The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A New Look at the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965

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THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION COMES TO IMMIGRATION LAW: A NEW LOOK AT THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT OF 1965

GABRIEL J. CHIN*

In this historical analysis of the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Professor Chin argues that Congress eased restrictions on Asian immigration into the United States in an effort to equalize immigration opportunities for groups who had been the victims of discriminatory immigration laws in the past. In Part I of the Article, he summarizes immigration law before the 1965 Amendments, illustrating the restrictions on non-white immigration which may be found in nearly all immigration

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A number of people and agencies graciously provided first-hand information about the framing and development of the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, including President Gerald R. Ford; Senator Charles Mathias; Governor Arch Moore, Jr.; Representatives James Corman, Don Edwards, Robert Kastenmeier and Peter Rodino, Jr.; former Senate Judiciary Committee staff member Dale DeHaan; David Burke, former Chief of Staff to Senator Edward M. Kennedy; Myer Feldman, Deputy Counsel to President John F. Kennedy and Counsel to President Lyndon B. Johnson; W. Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor under Presidents Johnson and Kennedy; the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel; Nicholas deBelleville Katzenbach, President Johnson's Attorney General; Norbert Schlei, Assistant Attorney General under Robert Kennedy; and former Department of Justice attorney Adam Walinsky.
laws before 1965.

In Part II, Professor Chin disputes the prevailing view among scholars that Congress did not intend to ease immigration opportunities for Asians, but passed the law with the expectation that few Asians would immigrate as a result. Relying on congressional documents chronicling the passage of the bill, as well as recent interviews with participants in the 1965 legislative process, Professor Chin rejects the argument that Congress expected little or no change in the demographics of the immigration stream, which was predominantly white during the first half of the twentieth century. Professor Chin claims that this erroneous interpretation of history is based in part on a misunderstanding regarding Attorney General Robert Kennedy's testimony before Congress. Professor Chin further rejects arguments that the bill was designed almost exclusively to remedy injustices to southern and eastern Europeans, that the easing of restrictions on Asian immigration was passed only with the understanding that the Act contained structural protections against increased Asian immigration, or that legislators did not know that Asian families and professionals wanted to immigrate to the United States.

Instead, Professor Chin argues that the 1965 legislation is widely misunderstood. He indicates that history shows that the bill was passed with a racial egalitarian motivation, thus taking a revolutionary step toward non-discriminatory immigration laws.

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"The 1965 Immigration Act... [has] been a disaster and should be either repealed or reformed so substantially as to imitate repeal."

From the success of California's Proposition 187, which denies most public benefits to undocumented aliens, to proposals in Congress to slash legal immigration, the nature of America's immigration policy is undergoing scrutiny of a scope and intensity not seen in decades. One way of understanding what is at stake in this debate is the continuing vitality of the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965 and the principles embodied in it. Although amended several times since 1965, this law established a framework which endures today.

The revolutionary feature of the 1965 Act was its elimination of race and national origin as selection criteria for new Americans. Race neutrality was a significant development for American immigration law, which had been explicitly race conscious from the first
substantive federal regulation of immigrants, the Coolie Act of 1862,\(^4\)
to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,\(^5\) passed only thirteen
years before the 1965 Act.

The 1965 Act represents a high-water mark for opponents of
immigration restriction. They celebrate the humane spirit of the 88th
and 89th Congresses which, in two remarkable years, passed the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the 1965 im-
migration law. Diversification of the immigrant stream is, from this
perspective, no less a civil rights triumph than is equal opportunity
under law in the voting booth or in the workplace. The elimination
of race as a factor was a practical as well as symbolic change. Since
1965, upwards of seventy-five percent of immigrants have been from
Asia, Africa, or Central or South America.\(^6\)

To some immigration restrictionists, the 1965 Act was America's
Trojan Horse, perhaps the quintessential example of the rule of unin-
tended consequences.\(^7\) That a majority of the post-1965 immigration
has been non-white, restrictionists contend, was as unexpected as it
was undesirable. Although the 1965 Act is racially neutral on its face,
a phalanx of scholars of otherwise diverse viewpoints agree with re-
strictionists that the Act was actually designed to increase the
number of \textit{white} southern and eastern European immigrants, not
people from the third world.\(^8\) Theodore H. White, for instance, wrote
that the "new [A]ct . . . was noble, revolutionary—and probably the
most thoughtless of the many acts of the Great Society."\(^9\) Indeed,

\begin{footnotes}
4. Act of Feb. 19, 1862, ch. 27, 12 Stat. 340 (regulating transportation of "inhabitants
or subjects of China, known as \textquoteleft coolies\textquoteright")\textendash repeated by Act of Oct. 20, 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-461, 88 Stat. 1387.

5. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 202(b), 66 Stat. 163, 177
(establishing special quota attribution rule for persons tracing ancestry to races indige-
nous to "Asia-Pacific triangle" area), repeated by Immigration and Nationality Act

6. See INS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE INS,
1991, at 29-30 tbl.2 (1992) (showing immigration by decade from 1971-90 and by year for
1991-92)\textendash hereinafter 1991 \textit{STATISTICAL YEARBOOK}; BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. DEPT OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES,
COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, at 105-09 (1976) (showing immigration by country for 1966-70)
\textendash hereinafter BUREAU OF THE CENSUS\textendash.

7. Many commentators use the 1965 Act as a prime example of the rule of unin-
tended consequences. \textit{See}, e.g., S.L. Bachman, \textit{As the Number of People Increases in Poor
Nations, the Number of People at the Borders of Rich Countries Does, Too}, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS, Mar. 20, 1994, at 7C ("The Law of Unintended Consequences upsets
planning."); Donald Devine, \textit{Impending Debate on Immigration}, WASH. TIMES, May 1,
1995, at A16 ("Talk about your unintended consequences from government actions.").

8. \textit{See infra} notes 122-35 and accompanying text.

9. THEODORE H. WHITE, AMERICA IN SEARCH OF ITSELF: THE MAKING OF THE
\end{footnotes}
David Reimers questions what "[Congress] would have done if this issue were clear in 1965,"\(^{10}\) suggesting the possibility that the bill would not have passed, at least not without measures designed to minimize Asian and other non-white immigration.\(^{11}\) Roger Daniels has no doubts: "[H]ad the Congress fully understood [the 1965 Act's] consequences, it almost certainly would not have passed."\(^{12}\)

This argument implies that the Administration and Congress were ignorant, hypocritical, or both. The argument is not simply that Congress was unaware of what seems obvious in retrospect: that poor relations of Americans would want to come here, or that skilled people from relatively impoverished regions of the world would find life in America attractive. Neither is it the claim that officials did not predict precisely how the details of the new law would play out. Instead, the argument is that the Congress which passed the 1965 Act had a conscious belief that white immigrants would continue to dominate the immigrant stream. Congress offered legal equality, these people say, because and only because they firmly believed that non-white immigrants would not take advantage of it.

Commentators such as Peter Brimelow, author of the controversial *Alien Nation*, point to seemingly conclusive evidence of the intent of the law, such as Attorney General Robert Kennedy's prediction that "5,000 [Asians] would come in the first year [under the 1965 Immigration Act], but we do not expect that there would be any great influx after that."\(^{13}\) To some scholars, Congress's mistake may be of historical interest only, but restrictionists contend that the law's unin-
tended consequences make it a monumental blunder that must be corrected.\textsuperscript{14} Lawrence Auster, an unsung godfather of the restrictionist movement, insists that introduction of so many immigrants of different cultural backgrounds is leading us down "the path to national suicide." The punch line: Admit mainly whites, urge restrictionists, or slam the door, before it's too late.\textsuperscript{15}

This Article examines the conflicting viewpoints concerning the meaning of the 1965 Act. What kind of America did the framers of the law envision? Was it a civil rights milestone, or was it intended to be a gesture of no impact that has gone badly wrong? A close reading of the legislative history of the 1965 Act shows some support for what is clearly the standard view that Congress did not anticipate a change in the racial demographics of the immigration stream. Nevertheless, the more probable conclusion is that Congress intended to create real equal opportunity for groups whose opportunity to immigrate had been restricted in the past. If the magnitude of the change was unexpected, it was also probably not a major issue to a group of legislators who, by passing laws prohibiting discrimination in a variety of contexts, demonstrated the sincerity of their faith in the irrationality of racial distinctions.

Part I of this Article briefly summarizes the racial and quasi-racial restrictions in American immigration law which were swept away by the 1965 Act, focusing on racial treatment of Asians. It points out that as recently as 1952, when Congress passed the McCarran-Walter Act, Congress was willing to pay a substantial price to avoid even trivial non-white representation in the immigration stream.

Drawing upon interviews with members of Congress and the Administration who worked on the bill and on the legislative history of the bill, Part II tests the scholarly consensus that Congress believed there would be no significant change in the racial demographics of the immigrant stream. It concludes that the better view is that Congress knew that more Asians would immigrate as a result of the law. Because the record supports the idea that Congress

\textsuperscript{14} See, e.g., \textsc{Lawrence Auster}, \textsc{The Path to National Suicide: An Essay on Immigration and Multiculturalism} 10-26 (1990) (arguing that consequences of 1965 Act were unintended); id. at 82-84 (arguing for slashing legal immigration); BrimeLOW, \textit{supra} note 13, at 74-91 (describing "accidental" nature of 1965 Act); \textit{id.} at 258-59 (arguing that 1965 Act should be repealed now that its consequences are known); Linda Seebach, \textit{Let’s Vote on a U.S. Immigration Policy}, \textsc{Baltimore Evening Sun}, May 8, 1995, at 9A.

\textsuperscript{15} See \textsc{Auster, \textit{supra} note 14 passim} (arguing that large-scale immigration of culturally dissimilar people will destroy the American culture).
meant exactly what it said—that race was no longer to be a factor in America's immigration law—the conclusion of some scholars and immigration restrictionists that Congress would not have passed the law had it known what the effects would be is far more doubtful than has been advanced.

I. RACE IN AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAW BEFORE THE 1965 ACT

A. The National Origins Quota System

Designed to maintain racial homogeneity, the national origins quota system based the number of visas awarded annually to natives of particular nations on the percentage of Americans who traced their ancestry to that country. Although the workings of the quota laws are described in detail elsewhere, they are briefly outlined here. The Immigration Act of 1924, the first permanent quota law, provided for about 150,000 immigrant visas annually. Visas were awarded to a country based on the number of American citizens who traced their ancestry to that nation based on the 1920 census. Each country received a minimum of one hundred visas per year. In 1952, the formula was amended by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, also known as the "McCarran-Walter" Act, so that nations were awarded quotas of one-sixth of one percent of the number of inhabitants of the United States who traced their ancestry to that country in 1920. Because the proportion of eastern and southern Europeans in the population was smaller than that of northern and western Europeans, eastern and southern European nations received low quotas, some receiving only the token one hundred visa minimum. Americans tracing their ancestry to southern and eastern European nations were instrumental in developing support for immi-

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migration reform in 1965.

Americans of African descent were not counted for purposes of awarding quotas to foreign nations. The law also provided special restrictions on colonial immigration which disproportionately affected persons of African descent. As a result of these factors and others, "[b]efore 1965, Africans represented less than one percent of the total immigrant population." Pre-1965 immigration policy particularly favored Canadians, Mexicans and Central and South Americans, and other residents of the Western Hemisphere. While England, Germany and Ireland had quotas so large that they were often unfilled, Western Hemisphere residents were subject to no numerical limitations.

B. Controlling Asian Immigration: Exclusion and Limited Wartime Reform

Control of the potentially massive numbers of would-be Asian


22. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 202(c), 66 Stat. 163, 177-78 (amended 1965). Residents of colonies were denied the unlimited immigration privileges awarded to Western Hemisphere nations or full access to the quotas of their mother countries and instead received the minimum 100-per-year quotas, which effectively limited this form of immigration. The Act provided in pertinent part:

Any immigrant born in a colony or other component or dependent area of a governing country for which no separate or specific quota has been established . . . shall be chargeable to the quota of the governing country, except that (1) not more than one hundred persons born in any one such colony or other component or dependent area overseas from the governing country shall be chargeable to the quota of its governing country in any one year.

Id.

23. Hing, supra note 21, at 240.

24. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 101(a)(27)(C), 66 Stat. 163, 169 (amended 1965) (stating that the term "nonquota immigrant" includes "an immigrant who was born in Canada, the Republic of Mexico, the Republic of Cuba, the Republic of Haiti, the Dominican Republic, the Canal Zone, or an independent country of Central or South America"). For a discussion of Latino immigration and demographics, see Berta Esperanza Hernandez Truyol, Building Bridges—Latinas and Latinos at the Crossroads: Realities, Rhetoric and Replacement, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 369, 383-96 (1994). While a full discussion of Western Hemisphere immigration is beyond the scope of this Article, it should be noted in passing that the argument of some critics that the 1965 Act should be "blamed" for increasing Latino immigration is incorrect. See Johnson, supra note 13, at 112 (noting that 1965 Act imposed numerical restrictions on Western Hemisphere immigration for the first time); Motomura, supra note 13, at 1934 (same).
immigrants was a special focus of American immigration law even up to the 1965 Act. For this reason, the law’s treatment of Asian immigration is something of a bellwether. American naturalization law discriminated against non-white immigrants from the first days of the Republic. America’s first naturalization act in 1790 offered benefits only to whites; persons of African descent were added in 1870. When persons of “races indigenous to the Western Hemisphere” were added to the statute in 1940, only members of Asian races remained ineligible to naturalize.

Asians were the only group whose immigration was restricted on the basis of race. A consistent feature of anti-Asian immigration laws was categorization by race and ancestry, rather than by place of birth. For example, a person of Asian racial descent born and raised in Brazil was treated as Asian, not Brazilian. By contrast, a Greek family could escape discrimination under the national origins quota system by bearing its children in more favored countries. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 was the first express racial restriction; as Japanese and Asian Indians began to immigrate, they too were excluded. This process culminated in the Immigration Act of 1924, which tied immigration to the right to naturalization. “[A]lien[s] ineligible to citizenship” were excluded entirely under the 1924 law.

28. See Hitai v. INS, 343 F.2d 466, 468 (2d Cir. 1965) (holding that a Brazilian of Japanese ancestry could not enter as a Brazilian, but only as a Japanese).
32. See id. § 13(c), 43 Stat. at 162.
This phrase was a euphemism for Asians because the Act defined an alien "ineligible to citizenship" as one covered by the Chinese Exclusion Act or by the Asiatic Barred Zone.\(^3\) Even though some United States citizens traced their ancestry to Asian countries, the quota allotment for Asia was zero.\(^3\) After 1924, virtually no Asians could immigrate,\(^3\) and any who were already here were prohibited from becoming naturalized citizens. Again, all of these laws operated on the basis of race, not nationality.

1. Propaganda Benefits from Limited Reform

The process of eliminating racial restrictions suggests how weighty racial concerns were. Beginning in 1943, the anti-Asian restrictions began to break down when Congress awarded China a minimum quota and allowed Chinese aliens to naturalize.\(^3\) In 1946, Congress extended these privileges to Filipinos and Indians,\(^3\) and finally, in 1952, McCarran-Walter granted these rights to all Asian nationalities.\(^3\) At first glance, these laws appear to represent a cau-

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33. See id. § 28(c), 43 Stat. at 168.
34. See id. § 11(b), (e), (d), 43 Stat. at 159 (noting that "aliens ineligible to citizenship" were not counted as "inhabitants in the continental United States in 1920").
35. Asians were, however, allowed to enter if they were previously lawfully admitted and were returning from a trip abroad, were a minister of religion or a teacher, or were entering solely for purposes of study in an accredited school. See id. §§ 4, 13(c), 43 Stat. at 155, 162.
38. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 201(a), 66 Stat. 163, 175 (establishing quotas for Asia); id. § 311, 66 Stat. at 239 ("The right of a person to become a naturalized citizen of the United States shall not be denied or abridged because of race or sex . . .").

Practically, these changes may have been as important for Asian Americans as Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was for African Americans living under Jim Crow. Extending the privilege of naturalization to Asians effectively mooted a system of state prohibitions on various forms of civil rights, including property ownership. See, e.g., Thomas Stuen, Asian Americans and Their Rights for Land Ownership, in ASIAN AMERICANS AND THE SUPREME COURT, A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 603 (Hyung-chan Kim ed., 1992) (discussing discrimination against Asians in owning property). Mike Masaoka, the late head of the Japanese American Citizens League, testified that he and his four brothers served in the U.S. Army in France in World War II; when his mother used the insurance proceeds from a son killed in combat to buy a house, the State of California confiscated the property because she was an alien ineligible for citizenship. See Immigration: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the Comm. on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, on H.R. 7700 and 55 Identical Bills, 88th Cong. 901-02 (1964), reprinted in 10A OSCAR TRELLES & JAMES BAILEY, IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACTS: LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES AND RELATED DOCUMENTS, doc. 69A (1979) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 7700]. Additionally, as aliens ineligible to citizenship, Asians were precluded from receiving many professional licenses. See, e.g., In re Hong Yen Chang, 24 P.
tious but real change in the attitude of the United States towards Asian immigrants. Testifying before Congress in favor of the proposals which became the 1965 Act, Secretary of State Dean Rusk asserted that the 1943 law was a "well-considered and cautious beginning of a revision of our policy of excluding Asian persons [which] has been followed by progressively liberal amendments to our laws." Therefore, in Rusk’s view, the 1965 reform proposal was not a "request... that the Congress drastically depart from existing policy, but rather that it pursue to a conclusion a development which began more than 20 years [before]."

The prevailing scholarly view is that Rusk put the reforms in an unrealistically flattering light. Rather than representing a decision by Congress about the desirability or acceptability of significant numbers of Asian immigrants, most authorities agree that the reforms were essentially ad hoc responses to particular emergencies or political circumstances. Contemporary scholars correctly observe that World War II motivated Chinese immigration reform.

China was

156, 157 (Cal. 1890) (holding that petitioner could not be admitted as an attorney because he was ineligible for naturalization); In re Takuji Yamashita, 70 P. 482, 483 (Wash. 1902) (same). See generally Philip Nash, Asian Americans and their Rights for Employment and Education, in ASIAN AMERICANS AND THE SUPREME COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra, at 897 (discussing historical discrimination against Asian Americans). In addition, allowing Asians to immigrate on the same basis as all other races allowed Asian Americans, who constituted substantially less than 1% of the population as late as 1965, see Immigration: Hearings on S. 500 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Naturalization of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 119 (1965) (statements by Sen. Fong and Secretary of Labor Wirtz), reprinted in 11 TRELLES & BAILEY, supra, doc. 70 [hereinafter Hearings on S. 500], to hope that numerical (and hence political) insignificance might not be permanent. Indeed, thanks to immigration permitted pursuant to the 1965 law, as of July 1, 1994 they represented 3.5% of the population. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 22 tbl. 22 (115th ed. 1995).


40. Hearings on H.R. 7700, supra note 38, at 388.

41. President Roosevelt himself regarded the "legislation as important in the cause of winning the war and of establishing a secure peace." S. REP. NO. 78-535, at 2 (1943). Scholars have not missed the political aim of the law. See, e.g., DANIELS, supra note 12, at 328 (describing the repeal of Chinese Exclusion as "a good behavior prize"); ROBERT A. DIVINE, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY, 1924-1952, at 152-53 (1957) ("The few who saw repeal as a renunciation of racist concepts and an effort to realize American ideals were very definitely in a minority, and it is most improbable that the liberals could have secured their objective on these moral and idealistic grounds."); WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, GO EAST, YOUNG MAN: THE EARLY YEARS 395 (1974) ("FDR felt that nations which were largely Caucasian had to be discreet and courteous in their relations with the colored peoples of Asia. Roosevelt took many steps in that direction, including a
the most important allied power on the Asian continent; many other Asian countries were under Japanese domination. It was essential to keep China fighting to keep the Imperial Japanese Army occupied, yet the Allies' global war strategy, according to President Roosevelt, "required the concentration of the greater part of our strength upon the European front." Supporters insisted the bill was necessary to request in 1943 that the Chinese Exclusion Laws be repealed.

One commentator has argued:

Proclaiming its moral superiority to Hitler and fascist Europe, America was faced with the inconsistency between its claims of equality, freedom and democracy, and its own institutionalized racism, including widespread racial segregation and the exclusion of Asians from citizenship. In short, the United States had to 'make good its claims to democracy.'


42. A State Department official, for example, reported that the Chinese Ambassador to the United States raised the issue with the State Department. According to the conversation,

[the Chinese Government is interested in removal of our discriminations against the Chinese as Chinese; they are eager for recognition, technical at least, of China and the Chinese on a basis of "equality." The fact, however, that the Ambassador twice expressed a hope that something might be done without undue delay causes me to speculate as to the possibility that he had the present military and economic situation in unoccupied China—which situation is becoming acute especially from point of view of morale—much in mind. What the Ambassador said, together with other indications, causes me to believe that it is desirable from point of view of the war effort for us to work along as liberal lines as may be possible and as expeditiously as may be possible toward doing something constructive with regard to the solution of this question.


43. S. REP. NO. 78-535, at 2. Representative Walter Judd suggested that this policy made this bill important because it provided some tangible evidence of support when the Allies were unable to provide munitions. The goal of winning in Europe first could only mean to the Chinese that prolongation of their sufferings was consid-
save American lives.\textsuperscript{44}

Immigration reform was particularly important because a central part of the Japanese propaganda campaign involved reminding Asians of the Chinese Exclusion laws.\textsuperscript{45} Representative Ed Gossett explained:

It is a notorious fact that for many years the Japanese have been carrying on a propaganda campaign seeking to align [sic] the entire oriental world behind Japanese leadership, seeking to set the oriental world against the occidental world. They have called it a campaign of Asia for Asiatics. This propaganda has generally been based upon two propositions insofar as the Chinese are concerned. And mind you just here, there is no propaganda quite so effective as true propaganda. The first leg of Japanese propaganda was that of extraterritoriality. The second leg has been the Chinese exclusion laws.\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{44} Representative Judd explained: "No one will dispute that this Nation is in the most critical hour in its whole history. . . . The question before us, therefore, is not just 105 Chinese immigrants a year. . . . More important, it is thousands of American boys, perhaps even victory or defeat in Asia." \textsuperscript{89} CONG. REC. 8590 (1943). According to Representative Judd:

We are sacrificing American lives insofar as we fail to mobilize fully the will and the confidence of so indispensable an ally. I do not want on my hands the blood of a single additional American soldier who had to die in China because we failed here to show our purpose to treat the Chinese as equals, and thereby weakened China's morale and will to fight offensively.

\textsuperscript{89} CONG. REC. 8592 (1943). Representative Thomas Scanlon saw "this bill saving the lives of our fighting men." \textsuperscript{89} CONG. REC. 8597 (1943). Representative Judd suggested that the bill would avoid a future cataclysmic race war. \textit{See id.} at 8633.

\textsuperscript{45} \textit{See HING, supra} note 30, at 36 (noting that the 1943 law was a response to Japanese propaganda); Helen Chen, Chinese Immigration into the United States: An Analysis of Changes in Immigration Policies 111 (1980) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Brandeis University) (on file with author) ("Congress was forced to act when Japan mounted its propaganda campaign to discredit Americans in Asia."). For examples of some of the Japanese propaganda, see \textit{id.} at 112-14 (citing \textit{Hearings on Repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Acts, H.R. 1882 & H.R. 2309, Before the House Comm. on Immigration and Naturalization, 78th Cong. 40-41 (1943)}).

\textsuperscript{89} CONG. REC. 8581 (1943) (remarks of Rep. Ed Gossett). "Extraterritoriality" was the doctrine invoked by colonial powers to deprive foreign nations of jurisdiction over crimes by Westerners, who would be tried by courts constituted by their home countries. The United States Court for China was an example of this practice. For a discussion of the legal and historical background of the Court for China, see \textit{Mookini v. United States}, 303 U.S. 201 (1938), and David J. Bederman, \textit{Extraterritorial Domicile and the Constitution}, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 451, 460-74 (1988).
Similarly, Representative Thomas Scanlon explained that the problem with this particular propaganda was that it was “based on truth.”

The Chinese Repealer was an effort to fight propaganda with propaganda rather than with significant levels of actual immigration. Using techniques replicated in later statutes, the law’s structure ensured that Chinese would have only a limited presence. First, the quota assigned was insignificant—105 annually. Second, this quota did not apply simply to citizens of China, or persons in China, but persons of Chinese racial origin, regardless of their citizenship, nationality, or place of birth. This broad application addressed Congress’s concern that persons of Chinese ancestry born in countries with larger quotas could enter through the quota of that country, thereby exceeding the 105 annual limitation. Notions of racial equality seem not to have been an important motivating force.

47. 89 CONG. REC. 8596 (1943). A memorandum by a State Department official confirmed this problem:

During the past forty years the Japanese, increasingly smarting under the grievance, as they saw it, of our discrimination against them as a race, made of this discrimination a diplomatic issue and used the fact of this discrimination as a springboard and a projectile of propaganda among their own people against the white race in general and the United States in particular.

Memorandum by the Advisor on Political Relations, June 9, 1943, reprinted in U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 42, at 777.

48. Representative Earl Michener correctly pointed out that “the enactment of this legislation will have an infinitesimal effect on immigration into this country.” 89 CONG. REC. 8603 (1943); see also id. at 8628 (remarks of Rep. William Poage) (“[I]t will have no practical effect on the United States . . . . In China, however, it will have vast practical effects.”). The Senate Report noted that “[t]he number of Chinese who will actually be made eligible for naturalization under this section is negligible.” S. REP. NO. 78-535, at 6. Representative John Coffee, likewise, assured doubters that the “current proposal is a gesture—a beau geste. This does not open the door. Some people think it is the camel putting its nose under the tent. But this assures the people of China that we recognize them as equals.” 89 CONG. REC. 8601 (1943). President Roosevelt himself observed that “[t]here can be no reasonable apprehension that any such number of immigrants will cause unemployment or provide competition in the search for jobs.” S. REP. NO. 78-535, at 3. Attorney General Biddle, likewise, wrote that “no useful purpose is being served by keeping the Chinese exclusion laws in effect, since under the quota provisions the Chinese quota would be only 105 persons annually.” Id. at 2; see also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 42, at 778 (observation of a State Department official that “[t]he immediate problem so far as this country is concerned is that of so revising our laws and procedures as to eliminate discrimination against the Chinese and at the same time safeguard ourselves against a large influx of Chinese immigrants”).

49. See, e.g., 89 CONG. REC. 8582 (1943) (remarks of Rep. Fred Busbey). Representative Judd assured his colleagues that “[t]here are no loopholes whereby persons of the Chinese race who were born in Hong Kong, for example, and therefore are British citizens, could come in under the British quota.” Id. at 8588.

50. While there was an occasional reference to racial equality, see, e.g., id. at 8593
In 1952, the McCarran-Walter Act eliminated the remaining bars against Asian naturalization and awarded all Asian countries immigration quotas, most of which were the hundred-per-year minimum. Although the statute has been credited with representing some progress towards racial equality, as with the Chinese Repealer, many scholars have correctly observed that congressional proponents of the bill relied almost exclusively on the foreign policy benefit of reducing racial restrictions against Asians. As the House Judiciary Committee Report explained:

This bill would make all persons, regardless of race, eligible for naturalization, and would set up minimum quotas for aliens now barred for racial reasons. Thus, persons of Japanese, Korean, Indonesian, etc., ancestry could be admitted and naturalized as any other qualified alien. No doubt this will have a favorable effect on our international relations, particularly in the Far East. American exclusion policy has long been resented there and, in the eyes of qualified observers, was an important factor in the anti-American

(remarks of Rep. Judd), the circumstances, in addition to the avowed military purposes of the bill, belie any such purpose. Indeed, during the hearings on the bill, when a witness admitted that he supported "social equality among all the races," Representative Leo Allen replied: "I thank you for giving your views. You have done your cause more harm than anybody else." *Hearings on Repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Acts, H.R. 1882 & H.R. 2309, Before the House Comm. on Immigration and Naturalization, 78th Cong. 40-41 (1943).*

51. *See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 201(a), 66 Stat. 163, 175 ("[T]he minimum quota for any quota area shall be one hundred.").*

52. *See, e.g., ROGER DANIELS, ASIAN AMERICA: CHINESE AND JAPANESE IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1850, at 284 (1988) ("Even more important than the changes in law were the changes in American ideology.... [S]ometime between June 1941, when Franklin Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8802 establishing a Fair Employment Practices Commission, and June 1952, when Congress dropped the racial and ethnic bars to naturalization, some kind of Rubicon in American policy had been crossed."); MICHAEL C. LEMAY, ANATOMY OF A PUBLIC POLICY: THE REFORM OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAW 10 (1994) ("Although the McCarran-Walter Act was restrictionist in its reaffirmation of the quota system, in order to secure its passage two provisions were included that did involve opening new doors. The Act established very token quotas for those nations—previously excluded—that were defined as the 'Asian-Pacific [sic] Triangle.' It opened up, for the first time since the late 1880s and the 1920s, the possibility of some Asian influx."); REED UEDA, POSTWAR IMMIGRANT AMERICA 43 (1994) ("Despite its basic conservatism, the McCarran-Walter Act did loosen some cornerstones of restrictionist policy.... [T]he 1952 law demolished the long-standing principle of Asian exclusion.").*

53. *See, e.g., DANIELS, supra note 12, at 329 (stating that the 1952 liberalization "should be seen as a fruit of the Cold War"); DIVINE, supra note 41, at 173-74; HING, supra note 30, at 37-38 ("The ideological Cold War between capitalism and communism made the United States acutely conscious of how its domestic policies, including immigration, were perceived abroad."); Torok, supra note 41, at 10-11, Chen, supra note 45, at 124; Dimmitt, supra note 41, at 209.*
feeling in Japan prior to the last World War.\(^5^4\)

Dean Acheson also recognized the political implications, writing to President Truman that "[o]ur failure to remove racial barriers provides the Kremlin with unlimited political and propaganda capital for use against us in Japan and the entire Far East."\(^5^5\) Extending immigration and naturalization privileges to natives of all Asian nations surely blunted this propaganda.

2. Propaganda Problems from Limited Reform

If war pressure explains why the laws were liberalized in the ways they were, it fails to explain why the reforms did not go far enough to satisfy the strategic concerns which generated them. With regard to the 1943 law, for example, one commentator persuasively explained that "[t]he ban was lifted because the Chinese were now our allies, and it would be unseemly to deny admission to the nationals of a country with whom we were fighting to rid the world of fascist and racist philosophies."\(^5^6\) However, if it was unseemly to exclude Chinese, was it not equally unseemly to exclude Indians and citizens of other countries or colonies whose people were fighting on behalf of the Allies?

Scholars have not particularly focused on the double-edged nature of the propaganda effect of the Chinese Repealer and this feature of McCarran-Walter.\(^5^7\) Members of Congress, however, un-


\(^{56}\) JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, ARE AMERICANS EXTINCT? 103 (1968).

\(^{57}\) Some commentators obliquely mention the inconsistency. See, e.g., JOHN W. DOWER, WAR WITHOUT MERCY: RACE AND POWER IN THE PACIFIC WAR 166 (1986) (noting that "any attempt to redress the insult to China would draw further attention to the larger anti-Oriental context of U.S. immigration policy"). Divine observed that the discriminatory features of the McCarran-Walter Act could have bad side effects in Asia, DIVINE, supra note 41, at 173-74, and called the McCarran-Walter Act a "triumph of nationalism over international considerations." Id. at 190. Divine explained: "Extremely conscious of a crisis in world affairs, the restrictionists viewed the McCarran bill as a vital measure designed to protect the integrity of the nation." Id. at 178. Nevertheless, some understand the McCarran-Walter Act's limited reform of Asian immigration to be a counterexample of Divine's point. See UEDA, supra note 52, at 43. Reimers appears to be unsure how this aspect of McCarran-Walter helped American security, but he does not go so far as to contend that it had a negative impact. See REIMERS, supra note 10, at 62 ("While the security provisions of the measure clearly related to the Communist issue, it was not clear that national origins and the racially discriminatory provisions of the Asia-Pacific triangle enhanced American security. But immigration laws were not always logical.").
derstood at the time that retaining discriminatory treatment for Asians would blunt the propaganda benefits of reform.

In 1943, for example, in addition to those who made traditional race-based anti-Chinese arguments, a group of dissenters in the House Immigration and Naturalization Committee and other opponents claimed that the bill created new propaganda problems with other Asian countries while addressing the Chinese morale problem poorly. Representative John Bennett of Michigan, a member of the Immigration and Naturalization Committee and an opponent of the bill, argued that the bill was a transparent gesture because it retained racial treatment for Chinese:

[T]his bill does not give the Chinese equality on immigration with any European nation.... [Y]ou compel the Chinese to come here by race and permit Europeans to come on the basis of nativity. This result did not come about by accident. It was brought about by a studied and intentional limitation in this particular bill which says in the one breath to China, we are treating you on the basis of equality with Europeans, but in the next breath, it positively limits the number of Chinese by restricting their entry to race regardless of the country of their birth.... Do you think for [one] minute that they are so abstruse that they will not discern the emptiness of this gesture?... Let us not proceed on the assumption that we are fooling anyone about this legislation.

As Representative Bertrand Gearhart suggested, the tiny quota also made the benefit inconsequential as a practical matter.

Bennett also argued that the bill was not an effective counter to Japanese propaganda because it left all other Asians subject to the exclusion.

While this fails to cure the propaganda situation as it presently exists it creates an additional propaganda weapon with

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58. One group relied on traditional antipathy to the Chinese, see 89 Cong. Rec. 9989 (1943) (remarks of Sen. Rufus Holman), contending that the bill was an “attempt to put the camel’s nose under the tent of our immigration laws.” Id. at 8602 (remarks of Rep. John Jennings); accord id. at 8626 (remarks of Rep. Compton White). One member suggested that allowing Chinese in would give “Japan an argument for breaking down our immigration laws, so that she can flood Washington, Oregon, and California with Japanese immigrants.” Id. at 8631 (remarks of Rep. John Rankin).


60. 89 Cong. Rec. 8584 (1943) (remarks of Rep. Bennett). Representative Thomas Jenkins, likewise, stated that “I do not rate the Chinese as being so ignorant and so easy as not to notice how they are being fooled and discriminated against.” Id. at 8599.

61. See id. at 8589.
respect to the Asiatics, particularly the Filipinos. By the provisions of this measure we put China in a favored position as against all other Asiatics, including the Filipinos who have been and are at present our own nationals. . . . Do you see then what further difficulties this legislation creates for us? As far as I can observe, if we are to place China on a quota basis there is no valid reason for refusing to do likewise for other Asiatics and, particularly, the Filipinos.  

Representative William Elmer agreed that "[t]o elevate China now above the other Asiatics is a discrimination against them and lays the foundation for future disputes with them."

The fascinating point about these arguments is that they were advanced by legislators who opposed liberalization entirely. Recognizing that it would appear hypocritical to provide a benefit to China but not to other Allied Asian nations such as India, they opposed reform even for the Chinese, rather than extending privileges to other Asian nationalities. All recognized that exclusion from immigration was a fact which was used as propaganda by the Japanese across Asia; indeed, the State Department reported that "this question is of importance from the point of view of the current and the future influence of the United States in our relations not only with China, but with the other countries of Asia and the world in general."

Instead of extending the token benefit of minimum quotas under the 1924 Immigration Act to other Asian nations and thus defusing this propaganda at relatively low cost, opponents thought it was better to continue denying immigration privileges to Chinese. Supporters, too, chose not to try to extend the bill to non-Chinese Asians; this was a special Chinese law for a special Chinese situation. Representative Warren Magnuson explained that "other Asiatic nations are not in the same position as China"; that is, they were less strategically important. Congress chose to forego a potential propaganda benefit because it was unwilling to pay the price of, say, five hundred visas annually, a number that in a millennium of immigra-

62. Id. at 8584. Representative Jenkins shared this view. See id. at 8598.
63. Id. at 8593. Senator Hiram Johnson argued:
    China is not our only Ally subject to our exclusion laws. What about our brave Allies the Filipinos, and what about all the potential Allies in the Orient, the natives of India, Burma, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, and others? Is not this proposed legislation a deliberate slap in the face for all Asiatic peoples, except only the Chinese?
    Id. at 9999 (statement of Sen. Hiram Johnson).
64. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 42, at 779.
65. 89 CONG. REC. 8587 (1943).
tion would have added less than one percent to the population of the United States.\textsuperscript{66}

Again, few academic commentators have focused on the fact that the special, humiliating restrictions on Asian immigration undermined the avowed foreign policy purposes of the McCarran-Walter Act or suggest that reference to the Cold War in and of itself is insufficient to explain the structure of the law.\textsuperscript{67} Just as in 1943, for example, the 1952 law provided strict controls on the admission of Asians. While the near-absolute prohibition on Asian immigration was eliminated, Congress replaced it with the Asia Pacific triangle, a geographic area subject to special restrictions. Congress awarded each triangle country a minimum quota of one hundred,\textsuperscript{68} but the total immigration from the triangle was limited to two thousand.\textsuperscript{69} Thus, if more than twenty countries came into being within the triangle, all triangle countries would have their quotas reduced.

In addition, following the Chinese Repealer model, the McCarran-Walter Act retained a racial test solely for persons tracing more than half of their ancestry to countries in the Asia Pacific triangle. Such persons were charged against the quota of their racial homeland, rather than their country of birth.\textsuperscript{70} As one commentator acknowledged, the triangle provision was "an obvious device to prevent such persons, because of their race, from immigrating to the United States under the possibly large quotas of their country of birth, or in the case of Western Hemisphere countries, from coming

\textsuperscript{66} That is, 500 visas times 1000 years is 500,000; less than one-half of one percent of the American population which, in 1940, was more than 131 million. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, supra note 38, at 8 tbl.1.

\textsuperscript{67} But see sources cited supra note 57 (addressing the inconsistencies caused by restrictions on Asian immigration under the Act).

\textsuperscript{68} See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 201(a), 66 Stat. 163, 175. China and Japan received marginally larger quotas. See President's Comm'n, supra note 16, at 99-101 tbl.5 (noting that China received a quota of 105 and Japan a quota of 185).

\textsuperscript{69} See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 202(e), 66 Stat. at 178 (stating that "any increase in the number of minimum quota areas above twenty within the Asia-Pacific triangle shall result in a proportionate decrease in each minimum quota of such area in order that the sum total of all minimum quotas within the Asia-Pacific triangle shall not exceed two thousand"). This feature of the law was removed in 1961. See Act Amending the Immigration and Nationality Act and For Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 87-301, § 9, 75 Stat. 650, 654 (1961); H.R. Rep. No. 87-1086, at 45 (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2950, 2979. Thus, after 1961, new countries in the triangle could be recognized without diminishing the quotas of preexisting nations.

Asian peoples could not have missed the import of these provisions, which presumably gave them little reason to align with the United States rather than the Soviet bloc. The self-defeating effect of the law appears not only in hindsight, but was emphasized by congressional critics who favored greater liberalization. However, the reasoning of this group was not that the bill was insufficiently egalitarian, but that its remaining discriminations against Asians were unwise in light of the Korean War and the global struggle with Communism.\(^7\) The minority Senate Judiciary Committee Report explained that Asian nations would be insulted by these restrictions:

> For the United States to apply the country-of-birth formula uniformly except for persons of Asiatic-Pacific descent would mean discrimination, on our part, between the native citizens of any given country, on grounds of ancestry. This proposed test will certainly be offensive to Indonesia, Burma, Siam, Japan, and other countries whose international cooperation we are seeking and to whom we will be attributing a contaminating ancestry.... Finally, these provisions are insulting to hundreds of thousands of citizens and residents of the United States.

Complete adoption of the principle that an alien be chargeable to the quota of his country of birth, regardless of race, on the other hand, would enhance our Nation's moral leadership in the world and, in particular, would strengthen our prestige in the critical areas of Asia and the lands of the Pacific where the struggle between democracy and communism rages most fiercely in the minds of men. The gain to us may be the lives of millions of our sons.\(^7\)

In a separate statement to the House Judiciary Committee Report, Representative Emanuel Celler also suggested that the restrictions were unwise: “The effect in Asia of such discrimination

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71. SCHWARTZ, supra note 41, at 109.

72. This point was noted by the Administration as well. See Memorandum by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget to the President, May 9, 1952 (noting that Walter bill contained a racial attribution feature, which because it "would apply only in Asia and nowhere else in the world, would call into question the meaning and sincerity of the gestures made by the bill .... The Kremlin is always quick to seize upon any half measure as proof of democratic duplicity."). reprinted in I U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 55, at 1591; see also I id. at 1595 (“These restrictions would announce to the peoples of Asia ‘the United States still considers you undesirable. We’re going to have one set of rules for everyone else in the world and a special set of rules for you. We want to make sure that too many of you won’t come over.’").

will have far-reaching effect and will supply ammunition for Com-
munist propaganda in that troubled area of the world. . . . Tragic
consequences are foreseeable, as a result of such legislation, in the
development of our foreign policy vis-à-vis Asia." 74

These themes were repeated in the House floor debates. Libe-
ralization was favored as a means of improving "our relations with the
people of the Far East,"75 but the special treatment of Asians, it was
argued, was antagonistic to this goal.76 In the Senate, as well, there
was vigorous debate about whether the bill went far enough to satisfy
foreign policy needs. Hubert Humphrey, a leading critic of the dis-
criminatory aspects of the bill, observed:

[T]he future of the world may well depend on what happens
in Asia, Africa, the Near East, and in the underdeveloped
and underprivileged areas of the world.

. . . .

I submit that the passage of the pending bill would an-
ounce by public policy and by public act of the Congress of
the United States that we do not consider them to be free
and equal citizens; that we consider them to be unwanted,
unequal, and undesirable.

That would bring about the worst kind of international
relations . . . .77

Later that day, he stated that "[t]he philosophy which is embodied in
this legislation may have a profound effect upon American policies
and American relationships in areas of the world where today we
stand very, very weak."78 Senators Herbert Lehman,79 John Pastore80
and Brien McMahon81 made similar arguments. The reality of the

(additional views of Mr. Celler).
75. 98 CONG. REC. 4304 (1952) (remarks of Rep. Farrington).
76. See id. at 4311 (remarks of Rep. Louis Heller).
77. Id. at 5315.
78. Id. at 5432.
79. Senator Lehman argued:
        We cannot fool the world. Let us not fool ourselves. If we wish to show our
        good faith to all of Asia, if we wish to rob the Communists of one of their
        strongest propaganda weapons in the Far East and wherever in the world there
        are people with colored skins, if we wish to discard outmoded racist doctrines, if
        we are not scared of bogeys dreamed up by our opponents, then let us wipe out
        discriminations in our immigration law based on race.
      Id. at 5612.
80. See id. at 5162.
81. Senator McMahon insisted that "[n]o propaganda, no assertion of pious inten-
tions and principles, can drown out the plain speaking of our own action here. The free
negative foreign policy implications was emphasized by Senator Lehman, who noted that even before the bill became law, the Philippines was planning a protest to the United States government.\textsuperscript{82}

In 1952, as in 1943, members of Congress invoked the Asian war as a justification for liberalization. Senator William Benton suggested that the bill was "potentially more costly, more damaging to the national interest, than any major bill which has come to the floor with so little understanding about it on the part of the Senate as a whole."\textsuperscript{83} Benton explained:

What folly it is for us, Mr. President, to spend hundreds of billions of dollars on defense and to incur more than 100,000 casualties in Korea, and then to undercut this great investment of our boys' blood and their parents' money by passing a bill which turns the world against us . . . .

[W]e can totally destroy that investment, and can ruthlessly and stupidly destroy faith and respect in our great principles, by enacting laws that, in effect, say to the peoples of the world:

"We love you, but we love you from afar. We want you but, for God's sake, stay where you are."\textsuperscript{84}

Benton went so far as to argue that the earlier Asian Exclusion laws contributed directly to Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor.\textsuperscript{85}

\begin{footnotes}
\item world which we seek to unite against the threat of encroaching totalitarianism will not be deceived." Id. at 5216-17.
\item See id. at 5332.
\item \textsuperscript{82} 98 CONG. REC. 5149 (1952). Benton was in an excellent position to evaluate the effects of propaganda on foreign policy; he had been both an assistant secretary of state involved in the founding of the United Nations, and the founder of a major Madison Avenue advertising agency, Benton & Bowles. For a discussion of his activities, see generally SIDNEY HYMAN, THE LIVES OF WILLIAM BENTON (1969).
\item \textsuperscript{83} 98 CONG. REC. 5150 (1952).
\item \textsuperscript{84} Senator Benton reported that he:
\item happened to be in Japan in 1937 on the anniversary of the day when the United States enacted its Oriental Exclusion Act. [sic] To my astonishment, I saw black flags break out all over Tokyo, even draped on buildings. It was a national day of mourning in Japan, a day of humiliation. No man knows the extent to which the Oriental Exclusion Act, by which we insulted the proud peoples of Asia, was responsible for the temper of the Japanese people which lead to the attack upon the United States at Pearl Harbor.
\item Id. at 5157; see also id. at 5616 (making similar comment).
\item \textsuperscript{85} A 1943 memorandum by a State Department official offers some support for this view:
\item The burning hostility of such men as the late Admiral Yamamoto toward the United States, and the desire and intention and plans and efforts of such men to make war upon and defeat the United States were animated in no small part by their view of and emotions regarding this matter of discrimination on our part against the race of which they were and are members.
\end{footnotes}
War concerns were not enough to move restrictionists. Senator McCarran opposed a substitute bill proposed by Senators Humphrey and Lehman which would have retained the essentials of the national origins system, but would have treated Asians the same as members of other races. McCarran’s response was that any foreign policy benefits would be outweighed by the cultural harms of increased Asian immigration:

>The cold, hard truth is that in the United States today there are hard-core, indigestible blocs who have not become [sic] integrated into the American way of life, but who, on the contrary, are its deadly enemy. The cold, hard truth, Mr. President, is that today, as never before, untold millions are storming our gates for admission; and those gates are cracking under the strain. The cold, hard fact is, too, Mr. President, that this Nation is the last hope of western civilization; and if this oasis of the world shall be overrun, perverted, contaminated, or destroyed, then the last flickering light of humanity will be extinguished. A solution of the problems of Europe and Asia, Mr. President, will not come as we transplant these problems en masse to the United States of America.86

McCarran further explained that the results of the Humphrey-Lehman bill would be so drastic that Asian American groups themselves opposed them. He argued that the “provisions of the substitute bill are so fantastic, so drastic, and so unrealistic that the major oriental groups in the United States are unalterably opposed to the amendment, because they know it would give them the kiss of death,”87 apparently implying that any effort at broader liberalization would be fatal to the bill. Senator McCarran pointed out that many Asian-American organizations supported his bill rather than the more liberal substitute.88

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Memorandum by the Advisor on Political Relations, June 9, 1943, reprinted in U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 42, at 777.

86. 98 CONG. REC. 5330 (1952).
87. Id. at 5624; see also id. at 5329 (referring to “kiss of death”).
88. See id. at 5092. Perhaps these Asian American groups supported Senator McCarran’s bill because they thought it was the best they could get. Cf. HING, supra note 30, at 55 (noting that the Japanese American Citizens League supported the McCarran-Walter bill, because it would allow the first-generation Japanese immigrants (“Issei”) to naturalize). Some Asian American groups withdrew their support for McCarran-Walter once the more liberal Humphrey-Lehman substitute was introduced. See 98 CONG. REC. at 5791, 5795.

Senator Francis Case attempted to respond to the foreign policy argument, first contending that the claim was unworthy of an American: “Mr. President, if that argument were true, it should not be advanced by an American.” Id. at 5764. He also noted that
The Humphrey-Lehman substitute was defeated, and the McCarran-Walter bill was passed by both houses. However, President Truman vetoed it, urging the Congress "to enact legislation removing racial barriers against Asians from our laws. Failure to take this step profits us nothing and can only have serious consequences for our relations with the peoples of the Far East." Congress overrode the veto.

Immediately after the bill was passed, Radio Moscow broadcasted the news to the Korean battlefront, suggesting that propaganda concerns were not groundless. Thirteen years later, many witnesses testifying about the 1965 immigration bill contended that McCarran-Walter created significant foreign policy difficulties, notably Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and James Sheldon, a Vietnam War "hawk" from the United Church of Christ who reported that McCarran-Walter "provided [Communists in Vietnam] a weapon worth more than a whole fleet of helicopters."

the Soviet Union also did not have a very good immigration policy:
Russia has no policy for inviting the immigration of peoples from other parts of the world. If she maintains an iron border against outside nationalities . . . it is ridiculous to say that because we have a policy of maintaining the historic proportions in this country, we are playing into the hands of the Kremlin.

Id. This overlooked the central message of American Cold War policy that the Soviet Union was an inappropriate role model.

89. H.R. DOC. No. 520, reprinted in 98 CONG. REC. 8082, 8085 (1952).
90. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 16, at 52-53 (discussing Radio Moscow's broadcast to Korea).
91. Another commentator reported in 1956 that the Soviets were exploiting discriminatory provisions of McCarran-Walter as part of their "New Look" policy. See J. Donald Kingsley, Immigration and Our Foreign Policy Objectives, 21 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 299, 306 (1956).
92. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 500, supra note 38, at 623 (remarks of Mike Masaoka of the Japanese American Citizens League); id. at 144 (remarks of Sen. Hugh Scott, reporting complaints about McCarran-Walter from officials in Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, New Zealand, Fiji, Tahiti and elsewhere); Hearings on H.R. 7700, supra note 38, at 390 (remarks of Secretary of State Dean Rusk); id. at 257 (remarks of Rep. Spark Matsunaga). Representative Matsunaga stated:
We are expending more than a million dollars a day together with the valuable lives of Americans in Vietnam. We are still facing the Communist Chinese across the truce lines in Korea. We stand prepared to aid India to resist further Communist Chinese aggression along its Himalayan frontiers. However, military victory over communism is only a phase; it must be accompanied by victory in the battle for men's minds.

Id.
93. See Hearings on S. 500, supra note 38, at 51 (statement of Secretary of State Dean Rusk); Immigration: Hearings on H.R. 2580 Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 91-95 (1965) (same), reprinted in 10 TRELLES & BAILEY, supra note 38, doc. 69 [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 2580].
94. Hearings on S. 500, supra note 38, at 878 (testimony of James Sheldon, represen-
In retrospect, the risk of increased Asian immigration seems fairly low. If immigration privileges had been extended to all Allied Asians in 1943, an absolute cap could have been imposed as it was in 1952. If McCarran-Walter had applied the place-of-birth principle to Asians as it did to members of all other races, it may well be that few additional Asians would have entered. A contemporary critic insisted that "[t]he numbers involved in a nondiscriminatory approach would be so small as to be insignificant."  

In 1943 and 1952, then, measures which could have offered aid in what were alleged to be struggles for national survival failed in the face of the historic policy of racial regulation of the immigrant stream. Congressional willingness to pay that price at those times for racial purity suggests a deep attachment to the idea.

II. REAL REFORM: THE 1965 IMMIGRATION ACT

"I think Christ would be excluded under present law."  

The year 1965 brought an abrupt change to American immigration law. The Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, sometimes known as "Hart-Celler," was structurally familiar
in certain ways. The new law provided for restricted immigration; a limit of 170,000 visas per year was imposed on the citizens of the countries in the Eastern Hemisphere. Furthermore, no more than 20,000 visas per year could go to natives of any one nation. McCarran-Walter’s system of awarding visas according to preference categories based on skills or family relationships was repeated in the new law; the new preference categories were based on employment skills or family connections to citizens or permanent resident aliens. In addition, immediate relatives of citizens—spouses, parents and unmarried children—could enter without numerical limitation, that is, regardless of whether one of the 170,000 Eastern Hemisphere (or 20,000 per country) visas were available, and without being charged against those limits.

Western Hemisphere immigration was limited for the first time to 120,000, but without preferences or per-country limitations. As in the Eastern Hemisphere, immediate relatives of citizens could enter without regard to the 120,000 annual limitation. The law’s revolutionary feature was its race-neutrality: For the first time since the United States started regulating immigration, race was not a factor.

A. Foreign Policy and War Policy

As in 1943 and 1952, foreign policy concerns surely helped pass the 1965 Act. Representative Michael Feighan, Chairman of the
House Judiciary Subcommittee responsible for immigration, noted that “[o]ur Secretary of State and two Attorneys General have testified that the quota system has made problems in the conduct of our relations with certain foreign countries.” Senator Hiram Fong expressed the views of many in Congress when he argued that the quota limitations “hurt America’s image as the leader of the free world.”

The importance of the foreign policy was highlighted by arguments that Americans were once again engaged in an Asian ground war. Representative John Lindsay noted:

[T]his nation has committed itself to the defense of the independence of South Vietnam. Yet the quota for that country of 15 million is exactly 100. Apparently we are willing to risk a major war for the right of the Vietnamese people to live in freedom at the same time our quota system makes it clear that we do not want very great numbers of them to live with us.

Tip O'Neill observed that the “current policy ... presents the ironic situation in which we are willing to send our American youth to aid these people in their struggle against Communist aggression in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, the United States felt compelled to abandon the national-origins quota.”; id (noting the important role of the Civil Rights Movement in awakening “the moral conscience of America”); Abba P. Schwartz, Foreign and Domestic Implications of U.S. Immigration Laws, 50 DEP'T ST. BULL. 675 passim (1964) (discussing foreign policy difficulties caused by McCarran-Walter); Torok, supra note 41, at 11-12; Chen, supra note 45, at 132-33.

106. 111 CONG. REC. 21,585 (1965); see also id. at 21,590 (remarks of Rep. Arch Moore, Jr.). For the State Department’s views on the 1965 law, see Dean Rusk, Foreign Policy Aspects of Proposals to Revise Immigration Law, 52 DEP'T ST. BULL. 384 passim (1965) and Dean Rusk, The Reform of our Basic Immigration Law, 52 DEP'T ST. BULL. 806 passim (1965).

107. 111 CONG. REC. 24,447 (1965). Senator Fong continued:

Many countries of Asia and the Pacific have traditionally sought more than a token of immigration to the United States. These are the countries that will play a large and vital role in determining the future course of world events. Their friendship is crucial to all those who are fighting to preserve freedom.

Id. at 24,467.

Representative Joseph Addabbo noted that “[t]he national origins system is discriminatory, and it gives a bad image to our friends overseas.” Id. at 21,768. Other members of the House made similar remarks. See id. at 21,777 (remarks of Rep. John Dent); id. at 21,781 (remarks of Rep. William Ryan); id. at 21,783-84 (remarks of Rep. Lester Wolff); id. at 21,784 (remarks of Rep. Leonard Farbstein); id. at 21,787 (remarks of Rep. Jeffery Cohelan); id. at 21,787 (remarks of Rep. Joseph Huot). Representative Jonathan Bingham informed his colleagues that from his “experience as an Ambassador to the United Nations, and from discussions with diplomats from the Far East, ... Asians feel very strongly about this discrimination.” Id. at 21,793. Senator Philip Hart pointed out that “[t]o State Department officials, the bill represents a public relations coup ... .” Id. at 24,240.

108. Id. at 21,769.
while at the same time, we are indicating that they are not good enough to be Americans." Jacob Javits and Edward Kennedy made the same point.111

B. Racial Egalitarian Motivation

Although foreign policy was a major motivation for the change in immigration policy towards Asians, it was not the sole motivation. Many commentators understand the 1965 Act as principled anti-racist legislation, at least to some degree.112 Congressional discussion

109. Id. at 21,790.
110. See id. at 24,470.
111. See id. at 24,777. Senator Kennedy remarked:
We have sent tens of thousands of American soldiers to Vietnam to defend the people of that country because we believe that as free people they are worthy of our support. But if the finest citizen of Vietnam wanted to come and live in America today, he would have to wait for many years.

Id.

112. See, e.g., VERNON M. BRIGGS, JR., IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE AMERICAN LABOR FORCE 62 (1984) ("Just as overt racism could no longer be tolerated in the way citizens treated their fellow citizens, neither could it be sanctioned in the laws that governed the way in which noncitizens were considered for immigrant status."); DANIELS, supra note 12, at 338 (noting that the Civil Rights Act, Voting Rights Act and Immigration Act "represent a kind of high-water mark in a national consensus of egalitarianism"); MALDWYN ALLEN JONES, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION 266 (2d ed. 1992). Jones wrote:
By the early 1960's, however, anti-Communist paranoia had waned, racial and ethnic stereotypes had lost some of their force, and Americans had become more tolerant of diversity. There was also growing awareness that the country was chronically short of skilled labor. Even so, it was not until Johnson's landslide victory in the 1964 presidential election had given Congress a more liberal complexion that reform at last reached its goal.

of the 1965 amendments supports this conclusion. Many legislators contended that the laws should be changed because racial and national distinctions were bad in principle, not because of some particular exigency. Senator Edward M. Kennedy argued that the national origins quota system was "contrary to our basic principles as a nation."113 Senator Joseph Clark insisted that "[t]he national origins quotas and the Asian-Pacific [sic] triangle provisions are irrational, arrogantly intolerant, and immoral."114 Representative Paul Krebs argued that the national origins system was "reprehensible to our national traditions," and that "[w]e must learn to judge each individual by his own worth and by the value he can bring to our Nation."115 Representative Dominick Daniels argued that "[r]acism simply has no place in America in this day and age."116 These kinds of arguments had been largely absent from debates in 1943 and 1952.117

This change in attitude apparently extended to Asians. Representative Leonard Farbstein stated to his colleagues that he could not "believe that there is any Member of this House who would say a word in defense" of the Asia-Pacific triangle provision.118 Senator Kennedy announced that he was "especially gratified that we are wiping out the Asia-Pacific triangle.... [A]fter almost 100 years, Asian peoples are no longer discriminated against in the immigration laws of our country."119

Others compared the bill to measures designed to eliminate do-

social consciousness of racial discrimination within the United States, as reflected in the Civil Rights Act of 1964." (citing Charles B. Keely, Immigration Policy and the New Immigration, 1965-76, in Sourcebook on the New Immigration: Implications for the United States and the International Community 15, 24 (Roy S. Bryce-Laporte ed., 1980)) [hereinafter Sourcebook on the New Immigration]; see also Daniel H. Foote, Japan's "Foreign Workers" Policy: A View from the United States, 7 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 707, 711 (1993) ("[S]ince... 1965, the United States has taken great strides toward achieving an immigration system based on universal standards; and the commitment today to a system free from racial bias appears to be supported by broad national consensus ... ").

114. Id. at 24,501. It was unjust, Senator Clark continued, that "[a] brilliant Korean or Indian scientist is turned away, while the northern European is accepted almost without question." Id.
115. Id. at 21,778.
116. Id. at 21,787.
117. Surely some members of Congress held racially egalitarian views in those years, but they may have concluded that such an argument would be unpersuasive to the majority.
118. 111 Cong. Rec. 21,785 (1965); see also id. at 21,792 (remarks of Rep. Brademas) (noting that the bill "will repeal the Asia-Pacific triangle which has too long been an insult to those of oriental ancestry").
119. Id. at 24,227.
mestic discrimination, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Reflecting the views of many, Representative Laurence Burton argued: "Just as we sought to eliminate discrimination in our land through the Civil Rights Act, today we seek by phasing out the national origins quota system to eliminate discrimination in immigration to this Nation composed of the descendants of immigrants."\textsuperscript{120}

Whether or not aliens had a right to immigrate on a race-neutral basis, officials recognized that racism in immigration was a civil rights issue because of its effect on Americans. Dean Rusk, for example, observed that immigration policy had significant domestic, as well as foreign, effects:

\[\text{G} \text{iven the fact that we are a country of many races and national origins, that those who built this country and developed it made decisions about opening our doors to the rest of the world; that anything which makes it appear that we, ourselves, are discriminating in principle about particular national origins, suggests that we think ... less well of our own citizens of those national origins, than of other citizens ... .} \textsuperscript{121}\]

\textsuperscript{120} Id. at 21,783; see also id. at 21,765 (remarks of Rep. Sweeney) (making similar observation); id. at 21,768 (remarks of Rep. Giaimo); id. at 21,783 (remarks of Rep. Wolff); id. at 21,784 (remarks of Rep. Farbstein); id. at 21,796 (remarks of Rep. Gallagher) (mentioning Voting Rights Act); id. at 24,446 (remarks of Sen. Fong) ("Elimination of racial barriers against citizens of other lands is a logical extension of eliminating discrimination against American citizens."); id. at 24,563 (remarks of Sen. Edward Kennedy).

\textsuperscript{121} \textit{Hearings on H.R. 7700, supra} note 38, at 390; see also id. at 410 (remarks of Attorney General Robert Kennedy) (noting that the bill "would remove from our law a discriminatory system of selecting immigrants that is a standing affront to millions of our citizens"); \textit{Hearings on S. 500, supra} note 38, at 9 (remarks of Attorney General Katzenbach) ("I do not know how any American could fail to be offended by a system which presumes that some people are inferior to others solely because of their birthplace... . The harm it does to the United States and to its citizens is incalculable."); \textit{Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Naturalization of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 1932 and other Legislation Relating to the Immigration Quota System, 88th Cong. 31 (1964) (unpublished) [hereinafter \textit{Hearings on S. 1932}] (remarks of Sen. Robert Keating)}.

Keating stated:

Moreover, by eliminating from the law the pernicious implications of racial inferiority contained in the Asia-Pacific Triangle provisions, the United States would no longer be in the position of having on its books a legal slap in the face of our ... own citizens of Asian background who can be justly proud of their record of attainments as Americans.

\textit{Id.}

Even opponents of reform, such as W.B. Hicks, Jr., Executive Director of the Liberty Lobby, understood this point. Hicks acknowledged the insult to Americans when the law discriminated against those of similar ethnic or national backgrounds:
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C. The Unintended Reform?

The evidence to this point suggests that the 1965 bill was a genuine repudiation of the discriminatory laws of the past, for Asians as well as for the African and southern and eastern European nationals whose opportunities to immigrate were limited by the national origins quota system. Yet, in spite of the racially egalitarian tenor of congressional and administration statements, a number of immigration scholars and historians, as well as leading anti-immigration

I would like to say that the people I have seen, the witnesses, coming before this committee to object to the quota system have made a very deep impression on me. Apparently the quota system is not an insult to foreigners so much as it is to Americans of foreign parentage of identifiable racial strains such as the Italian-Americans and Chinese-Americans, who feel that the quotas make them less valuable or that Congress feels they are less valuable as American citizens than others, and I can well understand their feelings. I think the people who subscribe to Liberty Lobby would agree with me on this, that we do not like the idea of discrimination based on race resulting in a feeling of being insulted on the part of our American citizens.

Hearings on H.R. 7700, supra note 38, at 852.

122. See IRVING BERNSTEIN, GUNS OR BUTTER: THE PRESIDENCY OF LYNDON JOHNSON 259 (1996) ("No one anticipated the dramatic changes that would soon take place."); BRIGGS, supra note 112, at 79; DANIELS, supra note 12, at 341, 344 ("Clearly, the 1965 law has not worked out as its proponents expected. The experts simply did not know what they were talking about . . . ."); JONES, supra note 112, at 267 (claiming that the massive increase in Asian immigration "was entirely unexpected"); REIMERS, supra note 10, at 73-76 (noting that many thought Asian immigration would not increase; citing, inter alia, Rep. Celler); ELIZABETH ROLPH, IMMIGRATION POLICIES: LEGACY FROM THE 1980S AND ISSUES FOR THE 1990S, at 10 (1992) (noting that Congressional interest in change in immigration law was spurred by "certain unanticipated consequences of the 1965 immigration reforms" including increase in Asian immigration); STEPHEN STEINBERG, THE ETHNIC MYTH 268 (1989) (noting that the dramatic increase in Asian immigration was "not fully anticipated at the time of its enactment"); TAKAKI, supra note 41, at 419; UEDA, supra note 52, at 45; PHILIP Q. YANG, POST-1965 IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES 18, 21 (1995) (noting that "both Congress and the Johnson Administration expected only a slight increase in Asian immigration" as a result of the 1965 Amendment); Franklin Abrams, Immigration Law and its Enforcement: Reflections on American Immigration, in SOURCEBOOK ON THE NEW IMMIGRATION, supra note 112, at 27 (stating that immigration of Asian professionals was unexpected); Edna Bonacich et al., Korean Immigrant: Small Business in Los Angeles, in SOURCEBOOK ON THE NEW IMMIGRATION 167, supra note 112, at 167 ("An unanticipated consequence of the new law has been a sharp rise in immigration from Asia."); Glazer, supra note 112, at 7; Nathan Glazer, The Closing Door, in ARGUING IMMIGRATION 37, 39 (Nicolaus Mills ed., 1994); Elizabeth Midgely, Comings and Goings in U.S. Immigration Policy, in THE UNAVOIDABLE ISSUE: U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE 1980s, at 52 (Demetrios Papademetriou & Mark Miller eds., 1983) (stating that "not all of the effects of the new system in practice were anticipated" including the increase in Asian immigration); The New Immigrants, 5 CQ RESEARCHER 108, 108 (1995) (noting that one of the "effects of the new law [was] a largely unanticipated rise in immigration from . . . Asia"); David M. Reimers, An Unintended Reform: The 1965 Immigration Act and Third World Immigration to the United States, 3 J. AM. ETHNIC HIST. 9, 25 (1983); Peter Schuck, The Emerging Political Consensus on Immigration Law, 5 GEO. IMMIG. L.J. 1, 7 (1991) ("Kennedy ad-
activists, 123 argue that there was no thought that the Asian proportion of the immigration stream would change as a result of the 1965 law. 124 More specifically, Robert Tucker is one of the few who suggest that some increase was expected: "Asian immigration was expected to rise only very modestly as a result of the new legislation." By contrast, Professor Vernon Briggs of Cornell writes that "it was anticipated that passage of the Immigration Act of 1965 would lead to a decline in Asian immigration." 125

Perhaps George Borjas captures the consensus view when he writes that "[i]t is conceivable that some of the framers of the 1965 amendments saw the family-reunification provisions as a way of preserving the status quo in the national-origin mix of the U.S. population, without having to resort to explicit racial or national-origin restrictions." 126 Similarly, Bill Ong Hing explains that the 1965 law was "driven by [America's] desire to be seen as the egalitarian champion of the 'free world'" but that "Asian immigration after 1965 took the United States by surprise" 127 because "little attention was paid to what, if any, impact the reforms might have on Asian
American communities.” Many scholars cite Robert Kennedy’s prediction that 5,000 Asian immigrants would come in the year after the act became law. Given that 5,000 was a fraction of the annual Asian immigration under the McCarran-Walter Act, reliance on this figure suggests that many scholars really believe that Asian immigration was not expected to increase at all.

The claim that post-1965 Asian immigration was unexpected seems to be not merely that no one considered the issue one way or the other, but that policymakers had a conscious belief that Asian immigration would not increase significantly or would actually decline. The literature’s repeated assertion of this point is significant because it implies that knowledge would have been material—that the law might have been structured differently—had the risk of increased Asian immigration been perceived. Not only do professors Reimers and Daniels suggest that the bill may have been conditioned on an assumption of no significant change in the makeup of the immigrant stream, but this “unintended consequence” is cited by restrictionists as a reason to scrap the law. If it is true that a determinative assumption underlying the law was that few Asians would immigrate, it necessarily means that the law was not really intended to eliminate race as a factor from America’s immigration laws.

The prevailing scholarly view does not give Congress enough credit. Close examination of the legislative history and interviews with people involved in the bill suggest that Congress knew more Asians would immigrate. The most probable view is that legislators and administration officials knew that Asian immigration would increase substantially, even if no one predicted the actual magnitude,
which was probably greater than expected. In this context, it would be easy to confuse an outcome that seems inevitable in retrospect and one that was actually known at the time. Nevertheless, a number of factors suggest that congressional and Administration officials knew that the likely outcome of liberalization would be an increase in Asian immigration. If Congress knew, then the question of what Congress would have done had they known becomes nonsensical—Congress knew and the 1965 Act is what they did in the face of that knowledge.

1. Contemporary Recollections of Participants

A number of participants shared their recollections—some faded—of the drafting and adoption of the 1965 legislation. When trying to determine what people meant by particular actions, what they say has some bearing. The responses were remarkably uniform. President Gerald R. Ford, for example, was the House minority leader in 1965, and a supporter of the bill. He remembers that Asian immigration was expected to increase substantially. "As I recall, it was anticipated that the 1965 Amendments would substantially increase the number of Asian immigrants. As the Republican Leader in the House of Representatives at the time, I favored that result."

The bill came out of the Democratic-controlled House Judiciary Committee, and its Subcommittee Number One, which was responsible for immigration. Peter Rodino, Jr., later Chairman of the

135. The absolute numbers of immigrants of all nationalities exceeded, in some years, the numbers predicted by Congress in 1965. See, e.g., DANIELS, supra note 12, at 340-44.

136. I do not mean to weigh in on the controversy over using legislative history to construe statutes. See Kevin R. Johnson, Responding to the "Litigation Explosion": The Plain Meaning of Executive Branch Primacy Over Immigration, 71 N.C. L. REV. 413, 425-31 (1993) (discussing debate and collecting authorities). First, no one questions that the 1965 Act eliminated the national origins quota system and formal consideration of race from the immigration laws. Moreover, this Article examines what Congress and the Administration thought they were doing when they changed the law. In answering this question, legislative history and other evidence is surely relevant. At the same time, the "'plain meaning' " rule—that the best evidence of congressional purpose is the "'plain meaning of the text'"—renders doubtful the claim that the racial diversification of the immigration stream was accidental. See id. at 426. It is implausible that Congress did not know that ending discrimination would create opportunities for previously excluded groups.

137. Letter from President Gerald R. Ford to Gabriel J. Chin, Assistant Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law 1 (Jan. 29, 1996) (on file with author).

House Judiciary Committee itself, recognized that there was enormous unsatisfied immigration demand in Asia. Representative Rodino recognized at the time that the increase in Asian immigration "could be substantial." Judiciary Committee member Robert Kastenmeier also expected that "many more Asians would be coming to the United States." Subcommittee member Don Edwards recalled that he knew "there would be more" Asian immigrants. Jack Brooks, Charles Mathias, and Arch Moore, all members of the Immigration Subcommittee, also anticipated increased Asian immigration, although not at the level that actually occurred.

According to Dale DeHaan, then advisor to Senator Edward Kennedy, supporters of the bill in the Senate recognized that more Asians would be coming. Aware of some scholarly opinions to the contrary, DeHaan disagrees with them.

Kennedy and Johnson Administration officials who worked on the bill had no doubt about its effects. Washington attorney Myer Feldman was Deputy White House Counsel to President Kennedy and White House Counsel to President Johnson. Feldman states

139. See Telephone Interview with Peter Rodino, Jr., Retired Member of Congress (Mar. 8, 1996) (transcript on file with author).
140. Id. at 9.
141. Telephone Interview with Robert Kastenmeier, Retired Member of Congress (Jan. 12, 1996) (transcript on file with author).
142. Telephone Interview with Don Edwards, Retired Member of Congress (Jan. 16, 1996) (transcript on file with author).
143. See Letter from Jack Brooks, Retired Member of Congress, to Gabriel J. Chin, Assistant Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law 1 (Jan. 17, 1996) (on file with author) ("As I recall the thought was that a few more Asians would enter and that it would modify the national origin system which had limited the number of Asian immigrants for a few years.")
144. See Telephone Interview with Charles Mathias, Retired United States Senator (Feb. 9, 1996) (transcript on file with author).
145. See Telephone Interview with Arch Moore, Jr., Retired Governor of West Virginia and Member of Congress (Jan. 18, 1996) (transcript on file with author).
146. See Letter from Gabriel J. Chin, Assistant Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law, to Dale DeHaan, Former Staff Member for Senator Edward M. Kennedy 1 (Dec. 16, 1995) (on file with author) (containing transcribed notes of interview). After leaving Senate service, Mr. DeHaan remained active in refugee and immigration matters. He was director of immigration and refugee services for the National Council of Churches and the Church World Service, and later U.N. Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees. In 1990, he was named to the U.S. Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development. See Robert Pear, Centralized Immigration Control Urged, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1990, at A22 (announcing Commissioner DeHaan's appointment).
147. See Letter from Gabriel J. Chin to Dale DeHaan, supra note 146, at 1.
that both Kennedy and Johnson believed that "[w]hether the immi-
grant was from Asia, Africa, Italy or eastern Europe, or whether the
immigrant was from England, France or Belgium, was not an accept-
able basis for discrimination between them." Speaking of Asian
immigration, Feldman writes: "[W]e did expect there would be an
increase and we welcomed it."

Nicholas deBelleville Katzenbach was Deputy Attorney General
under Kennedy before becoming Attorney General under Johnson. Katzenbach said recently that he was "surprised [but] not astounded"
at the percentage of non-white immigration under the 1965 Act, but
that he would not have been surprised at the time the bill was passed
if fifty percent turned out to be non-white. Although the details,
such as Southeast Asian immigration following the Vietnam War,
could not have been anticipated, "the general phenomenon" of in-
creased Asian immigration "should have been predictable, [and he] think[s] was" predictable when the bill was passed. W. Willard
Wirtz, then Secretary of Labor, generally shares Attorney General
Katzenbach's views.

Norbert A. Schlei, Assistant Attorney General in the Justice
Department's Office of Legal Counsel under Robert Kennedy,
worked on the original draft of the bill with Adam Walinsky. Both

149. Letter from Myer Feldeman, Former White House Counsel, to Gabriel J. Chin,
Assistant Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law 1-2 (Feb. 2,
150. Id. at 2.
151. During his remarks on the floor of the Senate, Robert Kennedy thanked 10 peo-
ple for their work on the bill including Adam Walinsky; the first two names mentioned
were Attorney General Katzenbach and Assistant Attorney General Schlei. See 111
CONG. REC. 24,498 (1965).
152. See Telephone Interview with Nicholas deBelleville Katzenbach, Former Attor-
153. Id.
154. See Telephone Interview with W. Willard Wirtz, Former Secretary of Labor
155. Schlei's background is remarkable; editor-in-chief of the Yale Law Journal and
first in his graduating class, he clerked for Justice Harlan on the Supreme Court and co-
authored a prize-winning book with Yale Professor Myers McDougall. See 2 WHO'S WHO
IN AMERICA, supra note 148, at 3705. Six years out of law school, he was an Assistant
Attorney General under Robert Kennedy, where he advised the White House on such
matters as the Cuban Missile Crisis and integration of the University of Mississippi. See
id.
156. Since leaving the Justice Department, in addition to practicing law in New York,
Walinsky has been one of the most provocative and interesting critics of the criminal jus-
tice system. See Adam Walinsky, The Crisis of Public Order, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July
ultimately successful efforts to establish a Police Corps, which occurred in 1994 by virtue
recall that Asian immigration was expected to increase; Walinsky points out that “you’d have to be a real dope not to know that the number would go up.” Thomas Ehrlich, President Emeritus of Indiana University and now a Stanford professor, worked on the original draft of the bill when he was on the legal staff of the State Department. He says that he and Assistant Secretary of State Abba Schwartz intended to “open up the gates, and . . . it happened just [that] way[].”

In sum, even filtered through thirty years of memory, the consistency of Republican and Democrat, House and Senate, Congress and Administration, suggest that these recollections are worth considering. It is, of course, conceivable that these recollections are self-serving, that the sincere anti-racism which the substance of the remarks suggest has been tailored to fit some notion of political prudence. For two reasons, this seems implausible. First, save only perhaps the Reconstruction Congresses, many of these men come from Congresses and Administrations more sympathetic to civil rights than any in American history. If some of these men were not sincerely in favor of civil rights, then we have never had elected officials who were. Second, their recollections are supported by the contemporaneous record of consideration of the bill.

People thinking about immigration, years before the results of the 1965 Act were known, predicted that ending discrimination against Asians would result in more of them coming over. For example, in his 1963 book American Immigration Policies, former Congressman Marion T. Bennett criticized Senator Philip Hart’s 1962 proposal to end quota preferences for Northern European nations. Bennett wrote:

*China and India . . . would . . . ultimately be the European-
successor to our immigration largesse. The 1961 Indian census reported 438 million people in that country. The 1953 Chinese census reported 583 million Chinese and in 1962 President Kennedy said there were 650 million in Communist China alone. The possibility that they might not take advantage of relaxed immigration restrictions is remote. Their quotas have been oversubscribed for years. One of the arguments advanced for greater Chinese immigration is that the Chinese quota is only 205 annually. It is pertinent to note, however... that nonquota Chinese immigration is much greater than the world average of two and one-half times quota immigration.161

What is obvious in retrospect was also observed at the time: Liberalization would mean benefits for countries with large populations and high immigration demand.

2. Legislative History: Asian Immigration Will Increase

In 1964 and 1965, there seems to have been no serious question that the racial demographics of the immigration stream would change. In what might have been the first use of the term "the new immigration" in the context of the 1965 Act, Senator Edward Kennedy explained that Americans need not fear the people who would be brought in under the bill: "[T]he people who comprise the new immigration—the type which this bill would give preference to—are relatively well educated and well to do. They are familiar with American ways."162 Kennedy argued only that the change would not be traumatic, not that there would be no change.

If only southern and eastern European immigration would be increased, then the following exchange about security measures between Representative Michael Feighan and State Department official Abba Schwartz makes little sense:

MR. FEIGHAN. The reason I ask [about changes in security procedures] is that the existing patterns of immigration to the United States have been in force for some time, thus permitting the development of security techniques and procedures which fit those patterns. The administration proposal could very well change those patterns to such an extent that you would be required to operate in new and un-

161. BENNETT, supra note 16, at 274 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Hart later introduced the bill which became the 1965 Act. See also Editorial, New Quota for Old, BOSTON REC. AM., Jan. 16, 1965 (noting irony that "those nations with large numbers of people who would like to emigrate to the U.S. are generally allotted the smallest quota").

162. 111 CONG. REC. 24,228 (1965).
charted waters. Is that a realistic possibility?

MR. SCHWARTZ. We certainly believe you are correct, Mr. Chairman. There may be people coming in greater numbers from different areas of the world. That certainly would be taken into account. I can imagine that if numbers were to increase of persons coming from areas where we do not have extensive personnel, or experienced people, that certainly would have an effect and we would have to take care of that.163

Senator Paul Douglas made no bones about the effect of the bill: "I would say the fundamental question is simply this. Should we not admit more of the hundreds of thousands of people in eastern Europe, southern Europe, southeastern Europe and Asia who want to come here...[?]"164

If Asian immigration volume was expected to rise insignificantly, that fact was kept secret from the many witnesses who predicted a substantial increase in Asian immigration. If few subscribed to witness Rosalind Frame's prediction that after forty years of immigration under the new law, there could be more than 114 million Chinese living in the United States,165 a number of groups, including The Citizens for a Sensible, Security-Minded Immigration Law,166 and The Daughters of the American Revolution,167 among several oth-
agreed that the bill would offer advantages to "immigrants from the overpopulated, socially, and economically deprived countries, such as China, India, and Africa [sic]."

Many witnesses and legislators also recognized that existing law was unfair to would-be Asian immigrants; and that there was un-
satisfied immigration demand in Asia.\textsuperscript{171} Many officials recognized that Asian immigration would increase. Edward Kennedy\textsuperscript{172} and Attorney General Katzenbach\textsuperscript{173} predicted that would-be Asian immigrants would benefit from the reforms.

Senator Ervin, ambivalent but ultimately a supporter of the bill, seemed to assume that China\textsuperscript{174} and India\textsuperscript{175} would take the maximum quota, and noted that the bill “would provide for at least possible, substantial increases in immigration from” a list of countries with small quotas, including Bhutan, Burma, Cambodia, China, Mongolia, India, Indonesia, Korea, Laos, Pakistan, Thailand, Western Samoa, and Vietnam.\textsuperscript{176} Representative George Miller of California, after speaking of a U.S. Air Force Academy graduate of Japanese American ancestry, said “I feel that we can accept more people here or we can perhaps better arrange the quotas to take in people from places and areas that are now given an insufficient quota.”\textsuperscript{177}

\textsuperscript{171} Mrs. Ray Erb mentioned the long waiting lists in some Asian countries, see \textit{Hearings on S. 500, supra} note 38, at 703-04, as did Senator Fong, see 111 \textit{CONG. REC.} 24,447, 24,448 (1965), and Representatives Ryan, see id. at 21,781, and Yates, see id. at 21,793 (discussing “heavily mortgaged Eastern quotas”).

David Carliner, testifying in support of the bill on behalf of the ACLU, pointed out that in addition to unsatisfied immigration demand in Italy and Greece, there was also unsatisfied demand to some extent from Eastern Europe and from Asia. I think that under this bill we redress the balance by letting those people come in, and in a historical sense, to give the Chinese a preference today would perhaps be a discrimination in their favor. But if someone has been getting a discrimination for 100 years, he cannot complain if somebody else gets a discrimination for the next 100 years. \textit{Hearings on S. 500, supra} note 38, at 448. According to Carliner, “[t]he critical problem is that the people in Greece, in China, to some extent in India, are seeking to come here in large numbers.” \textit{Id.} at 455.

Senator Leverett Saltonstall, after mentioning discriminatory effects against southern and eastern Europe and Asia, explained: “Today there are many quota numbers available in some countries where there is little pressure for immigration, while in other areas, where there are many persons who wish to immigrate to the United States, few quota numbers are available and the quotas are heavily oversubscribed.” 111 \textit{CONG. REC.} 24,441 (1965). He mentioned five countries: China, Italy, Greece, Poland and Portugal. \textit{See id.}

\textsuperscript{172} According to Senator Kennedy, “[t]he principal beneficiaries of the new system are those countries which have large backlogs of applicants for immigration, but have relatively small quotas.” \textit{Hearings on S. 500, supra} note 38, at 2. Kennedy named China and Japan, and seven other countries. \textit{See id.}

\textsuperscript{173} Katzenbach said southern and eastern Europe would benefit and “the Asian countries would get some benefit.” \textit{Hearings on H.R. 2580, supra} note 93, at 23.

\textsuperscript{174} \textit{See Hearings on S. 500, supra} note 38, at 64, 359, 571.

\textsuperscript{175} \textit{See id.} at 66, 196, 280, 530.

\textsuperscript{176} \textit{Id.} at 210-11.

\textsuperscript{177} \textit{Hearings on H.R. 7700, supra} note 38, at 189.
Representative Arch Moore, in explaining what the status of Japan, China and the Philippines would be after the bill was passed, told Congress precisely how the system would work—20,000 per year would be the upper limitation for them just as for every other country.\textsuperscript{178} As a result, the United States could "look forward to an increased number of each of the groups... referred to."\textsuperscript{179} Similarly, Senator Fong stated that there was no need to fear that an increase of Asian immigration would "upset the historical and cultural pattern of American life. An objective examination of the facts dispels this fear as groundless"\textsuperscript{180} because of historical patterns of Asian assimilation. The argument that Americans should not fear more Asians surely suggests that more would come.

Opponents of reform recognized that Asia would benefit. Representative O.C. Fisher, an opponent, stated that "[t]here is simply no way of estimating the number of refugees, Asiatics, Africans, and others, who would be admissible.... The big increase under the Celler proposal would come primarily from Africa, Asia, and some from southern Europe."\textsuperscript{181} Even Representative Frank Chelf, a subcommittee member who supported the national origins quota system, said that the bill should be rejected, but Asian immigration should increase:

As I recall... in 1952 we... recognized the Japanese, Koreans, Chinese, and the others. In other words, the Asian countries and this so-called affront of exclusion was removed.

While I agree... that this is only a token recognition—and I also agree... that there ought to be an additional recognition—how much, at this juncture, I am unable to say, but in all good conscience and sincerity, I do agree... we should eventually recognize them by a larger number.\textsuperscript{182}

Senators Spessard Holland,\textsuperscript{183} John McClellan\textsuperscript{184} and Robert

\textsuperscript{178} See 111 CONG. REC. 21,590 (1965).
\textsuperscript{179} Id. at 21,591. Representative Pelly stated that "[i]t is not that I register fear that they might come in because they make wonderful citizens." Id. Moore added that "[p]eople who attack what we are doing here today say that it will let millions of orientals come into the United States," and found that result unlikely. Id.
\textsuperscript{180} Id. at 24,467.
\textsuperscript{181} Hearings on H.R. 2580, supra note 93, at 157-58.
\textsuperscript{182} Hearings on H.R. 7700, supra note 38, at 393; see also id. at 847 (statement by Rep. Chelf) (stating to Chinese-American witness: "I favor an increased quota for your people.").
\textsuperscript{183} Senator Spessard Holland of Florida, a supporter of McCarran-Walter, noted: [T]he bill, as it is now disclosed on the floor, assumes to open the door to immi-
Byrd also recognized that Asian immigration would increase.

In April of 1966, before the full effects of the new law could be known, an Immigration and Naturalization Service employee writing about the law was certain that Asian immigration would increase. After discussing the elimination of the Asia-Pacific triangle provisions, he wrote:

This amendment will have the effect of making immigrant visas available to aliens who were previously chargeable to quotas so greatly oversubscribed that visas could not be issued to them for many years to come. The amendment will lead to an increase in the number of visa petitions filed with the Service. The fact that even the preference portions of some quotas were heavily oversubscribed had discouraged many relatives and prospective employers from filing petitions to accord aliens a preference classification.

He also recognized that the overall pattern of immigration would change in favor of relatives and skilled immigrants, and non-preference immigration would be virtually unavailable.
The news media did not overlook the likely effects of the 1965 law on Asian immigration. *U.S. News & World Report* was unambiguous: "Under rules just approved by Congress, officials forecast these changes in the flow of immigrants to [the] U.S. . . . FROM ASIA: Many more immigrants expected, since racial restrictions on Indians and Orientals are wiped out."189 "Nobody has estimated the number of Chinese who will apply to enter the U.S.,” the magazine reported, but "[t]he potential is large."190 Days after President Johnson signed the bill, the *Christian Science Monitor* reported that it would contribute to a "multinational and multiracial United States."191 In November 1965, *Scientific American*, reporting on the new law, noted that Asians, as well as Southern Europeans, would have increased opportunities to immigrate.192 Other newspapers agreed that the demographics of the immigration stream would change.193 Indeed, the argument that an increase in Asian immigration is surprising is the revisionist view of the history of this law. A 1966 article in *American Legion Magazine* insisted that the multiplicity of newspaper reports predicting an increase in Asian immigration were readily available. However, on and after July 1, 1968, such aliens will be competing for immigrant visas on equal terms with natives of countries which heretofore have had heavily oversubscribed quotas, such as Greece, Italy and China. It is highly probable that after July 1, 1968, the pattern of recent years will be greatly changed, with all or nearly all of the immigrant visas subject to the numerical limitation . . . being issued to preference immigrants.

*Id.* at 111-12.


190. *Id.* at 57.


were foolish.\textsuperscript{194}

3. Sources of the New Immigration: Families and Professionals

The few estimates which were offered support the idea that an increase in Asian immigration was expected. Administration officials predicted that Asian immigrants would account for 94,972 of the 820,910 immigrants expected during the five-year phase-out of the quota system that was proposed by President Kennedy;\textsuperscript{195} this was an increase over the 15,000 or so who came in each year during the 1950s, but, because of increasing numbers in the late 1950s and 1961-65, about the same proportion as had come in under McCarran-Walter.\textsuperscript{196}

Senator Fong predicted that about twenty percent of quota spots would go to the Asia-Pacific triangle once the new law was in full effect—more than a 300% increase over their share in the 1950s, and over 1300% more than their official quota of 2,000 (1.53% of all visas) under McCarran-Walter. Concretely, twenty percent of the 170,000 per year Eastern Hemisphere quota under the new law would be 34,000 for Asia (not counting non-quota immigration).

If hard estimates are scarce, impressionistic information is more plentiful. The 1965 law offered preferences to skilled immigrants and to family members of United States citizens or permanent resident aliens. The legislative record indicates that Congress understood that Asians would take advantage of both aspects of the new law.

a. Asian Family Reunification

Congress perceived clearly the problem of divided families—Americans separated from family members eligible to immigrate except for their race. Many immigrants, Massachusetts Senator Saltonstall explained, "have spouses, children, parents, brothers or sisters still abroad whom they wish to bring to this country to join them."\textsuperscript{198} Legislators recognized that this problem applied with spe-

\textsuperscript{194} See Deane Heller & David Heller, Our New Immigration Law, AM. LEGION MAG., Feb. 1966, at 6, 9. This and other misinterpretations of the law, according to the authors, were "a bit of faking" on the part of the press. Id. at 41.

\textsuperscript{195} See Hearings on H.R. 7700, supra note 38, at 589.

\textsuperscript{196} See 1991 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 6, at 29. Although Asian countries had no quotas or small quotas during this period, many Asians immigrated nevertheless, through special bills for refugees, relatives, scientists and the like. See infra notes 288-96 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{197} See Hearings on S. 500, supra note 38, at 118, 147.

\textsuperscript{198} 111 CONG. REC. 24,441 (1965). Although there were family reunification preferences under McCarran-Walter for low-quota countries, they were rapidly exhausted.
cial force to Asians. The experience of passing many private bills, necessary to reunite families or alleviate other severe hardships, was not forgotten in the debate on the 1965 law. Robert Kennedy, for example, testified as Attorney General about the problems Americans had bringing in an immediate relative who was “Italian or Australian, Spanish or Portuguese, Japanese or Korean, Indian or Filipino.” Senator Neuberger explained that we on the west coast have a large number of citizens who are second, third, and fourth generation Americans, but whose ancestors were born in China, Japan, Korea, other Asiatic countries—the Philippines—in order to reunite some of these families requires my putting in a number of private bills every year.

Congress recognized that the volume of Asian family reunification immigration would be significant. For example, Representative John Lindsay noted that in 1964, “[t]he great majority of the immigrants who entered the country over and above their national quotas were admitted because they were the wives, husbands, or children of U.S. citizens. Persons in any one of these three categories last year alone accounted for ... almost 8,000 from Asia.” As a result, non-quota family reunification immigration from Asia was nearly four times quota immigration. That these facts were before Congress when it passed the bill suggests that when they continued to be true, it was no surprise.


201. Hearings on S. 500, supra note 38, at 548.

202. Hearings on H.R. 2580, supra note 93, at 413. Many other members of Congress made the same point. Representative James Roosevelt wrote that an American citizen of Indian ancestry would have difficulty bringing in a brother or sister, while a British neighbor would find it easy. See Hearings on H.R. 7700, supra note 38, at 320. Representative Thomas Gill of Hawaii, stated: “Reuniting families, particularly when you deal with the various Chinese quotas and the Asian [sic] Pacific triangle quota, is very important to Hawaii.” Id. at 179; see also id. at 305 (statement of Rep. Joseph Minish) (noting that a Chinese constituent was unable to bring in her sister from Hong Kong); cf. id. at 697 (statement by a member of a social welfare agency that the wife and child of an American physician could not enter).

203. Representative Byron Rogers also spoke about family immigration pulling in large groups, see Hearings on H.R. 7700, supra note 38, at 78, and he later mentioned Indian or Italian family members. See id. at 83.
b. Asian Professionals

The record also shows that Congress was well aware that significant numbers of Asian professionals would immigrate once they had a chance. One after another, legislators regaled each other with stories about real or hypothetical Asian professionals who could not be admitted because of their racial ancestry.204 These stories were only anecdotes, but it was clear that the number of Asian professionals who would immigrate was thought to be significant. Indeed, Representative Arch Moore, a supporter of the bill, was concerned about the brain drain from Asia:

204. Senator Allott spoke of a Chinese nurse who faced deportation. See 111 CONG. REC. 24,473 (1965). Senator Clark noted that a “brilliant Korean or Indian scientist is turned away, while the northern European is accepted almost without question. . . . While Plato and Dante would have a hard time getting into the United States . . . Confucius or Lao-tze could not get in at all.” Id. at 24,501. Senator Robert Kennedy mentioned three professionals who could not get in because of the quota system: a Greek chemist, a Korean radiation specialist and a Japanese microbiologist. See id. at 24,482. Representative Thomas Gill spoke of a doctor of Chinese descent, who, he thought, was a native to the Philippines, who could not get into Hawaii. See Hearings on H.R. 7700, supra note 38, at 180. Senator Paul Douglas explained that a Chinese engineer in Evanston, Illinois, was unable to obtain permanent residency for his Chinese wife, a nurse, who had entered on a student visa. See Hearings on S. 500, supra note 38, at 153. According to Senator Neuberger, a cancer expert sought by a medical school was kept out because of the Asia Pacific triangle rule. See id. at 550-51. A representative of the ACLU stated that a hypothetical “brilliant physicist living in Hong Kong who is Chinese,” id. at 450, would not be able to come in. Attorney General Katzenbach testified that there were “innumerable” cases in which the quota system damaged the United States by keeping out professionals, including a “brilliant” Indian cardiac surgeon. See id. at 10. He also observed that an Indian brain surgeon would likely be excluded or subjected to a very long wait, but a common laborer from Ireland could easily enter. See Hearings on H.R. 2580, supra note 93, at 17. Attorney General Robert Kennedy said skilled workers from the United States would go to “Italy, Germany, England, and Japan,” just as we took their skilled workers. Hearings on H.R. 7700, supra note 38, at 427. Similarly, after Senator Kennedy noted that the Asia Pacific triangle restrictions would be eliminated by the bill, Maryland Senator Tydings noted that his family doctor was Chinese, that his son had a close Korean friend, and exclaimed with apparent passion:

Why if a man can make a great contribution—a doctor, a writer, a scientist, or a scholar—the fact . . . that he should be kept out, when we arbitrarily bring anybody in from northern Europe whether they can make a contribution or not, merely because the quota of northern Europe is not filled, just does not make sense.

Hearings on S. 500, supra note 38, at 657. John Lindsay explained: “A high proportion of those who most want to come to America and who would be of most benefit to us are ineligible. A very few countries are given high quotas which they don’t use. Other countries with vastly larger populations . . . are given tiny quotas.” Hearings on H.R. 7700, supra note 38, at 115. Senator Fong also advised the Senate Judiciary Committee of Nobel prize winning scientists who had managed to make it in, including a number of Asians. See Hearings on S. 1932, supra note 121, at 98 (listing immigrants from Europe and Asia who have won Nobel prizes).
In the Asia-Pacific triangle countries, there isn’t a very wholesome attitude about us from the standpoint of our immigration policies; and yet, here we become a scavenger for brain power in the same part of the world. It just seems to me that while we may in a very logical way, by removing the national origins system, remove the stigma of placing a greater value on one citizen over another, we jump right back into the fire in another respect when we set up these magnets to pull out their choicest citizens.205

Similarly, Labor Secretary Wirtz suggested that the quality of skilled immigration would increase because Asian immigration would open up. After discussing the small quotas available to the Asia-Pacific triangle countries, Wirtz said, “under the new bill there will be situations in which a more skilled person will come in where under the old bill a less skilled person from a country whose quota was not filled would have come in.”206

There was also evidence that once opportunities to immigrate were made available, Asians would take full advantage of them. In September of 1966, before the law was fully implemented,207 and therefore before its consequences could be fully known, British economist Brinley Thomas predicted that Asian immigration would increase.208 His argument was based not only on logic, but on the results of 1962 legislation,209 which made it easier for professionals to

205. *Hearings on H.R. 2580, supra* note 93, at 223. A critic writing in *The New Republic* argued that the law would “suck in the doctors and engineers that underdeveloped countries need at home.” T.R.B. from Washington, *Who Should Enter?*, *The New Republic*, Feb. 20, 1965, at 4, 4. Clearly, this was a reference to underdeveloped third world nations, not Germany or England. See also *Hearings on H.R. 2580, supra* note 93, at 374 (statement of W.B. Hicks, of the Liberty Lobby) ("Should we deprive the underdeveloped nations of the world of the cream of their limited supply of doctors, engineers, and teachers by making these skills the No. 1 preference in our immigration law, and at the same time, spend millions on programs designed to develop such skills in those nations?"); 111 CONG. REC. 21,775 (1965) (remarks of Rep. Durward Hall).


207. Under the law, the national origins quota system was not fully abolished until 1968. See *Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965*, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 1, 79 Stat. 911, 911 (providing that each country would have at least the same quota as it had under McCarran-Walter until June 30, 1968, but unused quota slots would be used for oversubscribed countries).


209. Act of Oct. 24, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-885, 76 Stat. 1247. Technically, the bill allowed entry over and above the quota of certain immigrants who, by virtue of their skills, were entitled to first preference entry under McCarran-Walter, but whose countries' quotas were exhausted. See S. REP. NO. 87-2276, reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4204 (reporting favorably on S. 336, describing in particular its effect on worthy Chinese who wished to immigrate).
enter the United States.

The 1962 statute allowed "large numbers of alien scientists and engineers to achieve immigrant status within a relatively short period of time."210 As a result, immigration of European scientists and engineers increased twenty-three percent, but "that of Asians increased by no less than 182 per cent. This indicates that skilled Asian immigration has a remarkably high elasticity with respect to a moderate liberalizing of the restrictions."211 The author concluded:

If the relatively minor supplement to the law in October 1962 led to an almost threefold increase in the influx of highly qualified Asians, one wonders what the basic alteration in the principles of selection enacted in 1965 is likely to do. One can only surmise that the process of creaming off skills from the poorest areas of the world will be intensified.212

Members of Congress working on the 1965 bill were aware of the prior law and its effects.213 In short, rather than concluding that immigration of Asian professionals should have been no surprise; it seems more probable that it was no surprise to any member of Congress who listened to the testimony and debates on the bill.

D. The Evidence Supporting a Prediction of No Asian Influx

There is some evidence that members of Congress and other informed sources doubted that Asian immigration would increase as a result of the bill. Some of it is ambiguous.214 Even the most compelling, however, does not outweigh the evidence to the contrary.

1. Attorney General Robert Kennedy's Prediction

The 1964 prediction by then-Attorney General Robert Kennedy, cited at the beginning of this Article, is the centerpiece of the widespread belief that no one expected an Asian influx as a result of

210. Thomas, supra note 208, at 67.
211. Id. at 67-68.
212. Id. at 68 (emphasis added).
213. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1932, supra note 121, at 13 (testimony of Senator Philip Hart) (noting the immigration "has not, in fact, flowed in the national origins channels set forth in the 1952 Act"); 111 CONG. REC. 24,226 (1965) (chart including all admissions under special legislation, including this act, described as the "act of Oct. 24, 1962").
214. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 500, supra note 38, at 563 (testimony of Sen. Claiborne Pell) ("Maybe there will be a huge surge from India or a huge surge from Africa, but I would tend to doubt it."). Senator Strom Thurmond, who voted against the bill, stated that he did not "believe that the immigration formula in the proposal now before the Senate, if properly administered, will result in drastic or undesirable changes in the patterns of immigration into the United States." 111 CONG. REC. 24,237 (1965).
immigration reform. According to Fortune, for example, "Attorney General Robert Kennedy told the Senate that 5,000 Asian immigrants might come the first year, 'after which immigration from that source would virtually disappear.'"\textsuperscript{215} The interpretation that Robert Kennedy's words constituted a projection that Asian immigration would quickly become a thing of the past has been cited in the halls of Congress,\textsuperscript{216} by academics including Bill Ong Hing,\textsuperscript{217} David Reimers,\textsuperscript{218} Roger Daniels,\textsuperscript{219} Peter Schuck,\textsuperscript{220} Nathan Glazer,\textsuperscript{221} Vernon Briggs,\textsuperscript{222} Nicolaus Mills,\textsuperscript{223} and Michael Teitelbaum;\textsuperscript{224} published in respected news outlets like the Economist,\textsuperscript{225} The San Francisco Chronicle,\textsuperscript{226} The Los Angeles Times,\textsuperscript{227} The Christian Science Moni-

\textsuperscript{215} Scott McConnell, \textit{The New Battle Over Immigration}, FORTUNE, May 9, 1988, at 89, 94.


\textsuperscript{217} See HING note 30, at 39-40.

\textsuperscript{218} See DAVID M. REIMERS, STILL THE GOLDEN DOOR 77 (1st ed. 1985); Reimers, supra note 122, at 9, 16. But see infra note 245 and accompanying text (discussing Professor Reimers's current view about the meaning of Robert Kennedy's comment).

\textsuperscript{219} See DANIELS, supra note 12, at 341 ("Members of [Johnson's] administration, almost certainly in good faith, had testified before Congress that few Asians would come in under the new law . . . .").

\textsuperscript{220} See Schuck, supra note 122, at 7.

\textsuperscript{221} See Glazer, supra note 112, at 7.

\textsuperscript{222} See BRIGGS & MOORE, supra note 126, at 19 ("[I]t was anticipated that passage of the Immigration Act of 1965 would lead to a decline in Asian immigration." (citing Attorney General Robert Kennedy's testimony)).


\textsuperscript{224} See Michael S. Teitelbaum, Skeptical Noises About the Immigration Multiplier, 23 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 893, 895 (1989).

\textsuperscript{225} See Yes, They'll Fit In Too, THE ECONOMIST, May 11, 1991, at 17 (The 1965 reform "has had large, and largely unintended, consequences. Robert Kennedy, the then attorney-general, was wildly wrong when he told a congressional committee that 5,000 immigrants might come from Asia in the first year "but we do not expect that there would be any great influx after that.").

\textsuperscript{226} See Ramon G. McLeod, A Call for an Immigration Policy, S.F. CHRON., July 4, 1991, at A1, A6: In 1964, the late Robert Kennedy told a congressional hearing that an immigration law ending quota systems would result in at most about 5,000 people immigrating from Asia. Almost 4 million Asians immigrated after the law went into effect in 1965. Such unanticipated results . . . have been the hallmark of recent immigration debate.

\textit{Id.;} see Ramon G. McLeod, 1965 Immigration Reform Law Opened Door for Asians, S.F. CHRON., July 4, 1988, at A5 (describing the contrast between the prediction and the large increase in immigration in the Bay Area).
The perceived meaning is completely wrong, making it possibly the most pervasive legend in immigration history.

Even under McCarran-Walter, Asian immigration in 1964 was 21,279, and had averaged 15,000 per year in the 1950s. Is it possible that Robert Kennedy thought that Asian immigration would "virtually disappear" after 1966; that he believed eliminating restrictions would diminish immigration? This interpretation makes no sense. Close examination of the hearing record where the statement was made shows why his testimony was misunderstood.

Attorney General Kennedy was testifying about the administration version of the bill, which continued the historical practice of imposing no numerical limitation on Western Hemisphere immigration. The bill, however, would, for the first time, extend the privilege of unlimited Western Hemisphere immigration to persons of Asian

227. See Douglas Massey, Immigration Adjustments Ignore the Chain Effect of Family Eligibility, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1988, pt. 2, at 7 (Op-Ed column by a sociology professor at the University of Chicago) (citing Kennedy quote as example of unpredictability of immigration law changes).

228. See John Dillin, Asian Americans: Soaring Minority, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 10, 1985, at 3 ("Seldom has any public official been so wrong.").

229. See Seebach, supra note 14, at 9A (editorial commentary by a California newspaper editor).


231. See Kermit Lansner, Who Will Be an American?, FINANCIAL WORLD, Apr. 17, 1990, at 100.

232. See AUSTER, supra note 14, at 20-23 (describing Kennedy's approach as "divorce[d] from reality").


234. See, e.g., BRIMELOW, supra note 13, at 78 (quoting and mocking Kennedy's purported prediction).

235. See Graham, supra note 9, at 19 ("Attorney General Robert Kennedy predicted 5,000 immigrants from the entire Asia-Pacific Triangle, 'after which immigration from that source would virtually disappear.' ").

236. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 6, at 109.

237. See 1991 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 6, at 49.

238. Query what bizarre phenomenon would make 5,000 Asians want to immigrate in 1965, but none thereafter?
ancestry who lived in the region. The question was:

Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Attorney General, what influx or increase in nonquota immigrants would you consider likely by the abolition of the Asia-Pacific triangle and the relationship of the same upon the nonquota immigration from the Western Hemisphere?

Attorney General KENNEDY. I would say for the Asia-Pacific triangle it would be approximately 5,000, Mr. Chairman, after which immigration from that source would virtually disappear; 5,000 immigrants could come in the first year, but we do not expect that there would be any great influx after that.

Kennedy was asked to comment on the increase in Asian immigration from the Western Hemisphere which would result from extending nonquota immigration privileges to them. Kennedy replied that 5,000 Asians would immigrate from the Western Hemisphere as a result of the change, not that 5,000 Asians would immigrate from all the countries of the world. To the contrary, during the same hearing, Robert Kennedy filed written projections estimating that 94,972 Asians—not 5,000—would immigrate in the first five years of the proposed law. Testimony by Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Justice Department officials makes clear that Kennedy was predicting that 5,000 Asians living in the Western Hemisphere would immigrate when they were eligible to do so, not that 5,000 Asians worldwide would come to the United States. A

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239. Recall that under McCarran-Walter, in effect when Kennedy was testifying, persons of Asian descent, wherever born, were relegated to the tiny quotas of their countries of racial ancestry. See supra notes 70-71.

240. Hearings on H.R. 7700, supra note 38, at 418.


242. See id. at 589.

243. See id. at 406 (testimony of Dean Rusk) (“The elimination of the Asia-Pacific triangle would result in an estimated 5,000 or 6,000 persons annually entering the United States from nonquota areas, who are now chargeable to highly oversubscribed quota areas within the Asia-Pacific triangle.” (emphasis added)).

244. Assistant Attorney General Schlei, for example, was asked about the repeal of the Asia-Pacific triangle quota and its effects on non-quota immigration. He replied:

I understand it is estimated, about 5,000 people who would like to come to the United States and are in either nonquota areas [i.e., the Western Hemisphere], or in areas where there are no waiting lists, such as England, Ireland, and Germany, but are now unable to come because they had Asiatic ancestors. We would, therefore, get 5,000 immigrants within the first year from that source, but from then on it would disappear.

Id. at 482 (emphasis added); see also id. (testimony of Office of Legal Counsel attorney
few people got it right, including David Reimers in his more recent work, but the myth persists. The best evidence that the framers of the 1965 Act believed it would not increase Asian immigration turns out to be a misunderstanding.

2. Focus on Southern and Eastern Europe and Backlogs on Wait-Lists

When it considered the law, Congress may well have been focusing on remedying injustices to southern and eastern Europeans. Several commentators have relied on this point as partial support for the idea that the increase in Asian immigration was unforeseen. Perhaps the possibility of significant Asian immigration was just overlooked, but this is implausible. Leaving aside the many affirmative statements that Asian immigration would increase, remarks by members of Congress noting the injustices to would-be Asian immigrants seem to suggest that Asians were not ignored by the people who were considering the law.

Under McCarran-Walter, when a visa was not available, an alien could be placed on a waiting list and thus become part of a country's "backlog." Some have pointed to the fact that the largest waiting lists for visas were in Italy and Greece at the time the bill was passed. The relatively smaller backlogs in China, say, might have indicated a lower demand for immigration, and hence supported the conclusion that not many Asians would want to immigrate after the reforms. But this analysis ignores the issue of relative quotas; a backlog of 50,000 is not daunting if a nation's quota is 25,000 per year; a backlog of 5,000 might be insuperable for a would-be immigrant from a nation with a quota of one hundred. The real question

Adam Walinsky) (noting that 5,000 Asians would come as a result of the change).

245. See REIMERS, supra note 10, at 74-76. Credit goes to Dr. Stephen Wagner for being the first scholar to identify this misunderstanding in his dissertation. See Wagner, supra note 122, at 470-71 n.21.


247. See DANIELS, supra note 12, at 341; HING, supra note 30, at 39-40; YANG, supra note 122, at 21.

248. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1932, supra note 121, at 10-11 (testimony of Sen. Philip Hart) ("Let us restore equality and fair play in our selecting immigrants. Discriminatory provisions against immigrants from eastern and southern Europe, token quotas for Asian and African countries, and implications of race superiority in the Asia-Pacific Triangle concept have no place in the public policy of the United States.").

249. See, e.g., REIMERS, supra note 10, at 76, 92-93; Reimers, supra note 122, at 16.
is not the backlog in absolute terms, but the length of the wait for a visa. This point did not escape members of Congress; among many others, Senator Saltonstall pointed out that over 40,000 people were on the wait list for the Chinese quota, which made the wait over 380 years for a visa, given China’s annual quota of 105. That Chinese would put their names on a list, even though, as Senator Fong noted, the quota was “for all practical purposes exhausted in perpetuity,” indicates a desire to immigrate to the United States of almost religious intensity.

3. Structural Protections Against Asian Immigration

Arguably, supporters of the bill might have expected little increase in Asian immigration because, as in 1943 and 1952, protections against unlimited immigration were built into the statute. To the extent that this argument suggests that there would be some upper limit on immigration, it is, of course, correct. If it suggests that the limits would ensure low proportions of Asian immigration, it is implausible because the structure of the 1965 law was so different from previous statutes that there was no reasonable basis for predicting that it would prevent “overrepresentation” from particular regions of the world.

One important restriction in the 1965 law was the 20,000 per country annual limitation, which was designed to avoid “opening up the gates to a vast flood from some particular country.” There are hints in the legislative history that the “particular countries” Congress was concerned with were Asian. Representative Feighan, for example, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee’s subcommittee with jurisdiction over immigration, stated that repeal of the Asia-Pacific triangle concept “has met with strong reactions from our allies and friends in Asia who have come to regard it as the same kind of personal affront as the old Chinese Exclusion Act.” In the next breath, he added that “the proposed selective system of immigrant admissions included in the bill guarantees that no country can receive a disproportionate number of the total visas authorized.” The fact

250. See supra note 171 (listing several other people who were concerned about the substantial backlogs in visa waiting lists).


252. Id. at 24,447.

253. See, e.g., Reimers, supra note 10, at 74-75.


255. Id. at 21,585.

256. Id.
that he thought of the per-country limitation might be read to suggest some connection between disproportionate immigration, on the one hand, and Asians on the other. Similarly, Representative Giaimo noted that the bill would repeal the Asia-Pacific triangle provisions, but added in the next sentence that “[i]t is important to note that this new law will not open the floodgates of immigration as charged by opponents of the bill.”

There is countervailing evidence suggesting that the 20,000 cap was not created with Asians in mind. However, even if the 20,000 per country annual limitation was intended to restrict Asian immigration, compared to prior restrictive laws—limiting Chinese immigration to 105, as the 1943 act had done, or all Asian immigration to 2,000—a maximum of 20,000 per country could be called an open door policy as easily as a restriction. Representative Moore, explaining that Asians would be treated the same as persons from other parts of the world, showed the arithmetic:

> It does not mean that that number, 20,000, of Chinese, Japanese, or Filipinos are immediately going to come into this country, but the upper limitation [of the number] to which they would be entitled would be that number. . . . People who attack what we are doing here today say that it will let millions of orientals come into the United States. I wanted to place in the RECORD the observation that there is no one in this House who need fear such an event occurring. Moore was right; millions of Asians would not enter each year. But Moore recognized the possibility that just three Asian countries could send 60,000 per year, thirty times as many as all Asians worldwide had been officially allowed under McCarran-Walter. This was a revolutionary increase compared to past treatment of Asian immigration.

Another potential safeguard was a Western Hemisphere quota limitation. Representative Fisher, echoing arguments from the

257. Id. at 21,767.
258. See Telephone Interview with Norbert Schlei, supra note 157 (explaining that the per-country limit was imposed because of southern and eastern European nations).
259. 111 CONG. REC. 21,590-91 (1965). Representative Thomas Pelly, who asked the question which engendered that response, stated that I would like to say to the gentleman that I would not fear that amount of those persons coming in. I have a great amount of Japanese, Chinese, and Filipinos in my district. It is not that I register fear that they might come in because they make wonderful citizens. I want to make that clear.
260. The restriction was not in the House bill reported by the Judiciary Committee
1943 and 1952 debates, argued that "there are about half a million Chinese living in the Western Hemisphere, many of whom would like to come into this country if they could, but who are prohibited now from doing so because of the triangle provision." The law protected against this eventuality by imposing, for the first time, a 120,000 annual limit on Western Hemisphere immigration. But this restriction also was insignificant compared to those which were eliminated.

4. Did a Mistake Regarding Non-Quota Immigration Contribute to the Passage of the Bill?

There was a very odd episode on the floor of the Senate immediately before the bill was passed. In an exchange on the floor of the Senate, in the presence of floor manager Edward Kennedy, the meaning of the bill was spectacularly misinterpreted in a way that suggested there was an additional protection against changes in the immigration stream.

Some senators may have voted for the 1965 law believing that a provision allowing unlimited immigration of immediate family members of citizens applied only to people who were citizens when the law was passed, and not to persons who became citizens through birth or naturalization after 1965. This was an important issue. If people born or naturalized after 1965 were required to unify their families through numerically limited quota immigration, then (leaving aside emergency situations) the 1965 law would have been extremely predictable—only 290,000 visas would be available each year, and every alien who wanted to come in would have to get one of them, or wait until next year. If this interpretation had been correct, the chain migration phenomenon would have been significantly dampened. This feature actually was not part of the law; even people who became citizens after 1965 could bring in their immediate relatives free of the quota.

However, on the floor of the Senate, proponents did not explain that non-quota, immediate relative immigration was a permanent...
feature of the law which would permit anyone who became a citizen in the future to bring their relatives to the United States. Instead, non-quota immigration was characterized as a transitional "clean-up" program, allowing people who were citizens on the date of the Act to reunify their families by bringing in immediate relatives.

The issue was raised when Senator Holland, an opponent of the bill, asked: "Is any distinction made between the members of families of immigrants already in the United States and those who would come in as new immigrants?" Edward Kennedy, misunderstanding this somewhat ambiguous question, simply described the preference system again, and Holland repeated the question: "Is there any difference between relatives of migrants who are already here, whether citizens or not, and relatives of migrants who will be coming in under the bill, as to their being charged or not charged to the quota?" Senator Ervin answered: "As I understand the bill, every person who comes as an immigrant is charged to the limitation, except certain relatives of one who is already here as an American citizen." Senator Kennedy added: "That is exactly correct." The ambiguity, of course, was whether "already here" meant as of the effective date of the bill, or at the time in the future when an alien relative sought to immigrate.

Senator Holland apparently understood that the answer was that only people who were already citizens in 1965 could bring in their relatives free of quota limitations: "Then there is a difference in the charging to the quota or not charging to the quota as between immigrants already in the United States seeking to bring their relatives in, and those who seek to bring them in with them after the passage of the law." Senator Pastore, a supporter of the bill, agreed that people who became citizens after 1965 could bring their relatives in only subject to quota limitations:

[Senator Holland] is making a good point. His question may be misunderstood. His question is this, as I understand: If a person who comes to the United States let us say, in 1970, has relatives abroad, under what conditions may he bring his relatives in? It is my understanding that under the bill, whoever comes in 1970 will have to come in under the overall number.... In other words, the exception is being

263. 111 CONG. REC. 24,775 (1965).
264. Id.
265. Id. (emphasis added).
266. Id.
267. Id.
made as to the people already in the United States; and at
the time of the signing of the bill there will be the authority,
the exemption, in order to provide for family unification.
But beyond that point, any relatives who come in new, so to
speak, will come in as immigrants and must be counted
among the number.\textsuperscript{268}

Again, it was not true that "whoever comes in 1970 will have to
come in under the overall number." A person born in the United
States in 1966 who wanted to bring in her alien spouse in 1986 could
do so without respect to the 290,000 numerical limitation. Yet, no
member of the Senate contradicted Senator Pastore's interpretation
of the new law.\textsuperscript{269} While the Senate Judiciary Committee Report it-
self was fairly clear on the effect of the law,\textsuperscript{270} there is no guarantee
that the majority of the senators were aware of it.

The apparent misunderstanding is important, because Senator
Pastore, who offered the misinterpretation, voted for the bill. It is
conceivable that other supporters shared that mistaken view. Ac-
cordingly, it may be that, had an opponent understood the actual
workings of the provision sufficiently to chime in, even supporters of
the general concept of scrapping national origins might have voted to
change this provision.

If some version of the interpretation expressed on the Senate
floor actually had been in the law, then the Asian-American situation
would have been quite different. A significant share of their post-
1965 immigration has been pursuant to non-quota family reunifica-
tion.\textsuperscript{271} Nevertheless, like the 20,000 annual limitation, and the

\textsuperscript{268} Id. (emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{269} Apparently, virtually the entire Senate was present for this exchange, because
Senator Holland was the third-to-last person to speak before Senator Edward Kennedy
called for a vote. \textit{See} \textit{111 Cong. Rec.} 24,779 (1965) (concluding remarks of Sen. Hol-
lund); \textit{id.} at 24,780 (Sen. Edward Kennedy calling for the vote).

\textsuperscript{270} \textit{See} S. REP. NO. 89-748, at 13 (1965), \textit{reprinted in Trelles & Bailey, supra} note
38, doc. 73 ("In order that the family unit may be preserved as much as possible, parents
of adult U.S. citizens, as well as spouses and children, may enter the United States with-
out numerical limitation."). It would not make sense for the non-quota admission of
"immediate relatives" of citizens to have been a transitional program because there was
no preference category for such persons. Thus, if they did not continue to be non-quota
on an ongoing basis, then they could have entered only as non-preference immigrants. In
that event, for example, spouses of citizens would have a far worse immigration situation
than spouses of resident aliens.

\textsuperscript{271} Statistics from a few randomly chosen years illustrate the point. In 1975, 386,194
immigrants were admitted, including 132,469 Asians; 33,539 Asians were immediate rela-
tives of citizens, and 94,032 entered subject to numerical restrictions. \textit{See INS, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1975 ANNUAL REPORT} 36 tbl.6 (1976). In 1980, of 530,639 immi-
grants, 236,097 were from Asia; 112,552 Asians entered subject to numerical limitations,
establishment of a Western Hemisphere quota, if this non-existent feature had been thought of as a protection against Asian immigration, it would have been so loose that it must be regarded as a break from the policies of prior statutes.

E. Celler, Masaoka, Rusk

The best evidence that members of the administration or Congress thought there would be little Asian immigration are the public statements of three knowledgeable participants, House Judiciary Committee Chairman Emanuel Celler, Japanese American Citizens League officer Mike Masaoka, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk.272

Celler's oft-cited remarks suggest that he believed non-white immigration would be limited:

Mr. Chairman, claim has been made that the bill would bring in hordes of Africans and Asians. This is the answer to that false charge: Persons from African and Asian countries would continue to come in as heretofore, but would be treated like everyone else. With the end of discrimination due to place of birth, there will be shifts to countries other than those of northern and western Europe. Immigrants from Asia and Africa will have to compete and qualify in order to get in, quantitatively and qualitatively, which, itself, will hold the numbers down. There will not be, comparatively, many Asians or Africans entering this country.

... 

Mr. Chairman, since the peoples of Africa and Asia have very few relatives here, comparatively few could immigrate


These numbers almost certainly understate to some degree the total effect of non-quota admission of immediate relatives. Even leaving aside the attraction effects of larger Asian populations, some persons who enter the United States as immediate relatives later bring in their relatives under a preference.

272. A number of commentators rely on Representative Celler's statements. See, e.g., BRIGGS & MOORE, supra note 126, at 17; TAKAKI, supra note 41, at 419; Reimers, supra note 122, at 16. Professors Briggs and Reimers also rely on Mike Masaoka's statements, as does Professor Daniels. See DANIELS, supra note 12, at 341; TAKAKI, supra note 41, at 419; Reimers, supra note 122, at 16. Lawrence Auster and Professor Reimers also rely on Dean Rusk's testimony. See AUSTER, supra note 14, at 21; REIMERS, supra note 10, at 75-76.
from those countries, because they have no family ties in the United States. . . . There is no danger whatsoever of an influx from the countries of Asia and Africa.\textsuperscript{273} Although Celler acknowledged that there would be shifts in the immigration stream, he also seemed to say that there would not be "comparatively" many Asian or African immigrants; that is, that there would be no huge influxes.

Mike Masaoka, longtime JACL officer and advocate of immigration reform, insisted that fears of a "flood of immigration from the Orient" were "groundless."\textsuperscript{274} Because seventy-four percent of the visas were designated for family reunification, the small numbers of Asians here would not be able to take advantage of them, with the result that "the general pattern of immigration which exists today will continue for many years yet to come."\textsuperscript{275} Dean Rusk, likewise, commented that "[a]ny increase in the volume of immigration resulting from the proposed amendments would be rather limited against the actual volume of Asian immigration into the United States between 1953 and 1963."\textsuperscript{276}

One possible explanation for the remarks is that people were simply stretching the truth to get a bill passed.\textsuperscript{277} If so, it does not necessarily mean that others shared a concern that a truthful prediction about an increase would be fatal to the bill. Celler and Masaoka had been defeated in 1952—McCarran-Walter had been passed despite racial restrictions they deeply opposed. Indeed, forty-one years later, when Celler's views finally prevailed, he reminded his colleagues that he "inveighed against this national origins theory a way back in 1924,"\textsuperscript{278} when Congress passed the first permanent quota law. Even if the traditional fear of Asian immigration had diminished in the minds of other legislators by 1965, it would be understandable if Celler and Masaoka were still concerned with the "kiss of death" that Senator McCarran had predicted would destroy any bill eliminating

\textsuperscript{273} 111 CONG. REC. 21,757-58 (1965) (emphasis added).
\textsuperscript{274} Id. at 24,503.
\textsuperscript{275} Id.
\textsuperscript{276} Hearings on S. 500, supra note 38, at 48-49; accord Hearings on H.R. 2580, supra note 93, at 90; Hearings on H.R. 7700, supra note 38, at 389. Similarly, although he believed that Asians would account for approximately 20% of Western Hemisphere immigration, Senator Fong suggested the possibility that the Asian American population might never exceed one percent of the total. See Hearings on S. 500, supra note 38, at 119.
\textsuperscript{277} As Adam Walinsky observed in this context, "people in debate say all kinds of things." See Telephone Interview with Adam Walinsky, supra note 157.
\textsuperscript{278} 111 CONG. REC. 21,579 (1965).
special restrictions on Asian immigration.\textsuperscript{279} When Masaoka observed that “the slant of my eyes . . . ha[s] nothing to do with the slant of my heart,”\textsuperscript{280} he might have suspected that others would not agree.\textsuperscript{281}

Equally plausible is that these comments, taken in the context of the entire history of the bill, were sincere, and \textit{have proved to be accurate}. What would constitute an “influx” or a “flood”? When attempting to alleviate fears of Asian immigration from the Western Hemisphere, Mike Masaoka argued that “[e]ven if all the million [persons of Asian descent] from Latin America . . . came in at one

\textsuperscript{279} See \textit{supra} note 87 and accompanying text (discussing Senator McCarran’s prediction). Former Assistant Attorney General Schlei believes this may be the explanation for Celler’s comments:

[T]he standard lore was that it was utterly impossible to change the national origins quota system because there was such an entrenched feeling in Congress and in the country that everyone wanted the same racial, national make-up of the immigrant stream, but when I began to promote that Bill and to talk to people about it in the Congress, I found that it was not anywhere near as totally accepted a proposition as everybody had thought. . . . [A]most everybody felt bad about our immigration laws and felt that something needed to be done about it. . . . But Celler was a fellow who had struggled with immigration for a generation, and he I think, feared that if the word was around that this was going to totally change the stream of immigration, the Bill might lose, so I think he tried to develop arguments (and we probably helped him) to reassure those people that if there was a change it certainly wouldn’t be sudden . . . . I think Celler was trying to think of every argument he could to reassure the conservative people that what we were doing was not going to blow everything up like a bomb; it was going to be a gradual change and not all that great.

Telephone Interview with Norbert Schlei, \textit{supra} note 157.

\textsuperscript{280} \textit{Hearings on S. 500, supra} note 38, at 626.

\textsuperscript{281} Perhaps it was no coincidence that Masaoka’s comment came from a Japanese-American, rather than an American of other Asian descent, because by 1965, the major Japanese immigration to the United States was over. Compared to other Asian groups, the influx of Japanese immigrants was small. \textit{See J. Wareing, The Changing Pattern of Immigration into the United States, 1956-75, 63 GEOGRAPHY 220, 221 (1978)} (“In Asia, despite the spectacular rise in numbers, the trend was not universal and immigration from Japan actually declined after 1965 because of the continuing buoyancy of the Japanese economy and the competition for visas.”). By the end of the 1970s, the first full decade of the law’s operation, Japanese-Americans fell from being the largest Asian subgroup to the third largest, behind Chinese-Americans and Filipino-Americans. \textit{See DANIELS, supra} note 52, at 321-22; see also HING, \textit{supra} note 30, at 106 (“A variety of factors have combined to limit the impact of the 1965 Amendments on Japanese America.”). This phenomenon was predicted before the 1965 bill became law. \textit{See Hearings on H.R. 7700, supra} note 38, at 725 (statement of James Carey, President of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers) (noting the economic boom in Japan and predicting that “very few Japanese would become emigrants [sic] to the United States today even if all bars were down”). \textit{But cf. Hearings on S. 500, supra} note 38, at 727 (testimony of Chinese-American leader Jack Wong Sing) (stating, much more ambiguously, “[l]et it not be said that Chinese immigration would be opened”); see also \textit{Hearings on H.R. 7700, supra} note 38, at 846 (asserting that any increase would be limited).
time...they still would not equal the number of Asiatics in this country. And the total number of Asiatics in this country is less than one-half of one percent.282 A million in one day from one region of the world would not be a huge influx. Similarly, Robert Kennedy argued that an increase of two percent in the Italian-American proportion of the total United States population over a course of years would not constitute an alteration of the ethnic makeup of the country.283 What seem to be very large shifts in absolute terms, we are told, are de minimis; what to one person might seem like a flood, to another is merely diversity.

Edward Kennedy explained that the bill “will not inundate America with immigrants from any one country or area, or the most populated and economically deprived nations of Africa and Asia...[N]o country can be given more than 10 percent of the total annual quota....”284 The protection was that no country could have more than ten percent, but that did not preclude, say, China, Korea, India and the Philippines, from having forty percent. Thus, when he advised that “[t]he principal beneficiaries of the new system are those countries which have large backlogs of applicants for immigration, but have relatively small quotas,” that is, countries with high immigration demand, he named China and Japan as two of the nine countries which had the most to gain.285 The result was not that there would be no change in the immigration stream, but that “the ethnic pattern of immigration under the proposed measure is not expected to change as sharply as the critics seem to think.”286 Indeed, the bill provided for a phasing out of the National Origins Quota System, designed to make sure that the traditional sources of immigration were protected for three years.287 The clear implication of this provision is that after 1968, sources of immigration could change more rapidly.

In these terms—a million in a day is not a huge influx, a two percent increase over a period of decades is not a huge influx, acceptance of a sharp (if not too sharp) change in the immigrant stream—there still has not been an influx of Asian immigrants.

282. Hearings on S. 500, supra note 38, at 627; accord Hearings on H.R. 7700, supra note 38, at 890-91.
283. See Hearings on S. 500, supra note 38, at 217.
284. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
285. Id.
286. Id. (emphasis added).
287. See Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 1, 79 Stat. 911, 911; see also supra note 207 (discussing this provision).
Compared to the population of Asia as a proportion of the world population, the percentage of Asians in the immigrant stream does not represent a huge influx. Compared to the population of the United States, the percentage of Asians in the immigrant stream does not represent a huge influx. In absolute terms, the United States is a long way from becoming a distinctly Asian country.

In addition, Celler, Masaoka and Rusk knew what is sometimes obscured today: By 1965, McCarran-Walter had failed to maintain an immigrant stream which reflected America's racial makeup as of 1952 or 1924; in particular, it had failed to limit the number of Asian immigrants. A series of special laws admitted refugees\(^2\) relatives,\(^2\) and others,\(^2\) in response to particular political and economic exigencies, even though no quota numbers were available for them.\(^2\) As Richard Poff, a member of the House Judiciary Committee Subcommittee Number One in 1964, explained:

\begin{quote}
[McCarran-Walter's] purpose has been called worthy and unworthy. Whether the concept is sound or unsound, the purpose worthy or unworthy, debate is no longer relevant. The question is moot. The purpose has not been achieved. The national origins system has not maintained the ethnic ratios of the American population which prevailed in 1920. . . . For the last 3 years, for every immigrant entering under the quota system, there were two entering by other means, entirely within the law as amended by Congress from time to time.\(^2\)
\end{quote}

Thus, under McCarran-Walter, that is, from 1953-1965, there were roughly 28,000 quota numbers allotted to Asia,\(^2\) but 238,507

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292. 111 CONG. REC. 21,772 (1965); see also H.R. REP. No. 89-745, at 11 (1965) (making similar observation). As one member of Congress put it, "[t]he basic inequities in the existing quota system have impelled Congress to enact numerous laws during the past dozen years to meet emergency conditions." 111 CONG. REC. 23,677 (1965) (remarks of Rep. Cunningham).

293. See Hearings on S. 500, supra note 38, at 308-25 (listing quotas for all nations).
Asian immigrants. Representative Moore noted that between 1953 and 1963, 119,677 immigrants came to the United States from China, Japan and the Philippines, and 109,000 were non-quota immigrants. Senator Hart informed the Senate Judiciary Committee that while China had a quota of 1000 for the period 1953-1962, actual entrants were 3,600 more; in spite of Japan's annual quota of 185, 48,169 immigrants arrived. A "limited" increase over a quota of 2000 is one thing; a "limited" increase from a situation where Asians are already coming in at a rate geometrically in excess of their quota, the situation Celler, Masaoka and Rusk were discussing, is another.

F. Was the Issue Left Vague Because Congressional Anti-Racism Was Sincere?

Perhaps the best evidence of the attitude of Congress in 1965 is what they did not say or do. In the committees and on the floor of Congress, some people said Asian immigration would increase a little or a lot, and others suggested those concerns were overblown. The only formal estimates covered the transition period, not the much more important time during which the law would be in full effect. If ethnic changes in the immigrant stream were an important consideration to the members of Congress who were neither extreme anti-racists nor racists, why did they not insist on some kind of projections, or structural protections in the law against that eventuality?

294. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 6, at 108 (giving annual admissions statistics).

295. See 111 CONG. REC. 21,590 (1965). In 1931-40, 3.1% of the 528,000 immigrants were from Asia; 3.5% of the approximately 1,000,000 immigrants admitted between 1941-50 were from Asia; in 1951-60, of 2,515,000 immigrants, 6% were from Asia. See 1991 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 6, at 29. Thus, in absolute and proportionate terms, Asian immigration had been increasing substantially for decades.


297. Sitting in the first session of the 89th Congress were many who had opposed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because of its fundamental principle, and signed the Southern Manifesto. For example, Senators James O. Eastland, Allen Ellender, Sam Ervin, Spessard Holland, John McClellan and Strom Thurmond voted against both the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see 110 CONG. REC. 14,511 (1964), and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, see 111 CONG. REC. 11,751-52 (1965); only Ervin switched sides and voted for the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965. See id. at 24,783. Each of these men—and ninety or so other members of Congress—signed a statement entitled "Deviations from the Fundamentals of the Constitution," subsequently known as the Southern Manifesto, the 1956 pledge of resistance to Brown v. Board of Education endorsed by almost every member of the Southern contingent in both houses of Congress. See 102 CONG. REC. 4515-16 (1956). Of the Southern senators, only Lyndon Johnson, Estes Kefauver, and Albert Gore declined to sign. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 752 (1976).

298. Senator Eastland argued that "it would be a grave mistake if we proceeded with haste to adopt new concepts unsupported by detailed factual surveys and studies," 111
It may be that race really was not a major issue to a majority in Congress. McCarran-Walter's supporters could not make political hay out of it, moderates were unconcerned about the race of new immigrants, and liberals thought it was fair for previously excluded groups to have a chance to enter in greater numbers. That is, perhaps Congress as a whole truly meant to eliminate the race factor from immigration policy.

Statements of David Burke, then Senator Edward Kennedy's Chief of Staff, suggests that this motive might have existed: "If you can ever find some nobility in public policy, elimination of the Triangle was one of [those] instances, I think, because it certainly wasn't going to bring any acclamation to Ted Kennedy or his brother Bobby."299 "Scare" argumentation invoking a renewed threat of the yellow peril would have been ineffective: "[I]n those days . . . if the guys from Alabama, or Mississippi, or Georgia, if that was the best they could come up with, it was not a concern. The Asian immigration was not a concern. It was not a threat...."300 According to Congressman Peter Rodino, Jr., given the tenor of the times, no legislator who wanted to avoid being tagged a racist would have insisted on racial estimates.301

Senator Charles Mathias, who was in the House in 1965, said it was fair to assume that the bill would have passed even had its effects been known at the time. "After all, the bill was fairly dramatic in abandoning the original quota system, and it was opening the gates wider than they had been opened . . . ."302 In Robert Kastenmeier's view, the bill would have passed even if its effects had been known at the time: "I don't know that somebody around here would quibble about whether it is one-half or one-third, or one-quarter, but I guess most of us who supported the bill would have said, 'well, . . . that's not an unreasonable figure.'"303 Immigration Subcommittee member Don Edwards also believes the bill would have passed even if its ef-

CONG. REC. 24,545 (1965), but his view did not prevail. Many commentators observe that increasing racial toleration domestically was a factor in passing the bill. See, e.g., supra note 112 (listing sources discussing increased racial toleration). But why was this important, if the 1965 Act was McCarran-Walter with a fresh coat of paint? A change in racial attitudes signaled that a substantive, not merely formal, change in immigration policy was possible.

299. Telephone Interview with David Burke, Former Chief of Staff to Senator Edward M. Kennedy (June 29, 1995) (transcript on file with author).

300. Id.

301. See Telephone Interview with Peter Rodino, Jr., supra note 139.

302. Telephone Interview with Charles Mathias, supra note 144. Senator Mathias did note that he was speculating. See id.

303. Telephone Interview with Robert Kastenmeier, supra note 141.
ffects had been known at the time. Arch Moore, Jr., also a member of the House Judiciary Committee subcommittee responsible for immigration, believes that awareness of the full consequences of the bill with regard to Asian immigration "probably would have caused some difficulty with the bill. Whether or not it would have been sufficient to have defeated the bill, which had widespread administration support, I doubt it." Similarly, James Corman, then a member of the House Judiciary Committee, "would have supported the bill" even if its effects in increasing Asian immigration had been known. President Ford's opinion that "[t]he existing laws were clearly out of date with unrealistic quotas and racial bars" is also consistent with an intent to create real change. Dale DeHaan explained that the race of new immigrants was simply not a serious issue for most supporters of the legislation, especially given the context of other civil rights legislation which was being passed at the time.

Participants from the administration echo these views. President Johnson's counsel Myer Feldman agrees that arguments about changes in the immigrant stream would have been unavailing: "Certainly, the argument against 'more blacks,' 'more Asians,' or 'more Poles' was unpersuasive." "I have no reason to believe," Feldman says now, "that the commitment to ending discrimination would have been less if its effects in increasing the percentage of Asians had been perceived at the time of passage.", Katzenbach also believes the bill would have passed even if its effects were known at the time, as do Schlei and Walinsky. While Thomas Ehrlich does not know how others would have reacted to advance knowledge of the bill's effects, it would not have made a difference to him or, he believes, to State Department official Abba Schwartz. If these

304. See Telephone Interview with Don Edwards, supra note 142.
305. Telephone Interview with Arch Moore, Jr., supra note 145; see also id. (making similar comment).
306. Telephone Interview with James Corman, Former Member of Congress (Jan. 18, 1996) (transcript on file with author).
308. See Letter from Gabriel J. Chin to Dale DeHaan, supra note 146, at 1.
310. Id. Referring to the absolute numbers of immigrants admitted, he explains that "we did not anticipate the high level of immigration that followed the enactment of the law. However, I doubt that if we had . . . , that [it] would have changed our policy." Id.
311. See Telephone Interview with Nicholas deBelleville Katzenbach, supra note 152.
312. See Telephone Interview with Norbert Schlei, supra note 157.
313. See Telephone Interview with Adam Walinsky, supra note 157.
314. See Telephone Interview with Thomas Ehrlich, supra note 159.
views are representative, and if indeed some did not forecast a significant increase in non-white immigration in 1965, perhaps the reason was that the question was not decisive.

This is not to say that full disclosure of the racial consequences would not have caused a ripple in Congress or the administration. Some officials said that if the full consequences had been known that would have given some supporters pause.\textsuperscript{315} However, not being entirely free of anxiety is not inconsistent with real change. It would not be surprising, for example, if even a sincere supporter of civil rights legislation felt a twinge when confronting the concrete effects of ending favoritism for whites. The reality that a white member of Congress could lose his seat might make him look at the Voting Rights Act from a different perspective.

\textbf{G. The Assimilation Assumption}

Members of Congress may have felt comfortable admitting a greater proportion of non-whites because they assumed immigrants would assimilate. Representative John Tunney, for example, assured his colleagues that "[t]here is no hidden nefarious motive behind the bill to undermine our American way of life."\textsuperscript{316} Congress assumed that immigrants wanted to come to the United States to share this way of life.\textsuperscript{317} Representative Paul Findley explained: "[T]he Statue of Liberty ... still stands as an inspiration and a hope to those millions beyond our borders who long for an opportunity to share in the American heritage. To them, America is a promised land, a place of refuge, a place where people can live in dignity and without fear."\textsuperscript{318}

Congress agreed with Presidents Kennedy\textsuperscript{319} and Johnson\textsuperscript{320} that

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\textsuperscript{315} See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Peter Rodino, Jr., supra note 139; Telephone Interview with David Burke, supra note 299; Telephone Interview with Thomas Ehrlich, supra note 159.
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\textsuperscript{316} 111 CONG. REC. 21,791 (1965).
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\textsuperscript{317} See, e.g., \textit{id.} at 21,597 (remarks of Rep. Donald Irwin) ("[T]here is still room for those in need of shelter and those in search of freedom."); \textit{id.} at 21,787 (remarks of Rep. Jeffery Cohelan) ("[T]oday we find countless thousands who look to this great melting pot as a land of freedom and opportunity ... ").
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\textsuperscript{318} \textit{Id.} at 21,783.
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\textsuperscript{319} In a letter to Congress, President Kennedy argued that his reforms would provide a sound basis upon which we can build in developing an immigration law that serves the national interest and reflects in every detail the principles of equality and human dignity to which our nation subscribes.... [The national origins quota system] should be modified so that those with the greatest ability to add to the national welfare, no matter where they were born, are granted the highest priority. The next priority should go to those who seek to be reunited with their relatives.
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\textsuperscript{320} Id. at 21,783.
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foreigners were allowed to immigrate to the extent that it was perceived to be a benefit to America. Thus, Representative Feighan insisted that "the interests of the United States were at all times first and foremost" when Congress drafted and passed the bill. Accordingly, the law "carefully establishes conditions which guarantee against any influx of refugees who might be openly or covertly hostile to American principles."

If America was looking out for itself, not the huddled masses, why could it so blithely eliminate racial and national tests? The answer was that individuals were nothing less than individuals, and factors like race, religion, color or place of birth were irrelevant—they said nothing about a particular person. This focus on individu-


320. See Remarks at the Signing of the Immigration Bill, Liberty Island, New York, in 2 PUB. PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: LYNDON B. JOHNSON 1965, at 1037, 1038 (Oct. 3, 1965) (stating that "[t]hose who can contribute most to this country—to its growth, to its strength, to its spirit—will be the first that are admitted to this land"); Remarks to Representatives of Organizations Interested in Immigration and the Problems of Refugees, in 1 PUB. PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: LYNDON B. JOHNSON 1963-64, at 123, 123 (Jan. 13, 1964) ("What is the training and qualification of the immigrant who seeks admission? What kind of citizen would he make, if he were admitted?"); see also Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, in 1 PUB. PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: LYNDON B. JOHNSON 1963-64, at 112, 116 (Jan. 8, 1964) ("[A] nation that was built by immigrants of all lands can ask those who now seek admission: 'What can you do for our country?' But we should not be asking: 'In what country were you born?'").

321. 111 CONG. REC. 21,585 (1965) (remarks of Rep. Feighan). Senator Pastore also noted:

John Kennedy's immortal test—Ask not what America can do for you—ask only what you can do for America—would still be his test.... [I]t makes no difference what the race is, it makes no difference what the nationality is, it makes no difference what the place of birth is. What counts is the contribution that a person can make to this great America of ours.

Id. at 24,562-63.

322. Id. at 21,770 (remarks of Rep. Jacob Gilbert).

323. President Johnson made this point in his signing message, saying that the national origins quota system "violated the basic principle of American democracy—the principle that values and rewards each man on the basis of his merit as a man." Remarks at the Signing of the Immigration Bill, Liberty Island, New York, supra note 320, at 1038; see also 111 CONG. REC. 21,594 (1965) (remarks of Rep. Peter Rodino) ("This long overdue change recognizes the dignity of the individual and is predicated on the principle that one person is no less desirable than any other person regardless of his race or place of birth."); id. at 21,759 (remarks of Rep. Clark MacGregor) (noting that the "fundamental American attitude [is] to ask not where a person comes from, or to prejudge a person on the basis of his place of birth, but to evaluate his personal qualities"). Representative Bernard Grabowski stated that immigration should be:

based on the worth and integrity of each individual without regard to his country or religion.... [Admission] will be based on what skills a person has to offer and
ality was not just an acknowledgment of the idea that all people are morally equivalent despite deep differences; it was also a claim that they actually bear fundamental similarities. Representative Silvio Conte noted the achievements of Italian Americans but then suggested that this kind of background was irrelevant: "The single overriding point is that aliens should and must be evaluated as individuals, not as incorrigible vassals of a racial, ethnic, or national strain. They must be evaluated as future Americans, not as former Italians, or Greeks, or Congolese, or Ethiopians, or anything else." On the other hand, even if "in the United States we judge a man by what he is and not by where his ancestors came from, what his religion is or what color his skin is," we still judge him. As Edward

whether he already has close relatives in this country. . . . It is time that we start to consider what an individual has to contribute, not whether those of his same nationality are preponderate in this country.

324. See id. at 21,764; see also id. at 21,771 (remarks of Rep. Jacob Gilbert) ("It is our birthright that we are a nation of men, women and children, each an individual, and not a pawn of society or the State. This measure is testimony of America's regard for the worth of the individual."); id. at 21,778 (remarks of Rep. Paul Krebs) ("We must learn to judge each individual by his own worth and by the value he can bring to our Nation."); id. (remarks of Seymour Halpern) ("Americans are concerned with a man's merit and personal integrity, and not with his ethnic background or racial stock."); id. at 21,784 (remarks of Rep. Frank Annunzio) ("We have always measured a man's worth by his capacity to contribute and not by his religious beliefs or nation of origin."); id. at 21,786 (remarks of Rep. Henry Helstocki) ("[W]e are seeking an immigration policy which will reflect America's ideal of equality of all men without regard to race, color, creed, or national origin . . . .").

325. See id. at 21,784 (remarks of Rep. Leonard Farbstein) ("Embodied in this bill is a realization and a recognition which has become widespread in this Nation rather belatedly. Indeed, even now it is not yet accepted in all quarters. I am speaking of the recognition of the basic equality of all men."); id. at 21,787 (remarks of Rep. Dominick Daniels) ("The very basic contention that 'all men are created equal' is negated by our immigration policy. A policy which flies in the face of our national ideals by holding that some races and some ethnic groups make better Americans than others."); id. at 21,807 (remarks of Rep. Paul Fino) (noting "fundamental truth that all men, regardless of race, color or religion, are created equal").

326. Id. at 21,818.

327. Id. at 24,777.

328. Id. at 21,787 (remarks of Rep. Dominick Daniels); see also Special Message to Congress on Immigration, in 1 PUB. PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: LYNDON B. JOHNSON 1965, at 37, 39 (Jan. 13, 1965) ("No move could more effectively reaffirm our fundamental belief that a man is to be judged—and judged exclu-
Kennedy put it, "[f]avoritism based on nationality will disappear. Favoritism based on individual worth and qualifications will take its place."329

One component of individual worth and qualification was that the new immigrant assimilate and become a good citizen.330 Representative Moore explained:

In addition to the existing numerical quota limitations, intending immigrants must satisfy strict moral, mental, health, economic, and national security requirements. The law is long and detailed on the specific criteria to be applied in testing the qualifications of applicants. The objective of these tests is obvious: To insure that those aliens admitted are of good character, healthy, will not be a burden on our economy, and will not endanger our form of government and way of life.331

The United States could welcome new immigrants without fear of damaging its special history and tradition, because the new immigration would assimilate to the United States just as had the old.332

But the form of assimilation suggested by the legislative history was cosmopolitan and fluid; it did not demand that immigrants' history would be wiped clean as they arrived at LaGuardia Airport, or

329. 111 CONG. REC. 24,226 (1965); see also id. at 24,238 (remarks of Sen. Philip Hart) (making similar point); id. at 24,564 (remarks of Sen. Thomas Dodd) (describing the provisions of the bill).

330. See id. at 21,765 (remarks of Rep. Brock Adams). He stated:
I am very proud of the people who live in [my] District who have been patient for many years in the face of America's inadequate immigration policies. They number among our finest citizens, and a look at the people this bill will help the most shows they are among the best people of our community. This is shown by the warm affection they enjoy in the community and by such statistical factors as the low school dropout rate, low crime rate, low incidence of welfare, and a high degree of participation in all civic endeavors.

Id.; see also id. at 21,796 (remarks of Rep. Roman Pucinski) ("We need good citizens, good Americans from all the four corners of the world."); id. at 21,799 (remarks of Rep. Edward Roybal) ("[W]e have always been an outward-looking people, coming as we do from many ethnic and cultural backgrounds—a true melting pot of the strength and diversity that has made America great.").

331. Id. at 21,780.

332. See, e.g., id. at 21,769 (remarks of Rep. John Lindsay) ("The law, obviously, must be geared to this country's absorptive capacity."); id. at 21,779 (remarks of Rep. Seymour Halpern) ("We are not a stagnant people, nor a nation stuck in its ways. Ours is a dynamic and ever-progressing society, always receptive to fresh insights and new ideas, while at the same time, preserving those principles which have made our Nation great."); id. at 21,783 (remarks of Rep. Lester Wolff) (arguing that the claim that many immigrants would be "hard to assimilate . . . [has] no foundation and crumble[s] when exposed to the facts of immigration reform").
that the United States would be denied the cultural contributions of people from foreign lands. The words of Senator Saltonstall capture both the respect for immigrant contributions to a dynamic and evolving culture and the assumption of assimilation that the bill embodied: "The homogeneity of American life has been enhanced by the efforts of many groups of heterogeneous people."  

President Johnson\(^\text{334}\) and members of Congress asserted that new immigrants would weave themselves into the fabric of a unitary America without eradicating cultural distinctiveness. Representative Rodino, for example, stated:

Surely one of the greatest sources of the strength of America is to be found in the diversity of the groups making up our Nation. Each group has brought its traditions, its culture, its individual genius, and these in turn have become part of the American heritage. Diversity marks the various contributions to this heritage; unity has been the outgrowth of a shared experience, of shared values. The American Nation today stands as eloquent proof that there is no inherent contradiction between unity and diversity.\(^\text{335}\)

Senator Edward Kennedy also made clear that new immigrants would assimilate:

Another fear is that immigrants from nations other than those in northern Europe will not assimilate into our society. The difficulty with this argument is that it comes 40 years too late. Hundreds of thousands of such immigrants have come here in recent years, and their adjustment has been notable. . . . The fact is, Mr. President, that the people who comprise the new immigration—the type which this bill would give preference to—are relatively well educated and well to do. . . . They share our ideals. Our merchandise, our styles, our patterns of living are an integral part of their own countries. Many of them learn English as a second language in their schools. In an age of global television and the universality of American culture, their assimilation, in a real sense, begins before they come here.\(^\text{336}\)

\(^{333}\) Id. at 24,441; see also id. at 24,501 (remarks of Sen. Joseph Tydings, citing an INS official) ("Their gradual fusion with the multinational immigrants who came to this land before and after them has helped to produce an amalgamated society which has no parallel [sic] in the world.").

\(^{334}\) See Remarks at the Signing of the Immigration Bill, Liberty Island, New York, supra note 320, at 1039 ("From a hundred different places or more they have poured forth into an empty land, joining and blending in one mighty and irresistible tide.").

\(^{335}\) 111 CONG. REC. 21,594 (1965).

\(^{336}\) Id. at 24,228. Senator Kennedy continued:
Emanuel Celler more than once told a story which palpably communicates its message of pluralistic harmony:

If you go to my district [in Brooklyn, New York] you will find people of all nationalities. And to give you an idea of the pluralistic character of my district, which is symptomatic [sic] of many, many districts in the Nation, I would like to tell you a story.

A man goes into a Chinese restaurant, and there, to his amazement, he sees a Negro waiter—a Negro waiter in a Chinese restaurant. And he says to the waiter, “What is the specialty of the house?” And the Negro waiter says, “Pizza pie.”

“Pizza pie in a Chinese restaurant?”
And he said, “Yes, this is the Yiddish neighborhood.”

That gives you some idea of what is happening in this country and what is happening is good for the land because all those races are amalgamated and they are here for a good, common purpose, the weal and the welfare of our Nation, to which all these diverse races make contribution. 337

In short, the law would not assume that a person could not be a good American because of race, color or place of birth, but it did assume that people would come here because they wanted to assimilate into this society. Even a legislator who recognized that it might not

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Let us erase forever today the stereotype of the immigrant in our history. The cities of America no longer have the foreign neighborhoods, the cultural islands, separate, unassimilated, a drag on the Nation. They are gone and policies based on them should be gone... The people who will be admitted under [the bill] will continue to adjust to our country with the speed and dispatch of past immigrants.

*Id.* at 24,777.

337. *Id.* at 21,757. Representative Durward Hall, likewise, explained:

Mr. Chairman, from the “melting pot” which certainly we were, and had to be, has come an American culture, a culture no less unique than that of any other established nation in the world... Persons from many nations and many nationalities and many ethnic groups all contribute to this culture. But it is also important to recognize that as they have changed America, so has America changed them. The result is a nation which in combining the best of each ethnic group has, in effect, like a great, fine hybrid, surpassed each predecessor, and has provided a standard of living that surpasses that of any country from which all our forebears once immigrated.

*Id.* at 21,775; *see also id.* at 24,467 (remarks of Sen. Hiram Fong) (“As a nation of immigrants, we have developed a racially heterogeneous society in which citizens of many cultures and ethnic origins live and work side by side to make the American dream a reality.”); *id.* at 24,781 (remarks of Sen. Joseph Tydings) (“In his book, ‘A Nation of Immigrants,’ President Kennedy reminded us that the three ships that discovered America flew the Spanish flag, sailed under an Italian captain, and included as members of their crew an Irishman, a Negro, an Englishman, and a Jew.”).
be easy for white Americans to get used to unfamiliar languages and colors could insist that anyone, in time, could become a part of "the adventure and opportunity that America means,"\textsuperscript{338} and share in the "dream of America."\textsuperscript{339}

CONCLUSION

The 1965 Act is widely misunderstood. In conjunction with other landmark civil rights bills of the time, it probably intended to take race out of America’s immigration policy. Although there is sometimes good reason to question the true motives behind particular laws, the Congress of Camelot and the Great Society was perhaps the most racially progressive America has ever seen. If these legislators were racial hypocrites, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 become very problematic—were they spurious, also?

Fortunately, the evidence in support of the argument that Congress passed the 1965 Act only because it believed there would be little change in the racial demographics of the immigrant stream is limited. The evidence, in fact, actually shows the opposite. This change is revolutionary, given how recently American interests in winning World War II, the Korean War and Cold War were subordinated to the more important policy of racial restrictions on immigration. Knowing that non-whites would be likely to take advantage of the equalized opportunities, Congress passed the law anyway. When Robert Kennedy announced that "[i]t will not matter whether they come from Italy or Germany or whether they come from some countries in the Far East,"\textsuperscript{340} he seems to have been telling the truth.

\textsuperscript{338} Id. at 24,562 (remarks of Sen. Pastore).
\textsuperscript{339} Id. at 21,783 (remarks of Rep. Philip Burton).
\textsuperscript{340} Hearings on H.R. 7700, supra note 38, at 421.