2008 AAA Employment LEXIS 122, at *12–16 (June 23, 2008) (Murov, Arb.) (determining whether an employee was a qualified individual with a disability for purposes of the Americans with Disabilities Act, by examining and distinguishing several judicial opinions).

125. See 2007 AAA Employment LEXIS 63, at *31–32 (Jan. 18, 2007) (Hartsfield, Arb.) (citing Foster v. Solvay Pharm., Inc., 160 F. App’x 385, 389 (5th Cir. 2005)).
favor, distinguishing the precedent proffered by the employer as a case in which there was no other evidence linking the adverse employment action to the employee’s protected activity. 126

It is hard to say how often arbitrators (or judges) should cite and distinguish precedent. To answer this question, we would have to identify both the functions that adjudication should serve and the level of engagement with precedent necessary to satisfy those functions. Thus, if we expect adjudicators to provide the parties and their lawyers with an adequate explanation for the result, they should cite (and distinguish) precedent to the extent necessary to serve this function. If we also expect them to inform the public and contribute to debates over social policy, or to supply rules to guide future behavior, they should cite and distinguish precedent to whatever extent is necessary to serve these additional functions. Whether a given judicial opinion or arbitration award fulfills these functions is practically unknowable. Moreover, the extent to which arbitrators (and judges) cite and distinguish precedent also will depend on a host of more quotidian factors, such as the size of the available pool of relevant precedent, the diligence of the parties in finding precedent to support their positions, and the extent to which the arbitrator (or judge or judge’s law clerk) has the time and inclination to perform independent research and produce a lengthy written decision.

To the extent precedent serves public functions—contributing to social debate, guiding future conduct—we might expect judges to engage with it more often, and more seriously, than arbitrators. After all, arbitrators will produce awards that discuss relevant

126. Id. at *31–32, *67.
128. Daniel A. Farber, Missing the “Play of Intelligence,” 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 147, 157–58 (1994); cf. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984) (noting that courts exist “to explicate and give force to the values embodied in authoritative texts such as the Constitution and statutes: to interpret those values and to bring reality into accord with them”).
129. McAdams, supra note 30, at 1089–92, 1113–17; Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1455, 1466–71 (1995); see also Reuben, supra note 127, at 1085 (noting the possibility that arbitration awards could serve a “powerful informational function”).
130. See Landes & Posner, supra note 31, at 238–39. For a comparison of judges and arbitrators, see infra text accompanying notes 163–179; see also Chew, supra note 8, at 198–207 (comparing arbitrators to judges in a sample of race discrimination claims).
precedent only if their customers are willing to pay for that service. What is striking about the evidence discussed thus far, however, is the degree to which arbitrators in these regimes do engage with precedent. There are exceptions, but the substantial majority of awards in both the employment and class arbitration regimes provide a reasonably detailed narrative explanation, frequently cite to precedent, and seem to engage with that precedent in some detail. Arbitrators in these regimes may not behave exactly like judges, but any difference is of degree and not of kind. And whatever else one can say about arbitrators in these regimes, their decisions seem anything but ad hoc.

C. Arbitral Precedent: On Arbitrators as Producers of Law

In this Section, I return to the entire dataset of awards, rather than the seventy-five-award subset, to explore the conditions under which arbitrators treated other arbitration awards as precedent. From Figure 1, recall that most AAA employment and class arbitration awards cited at least one judicial or arbitral precedent, while nearly half of the labor awards did so. In this Section, I report evidence only from the subset of awards that contained such a citation. Within that subset, Figure 2 showed that judicial precedent dominated employment and class arbitration awards, but not labor awards. The vast majority of employment awards (98.7%) and a sizeable majority of class arbitration awards (83.8%) cited only judicial precedent. This was quite rare in labor arbitration; only 14.9% of labor awards cited exclusively judicial precedent.

Another way to describe these findings is to say that arbitral precedent played almost no role in employment arbitration—at least not one that arbitrators were willing to acknowledge in the award. The same is true in securities arbitration, where arbitrators almost

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131. This is not necessarily a problem, at least where all parties to the contract make an informed choice of arbitration. Although some have expressed concern that widespread use of arbitration will diminish the supply of law available to the public at large, it is not obvious why litigants who are willing to pay for their own dispute resolution services should have to accept the public subsidy and litigate in court. This is, of course, a broader debate—one that has traditionally encompassed settlement as well. See generally Symposium, Against Settlement: Twenty-Five Years Later, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1117 (2009) (considering the impact of Owen Fiss's Against Settlement, supra note 128).

132. See supra Figure 1. Two-thirds of the employment awards cited to at least one precedent (including 76.2% of awards addressing a statutory discrimination claim), as did 71.8% of the class arbitration awards.
never cited any precedent and never cited arbitral precedent.\footnote{133} Citations to arbitral precedent occurred primarily in the labor awards and, to a lesser extent, in the class arbitration awards. Figure 3 makes this plain by depicting, for each arbitration regime, the proportion of awards that cited at least one arbitration award and the proportion of awards that cited only arbitration awards.\footnote{134}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\caption{Percent of “Precedential” Awards Citing Any and Only Arbitral Precedent}
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure3.png}
\end{figure}

As the figure makes clear, the employment awards almost never cited arbitral precedent.\footnote{135} The class arbitration awards, by contrast, were over ten times as likely to do so; 15.5\% of these awards cited to another arbitration award, mostly in connection with questions of contract interpretation and arbitral procedure.\footnote{136} For example, arbitrators sometimes cited past awards on the question of whether the parties’ contract permitted arbitration to proceed as a class action.\footnote{137} Although low as an absolute percentage, the fact that 15.5\%}

\footnotetext[133]{This is hardly surprising. Unreasoned awards are the norm in securities arbitration, and these have virtually no value as precedent. See Amy J. Schmitz, Curing Consumer Warranty Woes Through Regulated Arbitration, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 627, 683–84 (2008) (noting that published awards have potential signaling and informational benefits and can be persuasive in future arbitrations).}

\footnotetext[134]{The proportion of awards citing any arbitral precedent and the proportion citing only arbitral precedent were significantly higher in labor arbitration than in the other two regimes. The proportion of class arbitration awards citing any arbitral precedent was also significantly higher than the proportion of employment awards. ($\chi^2 \geq 11.9, p < 0.001$).}

\footnotetext[135]{On the two occasions where this happened, the arbitrator cited only to arbitration awards. The first award uses conventions typical of labor arbitration, such as referring to the employee as “grievant.” Unlike in labor arbitrations, the award does not mention a collective bargaining agreement, identify a union representative at the arbitration, or otherwise suggest that the workforce was unionized. See 1999 AAA Employment LEXIS 46, at *1–18 (Aug. 9, 1999) (Allen, Arb.). The second award is similar but makes clear there was no collective bargaining agreement. See 2005 AAA Employment LEXIS 6, at *4 (May 3, 2005) (Specht, Arb.). Both cases involved garden-variety contract disputes.}

\footnotetext[136]{See supra Figure 3. For a related finding in the context of international arbitration, see Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 35, at 368–73.}

\footnotetext[137]{This question has been complicated by the Supreme Court’s decision in \textit{Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.}, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). For more discussion regarding the \textit{Stolt-Nielsen} decision, see generally Strong, supra note 50.}
of class arbitration awards cite to other arbitration awards is noteworthy because class arbitration is in its relative infancy. Arbitrators did not begin to publish awards in earnest until 2003, and this limited the supply of potentially relevant past awards. Arguably, then, the class arbitration awards suggest that a fairly robust system of arbitral precedent might evolve in a relatively short time.

The labor arbitration awards offer an idea of what such a system might look like. Although over half of the labor awards cited no precedent at all, as shown in Figure 1, over three-fourths (76.2%) of the remaining awards cited at least one arbitration award and over one-third (35.6%) cited only arbitration awards as precedent, as shown in Figure 3. The labor awards also cited a reasonably large number of arbitration awards—an average of 5.6 per award (SD = 6.3), compared to only 2.6 (SD = 3.1) in the class arbitration awards. Nearly 20% of the labor sample cited 10 or more arbitration awards, and several cited more than 30.

It is clear, then, that arbitrators sometimes treat prior awards as having precedential value. But when are they likely to do so? One hypothesis is that a system of arbitral precedent will arise whenever arbitrators write and publish reasoned awards. Elsewhere, I have expressed reasons to doubt this as a general rule applicable to all

138. To be sure, arbitrators could have looked to other sources. In an employment class action, for example, the arbitrator conceivably might have looked to AAA employment awards for guidance on substantive questions of employment law. This did not happen in the dataset. Most of the class arbitrations, however, involve disputes (such as claims under laws regulating consumer credit transactions) that rarely result in published awards in other arbitration contexts. This means that most potentially relevant awards will come from other class arbitrations. In rare cases outside of class arbitration, arbitrators cited to awards produced in other forms of arbitration. This happened in two of the employment awards, each of which cited awards rendered by labor arbitrators. See supra note 135.

139. Over half of the class arbitration awards, by contrast, cited to only a single past award, and only one cited to more than ten.

types of arbitration, and the evidence discussed above gives further reason to be skeptical. For one thing, the dataset includes ten reasoned securities awards, none of which cite to a prior arbitration award. More telling still, since 2000 the AAA has published thousands of reasoned awards in employment disputes, yet only two of the employment awards in the sample cite to arbitral precedent. In short, although there is an extensive body of published, thoroughly reasoned employment arbitration awards, there is no evidence that AAA arbitrators view these as an important source of precedent.

So under what conditions will arbitration result in a system of precedent? The labor and class arbitration awards suggest that arbitral precedent primarily fills gaps in, rather than displaces, government-created law. Recall that most labor arbitrations involve an employee’s claim that an employer lacked “just cause” for its disciplinary decision under the relevant CBA and that courts rarely consider this type of breach of contract claim. The unions and employers who populate labor arbitration will expect to receive consistent answers to similar questions arising under the same CBA, so they are not likely to be satisfied with ad hoc decision-making. If parties want to support their arguments with relevant precedent, they will of necessity have to look to past arbitrations. The same is true for arbitrators when writing the award.

Likewise, recall that the class arbitration awards mostly cited arbitral precedent when considering questions of contract interpretation and procedure. Most of these citations appeared in the arbitrator’s discussion of whether the parties’ contract permitted arbitration to be conducted on behalf of a class. At least until the Supreme Court’s decision in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., courts rarely addressed this question of

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141. Weidemaier, supra note 7, at 1952.
142. See supra note 89.
143. Weidemaier, supra note 7, at 1930.
144. See supra text accompanying note 136.
145. Not all of this arbitral precedent was especially relevant, and arbitrators often disclaimed reliance on past awards. Nevertheless, the dataset contains 100 awards in which the arbitrator addressed a question of clause construction, and in 92 awards, the arbitrator interpreted the agreement to permit class arbitration.
146. 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). In Stolt-Nielsen, the Supreme Court held that an award construing a charter party to authorize class arbitration should have been vacated, notwithstanding the fact that courts typically defer to arbitrators on such questions of contract interpretation. For further discussion of the case, see generally Rau, supra note 50, and Strong, supra note 50. For a discussion of the implications of Stolt-Nielsen for the timing of judicial review, see Kristen M. Blankley, Did the Arbitrator “Sneeze”?—Do Federal Courts Have
contract interpretation, and, when they did, they afforded substantial deference to the arbitrator’s decision.\textsuperscript{147} As with the labor disputes, then, past arbitration awards were the most relevant available precedent and could be cited without creating a potential conflict with a judge’s decision in a similar case.\textsuperscript{148}

It is worth noting that all of the labor and class arbitration awards in the dataset were issued before \textit{Stolt-Nielsen}. In addition to subjecting the arbitration panel’s award to an unprecedented degree of scrutiny, the \textit{Stolt-Nielsen} Court also criticized the arbitrators for relying on other arbitration awards.\textsuperscript{149} The panel mistakenly proceeded, the Court said, “as if it had the authority of a common-law court to develop what it viewed as the best rule.”\textsuperscript{150} \textit{Stolt-Nielsen} is an odd case, and it is not clear that the Court’s analysis has much relevance outside the unique context of class arbitration. Indeed, perhaps the best understanding of \textit{Stolt-Nielsen} is that it establishes a firm presumption against class arbitration absent clear evidence that the contracting parties intended to authorize that procedure.\textsuperscript{151} Nevertheless, the Court’s “mystifying”\textsuperscript{152} critique of arbitrators who behave like common law judges may cause future arbitrators to discount the precedential value of past arbitration awards.

If the labor and class arbitration awards suggest that arbitral precedent primarily serves a gap-filling role, the employment awards suggest that, under some conditions, it may not even do that. At first glance, it is not surprising that AAA employment arbitrators almost never cite arbitration awards as precedent. Most of these disputes involve claims that courts routinely hear, such as breach of contract, wrongful discharge, and claims alleging violation of anti-discrimination statutes. Perhaps there is no need for arbitral authority in such cases. Courts have produced a substantial body of employment law and continue to produce more of it. These relatively

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[147.] See, e.g., Long John Silver’s Rests., Inc. v. Cole, 514 F.3d 345, 352–53 (4th Cir. 2008).
\item[148.] It is possible, of course, that arbitrators tend to cite arbitral precedent on questions of procedure and contract interpretation because these questions recur across a wide range of substantive disputes, while questions of statutory interpretation, say, do not. Thus, the pattern may be due to the fact that arbitral precedent exists only for questions of procedure or contract interpretation. Nonetheless, the pattern is consistent with a story in which judicial precedent, where it is available, crowds out arbitral precedent.
\item[149.] \textit{Stolt-Nielsen}, 130 S. Ct. at 1768 n.4.
\item[150.] Id. at 1769.
\item[151.] For more on this argument, see Rau, \textit{supra} note 50, at 37–46.
\item[152.] Id. at 31 (calling this “the most mystifying sentence to be found in any opinion ever written by the Supreme Court on the subject of arbitration”).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
thick bodies of law may leave few gaps for a system of arbitral precedent to fill. Indeed, because courts often are skeptical of arbitration in the employment context, citations to arbitration awards might provoke judicial hostility. For example, in other work, I have suggested that, because courts sometimes view arbitration as a means for employers to circumvent important legal rights, arbitrators have incentives to signal their fidelity to the law as articulated by courts. Citations to judicial precedent send that signal; citations to arbitral precedent do not.

Even if all this is true, it is puzzling that arbitral precedent does not play a larger role in the employment disputes. As noted earlier, many of these disputes involve recurring questions of contract interpretation. For example, an employee might assert a breach of contract claim based on a handbook or manual that governs most or all of the workplace. There is an obvious parallel here to labor arbitration. To be sure, employers that do not have to negotiate with a union may unilaterally set the terms of their workplace contracts. But in both contexts, the arbitrator must interpret and apply contract terms that necessarily affect many different employees. In both contexts, moreover, it is likely that all breach of contract claims will be resolved in arbitration, so courts will have few, if any, opportunities to interpret the relevant contract. Yet unlike labor arbitrators, AAA employment arbitrators almost never cite to the large body of extensively reasoned arbitration awards. This is true even though the awards are available on-line in fully searchable format (albeit with party and witness names redacted).

Perhaps there is a straightforward explanation for why arbitral precedent plays such a negligible role. Many potential explanations,
however, only beg the question. For example, it is possible that litigants do not cite past awards in their submissions, and arbitrators simply follow their lead. I do not have access to party submissions, so I cannot test this proposition directly. Even if this is the explanation, the question remains: Why don’t parties look to past arbitration awards to support their arguments? There is no clear answer to this question, but one possibility is that arbitration awards simply are not seen as valid precedent. Put somewhat differently, parties and arbitrators sometimes rely on arbitration awards to fill

available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1884421 (examining the impact of an organizational dispute resolution system on employee perceptions). If so, then even large employers with uniform workplace policies might not routinely appear in arbitration. See, e.g., Colvin, supra note 91, at 75–87 (finding that only 3 of 72 workplace disputes with one manufacturer reached mediation or arbitration); Lewin, supra note 91, at 386 (estimating that 4 to 5% of grievances are resolved in arbitration for employers with formal dispute resolution programs); Sherwyn, Estreicher & Heise, supra note 69, at 1587–88 (reporting that only 5% of claims submitted to one employer’s dispute resolution program reached arbitration).

Because the AAA employment awards redact the name of the employer, I cannot say how frequently particular employers appear in the sample. But given the size of the sample (231), it is plausible to assume that some employers appear more than once. For example, the AAA website provides extensive data on cases filed and lists the name of the non-consumer party in each case. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, Consumer Statistics, http://www.foreclosuremediationfl.adr.org/si.asp?id=6738 (last visited April 6, 2012). Using this dataset, I drew a random sample of 231 cases decided under the AAA’s employment arbitration rules. This random sample included 37 cases in which the non-consumer party also was involved in another dispute in the sample. This is not the same, of course, as drawing a random sample from published awards, but it gives further reason to believe that the sample includes a number of repeat employers.

160. For example, a study of arbitrations administered under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules found that arbitrators sometimes cited Iran-United States Claims Tribunal precedent, but only when one of the parties had previously cited the same precedent. See Gibson & Drahozal, supra note 10, at 543–44.

161. Most of the labor awards summarize the parties’ arguments, and many of the awards list the precedents cited by the parties. By comparing these citations to those in the award itself, past researchers have constructed a rough proxy for the extent to which the arbitrator has conducted independent research. See Cooper, Bognanno & Befort, supra note 36, at 31–32; Greenfield, supra note 36, at 690; Harris, supra note 36, at 28–29. Note that this proxy likely understates the extent to which arbitrators simply cite cases supplied by the parties. See Cooper, Bognanno & Befort, supra note 36, at 32 & n.43. Although I have doubts about its validity, I constructed a similar proxy in a random sample of forty labor awards in which the arbitrator cited some form of arbitral precedent. Based on this subset of awards, it appears that labor arbitrators perform a significant amount of independent research. In just over 20% of the cases, the arbitrator cited only awards that had first been cited by the parties. In more than half the cases, however, the arbitrator cited three or more awards not cited by the parties, and in 13% of the awards the arbitrator cited ten or more awards not cited by the parties. Once again, however, the patterns may simply mean arbitrators do not report every case cited by one of the parties—a possibility that seems especially likely when the parties cite a large number of precedents.
gaps in government-created law, but only when they view the awards as legitimate sources of authority.162

D. An (Imperfect) Comparison to Litigation

Except in the context of securities arbitration, it seems that arbitrators in these regimes behave much like judges. But how do they really compare? To get a better sense of how arbitrators and judges decide similar disputes, I attempted to construct roughly comparable samples of judicial opinions and arbitration awards.163 I began with the subsample of twenty-five awards rendered in AAA statutory employment discrimination cases. I selected employment discrimination disputes for several reasons. First, these disputes appear routinely in both arbitration and litigation. Second, concerns about arbitration are most acute when disputes involve claims arising under mandatory, government-supplied law, especially when the parties are of unequal bargaining power and thus have unequal influence over the arbitration process.164 And third, selecting statutory discrimination cases facilitated a rough comparison with earlier research into how arbitrators resolved claims alleging harassment on the basis of race.165

The comparison sample includes published federal district court opinions after a bench trial or resolving a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or a motion for summary judgment.166 Bench trials are perhaps the closest analog to arbitration, because the judge (like the arbitrator) resolves merits-related factual disputes. But bench trials are rare, and they often occur after the judge already has whittled down the issues in dispute by granting a summary judgment motion or a motion to dismiss with respect to some claims.167 Arbitrators, by contrast, typically reserve most legal

162. See Weidemaier, supra note 7, at 1951–54.
163. Note that I am not trying to determine whether the collective activities of AAA employment arbitrators produce a system of precedent as robust as that produced by the whole of the federal judiciary. I am instead asking whether arbitrators and judges use precedent in comparable ways when making comparable decisions. For further discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 191–95.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 27–29.
165. See Chew, supra note 8, at 207 (asserting “that arbitrators are beginning to sound, think, and act like judges”).
166. I limited the sample to federal rather than state judges because most of the AAA employment disputes involve federal statutory claims and most of these are litigated in federal court.
167. Selection bias, moreover, likely means that bench trials are not representative of trials overall. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1148–61 (1992). A variety of selection mechanisms
questions until the final award on the merits. I also included rulings on summary judgment motions and motions to dismiss, as these motions offer district judges their primary opportunities to make and apply precedent in a way that relates directly to the merits of the dispute.

I ran a Westlaw search designed to identify a pool of relevant opinions, and I randomly selected twenty-five for coding. I coded each opinion in the same way as the arbitration awards, although I did not count citations that related to procedural matters that have no analog in arbitration. In total, the comparison sample includes ten opinions issued after a bench trial, twelve rulings on summary judgment motions, and three rulings on motions to dismiss. These numbers are quite small, but there were no apparent differences in how judges used precedent in the various types of opinion. For that reason, I do not attempt to distinguish them in reporting the results that follow.

The comparison between arbitrators and judges complicates the picture of arbitration developed so far. As we shall see, precedent generally played a lesser role in the arbitration awards than in the judicial opinions, although this does not mean that precedent played

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1. See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, From Court-Surrogate to Regulatory Tool: Re-Framing the Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration, 41 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 843, 847-56 (2008), but parties who have agreed to arbitrate must submit factual disputes to the arbitrator, unless they jointly agree otherwise.


3. I limited my search to cases decided since 1999, when the AAA began publishing its employment discrimination awards. I ran the following search in Westlaw's United States District Courts Reported Cases ("DCTR") database: "discrimin! retaliat! harass! /s rac! sex! gender age disab! & "summary judgment" "bench trial" "motion to dismiss" & da(aft 1999 & bef 2010)." I generated numbers randomly and selected the opinion corresponding to the relevant number for coding.

4. For example, I did not include citations to cases setting out the standard for ruling on a summary judgment motion. Arbitrators have the authority to rule on such motions, see, e.g., Schlessinger v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650, 659-60 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (discussing motions for summary adjudication), and when they do, it is reasonable to assume they will apply standards similar or identical to those applied by judges, if only to avoid vacatur. See, e.g., Prudential Sec., Inc. v. Dalton, 929 F. Supp. 1411, 1417-18 (N.D. Okla. 1996). But it is rare for arbitrators to consider summary judgment motions and none of the awards in the subsample did so.
an insufficient role in arbitration. I first discuss these findings and then explain why they must be interpreted with caution.

1. Arbitration as Judging-Lite?

The core findings of this Section can be summarized succinctly: judges cited more total precedent and more unique precedent than arbitrators, and their citations were more likely to be of the “strong” variety. The implications of these findings, however, are less clear.

In the two small samples, the arbitration awards devoted somewhat more pages to legal analysis—an average of 9.7 pages versus 7.6 for the judicial opinions—but this difference was not significant. With respect to how arbitrators and judges used precedent, however, a somewhat different picture emerged. To begin with, each judicial opinion cited at least one form of precedent, while four arbitration awards cited no precedent at all. Even after excluding these four awards from the analysis, the judicial opinions included a significantly greater number of strong citations (mean (M) = 9.6) than the arbitration awards (M = 5.2). The judicial opinions also included more total citations (M = 33.8, M = 28.4) and more unique citations (M = 24.0; M = 21.6) than the arbitration awards. The differences in the total and unique citations variables were not significant, but they point in the same direction as the strong citations variable.

Note that raw citation counts are sensitive to opinion length. All else equal, longer awards and opinions will cite more precedent even if precedent is no more “important,” in a relative sense, to these decisions. For example, a five-page opinion that includes a total of twenty-five strong citations, all to unique precedents, would be coded exactly the same as a 100-page opinion with the same number and pattern of citations. Yet the two opinions unquestionably differ. One is not necessarily better than the other. The first, for example, might concisely synthesize an important area of law, in the process providing important guidance to future parties and adjudicators. Or it

172. See supra text accompanying notes 191–193.
173. Two-sample t(48) = −1.29, p = 0.207.
174. The strong citations, unique citations, and total citations variables were all positively skewed. To reduce skew, I performed a square root transformation, which adequately reduced skew and resulted in a more normal distribution than log transformation. Using the transformed variables, judicial opinions included significantly more strong citations than arbitration awards (t(44) = 3.36, p < 0.01). Non-transformed means are reported in the discussion.
175. Using transformed variables, see supra note 174, there were no significant differences between judicial opinions and arbitration awards in total citations to precedent (t(32) = 1.46, p = 0.16) or unique citations to precedent (t(30) = 1.1, p = 0.28).
might be larded with unnecessary quotations and woefully short on analysis. What seems clear, however, is that precedent plays a more prominent role—for good or ill—in the first opinion.

To facilitate a more direct comparison, I computed total citations, unique citations, and strong citations per page of legal analysis for each opinion and award.\(^{176}\) As Figure 4 depicts, opinions by federal district judges used significantly more of each type of citation per page than the arbitration awards. The judicial opinions contained an average of 4.6 total citations per page, versus 2.5 for the arbitration awards.\(^{177}\) In addition, the opinions used an average of 3.3 unique citations and 1.4 strong citations, per page, compared to 1.9 unique and 0.5 strong citations for the arbitration awards.\(^{178}\) An additional difference, not depicted in Figure 4, is that strong citations comprised a significantly higher proportion of total citations in the judicial opinions \((M = 0.31, SD = 0.15)\) than in the arbitration awards \((M = 0.21, SD = 0.15)\).\(^{179}\)

\(^{176}\) The coding focused on the legal analysis portion of each opinion and award. This was because citations appearing earlier in the opinion or award very rarely bore any relation to the narrative justification offered for the decision by the judge or arbitrator. In disputes involving a statutory claim, for example, many opinions and awards included a perfunctory reference to the relevant statute in the introductory paragraph. These references, however, did nothing to link the statute to any reason for the decision in the case.

\(^{177}\) For the total citations per page variable, the 95% confidence interval for the judicial opinions was 4.0–5.3 versus 1.8–3.2 for the arbitration awards. Once again, these variables were positively skewed. See supra note 174. Square root transformation adequately reduced the skew and produced a more normal distribution than log transformation. Using the transformed variables, judicial opinions used more total citations per page than arbitration awards \((t(44) = 4.82, p < 0.001)\). Means and confidence intervals are reported in non-transformed data.

\(^{178}\) As noted previously, these variables were transformed using the square root (although non-transformed means are reported in the text). See supra note 177. Using the transformed variables, judicial opinions used more unique citations \((t(44) = 4.03, p < 0.001)\) and strong citations \((t(44) = 5.07, p < 0.001)\) per page than arbitration awards. Using non-transformed data, 95% confidence intervals for the judicial opinions and arbitral awards were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unique Citations per Page</th>
<th>Strong Citations per Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>District Court</td>
<td>2.8–3.9</td>
<td>1.1–1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arbitration</td>
<td>1.3–2.6</td>
<td>0.3–0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{179}\) \(t(44) = 2.23, p = 0.03\). Proportional data was transformed using the arcsine. See David C. Howell, Statistical Methods for Psychology 341 (7th ed. 2010).
In the employment discrimination cases, then, the district court opinions made more extensive use of precedent than the arbitral awards and used a higher proportion of strong citations. These differences were significant notwithstanding the small sample size. If arbitrators in employment discrimination disputes generally cite less precedent—or if this is true of arbitrators generally—what should we make of the difference? As the next Section explains, there is no easy answer.

2. The Difficulty of Comparing Arbitrators to Judges

The initial problem is a fundamental one: process differences between arbitration and litigation make any comparison imperfect at best. As noted above, many events that produce judicial opinions—like motions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and motions in limine to exclude evidence—rarely occur in arbitration. Judges, moreover, rarely bear primary responsibility for resolving merits-related factual disputes. In short, even if judges and arbitrators hear the same kind of cases, it is difficult to find awards and opinions in which they are doing the same kind of work.

Other differences further complicate the comparison. Perhaps the most significant is that arbitrated disputes tend to involve lower financial stakes than cases brought in court. It is reasonable to

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180. See supra text accompanying notes 166–69.
181. Arbitrators and judges probably do not hear the same kind of cases, even when the substantive legal claims are formally identical. For general discussion, see Stephen J. Ware, The Effects of Gilmer: Empirical and Other Approaches to the Study of Employment Arbitration, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 735, 755–57 (2001); Weidemaier, supra note 167, at 847–56.
assume that litigants make greater investments in litigation as the stakes increase. By hypothesis, this means that parties to arbitrations will invest less in legal research and in making legal arguments. To a degree, both arbitrators and judges are dependent on the litigants to identify relevant precedent, and this is especially true of arbitrators. Thus, one might expect arbitrators to use less precedent, or a different kind of precedent, simply because they are presiding over lower-stakes disputes. Let us assume, however, that the differences in these small samples reflect underlying differences in how AAA employment arbitrators and federal district judges behave in comparable cases.

Perhaps not. Consider the strong citation variable, which is a proxy for “quality” citations—i.e., those that reflect meaningful engagement with the cited precedent. It is not surprising that opinions by federal district judges tend to include more strong citations. Unlike arbitrators, these judges may delegate research and writing tasks to law clerks. They also may invest time in opinion writing if they choose and need not ask the parties to pay them for it. Additionally, it is possible that these apparent advantages simply result in opinions crammed with unnecessary or extensive quotations, rather than useful analysis. Law clerks, for example, tend to be recent law school graduates, and perhaps they are more comfortable quoting descriptions of legal rules than stating the rule directly. Unnecessary quotations of this sort permeate some of the judicial opinions in the


One possibility, for example, is that parties and arbitrators will invest little in legal research and will instead rely on old briefs (or awards) to lay out the relevant law. If this is so, we might expect arbitrators to cite precedent that is somewhat older than the precedent cited by judges. See infra text accompanying note 194.

The AAA requires employment arbitrators to be “experienced in the field of employment law.” Am. Arbitration Ass’n, Employment Arbitration Rules & Mediation Procedure R. 12, at 24 (Nov. 1, 2009), available at http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM/ADRSTG_004362&revision=latest released. In practice, AAA arbitrators tend to be lawyers and sometimes former judges, although only one of the arbitrators in the twenty-five award sub-sample was a former state or federal judge. One additional arbitrator had been an administrative law judge for a state employment agency. When arbitrators are not lawyers, it is plausible to assume that precedent plays a smaller role in their awards. See infra note 207 and accompanying text.
sample. They also highlight the fact that the strong citation variable is overinclusive as a proxy for quality citations. Perhaps an adjudicator's efforts to distinguish precedent would make a better proxy for citation quality, for these efforts at least inform litigants and third parties about the criteria by which arbitrators identify relevant precedent. On this variable, there was no difference between the arbitration awards and the judicial opinions.

More broadly, any difference between citation practices in arbitration and litigation may be unimportant in terms of the functions that precedent is supposed to serve. Assume, for example, that citations to precedent facilitate private ordering by signaling that adjudicators will honor past decisions. It is not obvious that this function is materially better served in a system where the average opinion includes 3.3 citations to unique precedents per page, rather than a "mere" 1.9. In other words, even if arbitrators and judges observe different citation practices, it is a separate question whether the collective efforts of arbitrators result in a system of precedent that is materially worse, in functional terms, than the precedent produced by judges.

187. For example:

The Seventh Circuit has defined an adverse employment action as "more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities;" rather, an employee must show that "material harm has resulted from the challenged actions." In other words, "[t]he adverse action must materially alter the terms and conditions of employment." "A materially adverse change might be indicated by a termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices that might be unique to a particular situation."


188. See supra text accompanying note 109.


190. Explicit efforts to distinguish precedent were rare in both systems, although arbitrators distinguished a slightly higher percentage of overall citations than judges (3.2% versus 2.2%). One outlier arbitration award included thirteen citations to precedent that the arbitrator distinguished as inapposite. There was also no difference in the frequency of citations to statutes, formal regulations, or treatises and law reviews.

191. See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Managerial Litigants? The Overlooked Problem of Party Autonomy in Dispute Resolution, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1199, 1202 (2000); see also supra full paragraph p. 1110 (discussing how citations might signal that arbitrators try to reach consistent results).

192. It is tempting to say that arbitration will produce a less robust system of precedent because there is no appellate mechanism to resolve conflicts. See Landes & Posner, supra note 31, at 239. But when arbitration consumers agree on the correct rule, market forces
The evidence presented here does not attempt to answer that question.\textsuperscript{193} At most, it indicates that arbitrators use somewhat less precedent than judges and (perhaps) that they use precedent in slightly different ways. That alone is worthy of further investigation. Moreover, the data hint that arbitration and litigation may differ not only in number and quality of citations but also in the \textit{kinds} of precedent cited. Looking only at citations to judicial opinions, for example, district court judges tended to cite somewhat \textit{newer} cases, although the difference was not significant.\textsuperscript{194}

Without further evidence, however, the evidence provides little reason to believe that arbitration awards are qualitatively different than judicial opinions.\textsuperscript{195} What is undeniable, however, is that arbitrators are private actors who are chiefly accountable to the parties who pay their fees. It is a fair question whether they will \textit{apply} legal rules in the same way as judges, and it is equally fair to wonder why their activities—so like judges in one sense—should be effectively immune from judicial review. I briefly return to this point in the final Part, when I discuss some implications of these findings.

\textsuperscript{193} The question requires that we measure the \textit{effects} of precedent, not the behavior of judges and arbitrators. For example, one benefit of precedent is that it facilitates settlement. If arbitration results in a weaker system of precedent, we might expect settlement rates to drop relative to litigation. Evidence of such a drop might support the (theoretically sound) claim that judges will be better than arbitrators at producing precedent and other social goods. I know of no data allowing a meaningful comparison of settlement rates, but there is some tantalizing evidence that settlement rates are indeed lower in arbitration. \textit{See} Weidemaier, \textit{supra} note 167, at 853. Assuming this is so, there are many potential explanations. The most relevant here is that precedent creates asymmetric stakes in many disputes because precedent is primarily of concern to defendants. \textit{Id.} at 853 n.37. For example, in employment discrimination cases, an adverse precedent arguably imposes greater costs on the defendant, which incurs adverse publicity and is more likely to be a repeat player than the plaintiff or (by hypothesis) the plaintiff's lawyer. If arbitration awards have less value as precedent, this asymmetry would be more pronounced in disputes litigated in court. In that case, some theories would predict both lower settlement rates and higher claimant win-rates in arbitration, and this prediction is consistent with the limited evidence. \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{194} I computed the age of each citation to a judicial opinion and then, for each opinion or award, computed the mean and median age of the cases cited. For judicial opinions, the mean age was 8.8 years and the median age was 6.6. For the arbitration awards, the mean age was 10.6 years and the median age was 8.9 years. These differences were not statistically significant, but this may be a function of the relatively small sample.

\textsuperscript{195} \textit{See} Chew, \textit{supra} note 8, at 207 (concluding from a comparison of judicial opinions and arbitration awards "that arbitrators are beginning to sound, think, and act like judges").
IV. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION

As I have noted, citation practices reveal a good deal about how arbitrators justify their decisions, but less about how they actually make them.196 The absence of citations, for example, does not mean the tribunal ignored precedent in reaching its decision.197 Nonetheless, evidence of citation practices adds important context to debates over how arbitrators make decisions and informs our understanding of how and whether arbitration generates precedent. It bears repeating that other arbitration regimes may differ from those studied here. In the employment context, for example, the AAA has a relatively firm commitment to transparency and abides by due process protocols requiring that arbitrators “should be bound by applicable agreements [and] statutes” and “should be empowered to award whatever relief would be available in court.”198 Employers do not have to choose the AAA to administer their arbitration programs; those that do are opting into a relatively “judicialized” process.199 With this caveat, however, we can draw some tentative conclusions about arbitrator behavior, at least in the regimes studied here.

First, outside of securities disputes, there is little evidence that arbitrators render ad hoc decisions.200 In the three regimes that feature reasoned awards, arbitrators wrote reasonably lengthy decisions that were substantially devoted to legal analysis and that made ample use of precedent.201 Even in the labor sample, where a small majority of awards cited no precedent at all, arbitrators tended
to provide a reasonably lengthy narrative explanation for the result.\textsuperscript{202} To be sure, the awards may not fully describe the actual considerations underlying the decision, but the same is true of judicial opinions.\textsuperscript{203}

Second, except for labor arbitration, the overwhelming majority of awards cite primarily or exclusively to judicial precedent. Thus, all signs indicate that litigants want arbitrators in these regimes to resolve disputes by applying government-created law. I have no doubt that parties can use arbitration to "produce a sophisticated, comprehensive legal system,"\textsuperscript{204} but there is no evidence of that intent in the employment or class arbitration disputes. Again, this does not mean that arbitrators make unbiased decisions. The similarity between arbitration awards and judicial opinions is striking and, perhaps, unsurprising. Arbitration law in the United States may have its roots in the informal procedures employed by merchant communities,\textsuperscript{205} but this form of arbitration has been supplanted in many contexts—including those studied here—by a much more legalized process.\textsuperscript{206} Arbitration regimes often are populated by lawyers, both as party representatives and as arbitrators. Arguments from authority play a significant role in legal discourse, especially in the context of adjudication.\textsuperscript{207} So it may be routine for lawyers trained in common law methods to invoke rules and standards derived from past cases to support their arguments and for arbitrators to do the same to justify their awards.\textsuperscript{208}

\textsuperscript{202} This conclusion is based on the twenty-five-award sub-sample. See supra note 56. In that group of awards, the mean length of analysis was 3.6 pages—not especially long, but also not consistent with the notion that arbitrators produce ad hoc decisions.
\textsuperscript{203} See supra note 70.
\textsuperscript{204} Ware, supra note 20, at 747.
\textsuperscript{205} See Benson, supra note 18, at 481–85 (detailing historical use of arbitration in the United States); Brunet, supra note 5, at 43–45 (same).
\textsuperscript{206} Brunet, supra note 5, at 45–64.
\textsuperscript{207} One might say that what makes a lawyer is the ability to talk like a lawyer, and much lawyer-talk involves the invocation of precedent. Cf. Elizabeth Mertz, The Language of Law School: Learning to “Think Like a Lawyer” 16–30 (2007) (exploring the role of language in law and legal education); John M. Conley, Can You Talk Like a Lawyer and Still Think Like a Human Being? Mertz’s “The Language of Law School,” 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 983, 989 (2009) (“The practice of law is all words.”).
\textsuperscript{208} Only the labor awards clearly indicate whether lawyers appeared on behalf of the parties and whether the arbitrator was a lawyer. Although the subject is beyond the scope of this paper, lawyers exerted surprisingly little influence on the use of precedent in labor arbitration. One would expect, of course, that parties would more often choose to be represented by a lawyer and would more often select a lawyer as arbitrator when they expect their dispute to turn on the application of legal rules. So it seems reasonable to suppose that the presence of lawyers would correlate positively with citations to precedent. However, preliminary analyses revealed no significant increase in the
It remains possible, of course, that widespread arbitration will gradually erode government-created law. If arbitration awards have no value as precedent, but most disputes in a particular area are arbitrated, then the law may ossify.\textsuperscript{209} I close with two observations related to this subject. First, there is reason to believe that arbitrators can produce extensive bodies of precedent, even if they rarely do so now. Second, it is unusual and perhaps unfortunate that there is no meaningful dialogue between judges and arbitrators. Arbitration awards are subject only to limited judicial review, but a less formal dialogue between courts and arbitrators is both possible and potentially beneficial. Such a dialogue does not presently exist, but not because arbitrators do not take judicial opinions seriously. The evidence suggests that they do. Instead, the problem is that judges seemingly do not view arbitration awards even as persuasive authority.\textsuperscript{210}

With respect to the first point, I already have noted that labor arbitrators mostly preside over disputes that do not appear in court. Thus, labor arbitrators do not compete with judges as suppliers of dispute resolution services, and this perhaps explains why they use arbitral precedent so freely. Class arbitration, however, demonstrates that arbitrators view past awards as precedent in a wider array of circumstances, including on procedural and substantive questions that courts rarely address.\textsuperscript{211} The consistent theme, however, is that arbitrators cite other arbitrators primarily when there is no judge-made law to cite—and, as the employment awards indicate, not always then.

But what about when arbitration entirely replaces litigation, as is the case for many securities industry disputes?\textsuperscript{212} In that context, arbitrators cannot look to judicial opinions for guidance—there are no opinions to guide them. While it may not be ideal for arbitrators,
rather than judges, to supply the content of the securities laws, there may be little choice. If securities laws are to evolve under the present system, that evolution will take place in arbitration. As one securities arbitration panel noted in a rare reasoned award:

[W]e must recognize the obvious effect that [federal arbitration law] . . . has had on what would have been the normal case law development of state securities laws by state courts.... [A]lmost no customer/broker cases have been submitted to state courts. Thus, we have no way of knowing how the courts of Washington or California might now rule on the issues before this panel .... [A]rbitration decisions have generally omitted any explanation of the bases for the awards. This leaves the field of broker/dealer liability to customers bereft of persuasive legal precedent.... We hope our willingness to take on this task will encourage future NASD panels to be more forthcoming, so that a body of meaningful precedents, interpreting the securities laws of the various states, may become available, absent the ability of the various state courts to develop their respective state laws.  

The passage is noteworthy because it highlights why reasoned awards alone will not produce a system of precedent. Arbitral precedent is a necessity, the passage implies, but only because courts no longer produce relevant law. Securities disputes are therefore unlike employment disputes, where parties and arbitrators may draw on a relatively thick body of judicial precedent. Likewise, securities arbitration differs from class arbitration; the gaps in securities law more often extend beyond questions of procedure and contract interpretation. For these reasons, the passage implies that arbitral precedent is both more important and less controversial in the securities context.

FINRA, and before it NASD and the NYSE, have been reluctant to require reasoned awards, in all likelihood because these self-regulatory organizations have long been ambivalent about whether arbitrators should decide cases based on legal or equitable principles.  To a degree, that system may have worked—well enough, at least, to persevere through repeated calls for change. But if FINRA were to change its policies, or if change were mandated, a system of arbitral precedent might well emerge.

214. See Brunet & Johnson, supra note 12, at 474–86.
This possibility highlights the need for meaningful dialogue between courts and arbitrators. Federal arbitration law sharply limits judicial review of arbitration awards.\textsuperscript{215} Thus, courts have limited power to grant relief to parties injured by an arbitrator's mistake of law.\textsuperscript{216} This is problematic enough when arbitrators merely apply mandatory laws as interpreted by courts, as in many of the AAA employment disputes. It is more problematic still when arbitrators effectively create that law, as might occur if securities arbitrators begin to produce reasoned awards. In fact, the lack of dialogue is unfortunate even in disputes governed by default rules that parties may alter directly in their contracts, or indirectly through arbitration.

One reason is that arbitrators might have something useful to say on many of the questions courts confront. By definition, arbitrators' decisions are the product of a market for dispute resolution services.\textsuperscript{217} It is reasonable to suppose that successful arbitrators have answered legal questions in ways that market actors find satisfactory.\textsuperscript{218} In contexts where it is appropriate for law to be set by market actors, judges—who are to varying degrees sheltered from the incentives markets provide—might find arbitral awards persuasive sources of authority.\textsuperscript{219} Indeed, even when courts ought to retain final authority to make law, rules or practices that have evolved in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{216} For evidence of vacatur rates, see LeRoy, \textit{Moral Hazard}, supra note 69, at 1041–48; LeRoy, \textit{Misguided Fairness}, supra note 69, at 581–89.
\item \textsuperscript{217} See Rutledge, supra note 14, at 160–65.
\item \textsuperscript{218} See Bruce, supra note 36, at 8.
\item \textsuperscript{219} See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, \textit{What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does)}, 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 4–7 (2003). This is not to say that judges do not respond to similar incentives—such as the desire to please the lawyers who make case filing decisions. The point is only that the incentives are much more concrete and immediate for arbitrators.
\item \textsuperscript{220} For example, rules adopted by arbitrators might be superior majoritarian default rules—i.e., rules designed to mimic the rules parties would choose if they had to make their preference explicit.
\end{itemize}
arbitration might supply helpful context or persuasive reasoning. This would be especially likely when the relevant question relates to the arbitration process itself. For example, judges have occasionally looked to rules established by arbitration institutions to inform their decisions about what constitutes fair arbitration procedure. From there, it is a short step to treating arbitration awards as potentially relevant inputs into the judge’s decision on questions of substantive law.

It might seem problematic for judges to assign any precedential value to arbitration awards. Indeed, when the market is flawed—as may be true in some employment markets and markets for consumer goods and services—arbitrators may be especially likely to answer legal questions in ways that undercut the values the law is designed to promote. This concern underlies most objections to “mandatory” arbitration. But it is precisely in these cases that the dialogue might be most productive. Judges may have limited authority to vacate arbitration awards, but they have ample power to engage with these awards in their own opinions just as they might any other form of non-binding precedent. If a judge considered and rejected a rule announced by an arbitrator, for example, there is every reason to think that arbitrators and litigants would take the hint. Perhaps the most striking implication of the awards studied here is that judicial precedent, when it exists, enjoys unquestioned authority relative to arbitration awards.

Oddly enough, then, a system in which judges viewed arbitration awards as relevant but non-binding precedent—akin to an opinion from a judge in a coordinate court—might temper some of the worst fears about arbitration. Judges would remain limited in their ability to correct mistaken awards, but they could exercise significant control over the content of the law as announced by arbitrators. And in some subset of cases, judges might even find arbitral awards persuasive. Arbitrators seem to apply the law, and they are certainly capable of creating it. Either way, the process demands some meaningful dialogue between arbitration and the courts. After all, judging-lite is still judging.


222. Even when markets are not flawed, arbitrators may have incentives to provide rules that confer private benefits on the parties, and these rules may not be socially optimal. See Landes & Posner, supra note 31, at 239.
### ARBITRATION AS JUDGING-LITE

#### APPENDIX

*Table A-1: Citation Frequencies by Arbitration System*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Some Authority Cited</th>
<th>Percent of Citations of Subset that Cite 1+ Judicial or Arbitral Precedents, by Type of Citation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>48.6%&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>76.2%&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class Arbitration</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>71.8%&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>15.5%&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>66.7%&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1.3%&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Securities</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>1%&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table A-2: Sample Composition, by Year*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Employment</th>
<th>Labor</th>
<th>Securities</th>
<th>Class Arbitration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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*223. Values in a column followed by the same letter are not significantly different from each other at the 5% level of significance. P-values are adjusted by the Bonferroni method.*
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