The Protection of Well-Known Foreign Marks in the United States:
Potential Global Response to Domestic Ambivalence

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The Protection of Well-Known Foreign Marks in the United States: Potential Global Responses to Domestic Ambivalence

Robert C. Bird† & Elizabeth Brown††

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I. Introduction

A well-known strategist announced that an unprecedented free flow of information has transformed citizens into "genuinely global consumers" who "all share the same information." A Fortune article enthusiastically declared, "[t]hinking about going

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global? Friend, you're too late. The train has already left. Today the competition for goods, services and ideas pays no respects to national borders . . . A one-world market exists for products ranging from cars to consumer electronics to carbonated drinks.  

These comments are not recent posts on a blog or Twitter account, but are instead twenty-year-old declarations about the state of global commerce. If consumers from the 1980s, having neither the internet nor smartphones, were considered globally aware, then by today’s standards such consumers could be regarded as utterly indifferent to geographic and informational barriers. The internet, along with multinational commerce of the past twenty years, has created an integrated and universal consumer marketplace.  

Unfortunately, when technology and commerce advance, legal rules inevitably lag behind. American courts have often not been so globally minded as their consumer counterparts. While consumers are increasingly aware of some foreign trademarks, a sharp circuit split among the federal courts has placed the protection of these valuable foreign marks in jeopardy. In spite of earlier precedent holding that well-known foreign marks are entitled to protection, a Second Circuit decision denied that protection for foreign marks when a subsequent user has used the

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7 See Grupo Gigante SA De CV v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 2004).
trademark domestically and a foreign user had abandoned the mark. As a result, foreign trademark owners cannot be certain that their trademarks will receive full and appropriate protection in the United States. This lack of protection arguably places the United States in violation of two major international treaties governing the protection of intellectual property rights.

Scholars have recommended various solutions to the well-known marks problem. The most prominent solution reassesses the Lanham Act to better meet international trademark obligations. Some writers advocate for amending the Lanham Act to include protection of well-known foreign marks. Others remark that U.S. law does provide redress for owners of well-known foreign marks under international treaties, but that legal reforms remain necessary to solidify appropriate protection. Another proposed solution is the establishment of an international registry for well-known foreign marks as an amendment to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).

While these proposals are certainly meritorious, this article

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12 See Blake W. Jackson, Notorious: The Treatment of Famous Trademarks in America and How Protection Can be Ensured, 3 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 61, 89 (2009); Cook, supra note 6, at 413; Anne Gilson LaLonde, Don't I Know You from Somewhere? Protection in the United States of Foreign Trademarks that Are Well Known but Not Used There, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 1379, 1423 (2008).

13 See, e.g., Lockridge, supra note 11, at 1352-53.

takes a different tack. Although non-recognition of well-known marks is a domestic judicial question, it is an issue with a potentially profound global influence. As foreign interests are thwarted by non-recognition of well-known marks, their respective governments will feel compelled to take action on their behalf. The result could be a retributive wave of sanctions against American interests. Not only are trademarks at stake, but any intellectual property dispute with the United States could be justified or reinforced in part by citing America’s failure to honor its own treaty commitments toward well-known foreign marks. If used adroitly by foreign powers, a single court decision could generate ripple effects through American commerce.

This article explores the extent to which non-enforcement of well-known foreign marks in the United States can impact domestic interests around the world. Part I examines the legal protection of well-known foreign marks in the United States. It reviews the relevant treaties, explains the circuit split of opinion, and shows that the current state of affairs presents an uncertain and insufficient level of protection for well-known foreign marks. Part II analyzes the global impact of non-enforcement of these marks, highlighting the unique vulnerability that U.S. trademarks possess in a global space. Part II also discusses how nations seeking retribution could use international, national, and local interests to interfere with U.S. interests through both informal and formal means. Part III briefly explores how firms can defend

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15 See LaLonde, supra note 12, at 1391 (noting there were 150 contracting parties to TRIPS).


18 Cf. LaLonde, supra note 12, at 134; see also Ethan Horwitz & Jill Wasserman, Famous Indian Restaurant Bukhara Denied Protection by Second Circuit, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNSEL, Nov. 2007, at 62 (“[I]f U.S. courts are seen as failing to protect foreign interests, U.S. companies will be in a weaker positions to assert their rights as U.S. entities under TRIPS in the courts and tribunals of foreign jurisdictions.”).
well-known marks abroad in an uncertain legal environment. While lobbying for legislative action might be the ideal solution, firms can take a number of steps to inoculate themselves from the most invidious reactions of foreign governments dissatisfied with American treatment of intellectual property. Part IV concludes.

II. The Domestic Legal Protection of Famous Foreign Trademarks

A. Trademark Law and the Limitations of Territoriality

The underlying statute of federal trademark law is the Lanham Act of 1946. Among other things, the Lanham Act prohibits the infringement of protected trademarks and also empowers trademark owners to stop others from infringing. The purpose of the Act is to protect consumers from confusion between product sources and defend mark owners from rivals' attempts to trade off the reputation of the owned mark. In order to gain protection under the Lanham Act, an owner of a trademark must show that a rival's use creates a likelihood of confusion for consumers between the established trademark and the challenged use. If a mark owner proves a likelihood of confusion in court, it can stop the rival's use and recover damages for losses.

Disputes over protection of well-known marks often come within the context of trademark priority. Such a dispute can occur when a junior user commences publication of a mark that conflicts with an established foreign mark of earlier creation. A notable characteristic of the Lanham Act is its distinct determination of trademark priority. First ownership of a trademark is determined

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20 See id.
24 MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 29.1.
25 Id. § 16.
by the use of that trademark in ordinary commerce.\textsuperscript{26} This rule governing priority in the United States has been called the "first in time, first in right" rule.\textsuperscript{27} The rule contrasts with the practices of most nations that give trademark priority and ownership to the entity that first filed an application or obtained a registration.\textsuperscript{28} While registration of a mark cannot negate prior usage of that mark by another in the United States, registration or application, in most other countries, sets the definitive date for trademark priority.\textsuperscript{29} In other words, most countries allow a trademark holder to gain priority over challengers by being the first to register or apply for protection, regardless of when the applicant first used the mark in commerce.\textsuperscript{30}

While questions of priority can trigger well-known mark disputes, the underlying principle of greatest concern to well-known mark protection is the principle of territoriality.\textsuperscript{31} The territoriality principle holds that the priority of trademark rights depends solely on the priority of use in the country at issue and not on the priority of use anywhere else in the world.\textsuperscript{32} This principle stems from traditional notions of the important domestic functions trademarks serve, the independence of domestic rights from foreign obligations, and the concept of tying trademark protections to existing national political units.\textsuperscript{33} It also stems from the broader legal tradition of territoriality, in which certain laws are applied according to where the event giving rise to the legal claim takes place.\textsuperscript{34}

Under the territoriality principle, courts recognize the right to

\textsuperscript{26} Id. § 16:4.
\textsuperscript{27} Id. § 16:1.
\textsuperscript{28} Id. ("Whereas most civil law nations follow the rule that ownership and priority go to the party who was first to file an application or obtain a registration, in the United States, the rule of priority is that ownership and priority go to the party who was first-to-use.").
\textsuperscript{29} Id. § 16:4.
\textsuperscript{30} MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 16:4.
\textsuperscript{31} See Cook, supra note 6, at 423 (explaining the relationship between the territoriality principle and the principle of well-known mark protection).
\textsuperscript{32} MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 29:1.
\textsuperscript{34} See id. at 892.
use a mark in each country based solely on usage in that country and without reference to use of the same mark abroad.\textsuperscript{35} The converse approach is the principle of universality, which holds that a mark signifies the same source wherever it is used in the world.\textsuperscript{36} The United States follows the territoriality principle.\textsuperscript{37}

Early international treaties incorporated the territoriality principle as well. For example, the principle is reflected in Article 6(3) of the Paris Convention of 1883, which states, “[a] mark duly registered in a country of the [Paris] Union shall be regarded as independent of marks registered in other countries of the Union, including the country of origin.”\textsuperscript{38} The Paris Convention thus established minimum protections for intellectual property and introduced the principle of national treatment.\textsuperscript{39} This principle holds that member nations must treat foreign marks the same as they treat domestic ones.\textsuperscript{40} The Madrid Agreement of 1891 established a registration system called the Madrid Union.\textsuperscript{41} Upon filing under the Madrid Union, a domestically registered mark receives the same protection in member nations designated by the applicant as if the mark had been registered separately in each nation.\textsuperscript{42} The Paris Convention and the Madrid Agreement can be interpreted as not establishing a global trademark system, but rather reinforcing the notion that each nation’s trademark law shall have only territorial application.\textsuperscript{43}

The territoriality principle’s country-by-country protection is based on the premise that a mark functions to connote goodwill rather than the origin of the goods \textit{per se}.\textsuperscript{44} Territoriality, unlike

\textsuperscript{35} Pava, \textit{supra} note 14, at 634.
\textsuperscript{36} MCCARTHY, \textit{supra} note 23, \S 29:1.
\textsuperscript{37} \textit{Id}.
\textsuperscript{38} Paris Convention, \textit{supra} note 10, art. 6.
\textsuperscript{39} \textit{Id}. art. 2.
\textsuperscript{40} \textit{Id}.
\textsuperscript{41} Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, Apr. 14, 1891, as last revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 389.
\textsuperscript{42} \textit{Id}. art. 2.
\textsuperscript{44} See Lockridge, \textit{supra} note 11, at 1392 (“An owner’s right to prevent others from using a confusingly similar mark is limited to the area in which the owner possesses goodwill or reputation.”).
universality, is concerned with ensuring the goodwill due to the domestic mark owner and protecting that owner against potentially harmful use of the mark by others within the domestic market.\textsuperscript{45} In the words of the Fifth Circuit, "trademark rights exist in each country solely according to that country's statutory scheme . . . . 'It is well settled that foreign use is ineffectual to create trademark rights in the United States.'"\textsuperscript{46} In other words, the territoriality principle assumes that each country is an insulated market in which goodwill can be analyzed separately from any associations a mark may carry in another country.

While the territoriality principle has long been called "fundamental" to U.S. trademark law, some scholars have suggested that United States courts should reconsider their use of the principle, especially in connection with well-known foreign marks.\textsuperscript{47} Others have suggested that the principle "should be revisited in light of the globalization of markets and concomitant changes in modern marketing practices."\textsuperscript{48} Whether the principle of territoriality is critiqued through the lens of the well-known mark doctrine and its inconsistent application in the United States or through the lens of modern market realities, there is ample room for debate.

There is an inherent logic to territoriality in that it comports with an intuitive sense that each region should prescribe its own laws.\textsuperscript{49} As one author explained, "[l]aw is contextual, and geography is an important part of context."\textsuperscript{50} The concept of

\textsuperscript{45} McCarthy, supra note 23, § 29:1.

\textsuperscript{46} Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 F.2d 591, 599 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting La Societe Anonyme des Parfums Le Galion v. Jean Patou, Inc., 495 F.2d 1265, 1270 n.4 (2d Cir. 1974)).

\textsuperscript{47} See, e.g., Lockridge, supra note 11, at 1392.

\textsuperscript{48} Dinwoodie, supra note 33, at 889 (emphasis added); see also Leaffer, The New World, supra note 16, at 28, ("[T]he territorial model of trademark law in such a world is anachronism and, from a practical standpoint, hardly exists in its pure form.").


\textsuperscript{50} Dinwoodie, supra note 33, at 892.
Territoriality makes sense, to some extent, where a mark has a local reputation. For example, consider a plumbing company that may have a fairly limited geographic range of service and may not advertise predominantly on the internet. While there may be online discussion of the service through a consumer review site such as Yelp, the mark itself may be best known to the local community. A subsequent user would be properly precluded from using the mark in the same community.

For many larger companies, however, trademarks often become well-known through the borderless internet rather than purely through local advertising. Consumers learn about brands and develop impressions of marks through online interactions. The vast increase in the use of social media marketing, search engine optimization, and related online marketing efforts speaks to the primary importance of internet advertising for most large corporations. Because internet advertising by its nature crosses borders, the concept of territoriality may have become irrelevant to well-known marks, in some applications.

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51 See LaLonde, supra note 12, at 1411 (noting how consumer familiarity with a trademark engenders goodwill toward the company, and this goodwill in turn contributes to the company’s success in business).


53 See McCarthy, supra note 23, § 30:10 (discussing preliminary injunctive relief).

54 See Lisa Williford Arthur, eBay Becomes a Girl’s New Best Friend as the Second Circuit Sidesteps the Nominative Fair Use Doctrine, Leaving Tiffany to Police Counterfeits in the Online Marketplace, 12 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 29, 50 (2010) (“Because the Internet makes it so easy to create an article, a webpage, or even an advertisement, ordinary trademarks can become famous overnight, thus making trademark liability more frequent and this distinction [between famous and ordinary trademarks] less important.”).

55 See Dan L. Burk, Cybermarks, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1375, 1376 (2010) (“[Trademarks on the internet] are no longer primarily expressive; they are functional in the most mechanical sense of the term; they have become a form of computer code.”).


The debate over the extent to which courts should apply the territoriality principle in an internet-driven marketplace is informed by the analogous issue of internet-based personal jurisdiction. For at least fifteen years, federal courts have debated the extent to which internet transactions might satisfy the minimum contacts necessary for personal jurisdiction. In 1997, the Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc. decision established a sliding scale test to determine whether internet use is sufficient to exert personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Although courts have varied widely in their reactions to the "Zippo test," and the Supreme Court has yet to rule on the issue, there is a growing consensus that personal jurisdiction may, in some cases, be based on internet activity alone. If courts can extend personal jurisdiction on the basis of internet use, then it makes sense to ask whether exceptions to the territoriality principle should be made for well-known foreign marks.

Although the problems with applying the territoriality principle are meaningful, especially in light of modern consumer behavior and the rapid transmission of information, solutions to the U.S. issue of territoriality have long been in place. Early treaties are grounded in territorial protections, and both early and modern agreements acknowledge an exception for well-known marks and provide for their multinational recognition. Article 6bis of the Paris Convention requires the protection of well-known marks across national borders that are used for identical or similar

58 See id. at 4 (discussing how to determine personal jurisdiction, a concept largely based on territorial notions, concerning the internet, a virtual space devoid of physical definitions).

59 See, e.g., Barrett v. Catacomb Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d 717, 731 (1999) (holding that a psychiatrist suing a rival for defamation had failed to establish personal jurisdiction because, among other considerations, the plaintiff did not demonstrate the defendant had established sufficient minimum contacts with the jurisdiction through her internet activity).


61 Id. at 1124.

62 See, e.g., Illinois v. Hemi Group, 622 F.3d 754, 758 (7th Cir. 2010) (rejecting Zippo test yet finding personal jurisdiction on the basis of website operation); Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d 1063, 1077-78 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding personal jurisdiction established through eBay auction).

63 See Lockridge, supra note 11, at 1352.

64 Id. at 1358, 1361.
goods and are liable to create consumer confusion. In doing so, it provides a way for the owners of well-known marks to protect those marks abroad, even when they could not demonstrate actual foreign use of those marks. Article 6bis has been most influential for countries that base trademark priority on registration, rather than use, because it has otherwise been difficult to obtain relief against a mark holder in another nation where the senior mark holder has not registered.

Over ninety years later, the landmark TRIPS Agreement extended this famous marks protection to well-known service marks as well as to goods and services that are dissimilar to the well-known mark. Furthermore, a non-binding joint recommendation by the Paris Union and the World Intellectual Property Organization affirmed that a mark would be protected in a country where it is well-known regardless of whether the mark is registered or used in that country. The joint declaration also offered guidance to help determine whether a mark qualifies as well-known. Factors include the degree of public recognition of

65 The relevant treaty language states:

The countries of the Union undertake, ex officio if their legislation so permits, or at the request of an interested party, to refuse or to cancel the registration, and to prohibit the use, of a trademark which constitutes a reproduction, an imitation, or a translation, liable to create confusion, of a mark considered by the competent authority of the country of registration or use to be well known in that country as being already the mark of a person entitled to the benefits of this Convention and used for identical or similar goods. These provisions shall also apply when the essential part of the mark constitutes a reproduction of any such well-known mark or an imitation liable to create confusion therewith.

Paris Convention, supra note 10, art. 6bis(1).

66 Id.


68 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 16. Article 16(2) extends the Paris Convention's treatment of famous marks to services. Id. Article 16(3) extends the Paris Convention's treatment of famous marks to dissimilar goods. Id.


70 Joint Recommendation, supra note 69, art. 2.
the mark, the duration and location of registrations, and the commercial value associated with the mark.\textsuperscript{71}

The United States has signed both the Paris Convention and TRIPS, each of which include well-known marks exceptions to the general territoriality rule of the Lanham Act.\textsuperscript{72} When a nation is a signatory to a treaty, one would generally expect national compliance with the treaty’s terms.\textsuperscript{73} However, due to a technical legal requirement that a treaty be “self-executing,” a signed treaty is not guaranteed the effect of U.S. domestic law.\textsuperscript{74} The Paris Convention and TRIPS are non-self-executing treaties,\textsuperscript{75} and do not become effective as domestic law until Congress enacts implementing legislation.\textsuperscript{76} In contrast, self-executing treaties do not require separate domestic legislation.\textsuperscript{77}

Although the United States is a signatory, Congress has not fully incorporated provisions of TRIPS and the Paris Convention into the United States Code.\textsuperscript{78} Some commentators recommend

\begin{itemize}
    \item See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 504 (“In sum, while treaties ‘may comprise international commitments . . . they are not domestic law unless Congress has either enacted implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be ‘self-executing’ and is ratified on these terms.’” (quoting Igartua De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 150 (C.A.1 2005) (en banc) (Boudin, C. J.))).
    \item See Brandon Barker, The Power of the Well-Known Trademark: Courts Should Consider Article 6bis of the Paris Convention an Integrated Part of Section 44 of the Lanham Act, 81 Wash. L. Rev. 363, 364 (2006); Dinwoodie, supra note 33, at 940; LaLonde, supra note 12, at 1385.
    \item See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 504-05. For a more in-depth examination and criticism of non-self-executing treaties, see Sloss, supra note 73.
    \item See James Faris, The Famous Marks Exception to the Territoriality Principle in American Trademark Law, 59 Case W. Reserve L. Rev. 451-53, 488-89 (2009) (“It is up to Congress, not the federal judiciary, to incorporate the famous marks doctrine into federal trademark law.”)
\end{itemize}
that Congress amend the Lanham Act to incorporate the Paris Convention and TRIPS; some judges already treat these agreements as equivalent to domestic legislation. Others argue that the Lanham Act should be read to include article 6bis of the Paris Convention without any need for Congressional action. These reforms have not occurred. Without full execution of these treaties, the law in the United States remains uncertain regarding the protection of well-known foreign marks. Courts have thus been left to determine the extent to which the Lanham Act incorporates principles embedded in these international treaties.

B. The Uncertain Protection of Well-Known Foreign Marks

The struggle over the incorporation of the Paris Convention and TRIPS into American law has created fertile ground for conflicting court rulings on the protection of well-known foreign marks. The first appellate decision on the issue was Grupo Gigante SA de CV v. Dallo & Co. The case involved a large and well-established Mexican grocery chain named “Gigante,” which opened in 1962 as a single shop in Mexico City and grew to over one hundred stores by 1991. While Grupo Gigante operated no stores in the United States, six of its stores were located near the U.S.-Mexico border, including two in Tijuana, just south of San Diego. In 1991, before Grupo Gigante expanded its operations into the United States, Michael Dallo began operating a grocery store in San Diego under the name “Gigante Market.” Later that year, Michael’s brother Chris opened a second store in San Diego

79 See, e.g., id. at 488-89; Dariush Keyhani, Bulova Wrongly Decided: A Case Against Extraterritoriality of Trademark Law, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. 33, 37 (2007).
80 See supra note 75, at 384-89.
81 See supra note 78, at 384-89; Barker, supra note 75, at 384-89.
82 See supra note 78, at 488 (describing the lack of conclusive law on well-known marks exceptions in the United States)
83 See Barker, supra note 75, at 373-84.
84 391 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004).
85 Id. at 1091.
86 Id.
87 Id.
Grupo Gigante unsuccessfully confronted the Dallos' use of the word "Gigante" in 1998, and registered the "Gigante" mark with the state of California that June; the Dallos' did likewise the next month. Grupo Gigante opened its first store in the United States in 1999, followed by two in 2000; each was called "Gigante," just as in Mexico. In July 1999, the Dallos' sent Grupo Gigante a cease-and-desist letter demanding they discontinue their use of the name "Gigante," and Grupo Gigante responded by filing a lawsuit claiming trademark infringement under the Lanham Act.

Under the traditional application of the territoriality principle of trademark law, Dallo's rights to the "Gigante" mark would have trumped Grupo Gigante's in the United States. Priority of trademark in the United States depends solely upon use of that mark within U.S. territory; the Dallos were the first to use the mark in the United States. Grupo Gigante's earlier use of the trademark abroad would not override Dallo's use of Gigante in the United States.

The court ruled, however, that there was a well-known mark exception to the territoriality principle in the United States. Specifically, the court concluded that a foreign mark may qualify for the well-known mark exception if the mark owner shows "that a substantial percentage of consumers in the relevant American market [are] familiar with the foreign mark." Courts should consider factors such as whether the American copying of the foreign mark was intentional and whether American consumers are likely to think that they are patronizing the foreign enterprise in the United States. The court said:

While the territoriality principle is a long-standing and important
doctrine within trademark law, it cannot be absolute. An absolute territoriality rule without a famous-mark exception would promote consumer confusion and fraud. Commerce crosses borders. In this nation of immigrants, so do people. . . . There can be no justification for using trademark law to fool immigrants into thinking that they are buying from the store they liked back home.\(^9\)

According to the court, this exception allows, in certain cases, foreign nationals who use their trademarks in foreign markets to receive protection in the U.S. domestic market even though the mark has not yet been registered or used there.\(^9\) The court remanded the district court’s decision with instructions to reevaluate the claim in light of the famous marks exception to the territoriality principle.\(^9\)

This issue arose again three years later in the Second Circuit, in *ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc.*\(^1\) ITC is an Indian company that operates a restaurant called “Bukhara” in New Delhi.\(^1\) Situated inside a five-star hotel, since its opening in 1977, Bukhara has gained an international reputation, named one of the world’s fifty best restaurants by a London magazine.\(^1\) ITC expanded the Bukhara brand by opening more restaurants around the world, including in the United States.\(^1\) In 1986, ITC opened a Bukhara restaurant in Manhattan.\(^1\) In 1987, it opened a Chicago restaurant through a franchise agreement and registered its trademark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office.\(^1\) The New York restaurant remained open for only five years.\(^1\) In 1997, ITC cancelled the franchise agreement in Chicago.\(^1\) Since that time, ITC had not used the Bukhara mark in any restaurant in

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98 *Id.* at 1094.
99 *Gigante*, 391 F.3d at 1094-95.
100 *Id.* at 1098-99.
101 482 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2007).
102 *Id.* at 142-43.
103 *Id.* at 143 n.4.
104 *Id.* at 143.
105 *Id.*
106 *Id.*
107 *ITC Ltd.*, 482 F.3d at 143.
108 *Id.*
the United States.\textsuperscript{109}

In 1999, owners of Punchgini, Inc., opened the “Bukhara Grill” in New York City.\textsuperscript{110} The restaurant mimicked ITC’s logos, uniforms, menu style, and décor.\textsuperscript{111} Some of the owners had worked at the original Bukhara restaurant in New Delhi.\textsuperscript{112} One owner of Punchgini admitted in his deposition that since no Bukhara restaurant existed in New York, “we just thought we [would] take the name.”\textsuperscript{113}

After sporadic written communications between the parties, ITC sued, claiming trademark infringement and other claims.\textsuperscript{114} At trial, ITC argued that the court should recognize the well-known marks exception to the territoriality principle as was done by the Ninth Circuit in Gigante.\textsuperscript{115} ITC submitted that the Lanham Act incorporated the exception present in the Paris Convention and TRIPS.\textsuperscript{116} After reviewing the origin and development of the well-known marks doctrine,\textsuperscript{117} the court concluded that the Paris Convention creates no rights beyond what is already provided in the Lanham Act and that there is no evidence of Congressional intent to incorporate a well-known marks exception.\textsuperscript{118} As a result, ITC could not prevent the former employees of Bukhara from using the Bukhara trademark in the United States.\textsuperscript{119} The court then affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s Lanham Act claim.\textsuperscript{120}

The ITC decision resulted in a circuit split between two influential jurisdictions.\textsuperscript{121} The Ninth Circuit (author of the

\textsuperscript{109} Id. ITC did use a “Dal Bukhara” mark to sell ready-to-serve food products in 2003. Id.
\textsuperscript{110} Id. at 144.
\textsuperscript{111} Id.
\textsuperscript{112} Id.
\textsuperscript{113} ITC Ltd., 482 F.3d at 144 (citation omitted).
\textsuperscript{114} Id. at 144-45.
\textsuperscript{115} Id. at 161.
\textsuperscript{116} Id. at 161.
\textsuperscript{117} Id. at 156-62.
\textsuperscript{118} Id. at 161-62.
\textsuperscript{119} ITC Ltd., 482 F.3d at 165.
\textsuperscript{120} Id.
\textsuperscript{121} Compare Grupo Gigante SA de CV v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that there is a famous mark exception to the territoriality principle in federal law), with ITC, 482 F.3d at 172 (ruling that Congress has not
Gigante case) is influential in part due to its geography. The circuit governs nine western states including California and has been influential in the development of trademark law in such areas as survey evidence and internet protection. The Second Circuit (author of the ITC case), by contrast, governs only three states (Connecticut, Vermont and New York). However, the Second Circuit, as noted in one sample, has published nearly one-third of trademark infringement opinions in the United States, creating for itself disproportionate influence over the development of trademark jurisprudence. The Second Circuit is also responsible for developing the original list of factors that determine whether trademark infringement has occurred. Although other federal circuits are under no obligation to follow a different circuit’s approach, other appellate jurisdictions are likely to follow either the Second or the Ninth Circuit’s lead, thus further entrenching the disagreement.

The obvious solution would have been for the Supreme Court to resolve the question. The Supreme Court, however, declined to hear ITC’s appeal. Denying certiorari left the issue of when well-known foreign marks will be recognized in the United States unresolved and festering as a circuit split. The next section of incorporated the famous marks doctrine from the Paris Convention, nor TRIPS into federal law).


124 Geographic Boundaries, supra note 122.


126 Id.


128 See Alexis Weissberger, Is Fame Alone Sufficient to Create Priority Rights: An
this article discusses the global implications of that circuit split, which could have far reaching effects beyond a simple dispute over trademark ownership.

III. The Non-Enforcement of Well-Known Foreign Marks: The Potential for Global Retribution

Uncertain legal rules, such as those created by a circuit split, create problems for domestic and foreign firms doing business in the United States.129 Uncertain rules promote costly and time-consuming litigation between firms unclear about their legal rights or obligations.130 Duplicative contracting may be necessary because what may be permissible in one jurisdiction may not be permissible in another unless a “choice-of-law” clause is incorporated.131 Uncertain rules also promote overly conservative behavior by firms concerned about triggering regulatory scrutiny from authorities.132 The result could be a chilling effect whereby companies refrain from engaging in otherwise legal behavior for fear of triggering needless litigation from rivals.133 Burdens imposed by these spillover effects force firms to act at a suboptimal level of efficiency, passing costs along to the consumer.134

The disagreement between the ITC and Grupo Gigante cases represents more than a routine circuit split. If courts decline to fully respect well-known foreign marks in the United States, it places carefully developed global trademarks in jeopardy.135

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133 Id. at 1001-02.
134 Id. at 966-69.
for example, carefully cultivated its “Bukhara” trademark over a period of decades.\textsuperscript{136} As a result of this careful cultivation, Bukhara managed to be rated one of the top restaurants in the world.\textsuperscript{137} Diners patronizing such elite restaurants are likely to be well-travelled and recognize the Bukhara mark.\textsuperscript{138} The ITC decision enables an upstart to deliberately poach the name and use ITC’s goodwill to create a rival restaurant.\textsuperscript{139} Diners visiting the new Bukhara restaurant might encounter inferior food or service and associate that lower quality with the Bukhara name. Such a result would erode what companies so carefully try to construct: a well-known and respected brand readily recalled in the minds of its relevant consumers.\textsuperscript{140}

The disagreement about how to treat well-known foreign marks not only threatens the assets of foreign companies wanting to do business in the United States, but it also erodes the legitimacy of the United States and its role in supporting a strong global intellectual property regime. The United States has gone to great lengths to induce nations, especially developing nations, to comply with TRIPS and adopt Western-style intellectual property rights over the past fifteen years.\textsuperscript{141} During the 1980s and the early 1990s, the United States aggressively lobbied the Indian government, among others, to adopt strong Western-style intellectual property rights.\textsuperscript{142} By linking trade and intellectual

\textsuperscript{136} ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir. 2007).

\textsuperscript{137} Id.


\textsuperscript{139} See Jeffrey M. Reichard & Sam Sneed, The Famous Marks Doctrine: A Call for American Courts to Grant Trademark Rights to Famous Foreign Marks, 9 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 85, 97-98 (2009) (describing how new companies could legally use another company’s mark under ITC Ltd., 482 F.3d at 143).

\textsuperscript{140} See Alan S. Gutterman, The North-South Debate Regarding the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 89, 98 (1993) (“Trademarks can operate as both a valuable source of goodwill and a key marketing tool in foreign markets.”).


\textsuperscript{142} See id. at 322-25 (explaining that the United States recruited European trade
property, the U.S. government sought to impose (or imposed) economic consequences on national governments that refused to adhere to the proposed new rights. In the case of India, the United States exerted pressure by way of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This external economic pressure eventually overcame internal Indian resistance to the new regime, and India ended its opposition. From an Indian perspective, the United States’ enormous pressure to strengthen intellectual property rights in India (largely in favor of American firms) seems duplicitous when an Indian enterprise that manages to penetrate the U.S. market receives an unenthusiastic response from American courts.

A. The Inherent Vulnerability of U.S. Trademarks Abroad and the Exacerbating Effect of Weak Well-Known Mark Enforcement

Even if Congress and the American courts were punctiliously compliant toward their international obligations, U.S. trademarks would remain a vulnerable American corporate asset abroad. Trademark owners are uniquely susceptible to political, economic, and historical forces, all of which create disincentives for foreign governments to aggressively defend them.

partners and Japan to make intellectual property protection an issue in negotiations).

143 See id. at 323 ("Developing countries, led by BRIC nations of India and Brazil, resisted American efforts to link trade and intellectual property rights.").

144 See id. at 328-29 ("The United States pressured India to agree to the negotiation of TRIPS through its influence over International Monetary Fund assistance to the 1989 Indian economic crisis.").

145 See id. at 329 ("India abandoned its opposition to TRIPS in order to maintain badly needed U.S. funding and trade access.").


147 See Dan Rosen & Chikako Usui, The Social Structure of Japanese Intellectual Property Law, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 32, 63-66 (1994) (explaining that U.S. trademarks may remain vulnerable because foreign cultures have a different idea of ownership leading to a comparatively lenient enforcement philosophy).

148 See David H. Bernstein & Michael R. Potenza, Why the Reasonable Anticipation Standard is the Reasonable Way to Assess Contributory Trademark Liability in the Online Marketplace, 2011 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 9, ¶ 63 (2011) (arguing that a trademark owner’s expertise isolates her, thus making her vulnerable to transient
Politically, legislators have little direct incentive to make defense of foreign trademark rights a priority. Although foreign mark holders can exert influence through economic pressure, foreign corporations and the workers they employ in their home country cannot participate in the domestic legislative process.

By contrast, local manufacturing interests that employ local workers and have close connections to the government can exert significant pressure against strong protective legislation of foreign marks. Strong foreign trademark protection, and the associated financial benefits associated with that protection, could be painted to legislators as having a negative impact on the domestic economy. An emerging foreign rival augmented by trademark protection can hurt the market share of domestic producers. Those losses may be associated with closed factories and layoffs.

Furthermore, developing nations in particular are faced with a variety of pressing social ills. It is not unreasonable that legislative interest might be more focused on issues such as poverty and civil strife than the intangible rights of foreigners. If local competitors perceive foreign marks as imposing an unfair advantage on foreign companies in domestic markets, trademark legislation protection might be the first avenue of legislative response.

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149 See U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, supra note 135, at 5-30 (“China’s 2002 Government Procurement Law and subsequent implementing policies give priority to ‘local’ goods and services . . . .”).
150 See Bird, supra note 141, at 325 (attributing TRIPS to a corporate coalition led predominately by American companies).
151 C.f. U.S. CONST. amends. XV, § 1, XIX, XXVI, § 1 (reserving the right to vote for U.S. citizens above the age of eighteen).
153 See id. at 384-86 (explaining two cases in which Chinese courts found for Starbucks and imposed fines on domestic companies).
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 See Bird, supra note 141, at 323 (explaining that international trade may come second depending on domestic issues).
157 See id. at 345 (describing how the United States used legislative action against
legislation; rather, updated or strengthened trademark legislation might be delayed, placed in a dead-end committee, or mired in unproductive procedural wrangling.® Regardless of whether legislative concern is focused in other directions or legislators actively seek to please their constituents, the result would likely be the same: delayed or diminished legislative interest in furthering foreign trademark protection.

Certain countries, particularly those with developing economies, might perceive licensors of foreign marks as exploiting local businesses and taking advantage of vulnerable consumers.® Consumer loyalty to aggressively advertised foreign trademarks can arguably not only disadvantage local businesses, but also suppress traditional consumption habits that better sustain long-term health.® Illiterate consumers might be more easily swayed by sophisticated foreign advertising.® Domestic interests might also fear economic pressure from wealthy foreign interests who would use their powerful brand equity to force local licensees into accepting onerous contract terms.® The perceived result would be that foreign trademark rights impede the economic self-sufficiency of brand-dependent emerging markets.® Local firms

India when India failed to comply with trade agreements).

158 See id. at 348 (describing a cycle of delay utilized by India in response to U.S. pressure to strengthen intellectual property rights).

159 See id. at 319 (describing the two types of responses a country coerced into protecting international trademarks might have as either (1) retaliatory or (2) delayed).

160 See Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward a New Multilateralism, 76 IOWA L. REV. 273, 284 (1991) [hereinafter Leaffer, Protecting United States] (“Some developing countries have displayed hostility toward trademark protection in their substantive law. This attitude is nurtured by a fear that foreign licensors of trademarks exploit both local businesses and vulnerable consumers.”).


163 See Leaffer, Protecting United States, supra note 160, at 284 (“Foreign licensors are perceived as having superior bargaining power, permitting them to impose terms unfavorable to the local licensee.”).

164 See id. (“[L]ocal authorities believe that the increased use of trademarks will become an insurmountable obstacle to achieving economic self-sufficiency.”); Samantha D. Slotkin, Trademark Piracy in Latin America: A Case Study on Reebok International
may believe that strong foreign trademark protection would make it difficult to convince consumers already accustomed to buying foreign goods to switch to local brands. As a result, foreign trademarks may be perceived as having a suppressive effect on the establishment of local trademarks, a position supported by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

Finally, historical events also encourage an environment that is hostile, or at least indifferent, to foreign trademark protection. Traditionally, trademark protection has been exploited only by firms from the wealthiest nations. By 1974, half of all trademarks registered in developing countries were owned by foreigners. Furthermore, foreign trademark owners have been known to abuse local licensees. After negotiating an onerous license agreement, the foreign licensor sometimes allows the local licensee to build up the licensor's local business. Just as the licensee expects to finally receive significant returns on its investment, the foreign licensor arbitrarily terminates the license and reaps the benefits of the licensee's hard work. Today, firms in many developing economies own valuable trademarks that can compete with virtually any brand that American firms can offer.

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165 See Slotkin, supra note 164, at 675 ("Even if a local company decides to market locally manufactured goods, becoming established and gaining a market share may be difficult because consumers are accustomed to foreign goods.").

166 Leaffer, Protecting United States, supra note 160, at 284.


168 Spitals, supra note 162, at 378.

169 See supra note 160 and accompanying text.

170 See William H. Ball, Jr., Attitudes of Developing Countries to Trademarks, 74 TRADEMARK REP. 160, 163 (1984) ("This gives rise to the oft-cited example of the licensee in Peru, Yemen or wherever, who has worked for years to build up his foreign licensor's local business. Just as success is finally in his grasp, he is terminated arbitrarily.").

171 Id.

172 See Making a Name for Themselves: Emerging Markets Are Now Creating Highly Valuable Brands, ECONOMIST, Apr. 28, 2010,
In spite of this, the long-standing gross disparity in trademark ownership, along with incidents of abusive behavior, can cement the notion that trademark law remains mainly a tool for foreign advancement at the expense of domestic interests.

Given these political, economic, and historical factors, it would not be surprising for foreign governments—particularly those of developing nations—to view protection of U.S. trademarks with a degree of skepticism. National legislators already predisposed toward their own domestic mark holders would see little reason to support the protection of American trademarks when U.S. law may not protect foreign marks.\footnote{173} Non-enforcement may also reinforce the already established view that intellectual property protection is simply another form of economic colonialism by which developed nations seek to subvert the interests of the poorer nations in favor of their own.\footnote{174}

http://www.economist.com/node/16003537. This article comments:

Although American technology firms—Google, IBM, Apple and Microsoft—grab the top four places, the list [of the 100 most valuable brands] contains 13 brands from big emerging markets (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and Mexico), compared with just one in the consultancy’s [Millward Brown Optimor] 2006 league table. . . . Among the rich-world brands that have dropped out of the league are KFC, Yahoo!, and Ikea. Those taking their place include Baidu, a Chinese internet firm, ICICI, an Indian bank and Petrobras, a Brazilian oil giant.

If you don’t know them yet, you will.

\textit{Id.} \footnote{173} \textit{See supra} note 146 and accompanying text.


In particular, as between the developed nations of the North and the less developed countries of the South, increasing numbers of scholars have been questioning whether the flow of benefits of international intellectual property protection, which are part of the whole “free trade” package, may be skewed to the advantage of the economies, cultures, and nations of the North.

\textit{Id.} \footnote{174} \textit{See also} Clark W. Lackert, \textit{Famous Marks: Dilution from an International Perspective}, in \textit{Annual Advanced Seminar on Trademark Law} 154 (PLI Pat., Course Handbook Ser. No. 176, 1997) (“IP protection is viewed as a form of economic colonialism using trademarks as a form of exploitation.”).
B. The Potential Reaction of Foreign Governments in the Global Environment

Trademarks already stand on shaky ground. Foreign governments might not sit idly by if well-known marks from their countries do not receive full protection in the United States. Such a reaction might occur in a global forum where multinational disputes are raised and resolved. These fora could range from international organizations that resolve disputes to a court of global opinion that validates one's national position.

One of the most high-profile methods of resolving multinational disputes is through the dispute resolution forum provided by the World Trade Organization (WTO). Typically, a member nation brings a complaint before the WTO's dispute resolution body alleging that some practice violates TRIPS or another treaty regime. After a hearing, the body issues a decision and the loser may appeal. Many believe the WTO settlement forum is particularly effective because it authorizes the winning party to enforce the body's decision by withdrawing trade concessions against the offending nation.

Unfortunately, to the extent that the United States has interacted with global institutions on the topic of trademarks, its

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177 Id.


180 Id. art. 16 § 4.

181 Id. art. 21 § 5. See also C. O'Neal Taylor, Impossible Cases: Lessons From the First Decade of WTO Dispute Settlement, 28 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 309, 315 (2007) (explaining that the prevailing party can enforce the agreement through the DSB).
behavior has not always been admirable. The United States faced a trademark-related dispute before the WTO in "United States — Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998." In this dispute, the European Communities challenged Section 211 of the U.S. Omnibus Appropriations Act, known as the "Bacardi Bill," which prevented Cuban nationals from registering or renewing the trademark of any product whose assets were confiscated as a part of the Cuban revolution. Ostensibly a measure to punish acts of the Castro regime, this last minute addition to a 4000 page bill was more likely the result of a lobbying effort by Bacardi Rum to prevent French-Cuban rival Havana Club Rum from competing in the United States.

Reversing a contrary panel decision, the WTO appellate body concluded that Section 211 violated the national treatment and most-favored nation obligations under TRIPS and the Paris Convention. According to the WTO’s summary of the case, full compliance has not occurred and Section 211 remains in force. Meanwhile, Bacardi has launched its own Havana Club Rum brand in the United States. In August 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld Bacardi’s right to use the

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184 See Michael Riley, Comment, Cigars and Rum: Hazardous to the Health of Intellectual Property Law?: How the Cohiba Cigar and Havana Rum Cases Reveal a 'Carve-Out' for Intellectual Property Disputes with a Cuban Nexus, 38 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 457, 466 (2007) ("Though Bacardi is based in Bermuda, it enlisted its Miami-based subsidiary to persuade Florida Senator Connie Mack to insert a provision into the 1999 Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act — Section 211, which has become known as the ‘Bacardi Bill.’").

185 See U.S. Panel Report 2001, supra note 182, at 115-16 (finding § 211 inconsistent with a number of articles of TRIPS).


187 Riley, supra note 184, at 465.
Havana Club name in the United States over the objections of Pernod Ricard USA, LLC, which sells Havana Club Rum elsewhere in the world.¹⁸⁸

The WTO could be the forum in which further challenges arise regarding the protection of trademarks. For example, in “World Trade Organization, Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry,”¹⁸⁹ the European Communities and other nations asserted that an Indonesian system offering special tax and duty exemptions to certain Indonesian motor vehicle trademark owners violated TRIPS.¹⁹⁰ In another dispute, a group of nations led by Australia challenged the European Communities’ lack of protection for trademarks and geographical indications for agricultural products and foodstuffs.¹⁹¹

In addition to using the WTO to settle trademark-related disputes, nations could also use the retaliatory threat of WTO legal action as leverage in negotiations with the United States.¹⁹² Brazil did this by enacting a compulsory licensing statute that would forbid the use of any patent right unless the patent holder manufactured the subject of the patent in Brazil within three years from the patent granting date.¹⁹³ The United States responded by


¹⁹⁰ Id. at 2.


bringing a complaint before the WTO alleging that the law violated TRIPS because it gave preference to local patents. Brazil quickly retaliated by filing its own WTO complaint alleging those portions of the United States Code requiring U.S. manufacture of certain products made with government funding also violated TRIPS. Likely sensing opportunity, India intervened on Brazil’s behalf, claiming that it had a significant interest in the case. Brazil’s retaliatory action combined with savvy public relations campaigning by Brazilian ministers resulted in the United States withdrawing its WTO complaint.

Smaller nations could potentially use the WTO complaint system to achieve favorable results. During the 1990s, Antigua, a traditionally poor nation, discovered newfound wealth by targeting the United States with internet gambling operations. Pressure from the United States forced oversight and restrictions, triggering the industry’s flight and leaving ten percent of the total Antiguan workforce jobless. Antigua filed a complaint with the WTO, alleging that the U.S. ban on remote access gambling and payments violated its obligations under the General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS). The United States has not yet complied with the WTO’s decision. The WTO dispute system allows the successful party to impose economic sanctions against a non-compliant state. Antigua’s economic power is small

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194 Id. at 176-77.
195 Bird & Cahoy, supra note 192, at 313.
196 See id. (“India also wished to join Brazil in its request for consultations regarding U.S. law . . . ”).
197 See id. at 314 (“Brazil’s counter-campaign combined with global public pressure forced the United States to withdraw its complaint from the WTO.”).
198 See Codd, supra note 183, at 946-47 (explaining Jay Cohen’s internet gambling operations centered in Antigua that generated millions of dollars of revenue).
199 Id. at 947.
compared to the United States.\textsuperscript{203} However, if it were authorized to suspend its obligations under TRIPS by the WTO, the violation would give, at least in theory, a small nation like Antigua power to act against the United States, an economic powerhouse.\textsuperscript{204}

WTO-backed legal sanctions incur double vulnerability when well-known foreign marks are not enforced.\textsuperscript{205} The sanctions are not limited to well-known U.S. marks in the complaining country, although those marks are an obvious target.\textsuperscript{206} The WTO actually authorizes cross-retaliation, which means that TRIPS non-compliance in one industry can be punished with a suspension of concessions in an entirely unrelated industry.\textsuperscript{207} As a result, non-protection of well-known foreign marks in the United States could threaten foreign protection of U.S. patents and copyrights, as well as trigger tariffs on goods and services.\textsuperscript{208}

Conversely, WTO disputes in unrelated arenas can trigger sanctions against well-known U.S. marks. For example, when Brazil won its WTO claim against the United States regarding cotton subsidies to domestic producers, Brazil requested the right to retaliate not only against U.S. exports to Brazil but against U.S. intellectual property assets generally.\textsuperscript{209} American trademarks might prove a particularly tempting target for sanction.\textsuperscript{210} As noted, American trademarks abroad may be perceived as a symbol of Western global dominance\textsuperscript{211} as well as an inhibitor of local

\textsuperscript{203} Shamnad Basheer, Turning TRIPS on Its Head: An "IP Cross Retaliation" Model for Developing Countries, 3 LAW & DEV. REV. 141, 189 (2010).

\textsuperscript{204} Id.

\textsuperscript{205} Cf. id. (describing Antigua's right to "cross retaliate" by suspending its GATS obligations in other sectors).

\textsuperscript{206} Id. at 162.

\textsuperscript{207} Basheer, supra note 203, at 145.

\textsuperscript{208} Cf. id. (arguing that an intellectual property cross retaliation against the United States may be a feasible remedy for developing countries).


\textsuperscript{210} Cf. Codd, supra note 183, at 957 ("Between 1995 and 2004, the United States was the most active participant in dispute settlement, litigating as the respondent in fifty-seven disputes . . . ").

\textsuperscript{211} See Katya Assaf, The Dilution of Culture and the Law of Trademarks, 49 IDEA 1, 80-81 (2008); Amir H. Khoury, A NeoConventional Trademark Regime for
economic progress.\textsuperscript{212} America’s arguable non-compliance with TRIPS on this issue makes its marks a target of symbolic importance.\textsuperscript{213} If pressed on the fairness of the retaliatory action, the complaining party could contend that sanctions against well-known marks have the double benefit of satisfying the WTO-authorized sanction authority as well as bringing the United States into compliance with the global economic system, which may benefit the global economic system as a whole.\textsuperscript{214}

Whereas sanctions against American foodstuffs and important commodities might have direct negative economic effects on the local economy and quality of life, sanctions against well-known trademarks are less burdensome.\textsuperscript{215} Even a tiny nation such as Antigua could readily impose a special tax on intellectual property-related goods from the United States and combine it with a price control mechanism to ensure that the added taxes are not passed to the consumer.\textsuperscript{216} The United States is a global economic power, and such economic power can inoculate it against the efforts of weaker nations to force compliance.\textsuperscript{217} Nonetheless, well-known marks represent a tempting target for economic sanction; American non-enforcement of such marks represents a veritable invitation for developing and developed nations to impose them.\textsuperscript{218}

\textsuperscript{212} See Leaffer, Protecting United States, supra note 160, at 284.

\textsuperscript{213} Cf. Khoury, supra note 211, at 368 (describing the “distinctively Western value” of U.S. marks).

\textsuperscript{214} Cf. Basheer, supra note 203, at 141 (explaining that Antigua attempted to impose retaliatory sanctions against the United States in order to bring it into compliance with the international agreements on trade).


\textsuperscript{216} Basheer, supra note 203, at 144-46.

\textsuperscript{217} Id. at 141.

\textsuperscript{218} Cf. Ann Mota, TRIPS: Ten Years of Disputes at the WTO, 9 Computer L. Rev. & Tech. J. 455, 477 (2005) (describing the WTO complaint by the United States against Brazil's compulsory licensing statute and Brazil's retaliation of filing its own WTO complaint against the United States).
C. Potential National and Local Responses to Weak Trademark Protection

The responses by nations affected by weak U.S. trademark protection may not simply be limited to formal adjudicative procedures before the WTO. Non-enforcement of well-known marks can trigger local actions that threaten the economic well-being of global U.S. firms. Such non-enforcement, or even unenthusiastic enforcement, may not be as visible as a WTO proceeding, but may be just as effective as a retaliatory tool. Local actions are harder for the U.S. government and business interests to quickly prevent.

One of the simplest responses is for governments to fail to protect American latecomers to foreign markets. Reebok, then a British producer of athletic footwear, endured ten years of unsuccessful litigation in Peru, attempting to cancel registration of pirated ownership and regain its Reebok name. When a pirate filed an Argentine trademark application for “Hard Rock Cafe” in 1986, the true owners of the mark were ordered to cover all references to their name on Argentinean restaurants pending a ruling on the adverse application. At worst, the firm can be prevented from using its own mark in a foreign market, causing confusion in that and other markets as consumers learn of the pirate producer through the flow of global information.

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220 Cf. Leaffer, Protecting United States, supra note 160, at 281 (explaining that developing countries either do not provide governmental enforcement for intellectual property or provide insufficient enforcement).


222 Gutowski, supra note 219, at 722.


the foreign firm wins in court, it will have to spend significant advertising revenue clearing its brand from the negative associations entrenched by the inferior counterfeit.225

A national legislature might also theoretically pass legislation that impedes the influence of foreign marks.226 In 1976, Mexico threatened to implement a trademark “linking law” that would have forced all foreign trademark owners to associate their marks with a local Mexican mark in order to use them in connection with goods produced in Mexico.227 Such a law would result in a kind of trademark expropriation that allows a local licensee to “free ride” on the reputation of the foreign mark holder.228 Other nations also tried implementing regulations in the 1970s and 1980s.229 Such linking laws have not been attempted recently, and are probably not the looming risk they once were.230 However, such laws could be used as a threat or as a tool to place foreign trademark protection on the bargaining table in exchange for broader protections of the domestic firms’ intellectual property rights abroad.231 Nations still retain the power to severely restrict or even abolish the use of trademarks in their jurisdictions.232

Linking laws and other attempts to encumber foreign trademarks are not imminent threats, even if U.S. courts continue

articlesdetail.aspx?news=c46de5ed-711e-4c5b-960a-013abd4c7d6c (explaining that Apple cannot register the “iPhone” mark in China because of Hanwang’s prior trademark registration).


226 See Leaffer, Protecting United States, supra note 160, at 284-85 (describing a Mexican law that tried to deter the effect of foreign trademarks).

227 Id.

228 Id. at 285.

229 Ball, supra note 170, at 164-65.


231 See Bird & Cahoy, supra note 192, at 310-12 (arguing that Brazil was able to bargain with U.S. firms because of its intellectual property-impairing compulsory licensing statutes).

232 See Khoury, supra note 211, at 368-70 (describing but rejecting this approach as too costly). The notion of abolishing trademark was raised as a possibility in the early 1970s in order to reduce the price of pharmaceuticals. Id. at 369.
to not fully recognize foreign marks protection. Article 20 of TRIPS, for example, prohibits unjustifiable encumbrances upon the use of trademarks in commerce. This prohibition does not necessarily mean, however, that legislative encumbering of foreign marks would have no place as a retaliatory strategy. Countries, especially developing ones, know well that even a threat of intellectual property-impairing legislation can bring U.S. firms to the bargaining table, as Brazil did when its threats to break drug company patents helped secure it an affordable price for anti-retroviral AIDS drugs. Furthermore, passing TRIPS’s non-compliant legislation does not necessarily trigger immediate WTO-authorized foreign sanctions. A typical WTO dispute lasts three years. Nations can further delay sanctions through persistent renegotiation of time to comply, as the United States has skillfully done in the Section 211 dispute discussed above. During this time, the offending legislation could remain in place, impeding the ability of U.S. trademark holders to penetrate and expand in foreign markets. In response, the United States could certainly circumvent the WTO dispute resolution process and impose sanctions unilaterally. Such action would leave the United States open to criticism for not adhering to the very international legal rules that it helped create and impose on developing nations. Unilateral action would thus create a whole new set of problems regarding the legitimacy and moral authority of American global leadership.

Governments can conflate U.S. non-compliance with TRIPS

233 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 20.
234 See Bird & Cahoy, supra note 192, at 310-12.
235 Id.
237 Id. Some disputes take longer. See, e.g., William J. Davey, The WTO Dispute Settlement System: The First Ten Years, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 17, 49 (2005) (describing one WTO dispute that lasted nearly ten years).
238 See WTO Section 211 Dispute, supra note 186.
239 Cf. Heavner, supra note 224, at 55 (explaining that Apple cannot market its iPhone products until the issue with Hanwang’s registered mark is resolved).
240 Leaffer, Protecting United States, supra note 160, at 295.
241 Codd, supra note 183, at 963.
with pressing political issues.\textsuperscript{242} For example, the United States has persistently pressured China to increase enforcement efforts against trademark pirates who copy American marks.\textsuperscript{243} Such piracy costs U.S. firms billions of dollars annually.\textsuperscript{244} While China has stepped up its efforts, this lobbying has provoked responses from Beijing.\textsuperscript{245} The commerce minister painted U.S. behavior as contradictory, commenting that while Washington wants China to release political prisoners from prison, it is now asking for more Chinese citizens to be put in jail.\textsuperscript{246}

Indeed, Apple faced a serious challenge to the registration of its iPhone mark in China, one of its most profitable markets.\textsuperscript{247} When Apple registered its iPhone mark in China in 2002, it sought protection for the mark in connection with computer hardware and software, but not for mobile phones.\textsuperscript{248} In 2004, Hanwang Technology Co. registered the “i-Phone” mark for mobile phones.\textsuperscript{249} Because China gives priority based on registration rather than use in commerce, Hanwang was able to secure the legal right to use the “i-Phone” mark over Apple’s objections.\textsuperscript{250} If the United States had offered more predictable protection for Chinese well-known marks, China might in turn have had a stronger interest in protecting Apple’s marks, perhaps by allowing for a broader reading of the term “hardware” to include mobile phones.\textsuperscript{251} Apple’s experience illustrates some of the problems


\textsuperscript{243} See id.

\textsuperscript{244} Id. at 327 (“Trademark piracy in China is still rampant and continues to cost foreign trademark owners billions of dollars in lost sales and jobs.”).


\textsuperscript{246} Id.

\textsuperscript{247} Heavner, supra note 224, at 55.

\textsuperscript{248} Id.

\textsuperscript{249} Id.

\textsuperscript{250} Id.

\textsuperscript{251} Cf. Mota, supra note 218, at 477 (describing the WTO complaint by the United States against Brazil’s compulsory licensing statute and Brazil’s retaliation by filing its own WTO complaint against the United States).
that U.S. companies now face, and will likely face in the future, in securing protection for well-known marks in other countries.\footnote{For a more in-depth examination of the treatment of foreign famous marks in China, see Greene, \textit{supra} note 152.} The United States holds significant advantages in its flexibility to comply with global intellectual property rights.\footnote{Basheer, \textit{supra} note 203, at 141.} That power can inoculate the U.S. economy from coercive and retributive influence that might arise from the failure to enforce foreign marks.\footnote{\textit{Id.}} However, that does not mean that foreign nations are without the ability to make their influence felt. Nations with significant economic power can refuse to aggressively enforce U.S. trademarks in a way that imperils American interests abroad.\footnote{See Hoover, \textit{supra} note 242, at 346.} Other nations can make trade disputes public and advocate for its position in the court of public opinion.\footnote{See \textit{id.} at 348.} It is unlikely that the \textit{ITC} decision will provoke a wave of global trade counter-measures.\footnote{See Basheer, \textit{supra} note 203, at 141.} The decision has been in force for approximately five years with criticisms largely confined to academic critiques.\footnote{But see Kristin Zobel, \textit{Famous Marks Doctrine: Can and Should Well-Known Foreign Marks Receive Trademark Protection within the United States}, 19 DePaul J. Art Tech. & Intell. Prop. L. 145, 170 (2008) (predicting the need for either future legal or legislative action in order to navigate the \textit{ITC} decision).} Yet, the possibility of negative consequences remains a live issue with unenergetic enforcement, and other heavy handed actions by the United States could potentially encourage a response by national interests. The impact of this response would be felt by the U.S. government, but the brunt of any response would be shouldered by American firms doing business abroad.\footnote{ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 135 (2d Cir. 2007). See generally LaLonde, \textit{supra} note 12; Cook, \textit{supra} note 6 (explaining that academics see the \textit{ITC} decision as a roadblock to progress).} Firms with foreign intellectual property would have to take steps on their own to protect their intellectual property rights from being used as an
example for foreign retribution. The next section briefly discusses measures American corporations can take to shield their marks abroad.

IV. Defending U.S. Trademarks Abroad from Retributive Effects

As noted earlier, the most obvious defense against any retribution arising from the non-enforcement of foreign marks is for Congress to amend the Lanham Act to fully protect them. Reforms are certainly plausible and have been suggested by other scholars in the past. Literature exists studying the antecedents, consequences, and effectiveness of corporate political lobbying that need not be recounted here. The essential argument is little different than what has been emphasized here: the more effectively U.S. law protects well-known foreign marks, the more likely well-known American marks will be protected in foreign markets.

Attorneys representing ITC unsurprisingly made this argument. ITC argued in its legal brief to the United States Court of Appeals that the United States cannot expect other nations to protect its well-known American trademarks if American courts refused to offer reciprocal protection. What is surprising, given the outcome of the case, is that the Second Circuit was open and receptive to it. The court indeed agreed that a persuasive policy argument could be made in support of well-known marks protection. Citing academic and judicial sources, the court noted the desirability of the well-known marks

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261 See Heavner, supra note 224, at 55.
262 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
263 For thorough reviews of corporate political activity, see generally Amy J. Hillman, Gerald D. Keim & Douglas Schuler, Corporate Political Activity: A Review and Research Agenda, 30 J. MGMT. 837 (2004); Brian Shaffer, Firm-Level Responses to Government Regulation: Theoretical and Research Approaches, 21 J. MGMT. 495 (1995) (stating the view that Congress has been wary to look to international law to solve domestic issues).
264 See Cook, supra note 6, at 419.
265 ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 165 (2d Cir. 2007).
266 Id.
267 Id.
268 Id.
doctrine due to the global movement of consumers and the rapid transmission of goodwill-creating information through media and the internet.\footnote{Id. (citing De Beers LV Trademark Ltd. v. DeBeers Diamond Syndicate, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9307 (2005)).} The court also acknowledged that the well-known marks doctrine has become essential to prevent exploitation and piracy in the global trading system.\footnote{ITC, 482 F.3d at 165 (citing Frederick W. Mostert, \textit{Well-Known and Famous Marks: Is Harmony Possible in the Global Village}, 86 \textit{Trademark Rep.} 103, 106 (1996)).} The court emphasized that it was the prerogative of Congress to create an exception to the basic principle of territoriality.\footnote{Id.}

Assuming that the \textit{ITC} court is arguably correct that Congress must act in order to recognize the doctrine (the judges in the \textit{Gigante} case apparently make no such confining assumption), it is far from certain that, even with private lobbying, Congress will amend the Lanham Act.\footnote{See Bird, supra note 141, at 355.} In the past, Congress has shown little interest in taking affirmative steps to incorporate the Paris Convention and TRIPS into the United States Code.\footnote{See Cook, supra note 6, at 416.} While other provisions of TRIPS have triggered amendments of federal statutes, Congress has not chosen to address the issue of well-known foreign marks for over ten years.\footnote{Tashia Bunch, \textit{Well-Known Marks: Where Do We Go From Here?}, 90 J. Patent and Trademark Off. Soc’y 227, 231-32 (2008).} Congress might also be receptive to domestic firms lobbying against the measure in order to shield themselves from foreign competition.\footnote{See Bird, supra note 141, at 323.} Combine these forces with the current congressional climate of suspicion toward foreign law, and legislative adoption of the foreign marks doctrine becomes a difficult task.\footnote{See generally David T. Hutt & Lisa K. Parshall, \textit{Divergent Views on the Use of International and Foreign Law: Congress and the Executive versus the Court}, 33 Ohio N.U. L. Rev 113 (2007) (describing the conflict between the courts and Congress regarding foreign markets policy).}

Congress has shown little interest in improving protection for well-known foreign marks.\footnote{See Bunch, supra note 274, at 231-32.} Members of Congress may be
reluctant to act because, in addition to the overwhelming number of other pressing demands, there appear to be no direct and immediate benefits to their constituents.\textsuperscript{278} United States companies are unlikely to prioritize the legal protection of their competitors' intellectual property in their lobbying efforts, especially when those competitors cannot lobby competitively on their own behalf.\textsuperscript{279}

As an alternative to congressional legislation, private interests could lobby the government to pressure any nation that threatens to place American trademarks in jeopardy.\textsuperscript{280} American firms have been skilled at lobbying the executive branch and the United States Trade Representative to compel compliance with TRIPS and ensure meaningful enforcement of local intellectual property law.\textsuperscript{281} If a nation such as India threatens protection of American marks in retaliation for the United States failing to protect Indian marks in the United States, the United States could threaten trade sanctions against India in response.\textsuperscript{282}

The problem is that coercion rarely results in long-term protection for intellectual property rights.\textsuperscript{283} Coercion can provoke retaliation by the targeted state and devolve the dispute into a trade war.\textsuperscript{284} Sanctions can hurt American interests, which rely on foreign trade, and provoke resentment.\textsuperscript{285} The result of coercive efforts might be a short-term defense of well-known marks, but at a cost of a long-term hostility towards the United States and its interests.\textsuperscript{286}

Instead of pressuring government officials, U.S. firms can persuade them that protection of American trademarks is in the government's best interest. The protection of well-known foreign marks creates a beneficial economic effect for the domestic

\textsuperscript{278} But see Cook, supra note 6, at 419.
\textsuperscript{279} But see id.
\textsuperscript{280} See Bird, supra note 141, at 322.
\textsuperscript{281} Id. at 322-23.
\textsuperscript{282} Id. at 324.
\textsuperscript{283} Id. at 334-35.
\textsuperscript{284} Id. at 329.
\textsuperscript{285} Id. at 335-39.
\textsuperscript{286} Bird, supra note 141, at 335-39.
Local firms, like their foreign counterparts, also suffer from piracy of their trademarked goods and services. Encouraging strong piracy prevention efforts for all firms and supplying of multinational expertise and know-how on the issue would allow local trademark-sensitive enterprises and foreign mark holders to share a mutual goal. Stronger protection of trademarks will allow local firms to more effectively engage in local research and development, attract technology transfer, and improve the local economy.

Defense of foreign trademarks can influence the amount of foreign direct investment a nation attracts. Strong trademark protection is particularly important in influencing investment decisions for low-technology goods such as clothing because of the ease with which these goods can be pirated. As a result, trademarks lower the cost of exporting for the foreign firm because the foreign firm needs to spend less to prevent piracy and compete. For example, British firm Imperial Tobacco Group PLC (ITG) planned on building a $70 million factory that would buy tobacco from 60,000 farmers and license its cigarette rolling technology from a local partner. Construction of the factory was put on hold when ITG learned that a local trader had stolen its Davidoff trademark. Losing at the trial level, ITG ultimately won its trademark back in an appeal to the Supreme Court of Indonesia. The significant delay caused by the local pirate, however, delayed local farmers and workers access to badly needed investment dollars until the trademark dispute was resolved. The director of Asian business development for ITG

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287 Leaffer, Protecting United States, supra note 160, at 283.
288 Id.
289 Id.
290 Id.
292 Id.
293 Timothy Mapes, Battle to Reclaim a Brand, FAR EASTERN ECON. REV., May 22, 2003, at 36.
294 Id.
295 Id.
said at the time, "The country disqualifies itself in this way – and you’re talking about losing thousands and thousands of jobs. I listen to my friends and they say, ‘Why the hell are you bothering with this country.’ And that’s sad. The guy on the street is the one who eventually suffers."

Foreign trademark protection can also be construed as a matter of public safety. The sale of counterfeit trademarked pharmaceuticals alone constitutes an estimated $512 billion in global sales each year or five to seven percent of total international trade. Counterfeit products threaten public health and safety due to their typically inferior and sometimes dangerous nature. Highlighting the safety issues caused by the piracy of a foreign multinational’s trademark can prove more successful than coercive lobbying of local governments. When Heinz discovered Chinese pirates were selling products with their trademarked name and even copying Heinz’s trademarks on uniforms and delivery trucks, Heinz embarked on a public relations campaign to highlight the threat to Chinese consumers. The firm publicized raids which highlighted the unsanitary conditions of pirated factories and the risk such conditions would create for children. The result was significant interest in local authorities in preventing counterfeits and no serious further problems from pirates.

V. Conclusion

The United States has an important leadership role to play in advocating for robust intellectual property protection. America can only serve as an effective advocate, however, if its legislation matches its rhetoric. For a time, the judicial system appeared to be moving in the right direction with regards to protection of well-

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296 Id. See also Tom Wright, Indonesia Turns to Trademark Piracy; Cigarette Ruling Gives Hope to Foreign Companies Seeking to Protect Brands, WALL ST. J., Sep. 9, 2003, at A20.

297 See Mapes, supra note 293, at 37. See also Wright, supra note 296, at A20.


299 Leaffer, Protecting United States, supra note 160, at 283.

300 See Bird, supra note 141, at 357.

301 Id.

302 Id.

303 See id.
known foreign marks. The *Gigante* case decided in the Ninth Circuit, recognizing the well-known marks doctrine, was the leading viewpoint on well-known marks and an attractive precedent for lower courts to follow.\textsuperscript{304} It appeared only a matter of time before the well-known marks doctrine was cemented as a principle of trademark law in the U.S. federal judiciary.

The *ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini* decision changed that trajectory.\textsuperscript{305} The Second Circuit directly disagreed with the *Gigante* ruling and refused to recognize the well-known foreign marks doctrine, instead contending that the issue was a matter for legislative, and not judicial, resolution.\textsuperscript{306} As noted above, the result is that foreign owners of globally famous trademarks cannot be certain as to whether their trademarks will be recognized in the United States against an earlier local user.\textsuperscript{307}

The *ITC* decision is more important than one Indian firm’s loss of a single trademark. The decision gives national governments already predisposed against foreign trademarks and western-style intellectual property rights the incentive to retaliate in kind against the United States.\textsuperscript{308} Given that U.S. firms hold far more value in their trademarks abroad than non-U.S. firms hold within the United States, the possibility exists that the *ITC* decision will encourage a foreign response.\textsuperscript{309} Firms need to take steps to protect themselves before threats occur, or else American marks remain susceptible to retributive government action.

\textsuperscript{304} See Grupo Gigante SA de CV v. Dallo & Co., Inc., 391 F.3d 1088, 1098 (9th Cir. 2004).

\textsuperscript{305} ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 165 (2d Cir. 2007).

\textsuperscript{306} Id.

\textsuperscript{307} See supra note 9 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{308} See supra note 145 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{309} See Leaffer, Protecting United States, supra note 160, at 273.