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Matthew C. Stiegler

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The Uncertain Future of Limited Fund Settlement Class Actions in Mass Tort Litigation After *Ortiz* v. *Fibreboard Corp.*

When a body possessed of the institutional unflappability of the United States Supreme Court is moved to describe a body of litigation as "elephantine," it is safe to assume the problem is real. The pachyderm that sparked the Court's alarm is asbestos litigation. Asbestos is a fire-resistant insulator that also happens to be one of the most dangerous materials ever introduced into widespread use. By

3. See 1991 REPORT, supra note 2, at 4–7. Asbestos is a naturally occurring fibrous mineral, mined primarily for its noncombustability and its insulative properties. See 1 SOURCEBOOK ON ASBESTOS DISEASES: MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND ENGINEERING ASPECTS A1–A7 (George A. Peters & Barbara J. Peters eds., 1980). The first known English language report on the health dangers posed by asbestos was issued in 1898, see Morris Greenberg, *Knowledge of the Health Hazards of Asbestos (The First 60 Years)*, in 10 SOURCEBOOK ON ASBESTOS DISEASES: CURRENT ASBESTOS LEGAL, MEDICAL AND TECHNICAL RESEARCH 145, 149 (George A. Peters & Barbara J. Peters eds., 1994), and these dangers were first scientifically demonstrated in the United States in 1935, see 1991 REPORT, supra note 2, at 5. Although asbestos exposure remains a major public health problem in many countries, it has been substantially reduced in the United States. See BARRY I. CASTLEMAN, ASBESTOS: MEDICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS 787–95, 854–55 (4th
the middle of the next century, as many as 500,000 Americans will have died as a result of asbestos exposure. As a committee of federal judges dramatically reported in 1991, "[i]t is a tale of danger known in the 1930s, exposure inflicted upon millions of Americans in the 1940s and 1950s, injuries that began to take their toll in the 1960s, and a flood of lawsuits beginning in the 1970s." That flood of lawsuits—approximately 250,000 to date—has swollen into a well-documented legal catastrophe on par with its public health predicate. The sheer volume of claims brought by those exposed to asbestos has made it increasingly difficult for courts to provide, as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandate, "the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." As

ed. 1996). But see Rebecca Renner, Asbestos in the Air, SCI. AM., Feb. 2000, at 34, 34 (reporting that a recent housing boom in California is exposing residents to dangerous levels of naturally occurring asbestos).

4. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1384–85. One study has projected that cancer caused by asbestos exposure will result in one American death every hour until 2025. See CASTLEMAN, supra note 3, at 784. The most serious disease caused by asbestos exposure is mesothelioma, a particularly virulent cancer generally thought to be caused only by asbestos. See Federal Judicial Ctr., Individual Characteristics of Mass Torts Case Congregations, in REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION, app. D at 16 (1999) [hereinafter MASS TORT LITIGATION]. Some recent medical research suggests that a virus that contaminated the polio vaccine administered to nearly 100 million Americans in the 1950s and 1960s plays a role in triggering mesothelioma. See Joseph R. Testa et al., A Multi-Institutional Study Confirms the Presence and Expression of Simian Virus 40 in Human Malignant Mesotheliomas, 58 CANCER RES. 4505, 4505-09 (1998); Debbie Bookchin & Jim Schumacher, The Virus and the Vaccine, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 2000, at 68, 75. Monkey kidneys used to culture the vaccine are the apparent source of the viral contamination. See Bookchin & Schumacher, supra, at 68. The Testa study and others like it remain controversial. See id. at 71–72, 76–80.


6. See generally, e.g., Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2324–25 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (detailing problems posed by the volume of asbestos litigation); 1991 REPORT, supra note 2, at 1–3, 7–14 (describing the volume, delay, and costs of asbestos litigation); Coffee, supra note 2, at 1384–1404 (tracing the evolution of asbestos litigation); Federal Judicial Ctr., supra note 4, app. D at 14–17 (summarizing past and present asbestos litigation); Report of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and the Working Group on Mass Torts [hereinafter 1999 Report], in MASS TORT LITIGATION, supra note 4, at 28–47 (describing difficulties presented by mass tort litigation generally). The magnitude of asbestos litigation is illustrated by the fact that 60% of the increase in federal civil filings from 1976 to 1986 was attributable to asbestos cases. See Mary J. Davis, Mass Tort Litigation: Congress's Silent, but Deadly, Reform Effort, 64 TENN. L. REV. 913, 918 (1997). The volume of asbestos cases has been so great, one court observed, "as to exert a well-nigh irresistible pressure to bend the normal rules." In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1304 (7th Cir. 1995).

7. See, e.g., 1999 Report, supra note 6, at 31 (noting that the delays that have characterized the resolution of asbestos cases "raise legitimate concerns about whether some plaintiffs are de facto denied any meaningful access to court"). Such delay can exact a tragic price: during one asbestos class action, nearly one-sixth of the class members died
one trial judge illustrated the problem in a 1990 opinion approving an asbestos class action: "If the Court could somehow close thirty cases a month, it would take six and one-half years to try these cases and there would be pending over 5,000 untouched cases." For the tens of thousands whose injuries will become manifest in the decades ahead, there is a very real risk that recovery will be denied altogether.

To make matters worse, asbestos is not the only elephant in the stampede. Indeed, asbestos exposure is only the first, and so far the worst, of what have come to be termed "mass torts." One recent study has documented two dozen subsequent mass torts, and there is little optimism that mass torts are headed the way of the woolly waiting for their cases to be heard. See Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 651–52. As a committee of judges appointed to study the asbestos crisis grimly noted, "[u]nder these circumstances, the principle of 'justice delayed is justice denied' has added meaning." 1991 REPORT, supra note 2, at 12.

8. Perhaps the most oft-cited statistic in the literature of mass torts comes from a 1984 Rand Corporation study which found that only 39 cents of each asbestos litigation dollar actually went to asbestos victims. See 1991 REPORT, supra note 2, at 13. Such inefficiency is far less shocking when viewed in light of evidence from a subsequent Rand report indicating that the average plaintiff in non-automobile tort litigation receives only 43% of each litigation dollar. See Thomas E. Willging, Mass Tort Problems & Proposals: A Report to the Mass Torts Working Group, in MASS TORT LITIGATION, supra note 4, app. C at 3.

9. FED. R. Civ. P. 1; see also Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2325 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (asserting that the costs and delays of asbestos litigation may deny most victims recovery unless courts are given maximum discretion to aggregate claims).


11. The latency period for mesothelioma, the most serious asbestos-related disease, is 15 to 40 years or more. See Federal Judicial Ctr., supra note 4, app. D at 17. Such a long and variable latency period increases the likelihood that, absent claim aggregation, an asbestos manufacturer's assets will be exhausted by prior claims before other victims have manifested injuries.


13. Notwithstanding Professor McGovern's observation that "[m]ass torts have been defined in a number of ways, none of which is particularly helpful," Francis E. McGovern, The Defensive Use of Federal Class Actions in Mass Torts, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 595, 597 (1997), several such efforts have been made. See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961, 965–69 (1993) (defining mass torts as litigation characterized by a large number of related claims, commonality of issues, and interdependent value of claims); 1999 Report, supra note 6, at 8–9 (discussing different definitions). For a general overview of the mass tort phenomenon and the judicial problems that it poses, see 1999 Report, supra note 6, at 9–47.

mammoth in the near future. There is near-universal acknowledgment that mass torts pose grave problems for a legal system designed to mete out justice case by case, problems that can be addressed only through some form of aggregated adjudication. What procedural tool accomplishes that aggregation most appropriately and efficiently? This question is the central issue in mass tort jurisprudence, and no consensus answer has emerged. Opt-out class actions under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal

15. See 1999 Report, supra note 6, at 9 (stating that "mass tort litigation is probably here to stay"); Francis E. McGovern, Looking to the Future of Mass Torts: A Comment on Schuck and Siliciano, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1022, 1025–27 (1995) (examining institutional factors that perpetuate mass tort litigation). Indeed, by providing the mass tort plaintiffs' bar with the funds to invest in new mega-cases, the success of asbestos litigation has been a direct factor in perpetuating mass tort litigation. See Marianne Lavelle & Angie Cannon, The Reign of the Tort Kings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 1, 1999, at 36, 38 (quoting a leading plaintiffs' lawyer as saying, "[a]sbestos gave us a war chest for tobacco").

16. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 1283 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999), available in 1999 WL 796232 (statement of Professor Christopher Edley, Jr., Harvard Law School) (arguing that "the asbestos litigation crisis not only remains with us, but has in important respects grown worse in the late 1990s"); 1999 Report, supra note 6, at 19 (concluding that mass torts "impose extraordinary demands on the judicial system, which currently does not possess all the mechanisms necessary to address them"); Coffee, supra note 2, at 1347 (identifying a consensus on the existence of a crisis requiring a radical remedy); Willging, supra note 8, at 5 (noting that those who argue that the legal system can evolve to handle mass torts satisfactorily are a definite minority). But see Finding Solutions to the Asbestos Litigation Problem: Hearings on S. 758 Before the Senate Judiciary Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts, 106th Cong. (1999), available in 1999 WL 796237 (statement of Richard Middleton, Jr., President, Association of Trial Lawyers of America) (arguing that, with only 55 asbestos trials in 1998, no asbestos litigation crisis exists); Willging, supra note 8, at 3–5 (describing arguments that the current system is working).

17. See 1999 Report, supra note 6, at 15.

18. See JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE EFFECT OF CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES 1–3 (1995); 1999 Report, supra note 6, at 28–29. But see Willging, supra note 8, at 5–6 (noting some negative consequences of aggregation, primarily the concern that increased efficiency encourages filings).


20. A brief overview of class actions procedure may be helpful here. Federal class action practice is governed by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A class action allows individual plaintiffs to sue, not only for themselves, but also on behalf of a class of those alleging like claims. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). To sue on behalf of others, individual plaintiffs must obtain permission from the court, known as class certification. See id. 23(c). A class may be certified if it satisfies all four prerequisites of 23(a)—
Rules of Civil Procedure\textsuperscript{21} and reorganizations under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code\textsuperscript{22} have been the tools most commonly used to

numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation—and satisfies the conditions of one of the four types of class actions under 23(b). \textit{See id.} 23(b). Of these four types of class actions, two are of particular relevance in resolving mass torts: opt-out classes under 23(b)(3), \textit{see infra} note 21, and mandatory classes under 23(b)(1)(B), \textit{see infra} note 26; \textit{see also} Zipes, \textit{supra} note 2, at 17-18 (noting that (b)(1)(B) and (b)(3) are the most important class action provisions for mass torts).

Going beyond the text of Rule 23, an additional wrinkle to class certification has emerged in recent years: class certification for settlement only. \textit{See In re} Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300, 305 n.10 (6th Cir. 1984) (tracing the precedent for settlement-only classes back to a 1979 Fifth Circuit case, \textit{In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation}, 607 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1979)); \textit{infra} note 87 and accompanying text (noting the Supreme Court's recent approval of settlement classes). Settlement-only classes owe their existence to two realities: defendants want to be able to negotiate class settlements without risking a "bet-the-company" trial if negotiations break down, and judges want to be able to approve a class settlement even if the class would be too unwieldy to go to trial.

When settlement is used to resolve a class action, the district court must go beyond the class certification analysis to find that the terms of the settlement are fair; this fairness inquiry is derived from 23(e)'s requirement of court approval before a case may be dismissed. \textit{FED. R. CIV. P.} 23(e); \textit{see also} 2 HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 11.41, at 11-87 & n.222 (3d ed. 1992) (discussing the 23(e) fairness test); 7B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1797, at 340-41, 356-58 (2d ed. 1986) (same).

To summarize, all class actions must be certified by the court. Certification demands that all of the prerequisites of 23(a) and one of the requirements of 23(b) be satisfied. If the parties are seeking approval of a class settlement, the court also must find that the settlement terms are fair.

21. Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out classes are those in which absent class members have the right to choose to exclude themselves from the class, even after the class is certified. Such self-exclusion typically is done in order to pursue individual litigation. Classes without an express opt-out right are known as "mandatory classes." The opt-out class has been used widely to aggregate mass tort claims because it is the broadest of the class action provisions, allowing class certification in circumstances not permitted by the other Rule 23 provisions. \textit{FED. R. CIV. P.} 23(b)(3) advisory committee's note. Opt-out classes may be certified if, in addition to the general 23(a) prerequisites, \textit{see supra} note 20, questions common to the class predominate over uncommon questions, and class treatment is superior to other means of adjudication. \textit{See FED. R. CIV. P.} 23(b)(3).

aggregate mass tort claims, but from the perspective of a defendant seeking a global solution that will allow it to continue its business, both have serious limitations. As a result, in recent years such defendants have turned to a third option, the limited fund class action settlement, a mandatory settlement from which claimants have no express right to opt out.

23. Many other aggregative options exist, but "each has been found wanting, whether in efficiency, legitimacy or both." Cohen, supra note 19, at 274 (listing multidistrict consolidation, Rule 42 consolidation, specialized courts, private case management consortia, collateral estoppel, docket control, lobbying and legislative efforts, and specialized trial structures); see also 1991 REPORT, supra note 2, at 15-26 (discussing various aggregation options); WEINSTEIN, supra note 18, at 23-32 (same).

24. Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out classes are unappealing to defendants seeking total peace for two primary reasons. First, they allow class members to opt out, thus unpredictably increasing total liability. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 2, at 1382; Ralph R. Mabey & Peter A. Zisser, Improving Treatment of Future Claims: The Unfinished Business Left by the Manville Amendments, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 487, 506 (1995). Second, they have become more difficult to implement in light of recent case law. See, e.g., 1999 Report, supra note 6, at 41; Alex Raskolnikov, Note, Is There a Future for Future Claimants After Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor?, 107 YALE L.J. 2545, 2561 (1998). Bankruptcy, meanwhile, is unappealing to defendants primarily because plaintiffs may emerge in control of the company. See, e.g., In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 621 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (detailing a bankruptcy plan pursuant to which tort claimants took control of the reorganized company).

25. See Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805, 820 n.45 (1997) (noting that, from 1986 to 1990, only six class actions were certified under Rule 23(b)(1)(B)).

26. A limited fund exists when several parties hold claims against a single fund, and the sum of the claims exceeds the value of the fund available. See Limited-Fund Classes, in MASS TORT LITIGATION, supra note 4, app. F-9 at 1-2 (defining "limited fund"). For example, a limited fund would exist in a case in which a bus crash injures 100 people, causing $10,000 in injuries to each one for a total of $1,000,000 in claims, and the only asset available to compensate them is a $500,000 insurance policy. Limited fund cases are certifiable as class actions under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), see FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note, although the text of (b)(1)(B) does not limit its use to limited fund situations, see infra note 175 (discussing use of (b)(1)(B) in non-limited fund cases). To be certified under (b)(1)(B), a class must satisfy the general prerequisites established in 23(a). See supra note 20. In addition, the class must show that individual litigation of the claims would risk "adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B). To return to the bus crash example above, individual litigation would mean that the first 50 claimants get a full recovery, while the last 50 get nothing. In such a situation, individual litigation plainly would risk impairment of the ability of some class members to protect their interests.

Lower federal courts struggled for over a decade to assess the appropriateness of the various mass tort aggregation options, until the Supreme Court finally agreed to hear its first mass tort case in 1997.\(^{28}\)
In that case, *Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,* the Court sharply circumscribed the use of opt-out classes in mass tort litigation. Last term, in *Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.*, the Court turned its attention to the other significant mass tort class action tool, the limited fund settlement class. In *Ortiz,* a decision already described as "monumentally important for class action jurisprudence and the future of settlement classes," the Court rejected a limited fund settlement arising out of asbestos litigation. In so doing, the Court has cast doubt upon future mass tort limited fund settlements, stopping just short of barring such settlements altogether.

This Note begins by detailing the facts of *Ortiz* and summarizing its disposition by the Supreme Court. It then assesses the continuing availability of the limited fund settlement as a tool for resolving mass tort claims. Looking beyond the announced holding to the practical impact of the Court's opinion, this Note concludes that the limited fund settlement in its present form essentially has been foreclosed. This foreclosure becomes evident upon examination of the Court's treatment of the role of settlement in class certification, the types of intra-class conflicts that require creation of subclasses, and a host of serious questions raised and left unresolved in *Ortiz.* This Note next explores questions likely to emerge in post-*Ortiz* limited fund settlements, however, so it cannot be considered a mass tort case.

30. *See id.* at 612 (holding that a proposed class action designed to reach a global settlement of current and future asbestos claims failed to meet the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); *see also supra* note 24 (noting that *Amchem* made opt-out classes more difficult to certify); *infra* notes 84–87 and accompanying text (discussing *Amchem*).
33. *See Ortiz,* 119 S. Ct. at 2323; *see also infra* notes 91–123 (discussing the Court's disposition of the case).
34. *See infra* notes 132–74 (discussing the impact of *Ortiz*).
35. *See infra* notes 44–131 and accompanying text.
36. *See infra* notes 132–74 and accompanying text.
37. *See infra* notes 139–51 and accompanying text.
38. *See infra* notes 152–66 and accompanying text.
settlement class litigation, considering the implications of the Court's opinion viewed from the cutting edge of limited fund jurisprudence in the lower federal courts. The discussion examines one form of limited fund settlement that Ortiz unfortunately may encourage—the no-allocation settlement—and another form that Ortiz unfortunately may prohibit—the going concern settlement. The Note closes with a closer look at the question of whether defendants should be permitted to capture the transactional savings made available by a limited fund settlement.

By 1990, asbestos litigation already had forced many of the wealthiest asbestos producing companies into bankruptcy. Fibreboard had survived to that point at least in part because it was a relatively minor player, both in terms of its asbestos market share and in terms of its corporate wealth. But as the volume of claims rose and the number of other defendants shrank, time was decidedly not on Fibreboard's side.

The only hope for the company was a pair of insurance policies

40. See infra notes 175–250 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 176–210 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 211–35 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 236–50 and accompanying text.

Although Fibreboard has been a relatively minor defendant in asbestos litigation, it was the named defendant in the case generally acknowledged to have opened the floodgates for asbestos litigation. See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 13, at 1003 (discussing Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1092 (5th Cir. 1973), which held that asbestos product manufacturers could be held strictly liable for injuries resulting from asbestos exposure).
46. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1400 (noting Fibreboard's urgency to achieve a global settlement, given that its unpaid commitments exceeded $1 billion).
that Fibreboard had taken out for a few years in the 1950s.\textsuperscript{47} Fibreboard maintained that these policies provided virtually unlimited coverage for all asbestos claims that preceded policy expiration, and after a massive four-year trial, a California state court agreed.\textsuperscript{48} While the insurers appealed, the fate of all concerned hung in the balance.\textsuperscript{49} If the insurers lost, they faced billions of dollars in liability.\textsuperscript{50} If Fibreboard lost, it faced certain bankruptcy, while the asbestos victims’ prospects for meaningful recovery would evaporate.\textsuperscript{51}

With such astronomical stakes, Fibreboard decided that the time was ripe to negotiate a class action settlement with both victims and insurers.\textsuperscript{52} The insurers demanded that any settlement bring total peace,\textsuperscript{53} including resolution of all future claims; accordingly, negotiations focused on mandatory class settlement.\textsuperscript{54} These negotiations eventually produced three separate agreements: the inventory settlement, the global settlement, and the trilateral settlement.\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{47} See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2303. Continental Casualty Company and Pacific Indemnity Company issued the insurance policies. See id. The Continental policy was in effect from 1957 to 1959, and the Pacific policy was in effect from 1956 to 1957. See id. Both were comprehensive general liability insurance policies with per occurrence limits, but with no overall cap on how much the insurers would pay out under the policies. See id. Fibreboard did not argue that claims resulting from exposure after the 1959 expiration of the insurance policies were indemnified. See id. Thus, in 1993, claims alleging pre-1959 exposure settled for an average of $12,000, while post-1959 asbestos exposure claims settled for only $4000. See Flanagan v. Ahearn (In re Asbestos Litig.) (“Flanagan I”), 90 F.3d 963, 1013 n.49 (5th Cir. 1996) (Smith, J., dissenting), vacated and remanded, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997), reaff’d per curiam, 134 F.3d 668 (5th Cir. 1998), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999).

\textsuperscript{48} See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2303. This coverage litigation was described later as a “death struggle.” United States Supreme Court Official Transcript at *29, Ortiz (No. 97-1704), available in 1998 WL 849388 (oral argument of Elihu Inselbuch on behalf of settlement proponents). It was “one of the largest and most complex proceedings in the history of American civil jurisprudence.” Ahearn, 162 F.R.D. at 511.

\textsuperscript{49} See Flanagan I, 90 F.3d at 971.

\textsuperscript{50} See id.

\textsuperscript{51} See id.

\textsuperscript{52} See id. at 970–71.

\textsuperscript{53} As the term is used generally, a global peace resolution includes all possible claimants, including future claimants, and all possible defendants, including parent corporations and insurers. See generally Georgene M. Vairo, Georgine, the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, and the Rhetoric of Mass Tort Claims Resolution, 31 Loy. L. A. L. Rev. 79, 127–29 (1997) (describing total peace resolutions generally and the Dalkon Shield bankruptcy specifically).

\textsuperscript{54} See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2304.

\textsuperscript{55} See Flanagan I, 90 F.3d at 971–73; see also TIDMARSH, supra note 45, at 60–61 (describing the settlement negotiation history). Of these three settlements, only the global settlement was before the Supreme Court in Ortiz.
The inventory settlement, negotiated first, settled the claims of victims who were represented personally by class counsel. Settlement values were higher than average, but full payment was contingent on a subsequent resolution of future claims. The global settlement came next. It proposed a mandatory class composed of substantially all Fibreboard asbestos victims who had not yet filed claims. This class was not divided into subclasses. Class members would bring their claims through a trust, funded by $1.525 billion from the insurers and $10 million from Fibreboard; all but $500,000 of Fibreboard's share came from other insurance. Finally, the day after reaching the global settlement, the parties negotiated the trilateral settlement. The trilateral settlement provided that, should the global settlement fail to secure court approval, the insurers would pay Fibreboard $2 billion for a complete settlement of their liability.

56. See Flanagan I, 90 F.3d at 971. Two of the four class counsel were partners in the South Carolina firm Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole. The inventory settlement resolved that firm's entire inventory of pending cases. See id. Interestingly, Ness, Motley partners had also served as class counsel in the settlement struck down in Amchem. See Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 599 (1997). Ortiz was something of a grudge match in this respect, because Baron & Budd, the law firm representing those class members challenging the Fibreboard settlement, was the same firm that successfully challenged the Amchem settlement. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 615 (3d Cir. 1996), aff'd sub nom. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). The leaders of both firms were singled out as "tort kings" in a 1999 article in U.S. News & World Report discussing the influence of elite trial lawyers over the behavior of corporations and politicians. See Lavelle & Cannon, supra note 15, at 38.

57. See Flanagan I, 90 F.3d at 971 n.3; id. at 1010–11 (Smith, J., dissenting). Such arrangements have been identified by some commentators as a red flag suggesting collusion, because they may suggest that class counsel has received a premium for its cases in exchange for acting contrary to the interests of the class. See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton, Individualized Justice, Mass Torts, and "Settlement Class Actions": An Introduction, 80 CORNELL L. REV 811, 825 (1995); Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1064 (1995).

58. The negotiating attorneys reached the settlement at a chance midnight meeting at a coffee shop in Tyler, Texas. See Flanagan I, 90 F.3d at 971.

59. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2305 & n.5.

60. See id. at 2308.

61. See id. at 2304.

62. See id.

63. See id. The Supreme Court understood this $2 billion figure to be consistent with the insurers' absolute refusal to pay more through the trilateral settlement than they had agreed to pay under the global settlement. See id. at 2322. The trilateral settlement amount was higher because it covered more claimants; in addition to the global future claimants, it resolved the insurers' liability as to all pending or reserved claims. See Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corp., 162 F.R.D. 505, 521 (E.D. Tex. 1995), aff'd sub nom. Flanagan v. Ahearn, 90 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1996), vacated and remanded, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997), reaaff'd per curiam, 134 F.3d 668 (5th Cir. 1998), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999). Due to the transaction costs associated with
With the settlement negotiated by the lawyers, all that remained was to secure court approval of the class and of the settlement terms. Accordingly, the plaintiffs filed Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corp. in the federal district court for the Eastern District of Texas before Chief Judge Robert M. Parker, an innovative veteran of asbestos litigation. Chief Judge Parker appointed a guardian ad litem to report on the settlement's fairness and held an eight-day fairness hearing, at which several objecting class members testified. The objectors challenged the global settlement, alleging conflicts of individual litigation, the trilateral settlement was expected to provide a smaller recovery for claimants than they would have received under the global settlement. See Ahearn, 162 F.R.D. at 527.

64. See generally supra note 20 (discussing procedure for court approval of class settlements).


66. See Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV. 659, 660-67 (1989) [hereinafter McGovern, Mature Mass Torts] (detailing Chief Judge Parker's history of procedural innovation in asbestos litigation); Francis E. McGovern, Rethinking Cooperation Among Judges in Mass Tort Litigation, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1851, 1862 (1997) (describing Chief Judge Parker as "a staunch advocate of more radical solutions to resolving asbestos cases"). Chief Judge Parker was one of the six judges on the Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation. See 1991 REPORT, supra note 2, at 39. While the Ahearn appeal was pending before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, he was appointed to that court from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. The Fifth Circuit panel that heard the appeal of Ahearn was thus in the somewhat awkward position of reviewing a judge who had since become a colleague. Indeed, they actually were reviewing the work of two colleagues, as then-Chief Judge Parker had appointed Fifth Circuit Judge Patrick E. Higginbotham to serve as facilitator during the Fibreboard settlement negotiations. See Ahearn, 162 F.R.D. at 515. In fact, Judge Higginbotham had made the suggestion to negotiate the inventory and global settlements separately. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2330 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also infra note 111 and accompanying text (describing the Ortiz Court's holding that this procedure was impermissible).

67. Professor Eric Green was the guardian ad litem. See Flanagan v. Ahearn (In re Asbestos Litig.) ("Flanagan I"), 90 F.3d 963, 972 (5th Cir. 1996), vacated and remanded, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997), rea'd per curiam, 134 F.3d 668 (5th Cir. 1998), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999). This appointment was striking because Professor Green, as a vocal supporter of class action settlement, by his own account stood contrary to "the overwhelming majority of the scholarly community...led by the most highly respected scholars in their fields." Eric D. Green, What Will We Do When Adjudication Ends? We'll Settle in Bunches: Bringing Rule 23 into the Twenty-First Century, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1773, 1787 (1997). On the other hand, one commentator highlighted Chief Judge Parker's appointment of a guardian ad litem and his holding of lengthy fairness hearings as a model of responsible judicial inquiry. See Howard M. Erichson, Mass Tort Litigation and Inquisitorial Justice, 87 GEO. L.J. 1983, 2003-04, 2009 (1999).

68. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2305-06.
interest of class counsel resulting from the inventory settlement, 69 inadequate procedural protections in light of conflicting interests among class members, 70 and the absence of a limited fund. 71 Over these objections, Chief Judge Parker certified the mandatory class under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) and approved the settlement as "fair, reasonable, and adequate." 72

The objectors in Ahearn appealed to the Fifth Circuit, 73 where a divided panel affirmed. 74 The majority noted that the fact of settlement should be considered when deciding whether to certify a class action. 75 After concluding that there were no fatal conflicts within the class or between the class and the inventory settlers, 76 the court upheld certification of the mandatory class under a limited fund theory. 77 The majority held that Fibreboard's retention of most of its assets was permissible because the class was receiving a larger recovery as a result of the settlement. 78

69. See Ahearn, 162 F.R.D. at 525; see also supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing the argument that lucrative inventory settlements are used to persuade class counsel to reach a class settlement on terms that favor the defendant).

70. See Ahearn, 162 F.R.D. at 525. 71. See id. at 527. Without a limited fund, the objectors argued, certification of the class under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) was improper. See id. See generally supra note 26 (discussing the limited fund concept).

72. Ahearn, 162 F.R.D. at 528. 73. As inevitably happens in a settlement class action that is appealed, the party structure (and thus the caption of the case) shifted on appeal. The original parties—Gerald Ahearn, four other named plaintiffs, and the defendant—were united in defense of the settlement, while James Flanagan, Esteban Yanez Ortiz, and other objectors stood in opposition to the agreement. Thus, Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corp. became Flanagan v. Ahearn on appeal to the Fifth Circuit. Finally, when Flanagan dropped out, the case became Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp. on appeal to the Supreme Court. See supra note 44 (citing the complete procedural history of the case).


75. See id. at 975. Chief Judge Parker had assumed that certification standards for settlement classes and trial classes were the same. See Ahearn, 162 F.R.D. at 523. The issue of relaxing certification standards for settlement classes is discussed infra at notes 139–51 and accompanying text.

76. See Flanagan I, 90 F.3d at 978–82. 77. See id. at 988.

78. See id. at 985. The court also rejected the objectors' other challenges. First, the majority found that the Article III "case or controversy" requirement was satisfied. See id. at 988. It also rejected the argument that Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985), recognized a due process right to opt out of even mandatory classes. See Flanagan I, 90 F.3d at 986. The court noted that the holding in Shutts had been limited to cases predominantly for money damages, 472 U.S. at 811 n.3, while a limited fund class action's pro rata reduction of all claims made such actions equitable in nature. See Flanagan I, 90
Dissenting "vehemently," Judge Jerry E. Smith decried the majority's approval of "the first no-opt-out, mass-tort, settlement-only, futures-only class action ever attempted or approved." Disagreeing with essentially all of the majority's holdings, he also questioned the underlying justice of the settlement: "Fibreboard hand-picked a class that was uniquely vulnerable to exploitation, class counsel who were widely reported to have sold out a similar class, and a court with a reputation for favoring a global settlement."

While appeal of the Fifth Circuit decision in Ahearn was pending, the Supreme Court handed down Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor. The Court granted certiorari in the Fibreboard case and immediately vacated and remanded it to the Fifth Circuit for reconsideration in light of Amchem.

Amchem, like Ortiz, involved a massive settlement of future asbestos claims, but with one major procedural difference: Amchem had been certified as a Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out class, not a limited fund


79. Flanagan I, 90 F.3d at 993 (Smith, J., dissenting). For example, Judge Smith asked, "How could well-intentioned judges sanction—indeed, compel—such an untoward result?" Id. (Smith, J., dissenting). Later, he charged that "[e]ven rudimentary constitutional protections ... would have prevented ... this unfortunate miscarriage of justice." Id. at 995 (Smith, J., dissenting).

80. Id. at 993 (Smith, J., dissenting).

81. Id. at 994 (Smith, J., dissenting). The "widely reported" class counsel sell-out refers to Ness, Motley's representation of the plaintiff class that was ultimately rejected by the Supreme Court in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 629 (1997). See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1397–99 (arguing that the Amchem class counsel acted collusively); supra note 56.

82. 521 U.S. at 591. Amchem and its underlying facts have been analyzed thoroughly by scholars. See, e.g., TIDMARSH, supra note 45, at 25–31, 47–58; Koniak, supra note 57, at 1045–1138; O'Leary, supra note 78, at 469–89.

(b)(1)(B) mandatory class. As a result, the degree to which the Amchem holding applied to limited fund classes such as the one in the Fibreboard settlement was uncertain. Amchem's central, ambiguous holding was that settlement should be considered by a court in deciding whether to certify a settlement class, although such consideration did not in all respects weigh in favor of the proposed class. Amchem also established that both settlement class actions and mass tort class actions are permissible.

On remand, the Fifth Circuit took only five paragraphs to distinguish Amchem and again affirm the settlement. The court stated that Amchem involved an opt-out class under 23(b)(3) that allocated recoveries based on the type or severity of the injury, while the present case was a 23(b)(1)(B) mandatory class that treated all claimants alike. For the second time, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.

In an opinion written by Justice Souter, the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit. The Court began by noting that the heart

84. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 622. See generally supra notes 21, 26 (describing opt-out and limited fund classes).


86. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 619-21. This holding is discussed more thoroughly infra at notes 139-43 and accompanying text.

87. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 618, 625. Both points had been in doubt. See, e.g., 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 1783, at 76 (noting that "allowing a class action to be brought in a mass tort situation is clearly contrary to the intent of the draftsmen of the rule"); Note, Back to the Drawing Board: The Settlement Class Action and the Limits of Rule 23, 109 HARV. L. REV. 828, 830-31 (1996) (arguing that settlement classes are forbidden by Rule 23).

88. See Flanagan II, 134 F.3d at 669-70. Judge Smith again wrote in forceful dissent. See id. at 683 (Smith, J., dissenting) ("The panel majority ... casually dismisses the teaching of Amchem and blesses a class that falls far short of legal and constitutional requirements.").

89. See id. at 669-70 (Smith, J., dissenting).


91. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2323. Justice Souter's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Ginsburg. See id. at 2302. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a brief concurrence, in which Justices Scalia and Kennedy joined. See id. at 2323-24 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Justice Stevens. See id. at 2324-33 (Breyer, J., dissenting). For media reaction to the decision, see supra note 32 (listing articles). Because the trilateral settlement was not appealed to the Supreme Court, it is final, and the money that Fibreboard received is available to pay individual claims. See Weinstein, supra note 32, at A22.
of the case was "the conditions for certifying a mandatory settlement class on a limited fund theory under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1)(B)." The language of the Rule itself is quite broad; the Court concluded that if the only hurdles to the certification of limited fund settlement classes were those imposed by the text, then (b)(1)(B) might well be used in ways that violated the Rules Enabling Act, the Seventh Amendment, and constitutional due process. In need of a limiting construction of (b)(1)(B), the Court explored the history of limited fund class action cases from the vantage point of the drafters of the 1966 amendment that codified modern Rule 23(b).

Distilling these cases to their essence, the Court developed a limited fund class action "historical model." According to the Court, the historical model of limited fund class actions is composed of three elements: inadequacy of the fund, equity among members of the class, and exhaustion of the fund. The Court held that in a limited

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92. Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2302; see also supra note 26 (quoting the text of Rule 23(b)(1)(B)).
93. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2312–13; see also supra note 21 (discussing Rule 23(b)(3)).
95. U.S. CONST. amend. VII (stating that "[i]n suits at common law ... the right of trial by jury shall be preserved"); see Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2314.
96. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"); see Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2314–15.
98. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2308–10. Professor Mullenix described the Court's analysis as "parsimonious and constipated." Mullenix, supra note 32, at B12. The Advisory Committee notes accompanying amended Rule 23 state that mass torts arising from accidents such as plane crashes are "ordinarily not appropriate for a class action." FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee's note. The Committee did not even contemplate the use of mandatory classes under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) in such cases. See 1999 Report, supra note 6, at 38. Nor did it anticipate use of any provision of Rule 23 to resolve any mass torts that, like asbestos, did not arise from a single accident. See id. See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., An Historical Analysis of the Binding Effect of Class Suits, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1849 (1998) (describing the historical evolution of class litigation); Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (pt. 1), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356 (1967) (discussing the 1966 amendments in an article written by the reporter to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules).
99. Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2300.
100. See id. at 2311–12.
fund settlement class action, fund inadequacy and class equity are required, and fund exhaustion is at least presumptively necessary. Applying the historical model to the settlement class before it, the Court concluded that none of the three elements was satisfied.

To show inadequacy, the Court stated, it is not enough that the settling parties agree that the fund is limited to a particular amount. The parties to the settlement must present evidence—and the trial judge must make specific findings of fact—establishing with sufficient precision both the value of the available fund and its insufficiency to satisfy all claims. In the Fibreboard settlement, the fund consisted of the defendant's assets plus its available insurance

101. See id. at 2312 (stating that all three elements of the historical model are presumptively necessary); id. at 2321 (declining to reach the question of whether exhaustion is a required element); id. at 2323 (holding that inadequacy and equity are required). The Court's careful reservation of the question of whether exhaustion is an absolute requirement has been overlooked by two early Ortiz interpreters. See Cullen v. Whitman Med. Corp., 188 F.R.D. 226, 236 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (stating that all three elements of the Ortiz historical model are required); The Supreme Court, 1998 Term—Leading Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 200, 309–10 (1999) [hereinafter Leading Cases] (same).

Similarly, a state court has apparently already concluded that non-exhaustion alone is a sufficient basis for rejecting a limited fund settlement. See Schmitt, supra note 12, at B6. The court valued the settlement at $75 million and the defendant at $200 million, and as a result, "this court cannot and does not find that the exhaustion requirement identified in Ortiz has been met." Id. (quoting Alabama Circuit Court Judge Robert Kendall).

102. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2316.

103. See id. (noting the requirement of "a sufficiently reliable determination of the probable total"); see also infra note 174 and accompanying text (discussing the implications of the requirement of precise valuation of claims); infra notes 211–35 and accompanying text (discussing the implications of the requirement of precise valuation of defendant).

104. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2316–17. The Court further requires that the trial judge's factual findings follow a hearing in which the settling parties' evidence is subject to challenge. See id. The Court implicitly acknowledged that even the protections it required might be inadequate; it observed that, after presentation of evidence and findings of fact, the district court valued Fibreboard at $235 million, yet it was sold shortly afterward for $600 million. See id. at 2317 n.28; see also Alan N. Resnick, Bankruptcy as a Vehicle for Resolving Enterprise-Threatening Mass Tort Liability, 148 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2000) (manuscript at 12, on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (noting the difficulty of valuing the assets and liabilities of a large corporate defendant).

Another recent limited fund class settlement case illustrates even more vividly concerns about the effectiveness of the Court's inadequacy standard. In Fanning v. AcroMed Corp. (In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig.), 176 F.R.D. 158 (E.D. Pa. 1997), the settling parties valued the limited fund (the defendant company) at $104 million. See id. at 168. After hearing expert testimony from the settlement proponents, the trial court accepted this valuation. See id. at 170. Around the same time that all appeals to the settlement were dropped, the defendant was purchased for $325 million. See S. Elizabeth Gibson, Mass Torts Limited Fund & Bankruptcy Reorganization Settlements: Four Case Studies, in MASS TORT LITIGATION, supra note 4, app. E at 70 (1999).
The Court held that the district court erred by uncritically accepting the parties' negotiated valuation of that fund. With titanic attorneys' fees riding on the class counsels' willingness to reach a settlement, the class members could not have relied upon counsel to have negotiated a maximized value.

Equity within the class, the second element of the Court's historical model, encompasses two distinct inquiries: inclusiveness of the class and fairness of the fund distribution. The former asks how far the "natural class," that is, "everyone who might state a claim on a single or repeated set of facts, invoking a common theory of recovery," has been reduced by prior dispositions to form the settlement class. The settlement class here failed because class counsel agreed to exclude some 100,000 present claimants, roughly a third of the natural class, many of whom counsel represented directly. The Court left open the possibility that such class

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105. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2317. Of course, if Fibreboard won the coverage litigation, the fund would have been limited only by the assets of the insurance companies. The Court here assumed without deciding that a limited fund could be established by "a value discounted by risk," the more or less unlimited value of the insurance fund discounted by the risk that the insurers would prevail in the coverage litigation. Id.

106. See id. at 2316.

107. See id. at 2317-18; see also Coffee, supra note 2, at 1401 & n.227 (estimating attorneys' fees for the inventory settlement to be $167 million).

108. Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2319.

109. Id. at 2311.

110. See id. Reduction of the natural class occurs when the definition of the class is drawn to exclude natural class members. Such exclusions are apt to be particularly invidious when all present claimants are gerrymandered out of the class, because present claimants are more likely to monitor the performance of class counsel. See Flanagan v. Ahearn (In re Asbestos Litig.) ("Flanagan I"), 90 F.3d 963, 999–1000 (5th Cir. 1996) (Smith, J., dissenting), vacated and remanded, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997), reaft'd per curiam, 134 F.3d 666 (5th Cir. 1998), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999).

One post-Ortiz federal court has announced that any proposed limited fund class (including the non-settlement class before it) that does not include all potential class members cannot be certified. See Cullen v. Whitman Med. Corp., 188 F.R.D. 226, 236–37 (E.D. Pa. 1999) ("I decline to certify the class under 23(b)(1)(B) because the putative class members do not include all potential claimants." (citing School Dist. of Lancaster v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd. (In re School Asbestos Litig.), 789 F.2d 996, 1005 (3d. Cir 1986))). This holding, which did not cite Ortiz as authority for the court's conclusion, substantially extends the Ortiz "natural class" idea. In Ortiz, the Court stated that "[i]t is a fair question how far a natural class may be depleted by prior dispositions of claims and still qualify as a mandatory limited fund class." 119 S. Ct. at 2319 (emphasis added). The Cullen court's requirement that all natural class members be included in all limited fund classes goes beyond each of the italicized phrases.

111. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2318–19. The Court noted that excluded natural class claims (that is, other Fibreboard asbestos injury claims) included 45,000 settled present claims, an estimated 53,000 unsettled present claims, and an uncertain number of reserved claims, leaving an estimated 186,000 future claims in the class. See id.
exclusions might be acceptable if all natural class members received demonstrably comparable benefits, but it concluded that in this case the class members fared worse than the settled inventory claims.\textsuperscript{112}

On the second equity issue, fairness of the fund distribution, the Court held the settlement to be deficient.\textsuperscript{113} When a settlement class covers both unliquidated present claims and unaccrued future claims, the fairness element requires, at a minimum, the procedural protection of separately represented subclasses to address class members' conflicting interests.\textsuperscript{114} The Court held that the district court erred in failing to appoint subclasses to address two sets of conflicts within the class: those between present and future claimants and those between pre- and post-1959 claimants.\textsuperscript{115} Neither the provision of equal allocation to such disparate claimants\textsuperscript{116} nor the urgency of their collective interest in securing a settlement of the coverage litigation\textsuperscript{117} could obviate the need for procedural protections.\textsuperscript{118}

Finally, the Court found the settlement plainly at odds with the third element of the limited fund historical model, fund exhaustion.\textsuperscript{119} Far from devoting the entire fund to the claims,\textsuperscript{120} Fibreboard retained all but $500,000 of its net worth.\textsuperscript{121} Although it did not reach the question of whether such an arrangement alone would be

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{112} See id. at 2319.
\item \textsuperscript{113} See id.
\item \textsuperscript{114} See id.
\item \textsuperscript{115} See id. at 2319–20. The Court acknowledged that “at some point there must be an end to reclassification with separate counsel, [but that] these two instances of conflict are well within the requirement of structural protection.” Id. at 2320. Recall that pre-1959 claims arguably were covered by substantial insurance, while those arising after 1959 were not. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{116} See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2320. But see infra note 195 (explaining that the Fibreboard settlement did not involve equal allocations).
\item \textsuperscript{117} See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2320 (“Rule 23 requires protections under subdivisions (a) and (b) against inequity and potential inequity at the pre-certification stage, quite independently of the required determination at postcertification fairness review under subdivision (e) that any settlement is fair in an overriding sense.”).
\item \textsuperscript{118} See id.
\item \textsuperscript{119} See id. at 2321.
\item \textsuperscript{120} See id.
\item \textsuperscript{121} For examples of dubious non-exhaustion limited fund settlements approved before Ortiz, see In re Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc., 186 F.R.D. 459, 462 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (approving a limited settlement that released class members' claims against three companies, only one of whose assets were used to determine the limits of the fund), and In re Rio Hair Naturalizer Products Liability Litigation, No. MDL 1055, 1996 WL 780512, at *21 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 20, 1996) (approving a limited fund settlement that required payment of only 75% of available insurance and no contribution from the defendant corporation, while plaintiffs' counsel received 20% of the fund in fees).
\end{itemize}
sufficient to defeat approval of a mandatory class action settlement,\textsuperscript{122} the Court did note that it "seem[ed] irreconcilable" with mandatory treatment.\textsuperscript{123} In his two-paragraph concurrence, Chief Justice Rehnquist pointedly underlined the majority's call\textsuperscript{124} for a congressional solution to asbestos litigation.\textsuperscript{125} He noted that "the 'elephantine mass of asbestos cases' cries out for a legislative solution."\textsuperscript{126}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{122} See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2321; see also supra note 101 (noting that the Court did not hold that exhaustion is required).
\item \textsuperscript{123} Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2331.
\item \textsuperscript{124} See id. at 2302 & n.1.
\item \textsuperscript{125} See id. at 2324 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
\item \textsuperscript{126} Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (quoting id. at 2302). The Amchem Court made a similar plea for a legislative response to the asbestos crisis. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 598 (1997). Many unsuccessful attempts have been made since the late 1970s to address asbestos issues legislatively. See Mary J. Davis, Toward the Proper Role for Mass Tort Class Actions, 77 OR. L. REV. 157, 163 n.28 (1998) (citing hearings on four separate congressional bills); cf. Maria Gabriela Bianchini, Comment, The Tobacco Agreement That Went up in Smoke: Defining the Limits of Congressional Intervention into Ongoing Mass Tort Litigation, 87 CAL. L. REV. 703, 718-19 n.79 (1999) (citing five congressional efforts to legislate general mass tort reform since 1992). After Amchem, six asbestos defendants hired a lobbying firm to renew efforts to achieve a legislated solution, see Ericson, supra note 67, at 2019, but threats of "'nuclear war' " from plaintiffs' lawyers convinced all but one to withdraw their support. Holman W. Jenkins Jr., Now on Video: America's Scariest Special Interest, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 1999, at A23 (quoting attorney Joseph F. Rice). Nonetheless, in March 1999, the Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of 1999 was introduced in both the House and the Senate to create an Asbestos Resolution Corporation to resolve all claims. See S. 758, 106th Cong. (1999) (Sup. Docs. No. Y 1.4/1.106-1-758); H.R. 1283, 106th Cong. (1999) (Sup. Docs. No. Y 1.4/6:106-1-1283); see also Michael Barone, Money Talks, as It Should, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 15, 1999, at 37, 37 (supporting and describing the bill). This bill generally is supported by business interests and is opposed by the Association of Trial Lawyers of America and the AFL-CIO. See Congress Considers a New ADR Agency for Asbestos Suits, 17 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COSTS OF LITIGATION 137, 137 (CPR Inst. for Dispute Resolution 1999). While several commentators have expressed skepticism regarding the likelihood of congressional action, see Coffee, supra note 2, at 1463; Ericson, supra note 67, at 2019–20, 2024; Feinberg, supra note 19, at 365; Zipes, supra note 2, at 9 & n.6; Raskolnikov, supra note 24, at 2546 & n.18, a House subcommittee held hearings on the bill one week after Ortiz was decided. See Congress Considers a New ADR Agency for Asbestos Suits, supra, at 138. The bill's sponsor pointed to Ortiz as the latest stone in a " 'procedural wall' " preventing class resolution of asbestos litigation. Id. (quoting Rep. Henry J. Hyde).
\end{itemize}
In dissent, Justice Breyer accepted the majority’s limited fund historical model as a basis for analysis, but argued that the settlement substantially met each element. He argued that district courts should aggressively seek out efficient ways to resolve asbestos cases, while appellate courts should draw upon district courts’ greater experience with, and appreciation of, the problems posed by mass tort litigation. In an asbestos settlement, he said, “I believe our Court should allow a district court full authority to exercise every bit of discretionary power that the law provides.”

This Note has suggested that the fundamental question in the

Should Go First: Deferral Registries in Asbestos Litigation, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 541, 552 n.46 (1992) (citing studies reviewing the Black Lung program).

A recent comment analyzes the $368.5 billion tobacco settlement negotiated by the tobacco industry and 40 state attorneys general that Congress rejected in 1998. See Bianchini, supra, at 705. The author observed that the settlement negotiators essentially had agreed to a mass tort class action settlement that they had submitted to Congress rather than to a court. See id. The settlement likely would have run afoul of Rule 23 had the negotiators chosen to file the settlement in court as a class action, the author determined, see id. at 726–35, but if Congress had passed the settlement as legislation it would have survived any subsequent legal challenge, see id. at 735–43. The author concluded that Congress, and not the judiciary, is in a position to resolve mass tort litigation efficiently, but cautioned that a legislative solution heightens the dangers of collusion and special interest influence. See id. at 748–50.

An interesting aspect of recent mass tort jurisprudence is the extent to which the cases have divided otherwise like-thinking judges. See McGovern, supra note 13, at 596. In the Supreme Court, the schism has divided the liberal end of the court, with Justices Souter and Ginsburg writing the majority opinions in Ortiz and Amchem and Justices Stevens and Breyer dissenting. In the Fifth Circuit, the battle raged in Flanagan I and II between Judges Davis and Smith, both conservative judges. See Fifth Circuit, 2 ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 6, 18–19 (Megan Chase ed., 1998). Professor McGovern discusses various explanations for this phenomenon in an article written before Amchem was handed down. See McGovern, supra note 13, at 595–97, 602–14.

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evolution of mass tort law asks which tool or tools may be used to resolve mass tort claims. Before Ortiz, the limited fund mandatory settlement class action was one of the primary choices. The essential question, then, is whether limited fund settlement classes survive Ortiz.

On a formal level, at least, Ortiz provides no definitive answer to that question. No fewer than three times, the Court raised, without resolving, the “ultimate question” of whether Rule 23(b)(1)(B) settlement classes ever may be used to aggregate tort claims. It might be noted as a preliminary matter that the fact that the Court posed the question so insistently hardly suggests sympathy with those who advocate mandatory settlement classes for mass tort resolution. At a minimum, the Court has created a new level of uncertainty for mass tort litigants; before Ortiz, no federal court had held, or indeed even seriously considered, the possibility that limited fund classes were off limits to mass tort litigants.

Going beyond the Court’s formal holdings sheds further light on the continuing viability of the mandatory mass tort settlement class.

132. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.

133. Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2312, 2314; see also id. at 2323 (raising the issue without calling it the “ultimate question”). The subtle differences among the iterations of the question bear noting. One poses “the ultimate question whether settlements of multitudes of related tort actions are amenable to mandatory class treatment.” Id. at 2312. Another asks if Rule 23(b)(1)(B) can ever be used in a plan that resolves both present and future claims. See id. at 2323. In its broadest formulation, the Court poses “the ultimate question whether Rule 23(b)(1)(B) may ever be used to aggregate individual tort claims.” Id. at 2314.

134. See, e.g., Findley v. Blinken (In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.), 982 F.2d 721, 739 (2d Cir. 1992) (vacating the certification of a mass tort limited fund class, but noting that such a class would have been permissible with proper subclasses), modified, 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993); Abed v. A.H. Robins Co. (In re Northern Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig.), 693 F.2d 847, 856–57 (9th Cir. 1982) (decertifying a mass tort limited fund class, but leaving open the possibility that such classes could be certified). The only reported decision that even approaches saying that (b)(1)(B) is unavailable in mass tort cases is Walker v. Liggett Group, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 226, 233 (S.D. W. Va. 1997). In that case, the court rejected a limited fund settlement class composed of tens of millions of smoking victims, a class “so uniquely expansive” that it “appear[ed] to defy” necessary division into subclasses. Id. at 232–33. Such language, of course, is far from holding that limited fund resolution of mass torts is per se forbidden. Likewise, commentators have not argued for such a rule. But cf. Issacharoff, supra note 25, at 809–11, 832 (arguing that Rule 23(b)(1) is unavailable in mass tort cases—mass tort and otherwise—should face a strong presumption against certification); Richard L. Marcus, They Can't Do That, Can They? Tort Reform Via Rule 23, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 858, 877–88 (1995) (arguing that limited fund classes should be available rarely, if ever, in mass torts). Indeed, it appears that the suggestion that (b)(1)(B) would be unavailable to mass tort litigants specifically only arose during oral argument of Ortiz. See United States Supreme Court Official Transcript at *9, Ortiz (No. 97-1704), available in 1998 WL 849388 (oral argument of Laurence H. Tribe on behalf of settlement objectors).
A close reading of *Ortiz* strongly suggests that this issue, ostensibly unresolved by the Court, has been decided for all practical purposes.\textsuperscript{135} To see how, it is useful to look closely at three aspects of the opinion that the Court itself did not emphasize, but that, when viewed in light of existing case law, send an unmistakably negative message to those considering mass limited fund settlements in the future. First, *Ortiz* resolved an ambiguity in the case law regarding whether the fact of settlement should weigh for or against certification, holding that limited fund classes demand more scrutiny when certification is for settlement only.\textsuperscript{136} Second, the Court declined the obvious opportunity to endorse the consensus developing among lower courts that subclasses are required only when the conflicts within a class are substantial.\textsuperscript{137} Finally, *Ortiz* left several crucial issues unresolved, creating a level of uncertainty sure to be discouraging to those considering negotiating a major limited fund settlement.\textsuperscript{138} Taken together, these three aspects of *Ortiz* will force litigants to look elsewhere for a means to aggregate and resolve mass tort claims.

The most fundamental way that the Court can influence the viability of the limited fund settlement is by changing the standard of scrutiny applied to such settlements' certification. Heightened scrutiny of settlement classes obviously would make limited fund classes more difficult to certify, while a more deferential standard would encourage their use. The Court granted certiorari to hear *Amchem* in 1997 precisely to resolve a split among courts regarding whether the fact of settlement could itself be a factor weighing in favor of class certification.\textsuperscript{139} As it happened, however, *Amchem* only

\begin{footnotes}
\item 135. See Steven Glickstein et al., *Product Liability Class Actions*, in *NON-FEDERAL QUESTION CLASS ACTIONS: PROSECUTION & DEFENSE STRATEGY* 1999, at 317, 340 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. Ho-0068, 1999) (arguing that *Ortiz* "severely restricted, if not entirely eliminated, the use of 'limited fund' class actions in mass torts by imposing [the historical model]"); see also Richard B. Schmitt & Laura Johannes, *Judge Rejects Interneuron's Proposed Class-Action Settlement over Diet Pill*, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 1999, at B15 (quoting Arnold Levin, an attorney who helped negotiate a limited fund settlement rejected in light of *Ortiz*, as saying, "'I think the weight of the Supreme Court decision was just too great to overcome'"). \textit{But see} Mullenix, \textit{supra} note 32, at B12 (predicting that "$[l]awyers are not going to give up on limited-fund settlement classes after *Ortiz,*" but also stating that "Justice Souter single-handedly rendered the class action rule a quaint museum piece").

\item 136. \textit{See infra} notes 139–51 and accompanying text.

\item 137. \textit{See infra} notes 152–66 and accompanying text.

\item 138. \textit{See infra} notes 167–74 and accompanying text.

\item 139. \textit{See} Cramton, \textit{supra} note 57, at 824 (noting the openness of the question). \textit{Compare In re A.H. Robins Co.,} 880 F.2d 709, 738, 740 (4th Cir. 1989) ("[T]he promotion of settlement may well be a factor in resolving the issue of certification . . . . If not a
Amchem expressly rejected the Third Circuit's holding that settlement classes must be held to the same certification standard as litigation classes, noting that "settlement is relevant to a class certification" and that "settlement is a factor in the calculus." The Court specifically held that, in a proposed opt-out class, the court need not weigh trial manageability as a factor in its certification decision. Taken in isolation, such language seems to hold settlement classes to a lower standard than trial classes. Yet, Amchem went on to hold that "other" provisions of Rule 23—"those designed to protect absentees by blocking unwarranted or overbroad class definitions—demand undiluted, even heightened, attention in the settlement context." This language, again read in isolation, seemed to go beyond the Third Circuit's holding by setting higher standards for settlement classes, at least as to certain unidentified provisions of Rule 23. In a footnote, the Court explained rather mysteriously that "[s]ettlement, though a relevant factor, does not inevitably signal that class action certification should be granted more readily than it would were the case to be litigated.... [P]roposed settlement classes sometimes warrant more, not less caution on the question of certification."

Such mixed signals on the central holding of the case

140. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 619, 622.
141. See id. at 620 ("[A] district court need not inquire whether the case, if tried, would present intractable management problems, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D), for the proposal is that there be no trial."). Rule 23(b)(3)(D) provides that, in certifying an opt-out class, "[t]he matters pertinent to the findings [of predominance and superiority] include: ... the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D). Note that (b)(3)(D) is not relevant to the certification of a mandatory class.
142. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620; see also id. at 620 n.16 ("For reasons the Third Circuit aired, see 83 F.3d 610, 626-35 (1996), proposed settlement classes sometimes warrant more, not less, caution on the question of certification.").
143. Id. at 620 n.16 (emphasis added).
144. See Walker v. Liggett Group, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 226, 230 (S.D. W. Va. 1997) ("The precise question faced in Amchem was the role settlement may play under Rule 23 in
predictably spawned confusion. Some courts and commentators read *Amchem* to set a lower standard for settlement classes than trial classes. Others concluded just the opposite, with some courts decertifying classes that they previously had granted preliminary certification. Still others viewed the two standards as equal in all respects but trial manageability.

In *Ortiz*, the Court resolved the question of settlement’s role in certification firmly in favor of those who read *Amchem* to raise the bar for settlement class actions, at least as to mandatory classes. Without even referring to *Amchem*’s holding that settlement is a factor, the *Ortiz* Court transformed what originally served as a shield judging the propriety of class certification.

145. See TIDMARSH, supra note 45, at 27 (“The difficult question ... is deciding exactly which parts of Rule 23(a) and (b) can be de-emphasized in a settlement class action, and which must be strictly complied with.”); cf. Cabraser, supra note 28, at 84 (observing that decisions after *Amchem* appear to use *Amchem* as authority to support whatever decision—for or against certification—the court seems predisposed to make).

146. See San Antonio Hispanic Police Officers’ Org., Inc., v. City of San Antonio, 188 F.R.D. 433, 441, 453 (W.D. Tex. 1999); In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 186 F.R.D. 459, 472-76 (S.D. Ohio 1999); Fanning v. AcroMed Corp. (In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig.), 176 F.R.D. 158, 172 (E.D. Pa. 1997); see also TIDMARSH, supra note 45, at 69 n.168 (“The Fifth Circuit [in *Flanagan 1*] ... noted (correctly in light of *Amchem*) that the factor of settlement ... can be considered in deciding whether Rule 23’s elements have been met.”); Cabraser, supra note 28, at 87 (“*Amchem* indicates that the fact of settlement weighs strongly in favor of class certification ....”); Herbert E. Milstein & Gary E. Mason, *The Reaction to Class Action*, N.J. L.J., Aug. 18, 1997, at S-12, S-12 (“National settlements of [class action] cases may actually become more likely since the courts must now expressly consider the settlement itself when deciding whether to certify the settlement class.”).


149. See Blyden v. Mancusi, 186 F.3d 252, 270 (2d Cir. 1999); In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 187 F.R.D. 549, 551-52 (S.D. Ohio 1999); Cohen, supra note 19, at 285; cf. Cabraser, supra note 28, at 83, 85, 125 (arguing that *Amchem* has a narrow holding that should have a limited impact on class action jurisprudence).

150. Whether this heightened scrutiny applies to non-mandatory classes, in which the right to opt out of the settlement affords claimants at least a measure of protection not present in limited fund classes, is open to question.
protecting settlement classes into a weapon that courts must use against them. The Court held that, when class certification is for settlement only, "the moment of certification requires 'heightened' attention' to the justifications for binding the class members. . . . [A] fairness hearing under Rule 23(e) is no substitute for rigorous adherence to those provisions of the Rule 'designed to protect absentees,' among them subdivision (b)(1)(B)."

By conspicuously omitting all Amchem language that had suggested relaxed or even equal scrutiny for settlement classes, Ortiz makes it clear that the certification standard has been tightened substantially for proposed mandatory settlement classes. Such heightened scrutiny, taken alone, may not prove invariably fatal to future limited fund settlements, but it sends a clear signal to litigants and lower courts that alternatives to such settlements should be considered.

Ortiz landed a second, more telling blow to limited fund settlements with its treatment of conflicts within the proposed class and the requirement of appointing separately represented subclasses to address them. Here, too, the Ortiz holding must be viewed in light of Amchem's holding and the division in the lower courts that ensued. Amchem had suggested that subclasses were required when, "[i]n significant respects, the interests of those within the single class are not aligned." Some, including Judge Smith of the Fifth Circuit, concluded that Amchem required that any conflict within

151. Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2316 (quoting Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997)) (alterations in original). In Petrovic v. Amoco Oil Co., a case decided after Ortiz, the Eighth Circuit held that the heightened scrutiny of class certification that had been mandated by Amchem and Ortiz did not apply when over three years of discovery preceded the settlement and when the settlement was reached several months after class certification. Petrovic v. Amoco Oil Co., Nos. 98-3816, 99-1334, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 34295, at *5-6, *17-18 (8th Cir. Dec. 30, 1999). The court asserted that because of the extensive pretrial activity, the danger of collusion between the defendant and the class counsel was "not present here." Id. at *6. Applying a "deferential" abuse of discretion standard of review, the court upheld certification of the class. Id. at *2, *5, *6.

152. Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2319-20.

153. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 626. But see TIDMARSH, supra note 45, at 29 ("The [Amchem] Court did not, however, suggest whether subclasses would necessarily have solved the problems of adequacy of representation."); Cohen, supra note 19, at 315-16 (stating that Amchem did not resolve the issue of whether every subclass must have its own representative or its own counsel); Charles Silver & Lynn Baker, I Cut, You Choose: The Role of Plaintiffs' Counsel in Allocating Settlement Proceeds, 84 VA. L. REV. 1465, 1489 (1998) (observing that Amchem does not explicitly require separately represented subclasses for conflicts in the proposed class).

154. See Flanagan v. Ahearn (In re Asbestos Litig.) ("Flanagan II"), 134 F.3d 668, 677 (5th Cir. 1998) (Smith, J., dissenting) (arguing that "any real conflict, even if minor when compared to interests held in common, will render the representation inadequate"), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999).
the class, no matter how minor, result in the appointment of subclasses. A clear majority of courts, however, concluded that only substantial conflicts require subclasses.

Given the sharp debate in the lower federal courts and in the academic literature, the Court must have been aware that an issue existed whether the obligation to create subclasses was limited to intra-class conflicts that were deemed substantial. Thus, when the Court discussed the conflicts that required subclasses in Ortiz, the absence of any language limiting that requirement to substantial conflicts, or even noting that the conflicts in Ortiz were substantial, strongly suggests that no such limit exists. The Court established

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156. See Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding no need to create subclasses in a nationwide class when variations in state law were “not sufficiently substantial” and differences in damages and potential remedies were “relatively small”); Krell v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. (In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig.), 148 F.3d 283, 313 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that when class members share an interest in establishing the same “crux” issue, adequacy of representation is satisfied), cert. denied sub nom. Johnson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 525 U.S. 1114 (1999); Martens v. Smith Barney, Inc., 181 F.R.D. 243, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (explaining that “only a conflict that goes to the very subject matter of the litigation will defeat a party’s claim of representative status”) (quoting Krueger v. New York Tel. Co., 163 F.R.D. 433, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (internal quote marks and citations omitted)); Fanning v. AcroMed Corp. (In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig.), 176 F.R.D. 158, 176 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (finding subclasses unnecessary “[b]ecause there are no great divergent conflicts in the class); In re Telecommunications Pacing Sys., Inc., 172 F.R.D. 271, 292 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (noting that “the [c]ourt must make an evaluation to determine which variances are important or substantial enough to ... require subclasses”); see also Coffee, supra note 155, at 1553 (noting that “it is far from clear that Amchem Products will be extended so as to require subclasses (or, in any event, separate counsel) for every material difference among class members”).

157. Cf. Silver & Baker, supra note 153, at 1486 (writing before Ortiz was handed down that the issue of whether all class conflicts necessitated separately represented subclasses was before the Ortiz Court).

158. The significance of the Court’s refusal to limit the subclass obligation to substantial conflicts seems particularly clear in light of the fact that evidence of the substantiality of the conflicts in Ortiz was readily available. See, e.g., Flanagan v. Ahearn (In re Asbestos Litig.) (“Flanagan I”), 90 F.3d 963, 1013 n.49 (5th Cir. 1996) (Smith, J., dissenting) (noting that pre-1959 claims had been settling for three times the value of post-1959 claims), vacated and remanded, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997), reaff’d per curiam, 134 F.3d 668 (5th Cir. 1998), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999). Note that an argument could be made that the strict obligation to create subclasses enunciated in Ortiz does not apply outside the limited fund context, because the historical model created the obligation, not Rule 23(a)(4). But see Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2320 (noting that the failure to create subclasses for present and future claimants in Ortiz was “as contrary to the equitable obligation entailed by the limited fund rationale as it was to the requirements of structural protection applicable to all class actions under Rule
the need for subclasses on the bare statements that the class was "divided between present and future claims" and "[p]re-1959 claimants accordingly had more valuable claims than post-1959 claimants." Such conflicts created "disparate interests" among class members that fell "well within" the requirement to create subclasses. The Court may have stopped short of the position that no conflict is de minimis, noting that "at some point there must be an end to reclassification with separate counsel." Even this concession, however, seems a deliberate retreat from the language in Amchem suggesting that subclasses were required only when the interests of claimants clashed "[i]n significant respects." In short, whether any broad discretion to exempt insubstantial conflicts survives Ortiz is open to question.

23(a)(4)" (emphasis added)); Glickstein et al., supra note 135, at 319 (reading the stricter obligation to create subclasses established by Ortiz to apply to opt-out classes as well). 159. Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2319. The Court elaborated only to note that "for the currently injured, the critical goal is generous immediate payments," but '[t]hat goal tugs against the interest of exposure-only plaintiffs in ensuring an ample, inflation-protected fund for the future." Id. at 2319-20 (quoting Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626 (1997)). Here again, the Court appears deliberately to avoid any suggestion that the conflicts within the class need to be substantial before subclasses are required. 160. Id. at 2320 (citation omitted). 161. Id. 162. Id. (emphasis added). 163. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 626. But see Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2331 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (interpreting the majority's "at some point" language to oblige courts to balance the advantages and disadvantages of increasing the number of attorneys involved in the litigation). 164. In Petrovic v. Amoco Oil Co., Nos. 98-3816, 99-1334, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 34295 (8th Cir. Dec. 30, 1999), a case decided on December 30, 1999, the Eighth Circuit reached a profoundly different conclusion, one that only can be described as not reconciled easily with Amchem and Ortiz. In Petrovic, a group of property owners brought suit for property damage against the defendant oil company. See id. at *1. The suit was certified as a class action under Rule 23(b)(3). See id. at *5-6. The parties then negotiated a settlement that divided class members into three groups. See id. at *2. Under the terms of the settlement, the class members in the first group received compensation equal to 54% of the value of their property. See id. at *3. Those in the second group received a guaranteed payment of $1300. See id. Class members in the third group received no guaranteed compensation at all, despite the fact that the settlement granted the defendant easements on their properties to clean up the oil spill. See id. at *3, *27. The Eighth Circuit panel upheld the district court's refusal to appoint any subclasses. See id. at *7. Despite the glaring disparity in the allocation formula applied to groups within the class, see id. at *3, and despite evidence that the underground oil was migrating such that future claimants might be left uncompensated for their injuries by the settlement, see id. at *9, the panel concluded that the "stark conflicts of interest that the Supreme Court discerned in Amchem and Ortiz are [not] present here." Id. at *8. This conclusion was based in part on the court's observation that intra-class conflicts were minimized because all class members stood to gain from the settlement. See id. at *12. In Amchem and again in Ortiz, the Court emphatically rejected the argument that the common interest of class members
Unquestionably, the strict standard regarding subclasses imposed by *Ortiz* will discourage the use of the limited fund settlement in mass torts. Professor Green has remarked vividly that “in a mature litigation in which the landscape is littered with the bankrupt bodies of many major defendants, the balkanization of a large class of toxic tort victims into several subclasses seems to be a prescription for heightened conflict as opposed to efficient resolution.” Moreover, Professors Silver and Baker have argued that intra-class conflicts are so pervasive that “a firm ‘no-conflicts’ line ... means the end of class actions.” In the aftermath of *Ortiz*, the accuracy of that prediction will be tested.

The difficulty of certifying limited fund settlement classes after *Ortiz* does not depend simply on those questions that the Court answered in its opinion. Uncertain law can be just as strong a deterrent to litigation as unfavorable law, and *Ortiz* leaves a great deal of uncertainty in its wake. The Court left unresolved a substantial number of questions, the negative answer to any one of which could scuttle certification of limited fund mass tort classes.

[165] Green, supra note 67, at 1778; see also Coffee, supra note 2, at 1553 (explaining that “the result is to balkanize the class into an unmanageable assortment of small subclasses that cannot easily act in concert”); Cohen, supra note 19, at 315-16 (“It is possible to certify so many subclasses that the efficiencies of the class device are lost.”). Furthermore, observers writing after *Ortiz* have predicted that the burden of managing a more cumbersome class structure will deter trial judges from certifying class actions. See Glickstein et al., supra note 135, at 320.

[166] Silver & Baker, supra note 153, at 1493; see also Coffee, supra note 2, at 1444 (acknowledging the argument that mass tort class settlement would be impossible if any allocations within a class were suspect). Others, striking a less apocalyptic tone, have suggested that increasing the number of subclasses may increase the fairness of the process. One leading plaintiffs’ attorney has suggested that more rigorous subclass creation “may complicate and prolong the procedures by which a class action settles, or a settlement class is created or approved, [but] it does not invalidate such procedures, and in the long run may ensure that these mechanisms worked to the greater benefit of class members.” Elizabeth J. Cabraser, *Recent Developments in Nationwide Products Liability Litigation: The Phenomenon of Non-Injury Products Cases, the Impact of Amchem and the Trend Toward State Court Adjudication, and the Continued Viability of Carefully Constructed Nationwide Classes in the Federal Courts*, SC33 ALI-ABA 1, 26 (1998), available in WL, ALI-ABA database; see also Marcus, supra note 134, at 897 (arguing that increasing the difficulty of reaching settlement is good because “settlement should not be achieved at the expense of discernable subgroups who lack separate representation”).

[167] The deterrent effect of uncertain law is likely to be particularly powerful in the mass tort context, in which “[n]egotiating is expensive, and parties are reluctant to invest in negotiations that are bound to fail.” Silver & Baker, supra note 153, at 1473.

[168] See Mullenix, supra note 32, at B12 (suggesting that *Ortiz* left critical issues unresolved “that are destined to cause mischief in the lower federal courts”).
The net effect of such uncertainty will be to leave limited fund settlement classes looking like a poor gamble indeed.

Among the critical questions left open are the following:

- Can unmanifested injuries satisfy the Article III injury-in-fact test for standing, and can future claimants satisfy the case or controversy requirement?\(^{169}\)
- To what extent is notice required in a mandatory class, and can it ever be adequate to class members, such as mass tort future claimants, who are unaware of their injuries?\(^{170}\)
- Do settlements that involve interstate classes with claims under non-identical state laws comport with the Rules Enabling Act if claimants are not divided into subclasses by state?\(^{171}\)
- Do settlements involving damage claims that abridge claimants’ access to individual trials violate their Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial?\(^{172}\)
- Is it sufficient for the proponents of a limited fund settlement

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\(^{169}\) See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2307. See generally Jeremy Gaston, Note, Standing on Its Head: The Problem of Future Claimants in Mass Tort Class Actions, 77 TEX. L. REV. 215, 224–58 (1998) (discussing standing for future claimants and proposing that claimants without manifested injury be denied standing); Leading Cases, supra note 101, at 313 (asserting that had the Court opted to address the issue, it probably would have concluded that future claimants do not meet the constitutional requirements for standing). The author of the latter piece argued that the Ortiz Court should have seized the opportunity to hold that future claimants lack standing, thus forcing Congress's hand to enact a statutory solution to asbestos litigation. See Leading Cases, supra note 101, at 314; see also supra note 126 (discussing potential congressional asbestos legislation).

\(^{170}\) See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2312 n.19; see also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, THIRD § 30.45 (1995) (stating that future claimants “cannot be given meaningful notice”); Cramton, supra note 57, at 835 (arguing that notice to future claimants cannot satisfy due process); Rutherglen, supra note 78, at 271–77 (arguing that the Federal Rules should be amended to require that the necessary level of notice be determined on a case-by-case basis); Todd W. Latz, Note, Who Can Tell the Futures? Protecting Settlement Class Action Members Without Notice, 85 VA. L. REV. 531, 532–68 (1999) (arguing that closer scrutiny of the adequacy of class representation can overcome lack of notice to future claimants).

\(^{171}\) See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2314; see also Wish v. Interneuron Pharms., Inc. (In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig.), No. MDL 1203, CIV. A. 98-20594, 1999 WL 782560, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 1999) (rejecting, on Rules Enabling Act grounds, a settlement that failed to account for different state law remedies available to different class members); cf. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1300–02 (7th Cir. 1995) (discussing the problem of different state laws in nationwide classes). One commentator also has suggested that the supplantation of bankruptcy by limited fund class actions may be found to violate the Rules Enabling Act. See Resnick, supra note 104 (manuscript at 8 n.9).

\(^{172}\) See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2314–15; see also Amicus Curiae Brief of Association of Trial Lawyers of America in Support of the Petitioners at *13–18, Ortiz (No. 97-1704), available in 1998 WL 464927 (arguing that the Ortiz settlement violated the Seventh Amendment by shifting claims to a non-jury tribunal without a valid waiver of the class members’ rights).
to show a substantial probability that individual claims would compromise the rights of other claimants, rather than an inescapable certainty of such compromise?\(^{173}\)

- Are any mass torts mature enough to provide a court with an adequate basis for valuation of unliquidated claims?\(^{174}\)

In leaving so many unanswered questions in the path of future limited fund settlers, the Court may achieve through discouragement what it is reluctant to decree forthrightly—the abandonment of the limited fund settlement as a tool for resolving mass tort litigation.

To review, this Note has argued that Ortiz has rendered limited fund settlements so difficult to achieve that future litigants will be unable to continue to view them as a viable option for resolving mass tort cases. That is not to suggest, however, that such settlements will vanish altogether. It is therefore worth exploring the ways in which Ortiz permits or encourages innovation in structuring future limited fund settlements and considering whether such innovations are desirable. Looking primarily to recent limited fund cases in federal district courts, the discussion below anticipates three innovations that

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173. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2316 n.26; see also Hudson, supra note 19, at 698–703 (arguing for a more flexible alternative to the inescapably compromises standard). Hudson describes such a standard as "perhaps the quintessential example of the 'Catch-22.'" Hudson, supra note 19, at 699.

174. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2316–17 (assuming without deciding that the litigation history of asbestos, the most mature of all mass torts, provided a sufficient basis for valuing aggregate claim value). Mature mass torts are those that have reasonably complete discovery and an adequate number of cases resolved by verdict and settlement. See McGovern, Mature Mass Torts, supra note 66, at 659. See generally 1999 Report, supra note 6, at 22–25 (defining maturity and explaining its significance). The first court to apply Ortiz to a limited fund certification decision held that, due to the immaturity of the tort (fen-phen diet drug litigation), the court had an insufficient basis for calculating the total value of claims against the limited fund. See Wish, 1999 WL 782560, at *7; cf. Feinberg, supra note 19, at 366–67 (describing the difficulty of negotiating claim values in settlements of immature torts); Marcus, supra note 134, at 878–79 (noting the extreme difficulty of computing prospective tort claim values). See generally Drucker, supra note 28, at 215, 229–34 (arguing that class actions arising from immature torts should be forbidden).

Judicial estimation of mass tort liability has not been an unqualified success. See Thomas A. Smith, A Capital Markets Approach to Mass Tort Bankruptcy, 104 YALE L.J. 367, 368–69 (1994) (noting that claim estimation has been a "vexing" problem that has "haunted" recent mass tort cases). Two major mass tort settlements have foundered after the value of claims brought against settlement trusts vastly exceeded projections. See Findley v. Blinken (In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.), 982 F.2d 721, 726 (2d Cir. 1992) (observing that, as a consequence of an unexpectedly high volume of claims, the multi-billion dollar Johns-Manville trust was virtually penniless after less than two years of operation), modified, 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993); TIDMARSH, supra note 45, at 77–78 (discussing the failure of a $4.23 billion multi-defendant settlement of breast implant claims caused by a massive underestimation of claim volume).
may arise in the jurisprudence spawned by Ortiz.\textsuperscript{175} First, Ortiz likely will encourage limited fund settlement negotiators to attempt to sidestep the obligation to create subclasses simply by postponing allocation decisions until after settlement. Second, Ortiz may be read to discourage parties from negotiating settlements that measure the limited fund by the value of the defendant as a going concern. Finally, Ortiz may encourage limited fund defendants to insist upon retaining some or all of the savings in litigation costs made available by the settlement. Each of these three possible readings of Ortiz would undermine the Court’s insistence on fairness for absent class members.

The Court in Ortiz appears to reinforce the position that even minor conflicts within a proposed class require creation of subclasses.\textsuperscript{176} As discussed above, this subclass requirement will prove deeply problematic to future settling parties.\textsuperscript{177} Having placed such a formidable obstacle in the path to certification, however, Ortiz may have left open a questionable means to avoid that obstacle: the no-allocation settlement.

The basic rationale for creating subclasses is that class members with conflicting interests must be represented separately when allocations of the fund are negotiated.\textsuperscript{178} In other words, counsel to a class cannot make allocation decisions among competing interests within the class that they represent. That concern is never triggered, however, if the settlement itself makes no allocation decisions.\textsuperscript{179}

\textsuperscript{175} At least two other responses, not discussed in the text of this Note, also may be anticipated after Ortiz. One is certification of mandatory (b)(1)(B) classes on rationales other than the existence of a limited fund. The text of (b)(1)(B) includes no express requirement of a limited fund. \textit{See} \textit{Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B).} Ortiz recognized that non-limited fund (b)(1)(B) rationales could be argued, but did not reach the issue of whether such rationales are proper. \textit{See} Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2321 n.33. Non-limited fund (b)(1)(b) classes have been certified. \textit{See} \textit{In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc.,} 186 F.R.D. 459, 474 (S.D. Ohio 1999); White v. National Football League, 822 F. Supp. 1389, 1411 (D. Minn. 1993), aff'd, 41 F.3d 402 (8th Cir. 1994). The objectors in Ortiz, however, argued that (b)(1)(B) classes based upon claims exclusively for damages must show a limited fund. \textit{See} Brief for Petitioner at *24 n.20, Ortiz (No. 97-1704), \textit{available in} 1998 WL 464933. The settlement proponents did not agree. \textit{See} Brief of Respondents Continental Casualty Co. at *24-30, Ortiz (No. 97-1704), \textit{available in} 1998 WL 601118.

Another response that can be anticipated after Ortiz is that litigants will turn to state courts to file their limited fund settlements. A trend to state courts has already been well identified. \textit{See}, e.g., Erichson, \textit{supra} note 67, at 2000–01 & n.106.

\textsuperscript{176} \textit{See} supra notes 157–64 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{177} \textit{See} supra notes 165–66 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{178} \textit{See} Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2319; Silver & Baker, \textit{supra} note 153, at 1467, 1496.

\textsuperscript{179} It is important to distinguish between what this Note terms a "no-allocation settlement" and what might be called an "equal-allocation settlement." In a no-allocation settlement, all allocation decisions are postponed until after class certification and final
Because all claimants share an interest in maximizing the settlement fund, no conflicts materialize until allocation of the fund begins. Historically, settlement negotiations have encompassed both the overall size of the fund and its allocation, but no reason has yet been articulated why they must. Allocation decisions can be deferred until after certification and settlement approval, at which time either the court or a designated claims administrator allocates the money.

Almost unnoticed, no-allocation settlements already have begun to appear. In the 1993 case Butler v. Mentor Corp., a federal district court certified a limited fund mandatory class of breast implant recipients and approved a $25.8 million settlement. No subclasses were created, and all allocations were left for a court-appointed fund administration committee. Four years later, another district court approved a $104 million settlement of orthopedic bone screw claims in Fanning v. AcroMed Corp., certifying a mandatory class without subclasses on a limited fund theory. A claims administrator was appointed to make all allocation decisions. In holding that there were no conflicts that required subclasses, the Fanning court pointed to the fact that all allocation decisions had been postponed. In both cases, objectors to the settlements unsuccessfully challenged the fairness of binding class members without giving them any settlement approval. In an equal-allocation settlement, by contrast, the allocation is determined prior to final approval, and the allocation scheme chosen is one of equal payments to all class members. Ortiz rejected the argument that equal-allocation settlements cure conflicts within the class. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2320. For an argument that equal-allocation settlements are appropriate when all claims have a negative net expected value—that is, when litigation costs exceed expected recovery—, see Coffee, supra note 155, at 1555–56.

But see Silver & Baker, supra note 153, at 1509 (arguing that conflicts are also inherent to earlier phases of the litigation).

Indeed, it is somewhat surprising that the no-allocation settlement has not become popular earlier, given that neither party to settlement negotiations has a financial incentive to negotiate the often complex allocation. See Newberg & Conte, supra note 20, § 9.72, at 9-195; Coffee, supra note 155, at 1549–50.

See infra notes 183–91 and accompanying text (describing the use of such procedures in two recent cases).


See id.

See id.


See id. at 165.

See id. at 176.

See id.
information regarding allocation.\textsuperscript{190} Neither case, however, was appealed.\textsuperscript{191} The theory that no-allocation settlements can be used to circumvent the obligation to create subclasses largely has been overlooked by commentators; the fact that such settlements are already occurring seems nearly to have escaped scholarly notice altogether. Among the suddenly voluminous literature on mass torts,\textsuperscript{192} only one article directly discusses the use of no-allocation settlements to avoid subclasses.\textsuperscript{193} While the November 1998 article by Professor John C. Coffee, Jr.\textsuperscript{194} inaccurately identifies Ortiz (and only Ortiz) as a no-allocation settlement,\textsuperscript{195} his comments nonetheless bear careful attention. A no-allocation settlement, he wrote, "denies class members any information about what they will receive as of the time the settlement is approved; instead, they are forced to buy the

\textsuperscript{190} See Gibson, supra note 104, app. E at 58, 79.

\textsuperscript{191} See id. at 57, 83. The fact that neither case was appealed probably helps to explain their relative obscurity. Both cases were examined recently in id. at 46–86.

\textsuperscript{192} For example, as of February 7, 2000, there were 218 articles in the Westlaw JLR database with "mass tort" in their titles; more than half were written in the past five years. Cf. McGovern, supra note 13, at 613–14 (suggesting that, in Amchem, both the Supreme Court and the counsel for the parties had evident difficulty with the steep learning curve for mass tort law).

\textsuperscript{193} In 1997, Professor Resnik, without mentioning subclasses, expressed her opinion that allocation decisions should not be postponed until after settlement approval. See Judith Resnik, Litigating and Settling Class Actions: The Prerequisites of Entry and Exit, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 835, 858–59 & n.88 (1997). Professor Resnik argued that judges asked to approve settlements "must be provided with information about their facets.... [Q]uestions of inter-class equity should not be postponed to some fictive later stage: disclosure of methods of allocation of funds or other remedial forms must be provided prior to the approval of a settlement." Id. at 858–59. Two other sources discuss the related idea that class counsel may avoid ethical missteps by passing off allocation decisions to a neutral party. See Feinberg, supra note 19, at 370–71; Paul D. Rheingold, Ethical Constraints on Aggregated Settlements of Mass-Tort Cases, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 395, 406–07 (1998). Whereas Professor Feinberg endorses the practice, Professor Rheingold is critical: "While this technique sounds soothing because there is a judge or equivalent in the picture, in fact much of the vice of aggregate settlement still exists." Rheingold, supra, at 406.

\textsuperscript{194} See Coffee, supra note 155, passim.

\textsuperscript{195} See id. at 1554 n.23. As the Court in Ortiz noted, the decision to treat equally the unequal claims of those exposed before and after 1959 was itself an allocation decision. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2320. The limits on recovery and longer payment terms for claimants who opted to try their claims also effect an allocation, see id. at 2319, as did provisions that prioritized payment of more seriously injured claimants. See id. at 2326 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit appears to have believed that the settlement was a no-allocation settlement. See Flanagan v. Ahearn (In re Asbestos Litig.) ("Flanagan II"), 134 F.3d 668, 669–70 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (holding that a "controlling difference[] from Amchem was that here "there was no allocation or difference in award"), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999).
proverbial 'pig in a poke,' and await the subsequent claims resolution process." 196 Despite these fairness concerns, Professor Coffee anticipated general judicial approval of the no-allocation settlement device. 197 He predicted that such settlements would become increasingly popular as a means of avoiding the need for separate counsel during settlement negotiations. 198 Requiring separate representation at the time of allocation, he concluded, "creates an unfortunate incentive to employ [no-allocation settlements] in order to avoid intraclass allocations of the settlement fund (and, perhaps more importantly, the obligation to share the fee award with the counsel for these other subclasses)." 199

Judicial approval of no-allocation settlements may not be quite so foregone a conclusion as Professor Coffee suggests, however. Perhaps the strongest vehicle for challenging the no-allocation settlement is a court's obligation under Rule 23(e) to find that a class settlement is fair before approving it. 200 The law in this area is largely uncharted, but at least one court has held that specifics regarding fund distribution are "truly critical considerations for certification," 201 and another has found a proposed settlement unfair for the sole reason that it was insufficiently specific about how settlement funds actually would be spent. 202 These cases sound an appropriate note of caution. No-allocation settlements force trial judges to approve deals that they do not understand satisfactorily.

In addition to a fairness challenge, a settlement's failure to detail allocations within the class also could be challenged as inadequate

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196. Coffee, supra note 155, at 1554.
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. Id.
200. Rule 23(e) provides: "Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs." FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). This language is understood to require courts to assess the fairness of any settlement. See supra note 20 (discussing the 23(e) fairness test).
202. See Martens v. Smith Barney, Inc., 181 F.R.D. 243, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("The settlement leaves unclear both what new programs it will fund and to what extent existing Smith Barney expenditures can qualify .... The proposed programs are nowhere delineated or defined."). The court implied, however, that the specificity problem in the settlement might be cured simply by allowing the court to retain jurisdiction over disputes arising after settlement approval. See id. Issues regarding the fairness of no-allocation agreements also have arisen in the bankruptcy context. See RICHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW 230 (1991) (noting an unsuccessful challenge to the failure to provide information about projected recoveries in disclosure to claimants arising out of the bankruptcy of the Dalkon Shield's manufacturer).
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notice. Notice is an issue in class actions because it is one of the fundamental justifications for an exception to the general rule that claimants are only bound by adjudications to which they are a party. Rule 23 requires that class members in opt-out classes under (b)(3) receive the "best notice practicable," but it imposes no equivalent notice obligation for mandatory class members under (b)(1). In both types of classes, however, some form of notice is required before a court may approve a class settlement, in order to provide class members with an opportunity to offer objections to the settlement. Ortiz expressly left open the question of the degree to which due process requires notice to mandatory class members. It is not clear, then, whether failure to include allocation information would render notice to a mandatory class inadequate. The Second Circuit, in a 23(b)(3) settlement of Agent Orange litigation, has stated that there is no absolute requirement to detail a distribution plan in notice to class members.

203. See, e.g., Rutherglen, supra note 78, at 264–68.
205. See id. 23(e) (requiring "notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise . . . to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs"); see also Rutherglen, supra note 78, at 272 (explaining the importance of such notice in mandatory classes). See generally 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 1797, at 359–78 (discussing the 23(e) notice requirement). Rule 23(e)'s notice requirement can be quite demanding: the $18 million worldwide notice campaign in Ortiz was described by the settlement proponents as the most extensive ever undertaken in a class action. See Brief of Respondents Continental Casualty Co. at *47, Ortiz (No. 97-1704), available in 1998 WL 601118; see also TIDMARSH, supra note 45, at 67–68 (describing the Ortiz notice effort); Gibson, supra note 104, at 42–43, 55–56, 75–76 (describing the notice campaigns employed in three limited fund settlements).
206. See supra note 170 and accompanying text (noting the Court’s non-resolution of the applicability of notice to mandatory classes). See generally Rutherglen, supra note 78, at 271–77 (suggesting that current law largely leaves the extent and form of notice for mandatory classes to the discretion of the trial court and proposing that extensive, individual notice be required when practical).
207. See In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 170 (2d Cir. 1987) (indicating that an absolute requirement would unduly “overburden” the parties and the court). The Eighth Circuit went considerably beyond Agent Orange in Petrovic v. Amoco Oil Co., a post-Ortiz decision. Petrovic v. Amoco Oil Co., Nos. 98-3816, 99-1334, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 34925, at *29–32 (8th Cir. Dec. 30, 1999). In Petrovic, all settlement allocation decisions had already been made before notice of the settlement was undertaken. See id. at *30–32. The settling parties nonetheless chose to include only the aggregate settlement amount in the notice to class members, offering no information regarding individual recoveries, see id. at *29, despite the simplicity of the allocation provisions, see id. at *2–3 (describing the essential compensation terms in three sentences totaling under 100 words), and despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of class members were to be denied any monetary recovery, see id. at *3 (observing that “approximately 5,000” of the “more than 5,000” class members “receive no guaranteed compensation”). The Eighth Circuit panel concluded that the notice was adequate,
As Professor Coffee's "pig in a poke" observation illustrates,\(^\text{208}\) however, notice that is silent on the issue that each class member would be expected to care about most—the amount that each will recover—seems anything but adequate.\(^\text{209}\) A class member's right to object to a class settlement before it is approved is drained of its vitality if the fact most likely to trigger that objection is simply omitted. At the time when they have a chance to object to the settlement, all that class members know is that the total amount—in millions or billions of dollars—sounds like a considerable amount of money. If the plan actually undervalues the worth of the defendant, the class members will have little reason to undertake the difficult task of valuing the defendant independently. Class members, no less than trial judges,\(^\text{210}\) are entitled to know the details of allocation before the approval of a settlement.

A second important post-\textit{Ortiz} issue involves the means available to calculate the value of the limited fund defendant. Defendant valuation is critical to both the inadequacy element and the exhaustion element of \textit{Ortiz}'s historical model.\(^\text{211}\) Without a firm grasp on how much the defendant is worth, it may be impossible to meaningfully establish either the value of the limited fund or its exhaustion.\(^\text{212}\) Accurately calculating how much the defendant is worth, however, is often more complicated than merely totaling up

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\(^\text{208}\) See \textit{supra} note 196 and accompanying text.

\(^\text{209}\) See 2 \textsc{Newberg & Conte}, \textit{ supra} note 20, § 8.32, at 8-106 (explaining that notice under 23(e) generally should include the formula by which settlement funds will be distributed); Howard M. Downs, \textit{Federal Class Actions: Diminished Protections for the Class and the Case for Reform}, 73 \textsc{Neb. L. Rev.} 646, 692 (1994) ("The failure to give adequate notice of a settlement plan of distributions . . . contributes to the egregious lack of protection afforded to class members."); Latz, \textit{ supra} note 170, at 556 (arguing that notice to class members should include a means of calculating individual recoveries). \textit{But see Manual for Complex Litigation, Third}, § 30.212 (1995) (urging that notice should explain allocation procedures and clearly set out differences in relief, but noting with apparent approval the practice of postponing allocation decisions until after settlement approval); 7B \textsc{Wright et al.}, \textit{supra} note 20, § 1787, at 220-21 (stating that settlement notice "may" include information on allocation).

\(^\text{210}\) See \textit{supra} notes 200-02 and accompanying text.

\(^\text{211}\) See \textit{supra} notes 102-23 and accompanying text (describing the limited fund historical model enunciated in \textit{Ortiz}).

\(^\text{212}\) See \textit{supra} notes 100-23 and accompanying text. At least hypothetically, exhaustion could be established without an accurate valuation of the defendant, if the settlement simply transferred total ownership of the defendant corporation to the class. In reality, however, it is hard to see how a settlement effecting such complete surrender could ever be in a defendant's interest.
the sum of its assets. A going concern valuation, because it takes account of a defendant's projected future earnings as well as its present assets, will, at least in theory, often result in a substantially larger fund. Just as a college student may have few tangible assets but considerable future earning potential, the value of a defendant company's future earning capacity may greatly exceed the sum of its present assets.

The Supreme Court has long recognized going concern analysis as the appropriate means for corporate valuation, at least in the bankruptcy context. In Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Du Bois, the Court noted that "the commercial value of property consists in the expectation of income from it." The Court

213. See Marcus, supra note 134, at 879 (explaining that calculating a mass tort defendant's assets "is much more complicated than obtaining a simple net worth figure from the defendant's books").

214. See In re Mobile Freezers, 146 B.R. 1000, 1002 (S.D. Ala. 1992) (observing that bankruptcy reorganization envisions that "the continued operation of the debtor will result in a stream of earnings . . . whose present value is greater than the liquidation value of the firm"), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Mobile Freezers, Inc. v. United States, 14 F.3d 57 (11th Cir. 1994) (mem.); Donald S. Bernstein & Nancy L. Sanborn, The Going Concern in Chapter 11, in CHAPTER 11 BUSINESS REORGANIZATION 1993, at 157, 159 (PLI Com. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. A647, 1993) (describing bankruptcy policy of rehabilitating and preserving troubled business "if continuity of its operations and management—i.e., maintaining the business as a going concern rather than liquidating—would maximize recoveries by creditors and shareholders"). See generally 7 COLLIER, supra note 22, § 1129.06(2), at 1129-153 to -170 (describing going concern value and various methods for calculating it); MARK S. SCARBERRY ET AL., BUSINESS REORGANIZATION IN BANKRUPTCY 741-60 (1996) (same); Peter V. Pantaleo & Barry W. Ridings, Reorganization Value, 51 BUS. LAW. 419, 420-36 (1996) (same). Theoretically, a limited fund settlement based on a going concern valuation could be structured in at least three different ways: an initial lump sum payment to plaintiffs with money borrowed against the defendants' future earning potential, see, e.g., Fanning v. AcroMed Corp. (In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig.), 176 F.R.D. 158, 169 (E.D. Pa. 1997), installment payments, see, e.g., Wish v. Interneuron Pharms., Inc. (In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig.), No. MDL 1203, CIV. A. 98-20594, 1999 WL 782560, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 1999), or transfer of some fraction of the company's stock to plaintiffs, see, e.g., Gibson, supra note 104, app. E at 34 (describing Eagle-Picher bankruptcy reorganization terms).

215. See 7 COLLIER, supra note 22, § 1129.06(2)[a], at 1129-155. Similarly, when the value of a corporation must be determined to calculate dissenters' rights in a corporate acquisition, it is "well settled in case law . . . that fair value is based on going concern value and not on the liquidation value of the corporation." Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., Fair Value and Fair Price in Corporate Acquisitions, 78 N.C. L. REV. 101, 118 (1999). Professor Campbell notes that "[f]undamentally, under modern finance theory, the present value for any company . . . is determined by discounting the expected cash flows to be derived from the company in the future." Id. at 151.

216. 312 U.S. 510 (1941).

217. Id. at 526 (quoting Harrisburg & San Antonio Ry. v. Texas, 210 U.S. 217, 226 (1908)); see also Protective Comm. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 442 n.20 (1968) (defining reorganization value as the "present worth of future anticipated earnings" (citing Jerome
recognized, however, that such valuation was necessarily inexact: "Since its application requires a prediction as to what will occur in the future, an estimate, as distinguished from mathematical certitude, is all that can be made." That recognized imprecision, however, contributes to making going concern valuation an uneasy fit under the historical model analysis. Can such "an estimate, as distinguished from mathematical certitude," satisfy the Ortiz requirement that the size of the fund be "set definitely at [its] maximum[?]"

One federal court has already applied Ortiz in rejecting a going-concern-valued limited fund settlement, noting "[t]he difficulty in identifying, with any certainty, the scope of the fund." The same court had approved a limited fund settlement based on a going concern valuation two years earlier. Another district court rejected a going concern settlement in 1997, noting that "a limited-fund finding would have been facilitated greatly by the presence of a discrete, identifiable res rather than the amorphous corporate entity proffered by the parties." With many courts already outside their expertise when asked to assess conventional corporate valuation, and with Ortiz mandating heightened scrutiny of limited fund settlements, the going concern settlement may be doomed by its imprecision.

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220. Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2311.


224. See Campbell, *supra* note 215, at 104 (noting that cases involving corporate valuation "can be puzzling for courts unaccustomed to the world of corporate finance").

225. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.

226. See supra notes 218-20 and infra note 234 and accompanying text.
As if the difficulty of establishing inadequacy were not enough, the exhaustion element of the historical model increases the complexity of the court’s calculation exponentially. Ortiz noted that exhaustion traditionally requires that “the whole of the inadequate fund . . . be devoted to the overwhelming claims.” That formulation is fundamentally at odds with going concern settlements, in which the whole point is to allow the defendant to keep assets sufficient to continue earning money. Even if exhaustion is understood more broadly so as to require simply that “the class as a whole [be] given the best deal,” the exhaustion element would still present a nearly insurmountable obstacle if interpreted strictly. The calculation demanded is inherently nebulous: have the parties perfectly balanced the need for a maximized payment with the need to leave the defendant with assets sufficient to maximize its income and, thus, maximize its payments? Considering both the fact that the settling parties are before the court in a non-adversarial posture and the ever-present danger in mass tort settlements that class counsel has “sold out” the class, the court’s ability to make such a post-hoc judgment independently is quite uncertain.

If Ortiz is so interpreted, rejection of settlements based on a limited fund valued as a going concern may be an unfortunate development. Particularly in cases involving smaller defendants, going concern valuations have the potential to produce superior resolutions for all concerned, creating the largest possible recovery fund while allowing the defendant to survive intact. On the other

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227. Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2311.
228. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
229. Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2311.
230. See Wish v. Interneuron Pharms., Inc. (In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig.), No. MDL 1203, CIV. A 98-20594, 1999 WL 782560, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 1999) (holding that a proposed limited fund settlement violated the Ortiz exhaustion element because the defendant corporation was allowed to retain a portion of its assets in order to continue in business while the class members received a debt instrument to be paid back from the future earnings of the company). Despite the Wish settlement proponents’ argument that the proposed payment structure represented the best deal possible, id. at *8, the court stated that “the Wish class’s participation in Interneuron’s future . . . is fraught with risk, including . . . the risks found in financial markets as a whole. Those risks are better shouldered by Wall Street investors than the members of a compulsory class under Rule 23.” Id.
231. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2317–18; 5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.84[1] (Matthew Bender 3d ed. 1999); Coffee, supra note 2, at 1373–83.
232. Cf. 7 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 1129.06[2][c], at 1129-70 (noting the risks inherent to going concern valuation, because “formulas, like trained animals, perform according to what they are fed” (quoting In re Consul Restaurant Corp., 146 B.R. 979, 986 n.15 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1992))).
hand, the Court in *Ortiz* betrays a basic skepticism about the integrity of mass tort class counsel and the ability of trial judges to ensure that integrity.  

The benefits that going concern valuation theoretically makes possible could, in reality, be swallowed up by the absence of clear and reasonably ascertainable standards. Yet, to reject the potential benefits of going concern settlements on these grounds is to declare the inability of the American adversarial system to produce just results in mass tort litigation. More sophisticated judicial scrutiny of corporate valuation in settlements, rather than a blanket rejection of going concern settlements, appears to be the sounder course.

A third issue likely to arise in post-*Ortiz* litigation involves interpretation of the exhaustion element of the historical model. When a defendant faces tens of thousands of separate tort claims, it is far less expensive to negotiate a single settlement than to litigate each case separately. In mass tort cases, the savings can be in the hundreds of millions of dollars. Thus, it is hardly surprising that a defendant in a limited fund case would seek to retain for itself the money that, absent settlement, it would have spent on defense costs. The question after *Ortiz* is whether allowing a limited fund defendant to emerge from settlement with the saved litigation costs comports with the exhaustion element of the historical model.

Because mass tort defendants are not, as a rule, motivated by a strong sense of charity, they are likely to enter into limited fund

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233. *See supra* note 107 and accompanying text (noting the Supreme Court's explicit concern about the danger of collusion in mass tort settlements).

234. *Cf.* H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 222 (1977), *reprinted in 13 BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY* (1979) (observing that because of its inherent uncertainty, going concern valuation is often "a method of fudging a result that will support the plan that has been proposed").

235. *Cf.* Campbell, *supra* note 215, at 104 (noting that courts in jurisdictions that frequently handle cases requiring complex corporate valuations "in recent years have done much better in dealing with such issues"); Erichson, *supra* note 67, *passim* (discussing the emerging importance of careful independent judicial scrutiny of class action settlements).

236. *See, e.g.*, Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corp., 162 F.R.D. 505, 529 (E.D. Tex. 1995), *aff’d sub nom.* Flanagan v. Ahearn, 90 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1996), *vacated and remanded*, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997), *reaff’d per curiam*, 134 F.3d 668 (5th Cir. 1998), *rev’d and remanded sub nom.* *Ortiz* v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999). To understand what is at stake, consider a simple hypothetical mass tort defendant. This defendant has total assets of $100 million available to spend on defense costs, and it faces tort liability that exceeds that amount. If the defendant litigates each claim individually, it will pay out $60 million in settlements and judgments and spend the other $40 million on litigation expenses. If, instead, the defendant negotiates a limited fund class settlement, it will spend only $5 million on litigation expenses, thus freeing up $35 million.

237. *See, e.g.*, SOBOL, *supra* note 202, at 13, 172 (describing a mass tort defendant's apparent effort to discourage claims by interrogating plaintiffs about details of their sexual
settlements only if they expect better economic outcomes than they could get through bankruptcy or other forms of aggregated litigation. Whether the limited fund mandatory class settlement should provide that better economic outcome remains an open question. Both the Fifth Circuit and Chief Judge Parker squarely held that limited fund settlements need not equal what defendants would have paid through individual litigation.\textsuperscript{238} Ortiz expressly left the question unanswered,\textsuperscript{239} although several parts of the opinion cast serious doubt on the Court’s openness to a plan that allows a settling defendant to retain a portion of its limited fund.\textsuperscript{240}

Which standard is appropriate? Should exhaustion focus on the benefit to the plaintiffs or the cost to the defendant? A plaintiff-

\textsuperscript{238} See Flanagan v. Ahearn (In re Asbestos Litig.) (“Flanagan I”), 90 F.3d 963, 985 (5th Cir. 1996) (“To the extent intervenors are arguing that certification is improper because Fibreboard fares better under the class action settlement than under a bankruptcy proceeding, we find their focus misplaced. The inquiry instead should be whether the class is better served by avoiding impairment of their interests.”), vacated and remanded, 321 U.S. 1114 (1997), reaфф’d per curiam, 134 F.3d 668 (5th Cir. 1998), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999); Ahearn, 162 F.R.D. at 527 (“[A] rule [requiring that a settlement exhaust a defendant’s resources] would make no sense, would discourage settlements and has been rejected. In terms of the expected recovery for class members, the Global Settlement is far superior to either the Trilateral Settlement or to no settlement at all.” (citations omitted)).

\textsuperscript{239} 119 S. Ct. at 2322 (“If a settlement thus saves transaction costs . . . may a credit for some of the savings be recognized . . . as an incentive to settlement? It is at least a legitimate question, which we leave for another day.”).

A related issue, more complicated than the reduced transaction costs issue addressed by the Court, arises from the fact that the settlement itself could affect the value of the corporation. For example, in Ortiz, Fibreboard’s stock value rose nearly 300% on announcement of the settlement. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1402. Because the mere fact of settlement can have a major impact on the defendant’s value as a corporation, would exhaustion require that the parties attempt to anticipate this impact? Cf. Campbell, supra note 215, at 112-16, 122-27, 129-33 (noting that in corporate acquisition cases that require courts to calculate corporate value in order to determine the rights of takeover dissenters—when the acquisition itself creates value—courts are inconsistent in factoring that new value into their calculations of the corporate value). In the corporate acquisition context, the term for the added value created by the very act that triggers the need to calculate corporate value is “synergy.” Id. at 112.

\textsuperscript{240} The Court noted that traditional “limited fund cases thus ensured that the class as a whole was given the best deal; they did not give a defendant a better deal than seriatim litigation would have produced.” Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2311 (emphasis added). The Court went on to state that a limited fund settlement “requires assurance that claimants are receiving the maximum fund, not a potentially significant fraction less.” Id. at 2323. The Court expressly rejected the dissent’s argument that allowing Fibreboard to retain nearly all of its assets was permissible because the settlement made more money available than any likely alternative because “even if we could be certain that this evaluation were true, this is to reargue Amchem: the settlement’s fairness under Rule 23(e) does not dispense with the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b).” Id.
benefit standard would require only that the settling plaintiffs receive as much as they would have through individual litigation. Under a plaintiff-benefit standard, the defendant could retain some or all of the litigation cost savings resulting from the settlement. The defendant-cost standard, on the other hand, would require that the defendant’s total payments under the settlement equal what their total payments would have been absent settlement. Thus, a defendant-cost standard would ensure that the saved defense costs would go to the settling plaintiffs.

There is much to be said for allowing a defendant to retain some portion of the transactional cost savings under a plaintiff-benefit standard. Defendants would be encouraged to settle and resolve their claims, thus hastening compensation to victims and relieving docket congestion.241 Likewise, economically valuable businesses could retain assets sufficient to remain afloat.242 Additionally, a plaintiff-benefit standard arguably promotes fairness by providing victims with just as much compensation as they would have received had all claims been litigated individually. Such a standard ensures that some money is left over to pay commercial creditors.243 Finally, an argument can be made that a plaintiff-benefit standard serves to counterbalance an “overclaiming” effect attributed to mass tort litigation.244

Nevertheless, the arguments for a defendant-cost standard may be more compelling. There is a basic disconsonance in using a limited fund to force all claimants to accept a diminished share of their damages, while allowing a defendant to retain a substantial portion of that fund. Until all plaintiffs receive undiscounted compensation, the defendant should not recover.245 A plaintiff-benefit standard also

241. See Ahearn, 162 F.R.D. at 527 (concluding that a defendant-cost standard would discourage settlement); Green, supra note 67, at 1798–99 (arguing that encouraging settlement would produce outcomes that are more efficient and remunerative for asbestos victims).

242. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2332 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (praising the Fibreboard settlement for allowing the company to remain in business, a result “far better for Fibreboard, its employees, its creditors, and the communities where it is located”).

243. See Hudson, supra note 19, at 690–97.

244. McGovern, supra note 15, at 1022–23 (suggesting that while in general less than 20% of potential tort claims are pursued, in mature mass torts more than 100% of viable claims are brought); see also 1999 Report, supra note 6, at 16–17 (same); cf. Drucker, supra note 28, at 219–20 (arguing that class actions attract so many plaintiffs that they are unfair to defendants). But see Resnik, supra note 193, at 844 (suggesting that the limited participation of victims in individual tort litigation “is not an appealing alternative”); Schuck, supra note 126, at 961–62 (arguing that the benefits of the higher claim rate in mass torts outweigh the negative features of “junk claims”).

245. This argument is analogous to the absolute priority rule established by the
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could allow corporate wrongdoers to profit at the expense of those innocent victims who would have received full compensation through individual litigation. Finally, on a practical level, a plaintiff-benefit standard would appear to create incentives for defendants to under-insure and over-defend.\textsuperscript{246}

Ultimately, deciding which standard to use in measuring exhaustion (like many of the issues considered in this Note) may, practically speaking, turn on one’s views regarding the relative merits of bankruptcy and limited fund settlements as mass tort resolution tools. The choice between bankruptcy and class action is a matter on which courts and commentators are deeply divided,\textsuperscript{247} with an

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\textsuperscript{246} Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1994). Under the absolute priority rule, a debtor’s shareholders cannot receive any money from the debtor’s estate until all unsecured creditors have been paid in full. See id; see also 7 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 1129.04[4][a], at 1129-82 to -89 (describing the absolute priority rule). The Court in Ortiz noted its concern about procedural innovations that would undermine the structural protections provided to creditors in bankruptcy. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2321 n.34.

\textsuperscript{247} Because ample insurance would serve to raise the bar for establishing a limited fund, it would make it more difficult for a defendant to capture the savings available through a plaintiff-benefit standard limited fund class settlement. Similarly, it might be in a defendant’s economic interest to increase unnecessarily its defense costs, when such an increase would allow the defendant to establish the existence of a limited fund and thus capture the transactional savings of an aggregated solution.

246. Because ample insurance would serve to raise the bar for establishing a limited fund, it would make it more difficult for a defendant to capture the savings available through a plaintiff-benefit standard limited fund class settlement. Similarly, it might be in a defendant’s economic interest to increase unnecessarily its defense costs, when such an increase would allow the defendant to establish the existence of a limited fund and thus capture the transactional savings of an aggregated solution.

unfortunate dearth of careful research to inform the debate.\textsuperscript{248} For present purposes, it is enough to recognize that \textit{Ortiz} has made limited fund class certification substantially, perhaps prohibitively, more difficult and uncertain. A probable consequence is that, barring congressional intervention,\textsuperscript{249} more mass torts will be resolved through bankruptcy.\textsuperscript{250}

In 1935, the link between asbestos and cancer was reported for the first time.\textsuperscript{251} In 1974, the first asbestos class action was attempted.\textsuperscript{252} To the dismay and, one senses, the astonishment of most observers, the American justice system stands no more ready today to address meaningfully the continuing misery of the victims of asbestos than it did in decades past.\textsuperscript{253} Through that failure, it has become itself one of those victims.

In his opinion in the case that would become \textit{Amchem}, then-Judge Edward Becker wrote, “Every decade presents a few great cases that force the judicial system to choose between forging a solution to a major social problem on the one hand, and preserving its institutional values on the other.”\textsuperscript{254} Judge Becker chose institutional values, and in \textit{Ortiz}, the Supreme Court did the same. A generation from now the correctness or incorrectness of that choice may be more apparent. One thing is clear today: the elephants are still thundering closer, and there may well be one less weapon available to bring them down.

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\textsuperscript{248} See Jones, \textit{supra} note 247, at 1722 (“More rigorous scholarship from both the bankruptcy and civil procedure communities is urgently needed.”). One of the few valuable comparisons of bankruptcy and class actions is a collection of case studies examining the use of each tool that was published as an appendix to the report of the Working Group on Mass Torts. See Gibson, \textit{supra} note 104, app. E.

\textsuperscript{249} See \textit{supra} note 126 (discussing proposals and prospects for asbestos legislation).

\textsuperscript{250} Bankruptcy is not open to all mass torts litigants either, however. See, e.g., \textit{In re SGL Carbon Corp.}, Nos. 99-5319, 99-5382, 1999 WL 1268082, at *7, *14 (3d Cir. Dec. 29, 1999) (ordering dismissal of corporation’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition because of a lack of good faith, on the grounds that the corporation remained free of serious financial danger at filing).

\textsuperscript{251} See 1991 \textit{REPORT}, \textit{supra} note 2, at 5; \textit{CASTLEMAN}, \textit{supra} note 3, at 50. Professor Castleman details the extensive evidence of industry knowledge of the harmful effects of asbestos. See \textit{id.} at 1–158, 581–697.

\textsuperscript{252} See Yandle v. PPG Indus., 65 F.R.D. 566, 567 (E.D. Tex. 1974).

\textsuperscript{253} Professor Resnik aptly described this dismay when she wrote that “a good many judges, lawyers, and other participants ... are struggling with misery that they see around them and are trying, in a world of second-best responses, to do something useful in the face of huge problems.” Resnik, \textit{supra} note 193, at 860.