The Constitutional Law of Presidential Transitions

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This Article investigates whether there are constitutional principles that guide the conduct of the President of the United States during presidential transitions and, if so, how far those obligations extend. We introduce the issue by reviewing the procedures for selecting and inaugurating the President and by canvassing the historical record as to how transitions have previously been accomplished. We then discuss whether constitutional provisions such as the Take Care Clause, the Oath Clause, and the Term Clauses and/or the President’s foreign policy and national security powers confer legal duties on the President with respect to transition. We conclude that presidential transitions impose some constitutional obligations upon the President, but that outside the area of foreign policy, the extent of those obligations is relatively limited. We suggest that the outgoing President must offer sufficient briefings and assistance to assure that the new President is able and prepared to execute her powers from the first day in office. We contend, however, that the outgoing President is under no obligation to implement the new President’s political agenda or to end implementing his own even if the new President may be forced by the outgoing President’s actions to expend her political capital to undo the previous administration’s work. The Constitution does not demand that the outgoing President pave the political way for his successor.
INTRODUCTION

Presidential transition periods are times of uncertainty and contradiction. The outgoing President retains all the formal legal powers of the presidency, yet his last electoral success is four years removed and his political capital is at low ebb.¹ The incoming President, in contrast, enjoys an electoral mandate and enormous political influence but has no formal control over the reins of government.² During transitions, in short, there is no relationship between power, accountability, and electoral support that normally hallmarks the democratic process.³

Presumably, of course, not all is askew. Both Presidents, having achieved the highest level of public service, should be expected to act in the best long-term interests of the United States. And both may be motivated by the image of two prominent leaders burying their differences and acting together in the common good. But beyond this level of generality, the transition agendas of the two Presidents are unlikely to be aligned. For example, even if both Presidents are from the same political party, their goals in the transition period may be widely disparate. The outgoing President will be concerned with

¹ LAURIN L. HENRY, PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITIONS 3 (1960). Indeed, if the incumbent has been defeated in the election, his power is not only at low ebb, but his agenda has been effectively repudiated.

² Meanwhile, members of the outgoing administration tend to view their successors as naïve upstarts, while their successors view their predecessors as trapped in failed policies. CARL M. BRAUER, PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITIONS: EISENHOWER THROUGH REAGAN 15 (1986).

³ Indeed, in circumstances where the transition occurs after the incumbent has been defeated, the relationship between power and democratic support is fully reversed. See Sanford Levinson, Presidential Elections and Constitutional Stupidities, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 183, 184-85 (1995).
preserving his legacy. The incoming President, on the other hand, will be focused on beginning her own initiatives and on establishing a record in the first one hundred days that can set the stage for success throughout the next four years. The dominant agenda for the outgoing President, in short, is shoring up the past; the agenda for the incoming President is embarking on the future.

When the two Presidents are from opposing parties, the conflicts during the transition period will be even more acute. The outgoing President will want to protect his policies or accomplishments from being reversed or undermined, and he may also affirmatively want to create obstacles to prevent his successor from too quickly achieving political and policy success. The incoming President, in turn, may desire to expeditiously reverse the policies of the previous President and may additionally choose to tarnish the record of her predecessor in order to weaken any remaining support for his programs.

Throughout history, presidential transitions have followed no consistent pattern. Some Presidents have worked closely with their predecessors or successors. Some have been markedly less cooperative—for partisan reasons or otherwise. Because no constitutional provision specifically addresses this type of conduct during the transition period, presidential transitions have proceeded ad hoc rather than guided by explicit legal or constitutional principles. The question then arises as to whether there are constitutional constraints that govern Presidents with respect to transition, or whether presidential action in this area is wholly discretionary. Does the outgoing President have a duty to facilitate the transition to a new administration (and, if so, how far does this obligation extend)? Or should the outgoing President continue to exercise power until his last day in office as if there had been no election—that is, in undivided pursuit of his own agenda? Similarly, does the incoming President have residual duties after transition to the old administration once she takes office, or is she free to wholly ignore the actions of the old

4. BRAUER, supra note 2, at 97–98.
5. The first hundred days represents a special opportunity for the President and his new team to seize momentum; during this time, they “have an almost unparalleled opportunity to achieve early program results.” This time represents an interval when the President’s critics are not likely to publicly criticize him, while his allies organize around him with their support. MARTHA JOYNT KUMAR, THE WHITE HOUSE 2001 PROJECT, OPPORTUNITIES AND HAZARDS 4 (1998), available at http://whitehouse2001.org/WHTP ConsultancyReport.PDF.
6. See infra Part I.B.
7. See infra Part I.B.
administration?\textsuperscript{8}

This Article concludes that constitutional principles do indeed guide the conduct of the President and, to a lesser extent, the President-elect during presidential transitions. In our view, the constitutional duties that govern presidential conduct, while narrow, impose substantial and significant obligations on Presidents during the transition between administrations. We rely primarily on the Term, Take Care, and Oath Clauses of the Constitution, and on the President’s broad foreign affairs and protective powers. We therefore reject the position that the “rules” governing presidential transitions are only matters of comity without legal force. Any legal principles to be derived, however, will necessarily be quite general given the fact that the President is vested with substantial discretion with respect to how his obligations are to be fulfilled. Some general principles, however, may be discerned.

The Term Clauses\textsuperscript{9} require that the outgoing President should not act in any manner that threatens peaceful presidential transition and must take all possible steps to assure an orderly transition. The Take Care Clause\textsuperscript{10} requires that the outgoing President help ensure that the new administration is able to execute its powers from its first day in office. The Oath Clause\textsuperscript{11} and the President’s protective powers require that the outgoing President do all that she can to prepare the new President to meet threats to national security. Finally, the President’s foreign affairs powers require that the outgoing and incoming Presidents act in a manner that advances the ability of the United States to conduct foreign affairs.\textsuperscript{12}

This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides the necessary background. It reviews the procedures for selecting and inaugurating the President and introduces the types of issues that arise concerning presidential transition. Part II discusses the legal issues. It first examines whether the Constitution imposes legal duties on the President with respect to transition. Part II then attempts to discern the nature of those obligations. Part III discusses the particular problems raised by presidential transitions and the actions of federal agencies.

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\textsuperscript{8} In this Article, we refer to any obligations the incoming President has to the outgoing administration as transition obligations, although, as a technical matter, the transition is over once the new President takes office.

\textsuperscript{9} See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 1.

\textsuperscript{10} See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.

\textsuperscript{11} See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.

\textsuperscript{12} See infra Part II.B.
I. LEGAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A. Constitutional Transition

The Constitution says little about presidential transitions. Article II sets the term of office at four years.\(^{13}\) Article II\(^{14}\) and the Twelfth Amendment\(^{15}\) set forth how Presidents are to be elected. The Twentieth Amendment\(^{16}\) specifies January 20 as the date for inauguration of the victor, at which time an incumbent who has not been reelected leaves office. The Twenty-Second Amendment provides that no President may be elected for more than two terms.\(^{17}\) The Twenty-Fifth Amendment provides for presidential succession in circumstances when the President leaves office, by death or otherwise, prior to the expiration of his term.\(^{18}\) No provision, however, discusses how the transfer of power is to be achieved.

Nonetheless, presidential transition periods are obviously anticipated by the constitutional structure. The constitutional system for electing and installing the President ensures that the President will serve for a substantial period of time either knowing or facing a strong possibility that his period in office as President will be ending at a specific time in the near future.\(^{19}\) Presidential elections are conducted every four years regardless of circumstance. There is no provision in the U.S. Constitution for early elections and none for elections to be delayed. The legislature or some other body such as the cabinet cannot force early elections to replace an unpopular President. Even if the presidency is vacated during a term due to resignation, death, or impeachment and conviction, or if the President becomes unable to serve for health or other reasons, the election schedule remains unchanged. At the point the presidency is vacated, another designated officer, usually the Vice President, serves out the remainder of the former President’s term or, in the case of an incapacitated President, until the President is able to resume his

14. U.S. CONST. art. II.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XXII.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV.
19. Although the formal transition period exists only from the election to the inauguration of the new President, similar issues regarding the proper use of power arise in circumstances when the President knows he is leaving office even before the actual election, as in the case of the President nearing the end of the second term or an incumbent believing he is likely to be defeated.
duties.\textsuperscript{20} That there will be regular periods of presidential transition is also assured by the fact that the President may be elected only twice and may serve, under normal circumstances, a maximum of ten years.\textsuperscript{21} Further, the President is chosen via a three-step process that, under current procedures,\textsuperscript{22} takes two full months to complete, and the chosen President is not inaugurated until two weeks after that process is completed, about two and one-half months after the election.\textsuperscript{23}

The mechanics of the transition have evolved over time, including significant changes to its statutorily- and constitutionally-mandated structure. The Constitution provides that the President
serves a four-year term.\textsuperscript{24} Because the government under the Constitution began operating on March 4, 1789,\textsuperscript{25} March 4 was established as the date for inaugurating the new President and convening a new Congress every two years.\textsuperscript{26} The Constitution does not specify an election date. This is done by Congress, and in 1792, Congress specified that the election should be held sometime in late October, November, or early December.\textsuperscript{27} In 1845, Congress mandated the nationally uniform date of the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November.\textsuperscript{28} When a new President was elected, this meant that an outgoing President would remain in office for four months after the successor had been chosen. During this four-month period, the President would be a lame duck, but would still have a great deal of government business to handle as President. The length of this period caused significant problems when the outgoing President lacked sufficient power to deal with a crisis or when the outgoing President took actions that were against the will of the electorate as expressed in the November election.\textsuperscript{29} These problems, together with improvements in travel and communications that reduced the time necessary for a new President and Congress to

\textsuperscript{24} U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.


\textsuperscript{26} See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (establishing two years as the term for members of the House of Representatives); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (establishing six years as the term for members of the Senate); see also David P. Currie, \textit{The Constitution in Congress: Substantive Issues in the First Congress, 1789–1791}, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 839 n.386 (1994) (discussing the confusion in early Congresses over the beginnings and endings of legislators' terms).

\textsuperscript{27} See Presidential Succession Act of 1792, 1 Stat. 240 (1792) (repealed 1845) (stating that electors must be chosen “within thirty-four days preceding the first Wednesday in December”).


\textsuperscript{29} President Woodrow Wilson, expecting to lose the 1916 election, lamented the role that he, as a lame duck, would play in foreign affairs:

\begin{quote}
Four months would lapse before [the President-elect] could take charge of the affairs of the government, and during those four months I would be without such moral backing from the nation as would be necessary to steady and control our relations with other governments. I would be known to be the rejected, not the accredited, spokesman of the country; and yet the accredited spokesman would be without legal authority to speak for the nation. The direction of the foreign policy of the government would in effect have been taken out of my hands and yet its new definition would be impossible until [the inauguration].
\end{quote}

prepare to take office, led to constitutional reforms under which the new President is inaugurated on January 20 and the new Congress begins two and one-half weeks earlier, on January 3.\textsuperscript{30}

In addition to adjusting the timing of inaugurations, a second major constitutional change affecting presidential transition was the ratification in 1951 of the Twenty-Second Amendment imposing the two-term limit on presidential service.\textsuperscript{31} The length of the President’s term, including whether there should be term limits, was hotly debated during the Constitutional Convention, with the ultimate decision being a four-year term with no limit on the number of times a President could be reelected.\textsuperscript{32} The issue of term limits was originally tied by the Framers to the issue of presidential selection.\textsuperscript{33} If the power to select the President were given to Congress, then the consensus was that a term limit would be necessary to prevent congressional domination of the government. Congress would dominate under such a structure because the President would cater to Congress’s wishes in order to continue in office. If, on the other hand, the power to select the President were in some other body, such as the states or the people, then no term limit would be necessary because reelection would not threaten the separation of powers. The Framers thought that reelection would ensure that the President would act in the public interest, and they did not perceive any reason to prevent the people from reelecting a successful, popular President.

The issue of presidential term limits arose periodically in Congress, beginning in 1803 with the rejection by Congress of a

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{30} U.S. CONST. amend. XX. A constitutional amendment was necessary to make these changes because they affected the length of the terms of the then-incumbent President and members of Congress, and the length of those terms were constitutionally prescribed. See supra notes 24 and 26.
\item \textsuperscript{31} As noted, the amendment technically is a limit on the number of times an individual may be elected President, not a limit on the length of time an individual may serve as President. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. However, the electability limit has functioned as if it were a limit on service and it makes sense to treat it as such for the purposes of our analysis.
\item \textsuperscript{32} Although the Framers resolved the issue in favor of unlimited presidential service, a tradition limiting Presidents to two terms in office arose early. According to the folklore, Washington believed in a two-term limit to prevent anyone from becoming “President for life” akin to a king. In a draft of his farewell address, Washington mentioned this belief. See GEORGE WASHINGTON, GEORGE WASHINGTON: WRITINGS 941–42 (John Rhodehamel ed., 1997). In the actual address as delivered and published, however, Washington mentioned only personal reasons for stepping aside. See id. at 962–77. Based on Washington's example, and the views of Thomas Jefferson and Jefferson's immediate successors, an informal limit of two terms was observed by every President until 1940 when Franklin Roosevelt ran for and was elected to a third term. See Peabody & Gant, supra note 21, at 578–79 (discussing Jefferson's views on presidential term limits).
\item \textsuperscript{33} Peabody & Gant, supra note 21, at 589–90.
\end{itemize}
proposal to limit Presidents to three terms, only two of which could be successive.\textsuperscript{34} Fears of an entrenched President inspired periodic calls for term limits, with rumblings over the issue arising most strongly when a strong second-term President raised concerns that the President might seek a third term. After Franklin Roosevelt won reelection for a third time (and a fourth term) in 1944, the movement picked up steam, and after his death in 1945, a 1947 congressional coalition between Republicans and Southern Democrats passed the proposed amendment by a sufficient margin to send it to the states for ratification.\textsuperscript{35} Southern Democrat and Republican-dominated state legislatures ratified the Twenty-Second Amendment in short order, and by 1951 the Amendment had been ratified by the required two-thirds of the states.\textsuperscript{36}

In any event, the passage of the Twenty-Second Amendment assures that presidential transitions will occur regularly. There will be a new President at least every eight years, except in the rare instance in which a President dies in office or resigns in the second half of a term and is replaced by the Vice President, who is then elected twice. In such a case, a presidential transition will occur after eight to ten years. In actuality, new Presidents are inaugurated more often than every eight years on average,\textsuperscript{37} and often the new President is of a different political party than the President he replaces.\textsuperscript{38} Presidential transitions, thus, are an important, common, and inevitable element

\textsuperscript{34} Id. at 590.
\textsuperscript{35} Id. at 598.
\textsuperscript{36} See U.S. CONST. amend. XXII; Peabody & Gant, supra note 21, at 599. It is understandable that members of Congress would support a term limit on the President because the limit would tend to weaken the President and thus tend to increase the power of Congress. The fact that Republicans generally favored term limits more than Democrats may have been merely the historical accident that the first President to have violated the tradition was a Democrat whose liberal economic and civil rights policies apparently provoked opposition from the Republicans and Southern Democrats who supported the term limit. See Peabody & Gant, supra note 21, at 585 n.102. This may have been shortsighted on the part of Republicans since the next three Presidents to be elected to second terms were Republicans, although only two of the three, Dwight Eisenhower and Ronald Reagan, served two complete terms. Richard M. Nixon resigned during his second term.

\textsuperscript{37} Since 1948, Presidents have served an average of five and one quarter years. During this period, five Presidents were elected for only one term and five for two terms. President Kennedy, of course, did not complete his first term, and President Nixon did not complete his second term.

\textsuperscript{38} Since 1948, there have been eight presidential transitions that have occurred through the normal electoral process. Seven of those involved a change in political party, the only exception being Reagan to Bush I. The successions of Presidents Johnson and Ford, of course, were intraparty because they occurred through assassination and resignation, respectively.
of the constitutional and governmental structure of the United States.

B. Presidential Transition in Practice

The lack of explicit constitutional provisions regarding presidential transition has left it to Presidents and their successors to develop practices to facilitate orderly and effective transition. This process has evolved over time. Over the years, as society and government have become more complex, planning for presidential transition has become more involved, and now begins significantly before the election.39 Outgoing administrations have also increasingly aided in the handover of power by providing reports on their activities and other assistance during the transition.40

Transition between presidencies involves more than handing over the keys to the White House and taking an oath of office. Significant preparation is required along a number of fronts. First, preparations must be made to make all of the appointments within government that change with the administration. The most important appointments involve the cabinet, the President’s chief of staff, and other high level close advisors, but there are also numerous lower level appointments made at the time of transition.41 This work includes identifying nominees, checking their backgrounds, and doing the necessary legwork to secure Senate confirmation when required. Second, incoming officials must prepare themselves to take office by receiving information and policy briefings. Third, the President-elect must be prepared for office with briefings on the issues likely to require presidential attention. Finally, on what may be viewed as a fourth front, the President and his advisors must devise a political strategy to bring the goals on which they campaigned to fruition.42


40. See HENRY, supra note 1, at 707. See generally BRAUER, supra note 2 (providing a history of presidential transitions).


42. MARTHA JOYNT KUMAR ET AL., THE WHITE HOUSE 2001 PROJECT, MEETING
The President-elect needs the cooperation of the incumbent President and the outgoing administration on at least the second and third fronts. Historically, outgoing officials have held meetings with their successors and some have remained in office for a time after the new President was inaugurated to help with the transition.\(^4\) Presidential candidates have received national security briefings to prepare them in case they are elected.\(^4\) Outgoing Presidents have met with or offered to meet with their successors, and, in a symbol of continuity, have taken part in the inauguration ceremony.\(^4\)

The nature and degree of help provided by the outgoing administration to the new administration has varied over the nation's history and not all outgoing Presidents have been helpful in assisting with transition. President Calvin Coolidge, for example, was reported to be extremely uncooperative in working with his successor, fellow Republican Herbert Hoover. Referring to any purported obligation on his part to help Hoover address the nation's problems before leaving office, Coolidge reportedly stated: "We'll leave that for the Wonder Boy."\(^4\) Moreover, even when cooperation by the outgoing administration has been offered, such "aid" has often been designed more as an attempt by outgoing officials to retain influence in the new administration rather than as an effort to help the incoming administration accomplish its objectives.\(^4\)

Nevertheless, there is some pattern, dating back at least to the 1913 Taft-Wilson transition, of outgoing administrations recognizing

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43. The Wilson-Harding and Hoover-Roosevelt transitions serve as examples. See BRAUER, supra note 2, at 14 ("[O]ffice-leavers invariably want to feel that they have done their best to prepare their successors for their new responsibilities . . . "); HENRY, supra note 1, at 62-63, 285-310.

44. President Harry Truman initiated the tradition of briefing both candidates on matters of foreign affairs during the campaign, although it appears his favoritism toward the candidate of his own party limited the success of the endeavor. See HENRY, supra note 1, at 473.

45. For example, even after the topsy-turvy 2000 election, outgoing President Bill Clinton attended the inauguration of his successor, George W. Bush. See Glenda Holste, Editorial, Small Circles of Power Reduce Influence of Big Money, Restore Integrity, St. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Jan. 21, 2001, at 17A, available at Westlaw, General News Library. On the other hand, President John Adams was criticized for sneaking out of Washington early in the morning of the inauguration of his successor Thomas Jefferson. See DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 564-66 (2001).


47. See HENRY, supra note 1, at 62.
the need to facilitate smooth transitions in order to further the national interest.\textsuperscript{48} This pattern of increased efforts by outgoing administrations to foster smooth transitions began particularly to take hold with the Truman-Eisenhower transition. That transition was the first to occur under the abbreviated transition schedule imposed by the Twentieth Amendment, which moved inauguration day from March 4 to January 20. Perhaps because he was sensitive to the time pressures involved, President Truman was deliberate in his attempts to set precedents for future transitions. Accordingly, he directed a transition that combined all the elements that exist in current presidential transition practice—personal meetings between the President and President-elect, offers and actual assistance on complicated pressing matters, detailed briefings and memoranda across the board, and holdover of sub-cabinet officials to help successors get a firm grasp on the machinery of government.\textsuperscript{49} From the Truman-Eisenhower transition onward, the contacts between the incoming and outgoing administrations would be more regularized.\textsuperscript{50}

As the complexity of the government has increased, presidential transitions have become more and more difficult to manage. Historically, campaign funds and private donations were used to cover transition-related expenses such as office space, clerical help, and travel expenses. Congress relieved the parties of that burden with the Presidential Transition Act of 1963 (the "Act").\textsuperscript{51} Under the Act, Congress provides funds for the President-elect to establish a transition team and to bring potential appointees to Washington for interviews and general vetting. Funding under the Act has increased from approximately $375,000 for Richard M. Nixon in 1968–69\textsuperscript{52} to $5.27 million for George W. Bush in 2000–01.\textsuperscript{53} This funding allows the President-elect to make substantial preparations before taking

\textsuperscript{48} For example, Wilson’s incoming Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, was provided with elaborate memoranda on important matters to his department by his predecessor. \textit{See id.} at 74.

\textsuperscript{49} \textit{See id.} at 478–80. Truman's interest in a smooth transition was not necessarily reciprocated by his successor. According to one historian, while President Eisenhower's transition team was very interested in redecorating the White House offices and making sure there was furniture and space for new staff, the team apparently was not interested in the "operating procedures and substantive business of the White House ... [and] uninterested in discussions with their predecessors." \textit{See id.} at 510–11.

\textsuperscript{50} \textit{See id.} at 692–97.


\textsuperscript{52} \textit{Brauer, supra} note 2, at 131.

\textsuperscript{53} Press Release, U.S. General Services Administration, Presidential Transition Fact Sheet (Nov. 17, 2000), \textit{available at} \url{http://www.gsa.gov/Portal/gsa/ep/contentView.do?contentId=9025&contentType=GSA_BASIC}.\textsuperscript{53}
office, largely in terms of identifying and attracting potential appointees. In addition, the Act was amended in 2000 in order to streamline the appointments process during transition.

The period of time between the election and the inauguration, now six weeks shorter than originally provided for, is still long enough to create problems for the transition. Although the President remains in office until his successor is inaugurated, the President's political power is vastly diminished, especially if the incumbent has lost an election. An outgoing President may lack the political power to take strong action even if all would agree that such action would be in the national interest. In some such situations an outgoing President may seek commitments or assurances of continuity from his successor so he can effectively pursue a policy in the waning days of his administration. For a variety of reasons, an incoming President may be reluctant to make commitments before coming into office. For one, making an agreement with an outgoing President may make the incoming President appear weak just at the moment that the new President’s power should be at its zenith. Additionally, an agreement may strengthen the outgoing President or the outgoing President’s party in anticipation of the next congressional or presidential election. Also, the incoming President may be afraid that he will regret a commitment made without the full information and opportunities for consultation available only upon taking office. Thus, even in a crisis in which immediate and decisive presidential action would be in the national interest, it is unlikely that an incoming President would make an agreement on a course of action with the outgoing President.

The certainty of the deadline and the lengthy period between the

56. See infra note 90 (discussing incoming President Franklin Roosevelt’s failure to assist outgoing President Herbert Hoover resolve a banking crisis).
57. The phenomenon of incoming Presidents not wanting to make commitments dates back to the first time that an incumbent lost a reelection bid. Thomas Jefferson was unwilling to make commitments on pressing issues even when it might have helped ensure that he would be elected by the House of Representatives after the election failed to produce a winner. See MCCULLOUGH, supra note 45, at 561–62. Other examples are Woodrow Wilson’s refusal to make any commitments regarding a crisis in Mexico and Franklin Roosevelt’s refusal to make any commitments regarding the economy, despite Hoover’s repeated efforts. See HENRY, supra note 1, at 292–302.
58. See HENRY, supra note 1, at 292–302 (discussing Roosevelt’s reluctance to assist Hoover in the transition).
election and the inauguration of the new President provide conditions for a great deal of late-term activity by an outgoing administration.  

Late-term actions by the outgoing administration can be beneficial for a new administration if the actions ease the transition or take care of a messy problem before a new administration takes office. There are stories, recounted in Laurin Henry’s study of the transitions of the early twentieth century, of Presidents and Presidents-Elect conferring on inauguration morning while the incumbent President finished up last-minute business, including signing and vetoing legislation.

At other times, however, last minute actions by the outgoing administration can raise serious problems for a new administration. One classic example of this is President Adams’s last minute appointment of judges before the beginning of the Jefferson presidency. More recently, outgoing administrations have engaged in significant regulatory action late in the term. Some late-term actions are simply the result of the human tendency to work to deadline, while others may be designed, at least in part, to create political obstacles for the incoming administration. In recent decades, in particular, there has been a pattern to presidential transition when the incoming President is of a different political party from the outgoing President. The output of the outgoing administration, including presidential and agency action of various types, tends to


60. See HENRY, supra note 1, at 70-72, 197-98, 355. This occurrence was more likely before the transition between Congresses and the inauguration were moved to January. Under prior practice, a lame-duck session of Congress began in December of the election year after a new Congress had already been elected. That Congress would send bills, often including a budget, to the lame-duck President right up to inauguration day. The outgoing President would be signing and vetoing bills on inauguration day with his successor in the room. Under current practice it is unlikely, but not impossible, for the new Congress, installed on January 3, to have already sent any bills to the President by the inauguration day of January 20.


increase substantially, especially when the outgoing administration is of the Democratic Party and the incoming President is a Republican.\textsuperscript{63} In response, incoming Presidents have found it necessary to react by reexamining the late-term regulatory output of the prior administration, sometimes during a freeze issued by the new administration on the implementation of rules issued at the very end of the prior President's term.\textsuperscript{64}

The historical record, in short, is mixed. At times, outgoing administrations are particularly helpful in facilitating transition.\textsuperscript{65} At times, they place obstacles in front of their successors. At times, they may be helpful in some aspects of transition and obstructionist in others.

C. The Increasing Stakes and Internal Conflicts in Presidential Transition

The lack of a consistent pattern in presidential transitions should not be surprising. As noted previously, both incoming and outgoing Presidents face competing pressures during the transition period. On the one hand, there is the motivation to cooperate as fully as possible with the other administration. On the other, there are the demands not to sacrifice one's own political agenda and/or unduly promote a competing political program. These differing approaches may be termed, at the risk of oversimplification, the "good government" and the "good politics" models of presidential transition. What is

\textsuperscript{63} The increase in administrative output and other aspects of presidential transitions are described in detail by Beermann, \textit{id.} at 953-60. See also Cochran, \textit{supra} note 59, at 3 n.6 (describing increase in regulatory output when Democrats Carter and Clinton were replaced by Republicans Reagan and Bush, respectively). Although Cochran reports increases at the end of every term, the biggest increases occurred in the Carter-Reagan and Clinton-Bush transitions, both involving outgoing Democrats and incoming Republicans. \textit{See id.}

\textsuperscript{64} In response to the last-minute rulemaking of the Clinton administration, President George W. Bush ordered his Chief of Staff to issue a "memorandum directing agencies to delay the effective dates of recently published rules, not to issue any new regulations, and to withdraw finalized but not yet published regulations from the Federal Register." Beermann, \textit{supra} note 62, at 949.

\textsuperscript{65} Another relatively minor aspect of the transition is that outgoing Presidents and their spouses, which until now have always been "first ladies," have traditionally helped the incoming President with the household aspects of becoming President. Incoming first ladies have been invited into the White House to survey the premises and meet the household staff. Outgoing Presidents have made room for the incoming first family's belongings to be moved into the White House in advance of the inauguration. Some of these household arrangements are related to the performance of the President, as the White House is the site of numerous official functions, and the transition can be helped by a smooth handover of the household details of the presidency.
interesting is that the urgencies underlying both of these competing forces have dramatically increased in recent decades.

For a number of reasons, there is now a greater need than any time in our nation's history for incoming and outgoing administrations to work cooperatively during transition periods. To begin with, government is more complex and an incoming administration faces an inestimable learning curve in assuming office and digesting the mounds of information necessary to be able to understand the powers at its disposal and govern effectively. Accordingly, a new administration cannot learn all it needs to know in its first day of office. The new administration must engage in substantial preparation before assuming office and in so doing will be highly dependant on the old administration to prioritize the information to be learned and to direct members of the new administration to appropriate sources.

Second, as societal problems also become more complex there is a corresponding need for the governing administration to have access to the material, ideas, and data to address important issues. Again, in order to effectively govern, the new administration must have access to such materials before its first days in office.

Third, national security and foreign policy concerns demand enhanced cooperation and communication between the two administrations. As the world becomes more dangerous and the risks of harm more immediate, the need for effective and seamless transitions becomes correspondingly greater. Terrorists and nations engaged in conflict with the United States could exploit a flawed transition period when an adequate response to hostile action may be less likely. Thus, in this area particularly, the need for outgoing and incoming Presidents to work together is no longer an option but is an

66. "'The early months are so important,' observed David Gergen, a senior official in four White Houses. 'Because that's when you have the most authority, but that's also when you have the least capacity for making the right decisions.'" KUMAR, supra note 5, at 2.

67. As the Supreme Court stated in another context, "An incumbent President should not be dependent on happenstance or the whim of a prior President when he seeks access to records of past decisions that define or channel current governmental obligations." Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 452 (1977).


unavoidable demand of the contemporary world. The need for presidential transitions to proceed in accord with the good government model is therefore manifest.

But social and government complexity and national security and foreign policy dangers are not all that has changed. National politics as well have undergone transformation. We have entered, in the words of one writer, the era of the permanent campaign in which all government action is undertaken with an eye to its electoral effect. Accordingly, presidential power is exercised not only in the service of government but also in the service of the next legislative battle, the next election, and even the next news cycle. For the outgoing President or incoming President to choose not to work with the other (particularly when they are from different political parties) might then be seen as politically necessary. After all, neither side wants to help political opponents further their political agenda. Moreover, even if motivated by good government concerns, neither side wants to risk that what the other will learn in the transition process will be used to tarnish or damage their own political aims or reputation. Good deeds in Washington seldom go unpunished. The “good politics” motivation in presidential transition, in short, is also in ascendance.

It might be tempting to suggest that during transition both incoming and outgoing Presidents should adopt the good government as opposed to the good politics mode of action. But there is no clear line between the good government and good politics models. In the era of the permanent campaign, the act of governing cannot be separated from the act of campaigning. Indeed, most actors we suspect would perceive themselves as pursuing both. If the outgoing President believes, for example, that the announced goal of the incoming administration to reform social security or health care is a fool’s enterprise that would cause long-term damage to the nation, then he might legitimately believe that he should do all that is in his power to frustrate that effort. In these circumstances, placing obstacles before the new administration may be both good government and good politics. The question is whether there are

70. See Sidney Blumenthal, The Permanent Campaign 23–26 (Simon & Schuster 1982) (1980) (explaining that with the decline of political parties, the permanent campaign has become necessary to generate and sustain political support); see also Joe Klein, The Perils of the Permanent Campaign, TIME, Nov. 7, 2005, at 44 (noting the pressure of the permanent campaign in winning the focus of the daily news cycle).

71. See Klein, supra note 70, at 44, 47 (arguing that the Bush administration uses its power for political purposes).
constitutional obligations that should govern his judgment, and it is to this issue we now turn.

II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION

There are no cases addressing presidential duties and obligations with respect to transition, and even if a legal dispute developed, it is likely that a court would find it nonjusticiable. Moreover, it might also be argued that any transition obligations are at best products of comity and historical practice rather than true legal duties. After all, presidential transitions have taken place from the beginning without legal rules being articulated and with both incoming and outgoing Presidents apparently assuming they could do as they wished. Finally, it might be contended that the President’s discretion as to how (and whether) to execute her powers with regard to transition is so broad that no meaningful constraints can be discerned with respect to how the President must act.

That said, the position that the Constitution imposes duties on Presidents with respect to transitions is substantial and significant. While our arguments are legal, it is important to note at the outset that establishing that the outgoing President is constitutionally obligated to provide transition assistance may serve as an effective counterweight to the pressures of the permanent campaign and the excessive partisanship that currently dominate presidential politics.

72. The transition period is so short that the issue might be moot by the time it is ready for legal resolution. Courts, moreover, have been reluctant to review actions committed to executive branch discretion. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (stating that an agency’s decision whether or not to take enforcement action is generally not reviewable). The fact that an issue may be nonjusticiable, of course, does not mean that it does not give rise to a determinable constitutional question. It only means that the courts are not the arbiters of the constitutional issue. As Dawn Johnsen notes, “[t]he President’s obligation faithfully to execute the laws is not contingent on the availability of judicial review as a check on presidential excess. Indeed, the President should act with particular care when a controversial assertion of authority may be nonjusticiable.” Dawn E. Johnsen, The Constitution Under Clinton: A Critical Assessment: Presidential Non-Enforcement of Constitutionally Objectionable Statutes, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 26 (2000); see also Christopher N. May, Presidential Defiance of ‘Unconstitutional’ Laws: Reviving the Royal Prerogative, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 865, 992–96 (1994) (arguing that when a President refuses to execute a law based on a claim of unconstitutionality, she should do everything possible to ensure that the question is subjected to judicial review).

73. Despite the lack of clear standards, the transition behavior of individual actors has been seriously criticized. John Adams, for example, was seriously criticized both for his last-minute judicial appointments and for leaving Washington, D.C. before his successor, Thomas Jefferson, was inaugurated. See supra note 45.
Second, and more importantly, the conclusion that the President has duties and obligations with respect to transition is soundly based in constitutional law. Indeed, support for this proposition may be found in constitutional text, in the President’s implied powers, and, arguably, in general principles of representative government. We shall discuss each of these arguments in turn.

A. Constitutional Text

Four textual provisions arguably impose transition duties on the outgoing President—the Term Clauses, the Take Care Clause, and the Oath Clause. As will be discussed, the obligations imposed by the Term Clauses and the Oath Clause, although critically important, are relatively limited. The President’s Take Care Clause responsibilities, on the other hand, are potentially broader but less clearly defined.

1. The Term Clauses

The simplest argument that the Constitution imposes at least some minimal obligations on a President with respect to transition stems from the Term Clauses of Article I and the Twentieth Amendment. The Term Clauses set the presidential term at four years (unless the President is reelected) with the term ending at noon on January 20 of the year following the November election. The Term Clauses therefore demand that the President vacate the office at the end of that period and, as such, stand for the proposition that not all of the President’s behavior related to transition is fully discretionary. He is bound by at least one concrete constraint.

The obligation of the outgoing President to vacate the office and relinquish all official powers at the end of the term may seem so obvious that it is not worth stating, but history and current events are full of examples of rulers who have illegitimately held on to power after their terms were supposed to have ended. Moreover, even though the history of peaceful transitions in the United States

74. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1 ("He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years . . ."); U.S. Const. amend. XX, § 1 ("The terms of the President and Vice President shall end at noon on the 20th day of January . . .").

75. The obligation to leave office could be seen as derived from Article II, Section 1 limiting the presidential term to four years; the Twentieth Amendment, which provides that the term ends at noon on January 20; and/or the Take Care Clause, Article II, Section 3, which would impose upon the President the duty to assure that compliance with the four-year term.

76. To be sure, not even this argument is fail-safe. It might be contended that the duty to vacate the office arises after the President is no longer President and therefore does not interfere with absolute presidential discretion.
suggests that no President would likely attempt holdover only in order to retain power, there are circumstances in which a President might be tempted to hold on to power on an interim basis because of a national crisis or other such event. Consider, for example, the situation facing the outgoing President if the incoming President and Vice President are killed prior to assuming office, or if the election results are not finalized and remain in dispute after inauguration day. In both circumstances, legitimate concerns of government stability might lead an incumbent President (perhaps with both strong popular and congressional support) to believe he should guide the country through the period of uncertainty. Even so, we submit, the President must leave office. The language of the clauses is absolute: the term lasts four years and ends at noon on January 20, whether or not a new President has been inaugurated. Moreover, not only is the language of the clauses unconditional, but the policies underlying

77. Although it does not involve the President, there were reports that New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani considered staying on as mayor after his term expired in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. See, e.g., Jennifer Steinhauer & Michael Cooper, Giuliani Explores a Term Extension of 2 or 3 Months, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2001, at A1.

78. President Roosevelt, for example, relied on the concern for government stability in a time of crisis when he decided to run for a third term. See Rexford G. Tugwell, The Democratic Roosevelt: A Biography of Franklin D. Roosevelt 534 (1957). The question arises as to whether Franklin Roosevelt should be deemed to have violated his duty to leave office when he stood for reelection a second time, contrary to the longstanding tradition that the President should serve two terms only. On the one hand, the tradition against seeking a third term had been established since Washington and had become deeply rooted in the constitutional culture. Thus, it might be argued that by ignoring this deeply-rooted tradition, Roosevelt violated his legal obligations. Cf. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-28 (1992) (discussing the role of "constitutional culture" in interpreting takings cases). On the other hand, pro-term limits forces were never able to muster enough support to pass a constitutional amendment until after Roosevelt's second re-election, thus indicating the "tradition" may not have evolved into a set requirement. The better argument, then, is that even if Roosevelt acted in contradiction to non-legal norms, he had no legal duty to refrain from running for a third term.

79. The Constitution grants Congress the power to appoint the President in circumstances where neither a President-elect nor Vice President-elect have qualified for office. See U.S. Const. amend. XX, § 3 ("Congress may by law provide for the case wherein neither a President elect nor a Vice President elect shall have qualified, declaring who shall then act as President, or the manner in which one who is to act shall be selected, and such person shall act accordingly until a President or Vice President shall have qualified."). Whether Congress could appoint an outgoing President to continue in office in such circumstances is not immediately clear. While the Twentieth Amendment itself does not explicitly exclude the outgoing President from congressional consideration, such an appointment could still be deemed to be inconsistent with the text and the policies of the Term Clause. In any event, the Twentieth Amendment clearly does not grant to the President herself the authority to choose to remain in office even if the incoming President and Vice President are not able to assume office.
the provisions are equally uncompromising. Transition in time of crisis and uncertainty may be risky, but the risk of abuse of power by an incumbent government is, in the long run, even greater.

Second, the Term Clauses (in possible conjunction with the Take Care Clause)\textsuperscript{80} demand that the President must do all that is possible to assure that elections take place. As recent history suggests, one could imagine a strong argument for postponing a national election in a time of crisis. In fact, in 2004, there were published reports that the Bush administration was considering its available options in case terrorism threatened the viability or safety of the November elections.\textsuperscript{81} In our view, unless it is physically impossible to conduct the election, it would be inconsistent with the nation’s traditions and history, in which elections have been held during the gravest of crises, for a President to continue in office beyond the constitutionally mandated term.\textsuperscript{82} The incumbent President has a duty to do everything possible to ensure that an election is conducted, and the presidential term completed, according to its constitutionally and statutorily mandated schedule.

At the same time, it is difficult to read the Term Clauses as setting any more than such basic duties on the President. They imply nothing, for example, about assuring that the President’s successor is adequately prepared to take office, and they provide no direction about whether the President is free to pursue his own political agenda during the transition period or whether he must be more solicitous of his successor’s agenda.

2. The Oath Clause

Another textual basis from which to infer transition duties derives from the Oath Clause. The Oath Clause requires that before entering office, a President will “solemnly swear (or affirm) that [she] will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States,

\textsuperscript{80} See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{81} See Michael Isikoff, Exclusive: Election Day Worries, NEWSWEEK, July 19, 2004, at 8; see also Can Terrorists Postpone Election?, USA TODAY (Mag.), Sept. 1, 2004, at 9 (discussing whether presidential elections could be postponed in the event of a terrorist attack).
\textsuperscript{82} President Lincoln, for example, insisted in the midst of the Civil War that the election of 1864 go forward on schedule. “We cannot,” he declared, “have free government without elections; and if the rebellion could force us to forego, or postpone a national election, it might fairly claim to have already conquered and ruined us.” Jill Elaine Hasday, Comment, Civil War as Paradigm: Reestablishing the Rule of Law at the End of the Cold War, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 129, 134 (1996) (quoting Abraham Lincoln, Response to a Serenade (Nov. 10, 1864), in 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 101 (Roy P. Basler et al. eds., 1953)).
and will to the best of [her] Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States."83

That the Oath Clause imposes important duties on the President is not controversial.84 As one commentator suggests, the duty of the President to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States may, in fact, be the President's "first duty."85 Indeed the importance of the President's duty to "preserve, protect and defend," has been seen as so central to his role that the language has been interpreted as a source of presidential power as well as obligation.86 Coined the President's "protective" power, the duty has been interpreted as investing the President with broad and expansive authority to take actions necessary to protect the property and personnel of the United States from attack or other dangers.87 In any event, few would disagree that if the President did not act to protect the nation from danger, he would be in violation of his Oath Clause obligations.

It is also readily apparent that the President's protective duties should also govern his actions with respect to transition. The language itself that the President must "preserve" as well as protect and defend the Constitution explicitly directs that the President take actions with an eye to the future. His responsibilities are not limited to his own term of office. Failure to alert and cooperate with the incoming President with respect to imminent dangers facing the nation directly exposes the country to substantial risk. The new administration cannot be expected to sift though complex information, much of it classified and much of it conflicting, regarding potential dangers to the United States only upon taking office and still be able to craft effective responses. Reliance on the advice and direction of the previous administration is absolutely necessary to protect the United States. An outgoing President's refusal to provide that information and warn his successor as to potential dangers contradicts his protective duties. Accordingly, the outgoing

83. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
85. Paulsen, supra note 84, at 1263.
86. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 82 (1890) (Lamar, J., dissenting); see also Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 82 (1861) (stating that the duty to "preserve, protect and defend" the Constitution "implies the power to perform what he is required in so solemn a manner to undertake").
President's decisions whether or not to brief his successor on domestic or international threats to national security are not optional. "To preserve, protect and defend" means cooperating to the fullest degree to protect the United States against impending danger. 88

At the same time, the duties imposed by this provision, although critically important to the national interest, are limited in substantive scope. Refusal to allow the new administration access to government briefings on most domestic matters, for example, while harming the ability of the new President to make informed choices, would not likely threaten the Republic's survival. The "preserve, protect and defend" language, in short, imposes special duties in transition only with respect to matters of national security, broadly understood as those matters that threaten national survival.

A transition duty broader than one pursuant to the President's protective obligations might be inferred by the oath's requirement that the President "faithfully execute the Office of the President." Consider the following hypothetical. Assume that the outgoing President refuses to provide, and prohibits all members of his administration from providing, any and all advice and assistance with respect to transition. 89 This means, for example, that he refuses to allow the new President access to critical information on national security and foreign policy matters, that he refuses to allow members of his administration to brief incoming personnel on any issues whatsoever, and that he does not allow representatives of the new administration access to the White House in order to prepare for even the most basic elements of transition—the allocation of office space and the setup of a basic communications infrastructure. Whether such action would violate the oath to faithfully execute the office depends on whether "executing" an office includes preparing a new occupant of that office for transition. Although the answer is certainly debatable (executing an office may or may not necessarily mean preparing that office for transition), we believe that the better argument is that when the Oath Clause is read as a whole, it imposes transition obligations. That the Oath Clause references a duty to the office itself suggests that the incumbent's responsibilities extend

88. Given the timing, the generality of the duties involved, and their political nature, no legal remedy may exist for transgressions of these duties. Potential reputational loss and political consequences for the President's party provide some incentive to carry out transition-related duties, even in the absence of a legal remedy.

89. We will assume, however, in order to avoid any statutory non-enforcement issues, that the President does not prohibit the General Services Administration from funding the incoming transition team or from preparing the necessary material under the Presidential Transition Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-293, 114 Stat. 1035 (2000).
beyond his own tenure, and the most obvious direction for that responsibility to be exercised is towards the next President.

We do not contend, however, that the outgoing President’s transition duties under the Oath Clause go beyond those found in the Take Care Clause, which are addressed below. There is nothing in the language of the Oath Clause that suggests that the outgoing President must abandon his own agenda at the end of his term or that he must facilitate the new agenda of his successor, but he should not act in a way that disables or obstructs the new President, even for a brief period at the beginning of the term, from “tak[ing] Care that the Laws [are] faithfully executed.”

3. The Take Care Clause

The Take Care Clause, Article II, Section 3, provides that the President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” The language is notable. In contrast to Article I, Section 8, which provides that Congress “shall have Power” to engage in certain actions, the Take Care Clause explicitly imposes a duty on the

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90. Although this Article is primarily concerned with the transition duties of outgoing administrations, the question might also be raised as to whether the Take Care and Oath Clauses should be read to impose duties on the President-elect even before she assumes office. Franklin Roosevelt, for example, was seriously criticized in this respect for refusing to assist President Hoover during the transition period with respect to the bank solvency crisis that had enveloped the nation. During the transition, as depression-era bank failures accelerated, the governor of Michigan declared a “bank holiday” during which the banks were closed. This led to widespread panic and more bank failures as depositors rushed to withdraw their money. President Hoover, as a lame duck, did not feel he had the political power to take decisive action without agreement from the President-elect and repeatedly attempted to convince Roosevelt to agree to action such as declaring a national banking holiday. Roosevelt, however, refused to take action and the situation continued to deteriorate. See Henry, supra note 1, at 343–55. Arguably, Roosevelt’s decision not to assist Hoover harmed the nation’s long-term interests. Even so, however, we suggest that he or any other President-elect does not have any obligation to take action during transition. Certainly, the text does not support imposing obligations. After all, before inauguration the President-elect has no power to execute the laws and she has not yet taken the oath of office. There are pragmatic concerns, as well, that militate against imposing constitutional obligations. First, imposing a duty to act on the part of an incoming administration might actively harm the functions of government by leading to duplicative or potentially inconsistent action by the incoming President in relation to the incumbent administration. Second, even if the incumbent were willing to step aside, the incoming administration may not have the preparation, knowledge, or ability to take all necessary steps to resolve a serious problem. Thus, while action on the part of an incoming administration may be desirable, especially if taken in cooperation with the incumbent, we do not find a constitutional duty to act until the President actually takes office.

91. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
President. The Congress that chooses not to legislate does not violate its constitutional obligations; Congress may choose to exercise power or not, as it sees fit. The Take Care Clause, on the other hand, provides the President with no such option; she shall take care that the laws are faithfully executed.

Not surprisingly then, the Take Care Clause has been construed as imposing affirmative obligations on the President. These include requiring her to expend appropriated funds,\footnote{Train v. New York, 420 U.S. 35, 41 (1975); Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 613 (1838).} enforce statutes,\footnote{Kendall, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 613.} and implement Supreme Court decisions.\footnote{See The Attorney General's Duty to Defend and Enforce Constitutionally Objectionable Legislation, 4A Op. Off. Legal Counsel 55, 55 (1980); Arthur S. Miller, The President and Faithful Execution of the Laws, 40 VAND. L. REV. 389, 400, 402 (1987) (contending that the President's Take Care powers include the obligation to enforce Supreme Court decisions).} To be sure, not all of this is uncontroversial and none of it is absolute. The extent that the Take Care Clause imposes enforceable duties on the President, for example, has been hotly debated.\footnote{The literature on presidential refusal to enforce statutes that are potentially constitutionally objectionable is particularly rich. \textit{See} Miller, supra note 95, at 395–99; Peter L. Strauss, The President and Choices Not to Enforce, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 108 (2000). \textit{See generally} Johnsen, supra note 72 (considering the legitimacy of "presidential nonenforcement").} And there is substantial agreement that whatever the obligations the Take Care Clause imposes, the President has significant discretion as to how to carry them out.\footnote{Cf. Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 62 (1994) (characterizing the Take Care clause as one of "a laundry list of other discretionary presidential duties").}

The question is how does this understanding apply to presidential transitions? In some instances, the application of the Take Care provision may be clear. A President, for example, who refuses to take any action to assure that necessary pre-transition activities such as elections occur according to constitutional mandate may violate his Take Care obligations.\footnote{Cf. Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 62 (1994) (characterizing the Take Care clause as one of "a laundry list of other discretionary presidential duties").} He may also violate his Take Care obligations if he refuses to allow appropriated funds to go to the incoming administration's transition team as provided by statute.\footnote{\textit{See supra} notes 80–81 and accompanying text.}

But whether this responsibility goes beyond enforcing any specific constitutional provisions\footnote{See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text.} presents a more difficult question.

96. The literature on presidential refusal to enforce statutes that are potentially constitutionally objectionable is particularly rich. See Miller, supra note 95, at 395–99; Peter L. Strauss, The President and Choices Not to Enforce, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 108 (2000). See generally Johnsen, supra note 72 (considering the legitimacy of "presidential nonenforcement").
97. Cf. Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 62 (1994) (characterizing the Take Care clause as one of "a laundry list of other discretionary presidential duties").
98. See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text.
99. Cf. Zywicki, supra note 68, at 1575 (describing the General Services Administration's refusal to authorize transition assistance in 2000, until the election controversy was resolved).
100. It is not controversial that the mandate of the Take Care Clause that the President
In order to address this point, consider again the hypothetical of a President ordering his administration not to work with representatives of the incoming presidency. Undoubtedly, if the President were to take such an action it could seriously impair the ability of the new administration to begin its term effectively. It might also threaten the foreign policy and national security interests of the United States.

The argument that the outgoing President's refusal to assist transition violates the President's duties under the Take Care Clause is relatively straightforward. If the President has not provided his successor with the means to execute the laws, he has not taken care that the laws will be faithfully executed.

Nevertheless, the contention that failing to assist one's successor violates the Take Care Clause must meet a number of initial objections. The first is temporal. How can a President be held responsible for failing to take care that the laws are faithfully executed during a time period when he is no longer in office?

The second is more structural. Unlike the cases that address failure to spend appropriated funds or enforce specific laws, the failure to assist in transition does not raise separation of powers concerns. The claim that the President is acting unconstitutionally when she refuses to spend funds, for example, is buttressed in large part by the argument that her proper recourse is to veto the bill authorizing the expenditure.\textsuperscript{101} Refusing to spend funds is therefore an end-run around the veto requirement. No such problem arises when the President simply refuses to assist with transition. She is not, by that action, undercutting the authority of another branch of government. Instead she is merely refusing to act within the bounds of her constitutional authority.

The third is historical. The argument that the President does not violate the Constitution when he refuses to take a set of actions may also be supported by constitutional history. The framers explicitly considered and rejected a provision that would make the President impeachable for maladministration.\textsuperscript{102} This history might be read as supporting the proposition that maladministration alone, of which failure to assist with transition is surely a part, does not rise to the

execute the laws also means that he must appropriately execute the Constitution. The term "laws" in the Take Care Clause "necessarily includes the Constitution." Strauss, \textit{supra} note 96, at 108.

\textsuperscript{101} Laurence H. Tribe, \textit{American Constitutional Law} 732 (3d ed. 1999).

None of these arguments, however, are persuasive. First, the answer to the temporal argument that the outgoing President has no obligation to assure that the laws are faithfully executed during the next President’s term may be found in the nature of the Take Care Clause itself. The language of the clause is supervisory. The clause does not demand that the President enforce the laws herself.\textsuperscript{103} Rather it requires that she take measures to assure that the laws are effectively enforced.\textsuperscript{104} A new administration that assumes office without the benefits of briefing or other critical transition assistance will, at least for some period, be unable to perform its enforcement duties appropriately because it will lack the requisite knowledge to make informed choices. The outgoing President, who, by refusing transition assistance, causes the new administration’s disability, therefore has not taken care that the laws will be faithfully executed.

Likewise, the second, structural argument is incomplete. The constitutionality of presidential action need not be determined by whether it intrudes on another branch’s prerogatives. A President who takes office without taking the oath of office, for example, has explicitly violated a constitutional command even if her action does not threaten separation of powers.\textsuperscript{105} Similarly, a President who fails to appoint any Executive Branch officers has also violated her constitutional duties,\textsuperscript{106} even though such inaction does not undercut the powers of the other two branches.

Finally, the historical maladministration argument is also not persuasive. Deliberately failing to facilitate transition can be considered as more than maladministration but rather as a willful abdication of duty. As such, it would violate enacted constitutional provisions such as the Take Care Clause and not merely constitutional proposals that would have proscribed unintentional incompetency.

The Take Care Clause, then, fairly read, imposes the obligation on the outgoing President to assist in preparing his successor for office. As we see it, an outgoing President who orders his administration to abstain from helping the incoming President would be acting unconstitutionally.

We do not read the Take Care Clause, however, as requiring the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{103} See Lessig \& Sunstein, \textit{supra} note 97, at 61–62.
  \item \textsuperscript{104} See Strauss, \textit{supra} note 96, at 108.
  \item \textsuperscript{105} U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
  \item \textsuperscript{106} U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
\end{itemize}
outgoing President to facilitate the ability of the incoming President to effectuate changes in current policy. This conclusion also derives from constitutional text. The constitutional provision speaks only of the responsibility to faithfully execute the laws—not to work to change the laws that already exist. We therefore believe that the better reading of the Take Care Clause is that it requires the outgoing President to prepare the new President to be able to immediately execute the law upon taking office, but it does not require the outgoing President to do anything to facilitate the new President’s tenure beyond that obligation.

Similarly, we do not read the Take Care Clause as requiring an outgoing President, even a defeated incumbent, to abandon his own agenda during the transition period. This would mean, for example, that an outgoing President is free to issue regulations or executive orders late in the term even if he knows they will be undone by the incoming President, and even if his purpose in so doing may be to cause the incoming President to expend political capital to reverse the actions. The Take Care Clause does not impose upon the outgoing President the duty to assist the incoming President in taking a firm political hold of the presidency.

B. Foreign Affairs

The President’s implied and express powers to conduct foreign affairs also give rise to presidential obligations during transition. The implied foreign affairs powers of the President necessarily flow from the explicit powers to receive ambassadors and negotiate

107. Undoing the work of a lame-duck President is a long-standing tradition for incoming Presidents. For example, President Grover Cleveland had made forest protection one of the key aims of his administration; however, the issue was so controversial that Cleveland waited until February of 1897, when he was a lame duck, to “set aside twenty-one million acres of timber land as forest reserves to preserve it from logging.” Combs, supra note 29, at 332. Encouraged by “incensed constituents,” members of the House of Representatives tried to impeach Cleveland for two days, and when that effort failed, the Senate attached to the Sundry Civil Bill a rider annulling Cleveland’s reservations. Cleveland issued a pocket veto and left office. Incoming President McKinley then convened a Special Session of Congress to address the reservations, and it enacted the Organic Administration Act of 1897, which suspended the reservations and limited the purposes for which national forests could be reserved.

Id.

108. The Constitution explicitly gives the President the power to make treaties as well as appoint and receive ambassadors. U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2–3. Other foreign affairs powers, such as the ability to recognize governments or enter into executive agreements, are not explicit in the text.
treaties. These powers include all manner of foreign relations such as recognizing foreign governments and proclaiming the neutrality of the United States when other nations are at war.\(^{109}\) Dealings with foreign nations are not possible without a single authoritative voice. These powers have expanded dramatically in recent decades,\(^{110}\) and the President's responsibilities stemming from this power cannot be overstated.\(^{111}\) As one court proclaimed, "[t]he President is the constitutional representative of the United States with respect to external affairs."\(^{112}\)

The primacy of the presidency in foreign affairs raises special concerns in the conduct of presidential transitions. Once an election occurs, other nations begin to look to the President-elect rather than the incumbent President for leadership, which makes it difficult for the United States to conduct foreign policy during the period between the election and inauguration day.\(^{113}\) Thus, as Nancy Combs reports, "lame-duck Presidents usually steer clear of significant or controversial international issues; or, at the least, they seek their successors' concurrence or commitment as to the course to pursue."\(^{114}\)

Midnight presidential action in foreign relations can be much more damaging to the interests of the United States and the principles of presidential succession than late-term conduct in the domestic sphere. As a general matter, the ability of the United States to engage in foreign relations depends to a great extent on its reliability as an international partner.\(^{115}\) Abrupt changes in foreign policy can do great damage to the country's ability to advance its interests internationally. Because of this, once an outgoing administration makes a commitment, it may be very difficult for the

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110. The expansion in presidential power in foreign affairs has not gone unchallenged. Numerous commentators have pointed out the dangers of vesting so much concentrated power in one person. See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1727 (1996) (arguing that the executive branch has never been more powerful than it is presently). For the view that the President's foreign affairs powers have always been expansive, see H. Jefferson Powell, The President's Authority over Foreign Affairs: An Executive Branch Perspective, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 527, 554-55 (1999).

111. See Powell, supra note 110, at 555 (discussing the primacy of presidential power in foreign affairs).


113. Combs, supra note 29, at 305.

114. Id.

115. See id. at 334.
incoming administration to reverse course.\textsuperscript{116} Further, it would place an incoming administration in a very awkward position if it had to work with, and perhaps around, its predecessor's late-term foreign policy initiatives with which it disagreed and perhaps even campaigned against.

In our view, these special factors in the foreign relations context give rise to a duty on the part of an outgoing administration to refrain from engaging in avoidable significant foreign policy initiatives during the transition period and perhaps during the lead up to the election.\textsuperscript{117} During the transition, significant foreign policy steps should be left to the new administration, and the outgoing administration should not make any commitments or take any actions that would prejudice the ability of the incoming administration to engage in foreign policy in accordance with its electoral mandate. When there are pressing issues, the incumbent administration should, as has been done in the past,\textsuperscript{118} consult with its successors on the proper course of action. Not only does such consultation enhance the legitimacy of the administration's action, it strengthens the ability of the United States to conduct foreign relations during this period because foreign nations are already looking to the incoming administration.

At the same time, the incoming administration also has a duty not to abruptly abandon the foreign policy positions of its

\textsuperscript{116} An incoming administration inclined to repudiate late-term commitments made by its predecessor may find that international law places an additional obstacle in the way of its foreign policy goals. As Nancy Combs explains:

\begin{quote}
A certain tension exists between democracy and international law regardless of whether the administration binding the state is a lame duck. Democracy requires deference to the right of the majority to change its mind, whereas international law, in its effort to attain the stability necessary to ensure the peace and security of states, requires states to honor their commitments until the other party or parties to the agreement consents to a change.
\end{quote}

\textit{Id.} While we view the issue more in terms of presidential succession than purely democracy, the problem is the same—international law may stand in the way of policy changes that would normally occur in light of the outcome of the presidential election.

\textsuperscript{117} These factors also require the outgoing President to assure that the new administration is fully briefed on foreign affairs matters. As with the national security matters discussed above, the incoming administration will need to have as full an understanding as possible prior to assuming office in order to be able to act appropriately in this area. Moreover, the fact that much of the information relevant to foreign affairs decisionmaking will not be public creates a greater necessity that the outgoing administration take steps to assure that the new administration is fully informed on the day it takes office.

\textsuperscript{118} See \textit{HENRY, supra} note 1, at 445–48, 483–87 (remarking on President Hoover's advance consultations with Franklin Roosevelt and discussing pre-inauguration talks between Presidents Truman and Eisenhower).
predecessor. The need for continuity in policy goes in both directions: the successor administration also needs to be solicitous of previous administration’s policies in order to promote the nation’s larger foreign policy objectives.

None of this means that it is impossible for the United States to change courses in foreign policy. A new President, a President facing changed circumstances, or even a President whose views have changed, violates no constitutional duty or normative principle if he changes directions in foreign policy. In fact, the main reason that outgoing Presidents should not take significant foreign policy actions is to allow the new President to forge her own direction in foreign relations. However, the President’s constitutional duties demand that the President, at all times, be sensitive to the damage that can be done by changing foreign policy made in a manner that makes the United States appear to be an unreliable partner in foreign relations.

In sum, because of the concerns regarding presidential transition and foreign affairs, different transition obligations arise than is the case with domestic matters. Foreign policy requires continuity and reliability to be effective. Unlike most domestic issues, the President cannot suddenly and dramatically change course in foreign affairs without harming the nation’s international standing. Thus, in order to promote an effective foreign policy, a President must work within the framework established by his predecessor and create a framework that allows his successor to be effective. In the foreign policy area, the incoming and outgoing Presidents cannot ignore the other’s political agendas. Both have an affirmative duty to work with each other’s policies.

C. Democratic Theory

The final arguable constraint on the outgoing President’s actions during transition concerns his obligations under democratic theory to respond to the popular will.119 As mentioned in the introduction,

119. That nontextual principles such as democratic theory may legitimately form a basis of constitutional interpretation, while theoretically debatable, has nevertheless become an established tradition in constitutional law. For example, notions of federalism have long guided constitutional interpretation although federalism is nowhere mentioned in the Constitution. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971) (explaining the nontextual principle of “Our Federalism” as prohibiting federal courts from interfering with ongoing state prosecutions). Indeed, claims that the Constitution should be interpreted by resort to extratextual principle have come from a variety of sources and from a variety of angles. Recently, Justice Breyer, for example, has argued that promoting the democratic process should guide constitutional interpretation. See Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 245-47 (2002). Michael Paulsen,
presidential transitions are awkward times in our democracy. Power remains in the hands of an individual who is at least four years removed from his most recent electoral success and, in the case of a defeated incumbent, has actually been repudiated in the most recent election. Meanwhile, the person who has just earned an electoral mandate is on the sidelines without the power to start the agenda that she was elected to pursue.

In these circumstances, the outgoing lame-duck President who acts in disregard of the electoral results by either taking measures to inhibit the new President’s ability to fulfill her electoral duties or continuing to advance an agenda that has been defeated at the polls can be seen as acting contrary to the popular will and therefore in violation of democratic principles. Indeed, the fact that a lame-duck Congress continued to pursue a course of action that had been rejected at the polls was the major precipitating event behind the passage of the Twentieth Amendment.

The most serious weakness in contending that legal obligations of transition can be generated from democratic theory is that it may prove too much. Taken at its most extreme, it would require that the lame-duck administration actually start the new administration’s agenda or, at least, that it cease to take any action that could be seen as contrary to the new administration’s policies. But placing the outgoing President in what is in effect a secondary position with respect to the incoming President creates its own set of problems. As

meanwhile, has claimed that presidential power should be judged in relation to a principle of constitutional necessity. See Paulsen, supra note 84, at 1263.

120. Proponents of the Twentieth Amendment, which moved up the inauguration of the President and the installation of the new Congress, made this argument to champion their cause. See, e.g., 75 Cong. Rec. 3864 (1932) (statement of Rep. Stafford) (“The voice of the people in the election of their representatives is the supreme law of the land.”); 74 Cong. Rec. 5880 (1931) (statement of Rep. Glover) (“We are a Nation that says the people ought to rule . . . .”); id. at 5898 (statement of Rep. McCormack) (“In a representative government it is essential that the will of the voters immediately go into effect and operation.”).

121. The impetus for the Twentieth Amendment may be directly traced to President Warren Harding’s support for ship subsidies in 1922 . . . . The issue of ship subsidies had been central to the 1922 congressional campaigns, and the voters had defeated most members of Congress who supported the subsidy legislation. President Harding, still desirous of enacting the legislation, called a special lame-duck session of Congress to consider the matter. This action so inflamed certain Senators that they drafted what later became the Twentieth Amendment to the Constitution.

Combs, supra note 29, at 332; see also John Copeland Nagle, A Twentieth Amendment Parable, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 470, 479–84 (1997) (describing reasons why lame-duck Congresses were targeted in the Twentieth Amendment).
a theoretical matter, it subordinates the existing President to little more than an agent of his successor. Second, it creates the practical problems of forcing persons potentially opposed to a particular agenda to begin the process of effectuating its implementation. That is not a map for success.

Moreover, the democratic theory argument actually cuts both ways. The outgoing President was elected to a four-year term ending on January 20. His term does not end at the moment election results are finalized. He enjoys an electoral mandate for the full four-year period. Moreover, the Twentieth Amendment, although apparently intended to prohibit lame-duck legislation by Congress, does not so clearly govern lame-duck activity by the outgoing President. After all, the amendment provides that congressional terms shall begin on January 3 while inauguration day for the President is set for January 20. The possibility that a lame-duck President will be acting with a newly elected legislature is therefore inevitable. We therefore reject the argument that the democratic theory principle (outside the realm of foreign policy as discussed above) formally constrains the action of the outgoing President.

III. TRANSITION AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

Transition at the federal agencies has a different dynamic than at the White House. To begin with, it is less abrupt. At the White House there is virtually a complete change of personnel from one administration to the next, particularly when there is a change in political party. In the final moments of a presidential term, the White House empties and in the moments after inauguration a whole new team moves in. No instructions are left behind as to how to run the most powerful governmental engine in the world.

At the agencies, in contrast, most employees are career civil servants and relatively few of the positions turn over to presidential appointees. The incoming appointees at the agencies are therefore

122. See Nagle, supra note 121, at 486.
123. U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 1.
124. See supra notes 117–18 and accompanying text.
125. This is not to say that the policies of good government do not counsel the outgoing President in favor of deferring to the popular will as expressed by the election of his successor. See supra text accompanying notes 66–68. Our point is only that he is under no constitutional obligation to do so.
not faced with the lack of continuity that occurs at the White House. Instead, at the agencies, the President’s appointees preside over career officials with experience and expertise who provide stability and continuity as well as on-the-job training. While this may make it more difficult for the incoming President to immediately advance her own policy agenda, it makes it less likely that the transition will result in the inability of the President to execute the laws. The administrative machinery continues to operate to enforce and execute the laws even if the new administration is not yet prepared to place its political stamp on the agency agenda.

A major presidential transition issue that specifically implicates the agencies, however, is the problem of midnight regulation. As noted previously, outgoing Presidents have created significant difficulties for their successors by engaging in a high volume of action at the end of terms. Such late-term action can create significant problems for the incoming administration in two respects. First, the sheer volume of late-term action may be a significant impediment to effective administration early in the new President’s term. Reviewing and assessing last minute rules will require the new administration to spend significant resources addressing the work left by the old administration rather than applying those same resources to learn and master the business of government. Thus, it could be argued that if midnight regulation significantly undercuts the ability of the incoming President to adequately discharge her other responsibilities, it violates the outgoing President’s duties under the Take Care and Oath Clauses.

Second, midnight regulation can impose substantial political costs on the incoming President. When faced with new rules to which it objects, the new administration will have the choice of either enforcing these rules (or allowing those rules to become finalized if the administrative process is unfinished) to the chagrin of its political supporters or taking action to review, repeal or amend those rules. Either option will tend to diminish the administration’s ability to set its own agenda during the crucial period at the beginning of the term. Deliberately creating such political distractions for his successor, then, arguably, can also be seen as violating the outgoing President’s transition duties.

127. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
129. See Beermann, supra note 62, at 963–64 (discussing administrative action at the end of President Clinton’s term); Cochran, supra note 59, at 3 (discussing volume of administrative action at the end of the terms of several recent Presidents).
Finally, even beyond its effects on the incoming administration, excessive midnight regulation may be undesirable from a broader societal perspective. As Nina Mendelson argues, late-term agency actions that are inconsistent with the incoming administration’s preferences could contribute to the public’s cynicism about government. She argues that the public may view such actions as taken for the benefit of the officials involved rather than in the public interest, and may appear to be “nose-thumbing by the outgoing administration at the public’s choice of a new President.” Such cynicism, Mendelson contends, could be seen as a threat to voter participation in presidential elections.

Despite these concerns, however, we conclude that midnight regulation does not violate an outgoing administration’s transition-related constitutional duties. To begin with, the line between permissible late-term action and undesirable “midnight regulation” is unlikely to be particularly clear and is largely in the eye of the beholder. As noted previously, some late-term regulation occurs because of the tendency to work to deadline and determining the outgoing administration’s motivations with respect to any particular regulation is likely to prove extraordinarily difficult.

But consider even the clear case. Assume, for example, that during a presidential campaign, the incumbent announces that he is considering promulgating rules regarding federal expenditures for stem cell research. The President’s opponent meanwhile announces her opposition to those rules and the issue becomes a major focus of the presidential campaign with the end result that the incumbent is defeated. The incumbent President then orders that rulemaking proceed nevertheless knowing full well that the promulgation of those rules will create serious political problems for his successor in her first weeks in office.

Even in these circumstances, we suggest that the outgoing President has not violated his transition obligations. First, as discussed previously, the outgoing President does not have a duty to accommodate the political agenda of his successor and should be free

130. Mendelson, supra note 59, at 565.
131. Id.


133. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
to pursue his own agenda to the end of the term.\textsuperscript{135} The fact that the outgoing President may, through the vehicle of late-term regulation, choose to impose political costs on his successor is not constitutionally problematic.

Second, in any event, the incoming President has legal tools to protect herself against their predecessors' last minute actions—including voluminous or politically undesirable late-term regulation. For example, President George W. Bush, immediately upon taking office, instructed his administration: 1) not to issue any new rules (initiated during President Clinton's administration) until they could be evaluated by a Bush appointee, 2) to pull back any rules that were on the brink of being issued, and 3) to suspend the implementation of any rules that had been promulgated but had not yet gone into effect.\textsuperscript{136} Although there are arguments to the contrary,\textsuperscript{137} in our view these actions were well within the legal rights of the new President. Once a rule has gone into effect, current law makes it more difficult to revise or rescind the rule. However, if a rule has not gone into effect or created any reliance interests, a new administration should be allowed to make whatever revisions, including rescission, that would be supported by the original rulemaking record.\textsuperscript{138}

Third, unlike other possible efforts to constrain the outgoing President during transition, Congress has the power to regulate against midnight regulation should it become too great a problem. Congress seems powerless to prevent the President's failure to fulfill the duties that arise under the Term, Oath, and Take Care Clauses

\begin{footnotes}
\item[135] See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
\item[137] The basic attack on presidential intervention into the rulemaking process is that once an agency has decided in favor of a rule, it is improper for an agency to pull or suspend a rule based on an instruction from the President unrelated to the merits of the rule. In our view, as long as the rulemaking record supports whatever action is ultimately taken, the President's involvement should not be a cause for legal concern. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Beermann, supra note 62, at 1007–15.
\item[138] See id. Under current law, a rule already in effect is the baseline, and the reasonableness of any change or rescission of a rule requires good reasons for the change. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983). It is not enough that the record underlying the original rule would have supported a different rule or no rule at all and that the new administration takes a different view of the policies underlying the rulemaking. We think there are good arguments that this makes it too difficult for a new administration to make regulatory changes. In short, if the original rulemaking record would have supported a different result, we do not believe that it should be so difficult for a new administration to choose the different result, especially if the change occurs before the original rule was scheduled to go into effect. See Beermann, supra note 62, at 1010–11.
\end{footnotes}
discussed above. Even if, for example, a statute requiring the President to meet with and brief the President-elect were constitutional (which we doubt),\(^{139}\) we cannot imagine how Congress could force the President to do anything of substance. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to force the outgoing President to provide genuine help in the transition. Because Congress has the power to withdraw delegations in whole or in part, statutes embodying reforms to late-term administrative action present no separation of powers problem.\(^{140}\) Congress, as the master of delegations of legal authority to the Executive Branch, could place temporal limits on rulemaking, for example, by prohibiting the promulgation of new rules during the period after the November election or by prohibiting the issuance of any rules with an effective date after the election or inauguration of the new President.

In sum, although midnight regulation may at times be unseemly and even undesirable, the outgoing President has the right to continue to pursue her agenda until the new President is inaugurated. Because the incoming President has adequate tools to deal with any last minute actions by the outgoing administration, we do not believe that midnight regulation violates the outgoing President's transition related duties.

**CONCLUSION**

The case that presidential transitions impose constitutional obligations upon the President is substantial. Textual foundation for this position exists in the Term, Take Care, and Oath Clauses. Further support for this conclusion derives from the President's broad foreign affairs and protective powers. The "rules" governing presidential transitions are more than simple matters of comity without legal force, and while the legal principles at stake may be quite general, they are substantial.

From the Term Clauses, it may be established that the outgoing President should not act in any manner that threatens peaceful presidential transition and must affirmatively take all possible steps to

\(^{139}\) But see Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 452 (1977) (upholding the constitutionality of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act requiring that the President preserve certain documents and records from his administration against challenge that the Act infringed on presidential power).

\(^{140}\) See Biodiversity Assoc. v. Cables, 357 F.3d 1152, 1162 (10th Cir. 2004) ("[W]hen Congress is exercising its own powers with respect to matters of public right, the executive role of 'tak[ing] Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,' U.S. Const. art. II, § 3, is entirely derivative of the laws passed by Congress, and Congress may be as specific in its instructions to the Executive as it wishes.").
assure that an orderly transition takes place. The Take Care Clause requires that the outgoing President provide sufficient assistance to the new administration so that the latter is able and prepared to execute its powers from the first day in office. The Oath Clause and the President’s protective powers require the outgoing President to do all that she can to alert the new President to any threats to the nation’s security and work with the new administration to the fullest extent possible to prevent any harm to the nation. Finally, the President’s foreign affairs powers demand that both the outgoing and incoming Presidents act in foreign policy matters in a manner that advances the ability of the United States to effectively conduct foreign affairs. This means that the outgoing President must be aware and solicitous of the likely directions that the new President may take on foreign affairs issues and not work in a manner that may undermine the ability of the new President to achieve those goals. It also means that the incoming President does not have a free hand to reject the policies of his predecessor.

At the same time, the outgoing President is under no constitutional obligation beyond those just described to implement the new President’s political agenda or to cease implementing her own. This is so, moreover, even if the new President may be forced by the outgoing President’s actions to expend political capital to undo the previous administration’s work. The Constitution may impose some basic requirements to assure a safe and peaceful democratic transition, but it does not demand that the outgoing President pave the political road for his successor.