Holy Places in an Unholy World: Will Religious Beliefs Halt India's Suez of the East

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Holy Places in an Unholy World: Will Religious Beliefs Halt India's "Suez of the East"?†

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"Who may ascend the hill of the LORD? Who may stand in his holy place?"1

"And still I live in hope to see the Holy Ground once more."2

"My boy, we are pilgrims in an unholy land."3

†J.D, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2010. This article is dedicated to my father, Howard W. Brill, in appreciation for his suggestions, example, and love. I am also especially grateful for the constant encouragement and support of my wife, Seuli, and daughter, Asha.

1 Psalm 24:3 (New International Version).

I. Introduction

From Israel's King David to film's Indiana Jones, humans are constantly wrestling with the notion of holy places in a decidedly unholy world. There seems to be a common understanding—whether it is the exhortation to "never discuss religion and politics in mixed company" or Thomas Jefferson's "wall of separation between church and state"—that the collision of the "sacred and profane" worlds of religious beliefs and government action can inflame passions.

As a result, religious holy sites are often a source of tension between believers and their governments. Take, for example, the Buddhas of Bamian, Afghanistan. In March 2001, the ruling Taliban government destroyed two 1400-year-old giant statues of Buddha "in a fit of indignation." Although a Taliban official seemed to distinguish between these ancient structures and active religious sites by promising that the government would not demolish Hindu temples in the country, the act was condemned throughout the world as an intentional destruction of international treasures. This rhetoric is not confined to authoritarian regimes; in fact, a U.S. congressman and presidential candidate recently suggested that a threat to bomb Muslim holy sites would serve as an effective deterrent against terrorism.

3 INDIANA JONES AND THE LAST CRUSADE (Paramount Pictures 1989) (Henry Jones, Sr., to Henry (Indiana) Jones, Jr., on entering Nazi Germany).
7 Id.
8 Candidate Suggests How to Deter Terrorists, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Aug. 3, 2007, at A4 (quoting U.S. Rep. Tom Tancredo: "If it is up to me, we are going to explain that an attack on this homeland of that nature would be followed by an attack on the holy sites in Mecca and Medina. Because that's the only thing I can think of that might deter somebody from doing what they otherwise might do."). But see Anne E. Kornblut, State Dept. Asks Hopefuls For a Little Diplomacy, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2007, at A4 (State Department spokesman characterized Tancredo's suggestion as "absolutely crazy.").
One of the long-standing dilemmas at the intersection of religious practices and politics concerns how governments should protect religious sites that are holy or sacred to faith adherents.\footnote{See generally \textit{RON E. HASSNER, WAR ON SACRED GROUNDS} (2009).} Clearly, religious considerations cannot be eliminated entirely from political or judicial decisions, if for no other reason than because policymakers view the world through the perspective of their own faith.\footnote{Of course, this perspective is not limited to politicians. Judges, lawyers, and others also use their faith to guide their practice. \textit{See, e.g.}, Howard W. Brill, \textit{The Christian Lawyer: Seven Distinguishing Marks}, 2001 ARK. L. NOTES 137.} The question remains: To what extent should religious considerations inform policy decisions?

A massive infrastructure project off the southeast coast of India has brought this tension between religion and policy to the forefront.\footnote{\textit{See infra} Part IV.B.} India and Sri Lanka are separated by the Palk Strait, a shallow water passage navigable only by small fishing boats.\footnote{\textit{See infra} Part IV.B.} In 2005, India began dredging the seafloor in order to create a lane for commercial shipping traffic.\footnote{\textit{See infra} Part IV.B.} Known as the Sethusamudram Shipping Canal Project, this waterway would destroy a rock formation that many Hindus believe is Ram Sethu—an ancient bridge built by the Hindu deity Rama to connect the island of Sri Lanka to the mainland.\footnote{\textit{See infra} Part IV.B.} As of this writing, the important national infrastructure project has been stayed by the Indian Supreme Court, and the project’s status remains uncertain, pending the resolution of a challenge in the nation’s high court.\footnote{\textit{See infra} Part IV.B.}

The remainder of this Comment will use holy site protections around the world to help interpret India’s Sethusamudram Shipping Canal Project. Part II of the Comment will discuss international law and treaties protecting religious freedom and religious sites. Part III will examine, in more detail, examples of judicial or statutory protections of holy sites in other nations. Part IV will discuss India’s controversial Sethusamudram Shipping Canal Project, tracing the project’s background and legal history. Part V will examine selected case studies to determine if they may...
offer guidance in reaching a mutually acceptable resolution for both India’s religious and policy leaders.

II. International Protection of Religious Sites

A. International Agreements

International agreements that protect religious freedom generally provide the first principles for protecting religious sites. For example, all signatories to the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights have recognized the right of religious freedom: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.” For purposes of this Comment, the final phrase—“freedom . . . to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship, and observance”—is the most important, since holy sites provide a location for one to manifest one’s religion. Therefore, the UN Declaration requires some basic level of protection for holy sites in order to allow an individual to manifest his religion freely.

A second important international agreement is the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). As with the UN Declaration, the ICCPR protects the ability of an individual to “manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.” A major difference, however, is that the ICCPR specifically places limits on the freedom to manifest one’s religion. The limitations must be 1) prescribed by law; and 2) necessary to protect public safety, order, health, morals, or the fundamental rights and freedom of

17 Id.
18 Of course, governments can limit this freedom and apply different levels of protections to different holy sites. See infra text accompanying notes 19 and 214 (illustrating the limits of religious freedom and categories of holy sites).
20 Id. art. 18.
The first limitation protects against arbitrary government restrictions on religious actions. The second limitation, however, provides countries more flexibility in protecting this right; religious practices may be restricted with a valid justification.

Because these treaties allow individuals to practice their religion freely, international norms suggest that holy sites should generally be protected. However, religious freedom and the use of religious sites may be limited legally if the limitation falls under one of the ICCPR exceptions.

**B. International Agreements on Religious Sites**

In addition to international treaties addressing the broader issue of religious freedom, two agreements that deal more explicitly with religious sites are worth mentioning: The 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and U.N. Resolution 55/254.

The 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (the 1954 Convention) provides various protections for cultural property, defined as "movable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people . . . whether religious or secular." Although earlier conventions provided some limited protection for religious sites, the 1954 Convention expanded and unified these previous protections, extending them to all armed conflicts. The 1954 Convention is now universally accepted as customary international law.

The U.S. Senate did not ratify the 1954 Convention for more than fifty years. When the Senate finally acted on September 25,
2008, it included several reservations to the treaty. The Senate emphasized that cultural property may not be used to shield military targets and that cultural property may be targeted "if required by military necessity." The Senate also noted that nuclear weapons are excluded from the Convention's rules.

More recently, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution specifically regarding religious sites. The 2001 document condemned violence against religious sites and encouraged states to protect their religious sites and to "promote . . . a culture of tolerance and respect for the diversity of religions and for religious sites."

Thus, the international community has gone on record to specifically support holy site protections which are independent from the right to freely practice one's religion. While the U.N. has been primarily concerned about destruction of sites during wartime, it has also strongly emphasized that these sites should be protected as part of a broader culture of respect.

C. International Courts

International courts, perhaps surprisingly, have rarely considered issues relating to religious sites. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has considered only one case of note. In a 1962 decision concerning a controversy over Preah Vihear, an ancient Hindu temple on the border between Thailand and Cambodia, the ICJ awarded sovereignty over the site to Cambodia. Although the case involved a holy site, the primary issue was a border dispute, and the decision made no reference to the religious nature of the site. More than forty years later, passions about the site still run high, no doubt in part because

and ethnic groups, including sacred sites of such groups." See 154 CONG. REC. H9911 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2008).

26 154 CONG. REC. S9555, supra note 25.
27 Id. § 1.
28 Id. § 3.
30 Id. ¶ 3.
31 Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear, Merits, (Cambodia v. Thail.), 1962 I.C.J. 6 (May 26).
32 See id.
Preah Vihear is considered sacred. In 2008, soldiers from the two nations faced off in an armed standoff, prompted in part by the designation of Preah Vihear as a U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage Site. As recently as April 2009, Thai and Cambodian soldiers clashed at the temple site, resulting in casualties on both sides.

In its most recent consideration of the topic, the European Court of Human Rights emphasized the importance of holy site access in a 2002 case between Cyprus and Turkey. Cyprus claimed that Turkey, which effectively controls the northern third of the Mediterranean island, had violated a number of articles in the European Convention on Human Rights, including the religious freedom protections of Article 9. The court agreed with Cyprus, holding that Turkey had violated Article 9 by restricting the movement of the Cypriots. Turkey's regulations "considerably curtailed [the Greek-Cypriots'] ability to observe their religious beliefs, in particular their access to places of worship outside their villages and their participation in other aspects of religious life."

Taken together, these two cases demonstrate that international disputes involving religious sites are infrequent. When issues do arise, the religious nature of a particular site tends to be peripheral. Additionally, the disputes that do arise tend to be heated—an expected result when religious beliefs and government action converge.

III. National Case Studies

In addition to the international framework protecting religious sites, many individual nation-states have legislation or case law that protects sites within their borders. Selected case studies, while not exhaustive, offer a helpful frame of reference for both

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36 Id. ¶ 111.
37 Id. ¶ 246.
38 Id. ¶ 245.
India's Sethusamudram Shipping Canal Project and similar issues in other countries.

A. Australia

In recent years, Australia has codified protections for the religious practices of its Aboriginal peoples. The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act of 1984 protects "places, areas, and objects" sacred to the Aborigines. While religious sites are not explicitly in the act, they are implicitly included; "Aboriginal tradition" is used to determine which sites may be protected, including "any such traditions, observances, customs or beliefs relating to particular persons, areas, objects or relationships." The Northern Territory Aboriginal Sacred Sites Act, passed in 1989, was the first law to specifically address Aboriginal religious sites. The legislation established the Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority to register sacred sites and provides penalties for anyone who enters, desecrates, or works on a registered site. The Act defines a sacred site as "a site that is sacred to Aboriginals or is otherwise of significance according to Aboriginal tradition."

The most significant recent holy site dispute in Australia concerned a proposed bridge to Hindmarsh Island, a resort outside Adelaide. Aboriginal women protested the project on religious grounds under the Heritage Protection Act, and as a result of their religious concerns, a twenty-five year delay on the project was ordered. A Royal Commission later found the women's claim to

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40 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act, 1984, at Long Title (Austl.).
41 Id. § 3.
42 Northern Territory Aboriginal Sacred Sites Act, 1984 (Austl.).
43 Id. § 5.
44 Id. § 33-39
45 Id. § 3 (citing Aboriginal Land Rights Act, 1976 (Northern Territory) § 3).
46 Collins, supra note 39, at 253.
47 Id. at 253-54. The women refused to reveal the nature of their concerns to men, which made it difficult for the government to determine the legitimacy of the claim.
be false.\textsuperscript{48} In the end, the Australian Parliament exempted the bridge project from the relevant statute and the bridge opened in 2002.\textsuperscript{49} However, even this final step was not without controversy. In \textit{Kartinyeri v. The Commonwealth},\textsuperscript{50} the Australian High Court upheld the project’s exemption from the Heritage Protection Act.\textsuperscript{51}

Australia, thus, is notable for its strong and systemic legislative protections of indigenous holy sites. Additionally, as illustrated in the Hindmarsh dispute, religious concerns about a site are taken very seriously, assuming that the concerns are legitimate.

\textbf{B. New Zealand}

The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act of 1990\textsuperscript{52} mirrors some of the protections of the ICCPR.\textsuperscript{53} Article 13 protects the right to freedom of religion,\textsuperscript{54} while Article 15 gives New Zealanders the right to manifest their religious belief “in worship, observance, practice, or teaching, either individually or in community with others, and either in public or in private.”\textsuperscript{55} Article 20 specifically provides that a member of a religious minority “shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of that minority . . . to profess and practise the religion . . . of that minority.”\textsuperscript{56} The “in community” limitation ensures that an individual cannot create a religion and later claim that his particular religion, of which he is the only follower, is being infringed.

At least eight additional statutes recognize the right of the Maori, New Zealand’s indigenous people, to protect their sacred sites, or “wahi tapu.”\textsuperscript{57} Wahi tapu is broadly defined in New

\textsuperscript{48} Id. at 254.
\textsuperscript{49} Id. at 255.
\textsuperscript{50} 195 C.L.R. 337 (1998).
\textsuperscript{51} Id. at 27.
\textsuperscript{53} ICCPR, supra note 19.
\textsuperscript{54} New Zealand Bill of Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 109, art. 13.
\textsuperscript{55} Id. art. 15.
\textsuperscript{56} Id. art. 20.
\textsuperscript{57} Collins, supra note 39, at 247.
Zealand’s Historic Places Act 1993 as “a place sacred to Maori in the traditional, spiritual, religious, ritual, or mythological sense.”58 While religious sites have some protection, the net result of these statutes is to “diminish the relative importance of religious freedom by equating it to other cultural and environmental concerns.”59

_Watercare Services Ltd. v Minhinnick_,60 likely the most important decision on Maori sacred sites,61 illustrates how courts balance these concerns. In this case, a local governmental authority planned construction of a major sewage pipeline across sacred Maori land.62 The Wellington Court of Appeal described the amount of weight that courts should give to religious belief:

The Court must weigh all the relevant competing considerations and ultimately make a value judgment on behalf of the community as a whole. Such Maori dimension as arises will be important but not decisive even if the subject-matter is seen as involving Maori issues. Those issues will usually, as here, intersect with other issues such as health and safety . . . . Cultural well-being . . . . is accompanied by social and economic well-being. While the Maori dimension . . . . calls for close and careful consideration, other matters may in the end be found to be more cogent when the Court, as the representative of New Zealand society as a whole, decides whether the subject-matter is offensive or objectionable . . . . In the end a balanced judgment has to be made.63

The court allowed the “community at large” rather than “a reasonable Maori person representative of the Maori community at large” to determine whether the governmental intrusion interfered with religious beliefs, thus considering religious beliefs in the context of broader societal values.64 Emphasizing the need for balanced approach, the court held that “[t]he views of individual

58 Id. (quotations omitted).
59 Id. at 248.
61 Collins, supra note 39, at 250.
62 Minhinnick, 1 N.Z.L.R. at 294.
63 Id. at 305.
64 Id.
members of society must always be sympathetically considered but the [relevant legislation] does not require those views to prevail irrespective of the weight of other relevant considerations.\textsuperscript{65}

New Zealand’s legal system thus recognizes that religious beliefs are rarely the only consideration in a holy site dispute. The needs of a modern and diverse society require courts and policymakers to consider more than just the viewpoint of the believer.

C. Israel

Despite its small size, Israel has a disproportionate number of sacred sites, many of which have experienced conflict.\textsuperscript{66} The multitudes of Christian sites alone have seen numerous disputes since the Crusades.\textsuperscript{67} In the modern state of Israel, only days after the 1967 Arab-Israeli Six Day War, the Israeli Knesset passed explicit protections for sacred sites in the Protection of Holy Places Law.\textsuperscript{68} The law treats all religions equally. Specifically, it provides that \textquoteleft\textquoteleft[t]he Holy Places shall be protected from desecration and any other violation and from anything likely to violate the freedom of access of the members of the different religions to the places sacred to them or their feelings with regard to those places.\textquoteright\textquoteright\textsuperscript{69} It also provides strong enforcement measures; a violator of the law can be imprisoned for up to seven years.\textsuperscript{70}

Although the mention of Israeli holy sites often invoke thoughts of the Dome of the Rock, the Temple Mount or the traditional burial place of Jesus, smaller, lesser-known sites garner just as much controversy. For example, Ethiopian Christian monks and Coptic Christian monks have disputed ownership of the Deir el-Sultan monastery atop the Church of the Holy Sepulcher for centuries.\textsuperscript{71} Although Ethiopian Christian monks

\textsuperscript{65} Id.
\textsuperscript{67} Id.
\textsuperscript{68} Protection of Holy Places Law, 5727-1967, 21 LSI 76 (1967) (Isr.).
\textsuperscript{69} Id. § 1.
\textsuperscript{70} Id. § 2.
\textsuperscript{71} Lerner, \textit{supra} note 66, at 259. The Church of the Holy Sepulcher is the traditional crucifixion site of Christ and a particularly sacred site to Christians. \textit{See id.} at
control the site, Coptic Christian monks believe they own it, and physical violence between the two groups occasionally erupts.\textsuperscript{72} The dispute was taken to the Israeli judiciary, but a court deferred a resolution to the political branches of government.\textsuperscript{73} Unfortunately, more than thirty years later, the government has still not acted.\textsuperscript{74} Although the current Israeli government plans to take an active role in mediation,\textsuperscript{75} there is a high likelihood that a resolution is far in the future.\textsuperscript{76}

Despite this long history of religious site disputes, an interfaith commission known as the Holy Sites Project has suggested that Jerusalem's holy sites can still be protected.\textsuperscript{77} The project argues that "a legal regime founded upon the fundamental human right of religious freedom . . . implemented through a legal regime to regulate . . . the obligations imposed by the regime, need not conflict with sovereignty and sovereign interests such as security and social and economic administration."\textsuperscript{78} While the goal sounds promising, the difficulty lies in avoiding such a conflict.\textsuperscript{79} The commission suggests several principles. The concerned parties should 1) respect the holy sites and use them only for religious and peaceful purposes; 2) share the power of control over the sites; 3) provide open access; and 4) prohibit seizing another religious

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[73] Friedman, \textit{supra} note 72.
\item[74] \textit{Id.}
\item[75] \textit{Id.}
\item[76] \textit{See id.} (providing examples of feuds at this site, including the lack of agreement on where to build a fire exit, controversies over who sweeps the steps, and a ladder that has stood for over 100 years because no sect will let another take it down). \textit{See also} Matti Friedman, \textit{Monks Brawl at Christian Holy Site in Jerusalem}, ASSOC. PRESS, Nov. 10, 2008, ¶ 12, \textit{available at} http://www.usatoday.com/news/religion/2008-11-09-monks-brawl_N.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2010).
\item[77] DAVID E. GUINN, \textit{PROTECTING JERUSALEM'S HOLY SITES: A STRATEGY FOR NEGOTIATING A SACRED PEACE} 192 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2006). The report is based on a study by the Holy Sites Project, initiated by the International Human Rights Institute of DePaul University College of Law. \textit{See id.} at 2.
\item[78] \textit{Id.} at 193.
\item[79] It may be appropriate to recall the aphorism, "The devil is in the details."
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
community’s sites.\textsuperscript{80} The custodial faith community should 1) administer the site “in accordance with their own religious beliefs and practices;” 2) “take all necessary and reasonable steps to protect and preserve” the sites; and 3) provide access to the sites for others.\textsuperscript{81}

This systematic proposal is only one of many ideas that have been suggested to protect Israel’s holy sites. Another plan would simply codify the current status of the sites; Israeli Justice Itzhak Englard noted that “great importance is attached to maintaining the status quo.”\textsuperscript{82} Still others argue that the international community should become more involved. A former director-general of UNESCO, Federico Mayor, discussed a U.N. framework for protecting Israel’s holy sites, suggesting that they belong to the common heritage of mankind.\textsuperscript{83} At least one prominent fictional television show has even suggested that U.S. troops be used to maintain stability over the Holy Land, including religious sites.\textsuperscript{84}

One need not look any further than Israel to see how holy sites can cause a variety of conflicts, even within the same faith community. Especially in a land of shared and diverse faiths, resolution of these conflicts is difficult—a systematic, comprehensive, and balanced approach is needed.

\textbf{D. United States}

American religious protections began in 1789 with the First Amendment, which states only that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”\textsuperscript{85} Baseline protections for holy sites have come more recently and have tended to deal with traditional Native American religions, similar to the legal protections for indigenous religions in Australia and New Zealand.

In 1978, Congress passed the American Indian Religious

\textsuperscript{80} GUINN, \textit{supra} note 77, at 193.
\textsuperscript{81} \textit{Id.} at 193-94.
\textsuperscript{82} Collins, \textit{supra} note 39, at 257 (citation omitted).
\textsuperscript{83} \textit{Id.} at 259 (citation omitted).
\textsuperscript{84} \textit{The West Wing: The Birnam Wood} (NBC television broadcast Oct. 27, 2004).
\textsuperscript{85} U.S. CONST. amend. I. The judicial history of the clause’s interpretation is unnecessary for this article.
Freedom Act, which reiterated U.S. policy to protect native religious practices "including but not limited to access to sites." Although the statute included no penalties, it was clearly designed to right a wrong; in fact, President Carter's signing statement noted that the government had "on occasion, denied Native Americans access to particular sites." Another important statute governing holy sites is the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which provides Congress's interpretation of the free exercise clause. The law allows the government to "substantially burden" religious exercise only if there was a "compelling government interest." Congress passed RFRA in response to Supreme Court cases such as Employment Division v. Smith, which "virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify the burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion." Previous Supreme Court cases had required a compelling governmental interest before burdening religious practice, and Congress acted specifically to restore this compelling interest test. However, Native Americans face a unique free exercise test. They must show that the religious practice is 1) central to their religion; 2) indispensable to their religion; and 3) cannot be done elsewhere.

After RFRA was passed, President Bill Clinton took additional executive action to protect American Indian sacred sites. Executive Order No. 13007 directed federal agencies to both accommodate the access and use of Indian sacred sites on federal lands and to avoid an adverse effect on the sites, keeping their

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89 Id. § 2000bb-1b.
location confidential if appropriate.\textsuperscript{95} For purposes of the executive order, a sacred site must be "specific, discrete, [and] narrowly delineated" and must be disclosed to the agency.\textsuperscript{96}

Legislative proposals on sacred sites have been rare. Most recently, U.S. Representative Nick Rahall introduced legislation in the 108th Congress "[t]o protect sacred Native American federal land from significant damage."\textsuperscript{97} Rahall identified four major purposes of the Native American Sacred Lands Act: 1) To enact Executive Order No. 13007 into law; 2) to allow Indian tribes to ask the government to exempt sacred land from development; 3) to maintain confidentiality of sites; and 4) to permit lands to be transferred from the government to the Indian tribes.\textsuperscript{98} Despite these worthy goals, Congress rejected a scaled down version, which only prohibited funding for activities that would "adversely affect the physical integrity of sacred sites," likely because of concerns about the broad language in Rahall's proposal.\textsuperscript{99}

The one example illustrates the recurring tension between the federal government and Native Americans over holy sites. Oklahoma's Fort Sill Army Base, founded in 1869, is home to the Army's Field Artillery School.\textsuperscript{100} Fort Sill has a rich history. It is the only active Army installation on the South Plains remaining from the time of the Indian Wars, and its famous residents ranged from "Buffalo Bill" Cody to Geronimo.\textsuperscript{101} Although over a century has passed since the Fort's founding, conflict between the government and local tribes continues.

As part of Fort Sill's expansion, the government planned to build an additional 43,000 square foot building\textsuperscript{102} known as the Training Support Center.\textsuperscript{103} The new building is located near

\textsuperscript{95} Exec. Order No. 13007, 3 C.F.R. 196 (1996).
\textsuperscript{96} Id. §1(b)(iii).
\textsuperscript{100} Fort Sill Military Facility, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/fort-sill.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2010).
\textsuperscript{101} Id.
\textsuperscript{102} For purposes of comparison, the building would be about the size of an acre, or about two-thirds the size of a football field.
\textsuperscript{103} Comanche Nation v. United States, No. 08-849, at *3 (W.D. Okla., Sept. 23,
Medicine Bluffs, a religiously significant site to Native Americans that is listed on the National Register for Historic Places.\textsuperscript{104} The Comanche Nation sued under RFRA, alleging that construction of the Training Support Center interfered with their religious exercises.\textsuperscript{105} The court agreed and in September 2008, granted a preliminary injunction halting construction.\textsuperscript{106} In his decision, District Court Judge Timothy DeGuisti found that construction would substantially burden the Comanche’s religious practices by interrupting the “unobstructed view of all four Bluffs [which] is central to the spiritual experience of the Comanche people.”\textsuperscript{107} Rather than fight the injunction, the military is proceeding with construction of the facility at an alternate location.\textsuperscript{108}

The Fort Sill case illustrates that, despite limited statutory protections for Native American holy sites, the American judiciary is willing to enforce those protections when an important site is threatened. These types of decisions also uphold international norms, because RFRA’s compelling interest test is consistent with language in the ICCPR allowing a government to only restrict religious practices with a valid justification.\textsuperscript{109}

IV. India’s Sethusamudram Shipping Canal Project

\textit{The State of Religion in India.}

Before turning to the Sethusamudram project, a brief examination of India’s religious demographics provides a helpful perspective. India has approximately 1.1 billion people and is religiously diverse; the nation is approximately eighty-one percent Hindu,

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{104} \textit{Id.}
\bibitem{105} \textit{Id.} An additional claim was made under the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966.
\bibitem{106} \textit{Id.} at *49.
\bibitem{107} \textit{Id.} at *51; see also Ron Jackson, \textit{Tribes: Judge's Ruling Shows Fort Sill Museum Director was Left Out of Decision-making Process; Warnings on Sacred Site Squelched, Memo Claims}, \textit{OKLAHOMAN} (Oklahoma City), Sept. 25, 2008, at A10.
\bibitem{109} \textit{See supra} notes 85-94 and accompanying text.
\end{thebibliography}
thirteen percent Muslim, and two percent Christian. There is, however, no state religion. The nation is fast becoming a world power with industrialization and modernization providing both challenges and opportunities.

General religious protections are included in Article 25(1) of the Indian Constitution, which protects "the right freely to profess, practise, and propagate religion." This right is not absolute, however. As in the ICCPR, religious freedom is "subject to public order, morality and health." Despite these statutory protections at the national level, state and local governments continue to restrict religious freedom. The U.S. Department of State has also noted that the Indian government has been criticized for "alleged indifference and inaction toward [religious] abuses [committed by] state and local authorities and private citizens."

One specific law protecting religious sites is India’s Places of Worship Act of 1991. The Act prohibits a place of worship (such as a mosque or temple) from being converted into a place of worship for another religion. However, it does not apply to ancient monuments or archeological sites.

Several sections in the Indian Penal Code provide criminal penalties for offenses against religion. Section 295 is the most relevant and prohibits the intentional destruction of religious sites:

Whoever destroys, damages or defiles any place of worship, or any object held sacred by any class of persons with the intention of thereby insulting the religion of any

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111 Id.


113 INDIA CONST. art. 25, § 1.

114 ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 18, § 3.

115 Id.

116 IRFR, supra note 110.

117 Id.


119 Id.

120 Id.
class of persons or with the knowledge that any class of persons is likely to consider such destruction, damage or defilement as a insult to their religion, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.  

Additional laws prohibit intentional acts, words, or gestures intended to "outrage religious feelings," disruptions of religious gatherings, and trespassing on sites of worship or burial.  

Unfortunately, these protections do not immunize holy sites from religious violence. The high-profile Ayodha dispute of the 1990s illustrates a common type of controversy over Indian religious sites. The dispute can be traced to 1528, when the Babri mosque was built in the town of Ayodhya. Many Hindus believe that the mosque was built on the same site as the birthplace of the deity Rama, and as a result, religious violence has been recorded at the site since 1853. In 1984, several political parties began a campaign to build a temple in honor of Rama on the site, and in 1992, Hindus destroyed the mosque. In response to this destruction, religious violence erupted across the nation and killing thousands of people. While this example may be extreme, Hindu-Muslim violence over religious sites is unfortunately still commonplace today.  

B. The Sethusamudram Shipping Canal Project  

Though perhaps less common in India than inter-religious conflicts over a single site, protests over religious sites threatened by development are no less controversial. Although virtually unknown in the United States, a contentious disagreement of this type is currently taking place off the southeast coast of India.

121 INDIA PEN. CODE § 295.  
122 Id.  
124 Id.  
125 Id.  
126 Id.  
127 See IRFR, supra note 110.  
For almost 150 years, proposals have been floated to create a canal through the Palk Strait separating India and Sri Lanka. Currently, commercial ships traveling around India must navigate around the island of Sri Lanka because the strait is so shallow. Unlike the canals through the isthmuses of Panama and the Suez, the forty billion rupee (US $830 million) Sethusamudram


130 Ripunjoy Kumar Sarma, What is this Sethusamudram Project?, THE ECON. TIMES OF INDIA, July 5, 2005, 3; see also SUBRAMANIAN SWAMY, RAMA SETU: SYMBOL OF NATIONAL UNITY 24-31 (Har-Anand Publications 2008) (providing a historical outline of proposed canals at this location since 1860).

131 Sarma, supra note 130, 6.

Shipping Canal Project (SSCP)—"the Suez of the East"—would dredge a 103 mile ship channel through the existing waterway to allow nautical traffic to pass. When completed, the project is estimated to save ships as much as 424 nautical miles and 36 hours of sailing time. Proponents point to the enormous trade, economic development, and national security benefits of the completed project. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh touted these benefits to the nation when he officially launched the SSCP on July 2, 2005, saying that "the lives of the people will be transformed with the implementation of this project."

But almost since its inception, the Sethusamudram project has seen significant opposition, primarily at first on environmental grounds due to the destruction of habitat resulting from the project’s extensive dredging. As the project progressed, however, religious opposition began to emerge. For example, the Chief Minister of the state of Madhya Pradesh (similar to a U.S. governor) called on India’s president to choose an alternative route, saying the project "is likely to damage the Ram Setu and hurt the deep rooted religious feelings involving issues of faith." Religious leaders soon petitioned a court for an injunction to stop construction. Traffic blockades were held in Mumbai, Delhi,

133 Sanna, supra note 132, ¶ 7; see also Shaikh Azizur Rahman, Hindus Rip Plan to Breach Mythical Bridge; Indian Shipping Channel Would Cut Travel Costs, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2007, at A6; Padma Rao, By Building a New Shipping Line, India Realizes an Old Dream, SPEIGEL MAG., Oct. 10, 2005.
134 Rahman, supra note 133, at A6.
135 Id.
136 PM Opens Sethu Project, STATESMAN (Kolkata, India), July 3, 2005; see also The Sethu Canal, www.sethucanal.com (arguing that the canal will symbolize “India’s dominance in the international trading route” while minimizing religious and environmental disruptions) (last visited Jan. 27, 2010).
137 See Sarma, supra note 130; see also SWAMY, supra note 128, at 69-127 (outlining the environmental, economic, and national security opposition to the canal); Tony George Puthucherril, Ballast Waters and Aquatic Invasive Species: A Model for India, 19 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 381, 415-16 (2008) (discussing how the SSCP may spur India to adopt additional environmental protections).
and other major cities, and over 50,000 opponents of the project protested in the capital of New Delhi. Perhaps most disturbingly, a fundamentalist political leader offered a reward in gold to anyone who beheaded the party leader in charge of the state of Tamil Nadu, who is a strong supporter of the project.

Why would this construction project arouse such strong feelings? The religious opposition is based on the ancient Hindu text of the Ramayana, which describes a bridge across the ocean built by Rama's army of monkeys. The relevant passage is worth quoting at some length:

[T]he mighty Nala, foremost among the monkeys . . . constructed a great bridge, ten leagues in width and one hundred in length, right through the middle of the ocean, lord of rivers and streams.

The bridge that Nala constructed over the ocean, abode of sea monsters, was as majestic and splendid as the path of the constellation Svati through the heavens.

The leaping monkeys were bounding, bellowing, and leaping. All beings gazed upon that inconceivable, seemingly impossible, and hair-raising marvel: the building of a bridge across the ocean.

And so, constructing that bridge over the sea, those hundreds of billions of immensely powerful monkeys reached the farther shore of the ocean, the great receptacle of the waters.

Broad, well-built, majestic, smooth-surfaced, and beautifully proportioned, the great bridge resembled a

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Fundamentalist Hindu groups believe that this bridge, known as the Ram Sethu, was built from the southeast coast of India across the Palk Strait to the island of Sri Lanka. According to these believers, the remains of this twenty-seven mile long and one mile wide bridge still exist in a chain of shoals stretching across the shallow strait. Geologists, however, have determined that the structure is simply "a naturally occurring chain of calcareous limestone shoals created by sedimentation." The opinions of scientists notwithstanding, the dredging of the Sethusamudram canal would thus destroy this bridge; a result unacceptable to these believers.

Prompted by their religious concerns, a number of Hindu groups have organized campaigns to save Ram Sethu and prevent the channel's construction. The Viswa Hindu Parishad (World Hindu Organization) began a protest in 2005, and a major opposition political party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), has also joined the campaign. Some secular organizations are also calling for the site to be declared a UNESCO World Heritage Site due to its religious and environmental significance.

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144 The structure is also known as Adam’s Bridge. See Rahman, supra note 133. For the sake of consistency, Ram Sethu will be used in this Comment.

145 Id.

146 As with any religion, this belief is by no means uniform.

147 SWAMY, supra note 130, at 58-68.

148 Id. The structure is approximately thirty miles long, and the water is no more than four feet deep. See 1 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 88 (15th ed. 2005).

149 Atal Bihari Vajpayee, who served three terms as India’s Prime Minister between 1996 and 2004, is a member of the BJP. See BJP website, www.bjp.org (last visited Jan. 27, 2010).

150 Bidwai, supra note 142; see also BHARATIYA JANATA PARTY MANIFESTO, LOK SABHA ELECTION 48 (2009), available at http://www.bjp.org/images/pdf/election_manifesto_english.pdf (listing realignment of the canal as one of the party’s key platform points in the 2009 national elections).

1. Indian Courts and the SSCP

Legal proceedings challenging the public hearing process in the Madras High Court were filed against the SSCP well before the project was inaugurated. In 2004, the court upheld the hearing process and ordered the SSCP to be “completed as expeditiously as possible.” While religious concerns were not at issue in the case, the court made it clear that environmental concerns should take a back seat to progress and industrialization:

[W]e should not obstruct the scientific and technical progress of the country in the name of environment protection. No doubt, the environment has to be protected, but at the same time [w]e must never overlook the basic aim of our country which is to make India a powerful and modern industrial state. . . . [I]f we wish to get respect in

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154 Fernandes, Madras H.C., W.P. No. 33528 (2004), at no. 16.
the world community we must make our country highly industrialized and prosperous . . . .

[Relevant constitutional] provisions have to be read long with the basic objective of the country . . . and protection of [the] environment must be regarded as only incidental to this main aim, and not itself the main aim. 155

As a result, the Madras High Court allowed the SSCP to go forward in order to further India’s modernization, thus equating industrialization with both environmental awareness and more importantly, world respect. 156 This decision indicates that other Indian courts may prioritize progress over other concerns such as environmental or religious objections.

Despite the court’s approval of the project, additional challenges were soon filed in the Madras court. 157 In July 2007, the Indian Supreme Court transferred and consolidated the challenges to determine 1) If an additional alternative route could bypass the Ram Sethu; and 2) whether an archeological survey could be done to determine whether the structure qualified as a national monument. 158 The statute in question gives the government the power to declare and protect sites as “ancient monuments” of “national importance.” 159 Opponents of the SSCP argue 160 that the structure should qualify under the specific delineation for religious sites: “A protected monument maintained by the Central Government under this Act which is a place of worship or shrine shall not be used for any purpose inconsistent with its character.” 161 Presumably, destruction of Ram Sethu—if it

155 Id. at no. 17-18.
156 Id.
157 See Rama Gopalan v. Union of India & Ors., W.P. No. 18076 (2007); Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India & Ors., W.P. No. 18223 (2007); Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India & Ors., W.P. No. 18224 (2007). The case statuses of these writ petitions are available at http://courtnic.nic.in/chennai/content.asp.
160 SWAMY, supra note 130, at 33 (“If only because of the sheer faith of the masses of India in Sri Rama, the Rama Setu must be declared an ‘Ancient Monument’ . . . and it must be protected and nurtured as a revered national heritage.”)
161 Ancient Monuments Act § 16(1).
is indeed a place of worship—would thus be “inconsistent with its character.”

In order to resolve these questions, the court stayed the canal’s construction in an interim order in August 2007, making the order permanent two weeks later.\(^1\) Despite the pause in construction, tensions in India remained high. Hindu opponents of the SSCP became even more resolute in September 2007 after the Archaeological Survey of India filed an affidavit questioning the historical validity of the deity Rama.\(^2\) Days later, widespread outrage at this religious affront caused the government to withdraw the affidavit.\(^3\) In July 2008, with the controversy not yet resolved, the Supreme Court appointed an expert committee to consider alternative alignments to the canal.\(^4\) As 2009 ended, the panel had not yet made its report, and the government told the Supreme Court that the report could be delayed until mid-2011.\(^5\) Opponents alleged that the government was delaying in order to suppress a damaging environmental report that would cause the entire project to be abandoned.\(^6\)

While the experts deliberate, both supporters and opponents of the SSCP continue to argue before the Supreme Court. The government claims that the stay on construction should be overturned based on *Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India*.\(^7\)
In that case, which involved challenges to construction of a major hydroelectric dam, the Supreme Court deferred to the political branches of government:

In the case of projects of national importance where Union of India and/or more than one State(s) are involved and the project would benefit a large section of the society and there is evidence to show that the said project had been contemplated and considered over a period of time at the highest level of the States and the Union of India and more so when the project is evaluated and approval granted by the Planning Commission, then there should be no occasion for any Court carrying out any review of the same or directing its review by any outside or “independent” agency or body. In a democratic set up, it is for the elected Government to decide what project should be taken that unless and until it can be proved or shown that there is a blatant illegality in the undertaking of the project or in its execution, the Court ought not to interfere with the execution of the project.\(^{169}\)

In February 2008, the government also filed a new affidavit to replace its withdrawn submission.\(^{170}\) In it, the government took a more conciliatory view toward religious belief, recognizing the importance of faith in Indian society, but arguing that policy decisions cannot be based on faith alone.\(^{171}\) Only months later, however, the government, using a different religious text, argued before the Supreme Court that the god Rama had himself destroyed the Ram Sethu.\(^{172}\) This was contrary to its earlier affidavit that faith should not be used to make policy decisions.\(^{173}\)

Representative of canal opponents and Hindu activist Rama

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\(^{169}\) Id. ¶ 18 of Conclusion.


\(^{171}\) Id. ¶ 2.


Gopalan filed an affidavit of his own, arguing that the Ram Sethu should be declared a national monument and protected. He noted that the structure is sacred to every true Hindu because it was built by Rama at an actual historical time and place. Gopalan argued that whether or not the court believes Ram Sethu to be a holy place, it should extend protection simply because many Hindus do believe that it is holy.

Opponents base this argument on *Chettiar v. Naicker*, a 1958 Indian Supreme Court opinion. In its decision, the court seems to ascribe broad protection to sacred objects, regardless of how many adherents believe it to be holy:

Any object however trivial or destitute of real value in itself if regarded as sacred by any class of persons would come within the meaning of the penal section. Courts have got to be very circumspect in such matters, and to pay due regard to the feelings and religious emotions of different classes of persons with different beliefs, irrespective of the consideration whether or not they share those beliefs, or whether they are rational or otherwise, in the opinion of the court.

As a result, canal opponents believe “there is no room left not to respect the sentiments of the vast majority of Indians who regard the Rama Setu as an inalienable heritage.” At least in principle, these opponents believe that the same approach should be taken even if the SSCP were to destroy a Muslim or Christian

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176 *Id.* ¶ 78.

177 *Id.* ¶ 85.

178 *Id.* ¶ 88.


180 INDIA PEN. CODE § 295.


182 SWAMY, *supra* note 130, at 34.
holy site.\textsuperscript{183}

These dueling affidavits, charges, and countercharges vividly demonstrate the intersection of religion and law in India.\textsuperscript{184} Courts have significant discretion on the matter:

\begin{quote}
[T]he courts can determine what is an integral part of religion and what is not . . . . Therefore the courts can discard as non-essentials anything which is not proved to their satisfaction -- and they are not religious leaders or in any relevant fashion qualified in such matters -- to be essential, with the result that it would have no constitutional protection.\textsuperscript{185}
\end{quote}

The Supreme Court could well determine that Ram Sethu is so sacred to Hindus, and thus the nation, that it should be protected as a national monument.\textsuperscript{186} Regardless of its decision, the court has the difficult task of sorting through these various claims to determine what Hindus believe about the site. Only after this determination can the court reach a decision about whether the need for a canal outweighs those concerns.

\section*{2. International Courts and the SSCP}

Despite the tangled story of lawsuits in the Indian courts and the project's impact on India and Sri Lanka, the international legal system is not currently involved in the Sethusamudram dispute. However, its involvement could emerge as a possibility in the future; Sri Lanka previously threatened legal action against India as "a measure of last resort" if environmental concerns were not resolved.\textsuperscript{187} At the time, Sri Lankan international legal experts believed that a complaint could be based on the military,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{183} E-Mail Interview with Subramanian Swamy, Former Union Law Minister, Government of India (July 17, 2009) (on file with author) [hereinafter Swamy Interview]. Swamy currently serves as National President of the Janata Party. See Janata Party Website, http://www.janataparty.org/president.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2010).
\item \textsuperscript{184} J. DUNCAN M. DERRETT, RELIGION, LAW AND THE STATE IN INDIA 437 (2d ed. 1999).
\item \textsuperscript{185} Id. at 447.
\item \textsuperscript{186} From a Western perspective, this would be similar to a court—rather than Pope Benedict XVI—determining a tenet of the Catholic faith.
\end{itemize}
ecological, and archaeological implications and the international law of the sea.\textsuperscript{188} Notably, religious concerns were not cited as a rationale.\textsuperscript{189} By late 2007, however, that threat had apparently dissipated.\textsuperscript{190} As a result, only the Indian court system is currently examining the legitimacy of the Sethusamudram project.

V. Lessons from Case Studies

The high stakes and tangled legal questions of the SSCP case have clearly made this case a difficult one for the Supreme Court, even after nearly three years. Can the experiences or legal systems of other countries help reach a resolution?\textsuperscript{191}

First, it must be noted that India poses two unique challenges distinguishing it from Australia, New Zealand, Israel, and the United States. One major difference is the amount of latitude that Indian courts have in determining, as a matter of law, the essentials of religious belief.\textsuperscript{192} Although American courts, for example, do examine religious beliefs more closely,\textsuperscript{193} the basic test under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is simply whether the religious practice has been substantially burdened.\textsuperscript{194} The centrality of the practice to the religion is not the key question. Indian courts, in contrast, must be intricately involved in issues of faith when considering holy site disputes.

The second difference is rooted in the history and demographics of the country of India. Despite the religious

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{188} Ravi Ladduwahetty, \textit{Controversy-ridden Sethusamudram Canal Dredging Project: Time Ripe for Lanka to Sue India?}, \textsc{Nation} (Colombo, Sri Lanka), Jan. 7, 2007, ¶2.
\footnote{189} \textit{Id.}
\footnote{190} Bidwai, \textit{supra} note 142 (explaining that the Indian Government appears to have won over Sri Lankan government experts by arguing that the project will increase the movement of naval ships and help intercept militants).
\footnote{191} This assumes, of course, that one nation's law should have an influence on another nation's legal system, which is far from a settled question. \textit{See}, \textit{e.g.}, Adam Liptak, \textit{U.S. Court, a Longtime Beacon, is Now Guiding Fewer Nations}, \textsc{N.Y. Times}, Sept. 18, 2008, at A1 (noting divergent opinions and trends in the U.S. on the role and importance of foreign law).
\footnote{192} \textit{Derrett, supra} note 184, at 437.
\footnote{193} \textit{See}, \textit{e.g.}, \textit{Sherbert}, 374 U.S. 398 (stating that where an otherwise neutral law imposes a "significant burden" on an individual's exercise of religion, the government must show a compelling interest to not grant an exemption to that individual).
\footnote{194} McDonald, \textit{supra} note 94, at 762.
\end{footnotes}
diversity of India, the overwhelming majority of the country remains Hindu (as well as ethnic Indian).\(^{195}\) This marks a sharp contrast with the United States, New Zealand, and Australia,\(^{196}\) which were all settled by Europeans and now have a primarily non-native population. In the American context, for example, history plays an important role in the conflicts over indigenous religious sites: “[B]ecause the United States gained its property through the denial of native land rights, American values have been formed against traditional Native American religions and, therefore, Americans have been less than accommodating in providing the native population access to lands it considers sacred.”\(^{197}\) This argument cannot be made in the Asian-Indian context. Despite the country’s growing secularization, Indian values cannot be said to be squarely set against Hindu religious values or principles, and Hindu law still plays a large role in modern Indian law.\(^{198}\) Courts may well afford different weights when considering a protest by a nation’s religious majority—as in India—as opposed to a protest by a Native American minority.

A. Options for Resolving the SSCP Controversy

With those differences in mind, how can the Indian Supreme Court resolve the Sethusamudram controversy while balancing religious beliefs and national economic development?\(^{199}\)

One alternative for resolution of the controversy would be to use international legal norms on religious freedom and exercise, which are reflected in the Indian Constitution.\(^{200}\) However, these guarantees do not necessarily provide broad protection for sacred


\(^{196}\) To a lesser extent, the modern state of Israel was also settled by Europeans.

\(^{197}\) McDonald, supra note 94, at 759-60.

\(^{198}\) See DERRETT, supra note 184, at 437.

\(^{199}\) Despite the high-profile nature of the project, a resolution may not necessarily be imminent. See India Court 466 Years Behind Schedule, ASSOC. PRESS, Feb. 12, 2009, ¶ 1, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29164027 (noting that the Delhi High Court may need 466 years to clear its docket of pending cases). It should also be noted that opponents believe the SSCP is already “de facto dead” based on a “secret report” which “rubbished” the government’s original analysis of the project. See Swamy Interview, supra note 183.

\(^{200}\) See INDIA CONST. art. 25, § 1.
sites and are often interpreted very narrowly. One scholar argues that the right to "practice" one's religion should "not be used as a vehicle for expanding the scope of the freedom into the public sphere and permit followers of a religion or belief to act in a fashion which is in accordance with their beliefs but cannot be linked to a form of worship, observance or teaching." Thus, even if Ram Sethu is a historical site constructed by Rama's monkey army in accordance with Hindu beliefs, it can only be protected if it is connected to a form of worship. In fact, opponents of the SSCP are arguing this very point, that Ram Sethu is not just a historical bridge, but an object that is worshiped. However, since the court has not resolved this threshold issue of whether Ram Sethu is connected to worship, international norms cannot yet provide specific guidance in this situation.

A second option would be for India (or Sri Lanka) to ask an international court to decide the issue. However, this also does not appear to be a viable solution. Even if Sri Lanka reversed course and challenged India's right to construct the SSCP, religious objections would likely not be raised. The question at issue would more likely concern questions of boundaries and the impact on the ecosystem. Additionally, a decision in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) would likely take years and may not permanently solve the dispute. Even if there is no precise controversy at issue, India or Sri Lanka could ask the ICJ for an advisory opinion concerning the canal's completion, which the court is empowered to give on "any legal question." However, this too would likely delay the project for years while the ICJ deliberates. As a result, even an ICJ advisory opinion is not a likely solution, particularly when the Indian government is anticipating enormous national benefits from the timely completion of the canal.

202 Id. at 46.
203 Aff. of Rama Gopalan, supra note 175, ¶ 76-101.
204 The underlying religious passions about a particular holy site are likely to remain after judicial resolution of a dispute. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text (discussing the armed skirmishes at the Preah Vihear holy site decades after an ICJ decision).
205 Statute of the International Court of Justice, ch. IV, art. 65, § 1.
A third option would be for the Court to simply wash its hands of religious questions by deferring to the political branches of government. This option would enable Parliament, a branch that is theoretically more responsive to the people, to decide the difficult issues. The Indian Supreme Court has already shown its interest in allowing the political branches of government to decide questions of national infrastructure. Particularly, in light of the national security implications of the canal, case law from other countries could support such deference.

The fourth option would be for the Indian Supreme Court to directly resolve the SSCP religious dispute. Opponents of the project would likely support this option, on the belief that the current route was chosen "arbitrarily, unreasonably and for malafide motives" and that the judiciary or mediators are best equipped to resolve holy site disputes. If the court decides to determine the canal's future, the observations of the New Zealand court in Minhinnick may be helpful. The Minhinnick court determined that: 1) The balance between holy site protection and development should be determined by a reasonable member of the community at large, not a reasonable member of the religious group; and 2) the court's decision could incorporate religious beliefs, but should not be based solely on them.

As to the first question, defining the "reasonable person" poses a difficulty. The court may have to determine whether members of the fundamentalist Viswa Hindu Parishad (VWP) adequately represent the larger Hindu community, many of whom are not protesting the project. Based on the VWP's alleged involvement


207 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (giving great deference to military judgment and upholding the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II).


209 Swamy Interview, supra note 183.


211 Id.
in the Ayodhya mosque dispute,\textsuperscript{212} a court could easily find that the group is on the fringes of Hindu belief, and thus, not representative of the larger community of belief. In this scenario, a reasonable member of the larger community would be an Indian who was culturally Hindu—perhaps someone who believed in the deity of Rama but was less convinced of the historicity of the Ram Sethu.

As to the second question, helpful language comes from the United States's Religious Freedom Restoration Act.\textsuperscript{213} Government can only "substantially burden" religious exercise if there is a "compelling government interest."\textsuperscript{214} In this analysis, the government interests in trade and economic development are fairly compelling; the difficulty lies in determining whether the SSCP, by destroying the Ram Sethu, is a substantial burden on Hindu religious practice. This again forces the court to determine whether the Ram Sethu is an object of worship and whether it is central to Hinduism. Since Hinduism has no single theological authority, the court will have to use its judgment to determine whether veneration of Ram Sethu is an essential element of the Hindu faith.

\section*{B. Options for Preventing Future Problems}

Once the current SSCP issue is resolved, it is important for India to establish a structure for preventing future disputes of this type. India's religious diversity, rapidly increasing population, and history of religious conflict indicate that controversies over holy sites are likely to continue. A three-step process based on other nations' solutions provides a helpful framework for managing India's religious sites.

First, India should take a similar approach to that proposed by the Israel Holy Sites Commission.\textsuperscript{215} The commission suggests

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{212} Timeline: Ayodhya Crisis, supra note 123, ¶ 5.
\item \textsuperscript{213} RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1b.
\item \textsuperscript{214} \textit{Id}.
\item \textsuperscript{215} GUINN, supra note 77. Of course, the Holy Sites Commission offers only one potential framework for evaluating, protecting, and managing holy sites. \textit{See}, e.g., Int'l Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), \textit{Sacred Natural Sites: Guidelines for Protected Area Managers} (2008), available at http://data.iucn.org/dbtw-wpd/edocs/PAG-016.pdf. The important point is that future holy site claims must be evaluated systematically.
\end{itemize}
identifying common features of holy sites, defining various types of holy sites, and then categorizing existing sites.\textsuperscript{216} The Commission identified four common features of holy sites, that they are "(1) historic, (2) often connected to particular important religious figures, (3) supported by a community of faith, and (4) they provide a space or locus for worship or ritual."\textsuperscript{217}

How does Ram Sethu fare under this analysis? While there is a dispute about whether the shoals are in fact historic remains of an ancient bridge, the Commission’s approach is focused more on whether the site has been important to believers throughout history than whether it is a historical reality. "[T]he most important sites among the holy sites must be those that possess a long historical association with that faith."\textsuperscript{218} As a result, Ram Sethu does well under the first two factors. It is clearly connected to an important religious figure, the deity Rama, and dates back thousands of years. Ram Sethu, however, is not "home to a living community of believers"; rather, it is more like an archaeological relic.\textsuperscript{219} Therefore, the third factor leans in favor of the canal’s construction. The final factor in the analysis is whether Ram Sethu is home to religious rituals and services. The dueling affidavits in the SSCP case show that this question remains unsettled.\textsuperscript{220} Ram Sethu will have the strongest claim for protection as a holy site if it meets all four factors.

Once these factors are weighed, the Israel Holy Sites Commission proposes that a site be placed into one of several categories: 1) iconic holy sites (central sites that are the focus of believers from across the world); 2) cultic holy sites (where regular worship takes place); 3) latent holy sites (where no regular worship currently takes place but may in the future); 4) cemeteries; 5) historical and archaeological sites; and 6) contested holy sites.\textsuperscript{221} It would not remove the courts completely from the process (since a judge may still need to determine the category in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{216} GUINN, supra note 77, at 130-41.
\item \textsuperscript{217} \textit{id.} at 131.
\item \textsuperscript{218} \textit{id.} at 132.
\item \textsuperscript{219} \textit{id.}
\item \textsuperscript{220} Aff. of Rama Gopalan, supra note 175, ¶ 76-101.
\item \textsuperscript{221} \textit{id.} Of course, these factors might not all be applicable to India, but this type of analysis would be a helpful framework.
\end{itemize}
which a contested site belongs), but it would provide a good starting point. Additionally, some of the most controversial sites (like Ram Sethu) could be categorized ahead of time, thus anticipating the question of how much protection each site deserves.

Step two of this proposed process would be based on Australia’s Northern Territory legislation. The Aboriginal Sacred Sites Act begins by establishing a new agency with broad power to protect sacred sites, including the authority to acquire land. The Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority is also charged with creating a register of sacred sites that can then be protected from trespass, encroachment, or development.

Legislation of this type might be helpful for the nation of India. Once existing sites are placed into different categories, a mechanism for protecting religious sites can be established. India’s population density is much greater than Australia’s, so a register may deal less with protecting undiscovered places than ensuring that existing sites are not overtaken by India’s rapid growth and development. Admittedly, this proposal does create additional bureaucracy. But if prolonged and heated conflicts such as that over Ram Sethu and the SSCP can be minimized, the government’s additional expenditures, agency staff, and political structure will be worthwhile.

The third step in this process is not so much a statutory requirement as an executive necessity: Increased enforcement of religious site protections. The 2008 International Religious Freedom Report cites multiple examples of religious violence in 2008 in India. According to the Indian government, there were 943 instances of violence along religious grounds in 2008-2009. Attacks against Christian churches and believers were common,

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222 Northern Territory Aboriginal Sacred Sites Act, 1994, § 5 (Austl.).
223 Id. § 41.
224 Id.
225 But see Lawrence Cox, Freedom of Religion in China: Religious, Economic and Social Disenfranchisement for China’s Internal Migrant Workers, 8 ASIAN-PACIFIC L. & POL’Y J. 370, 383-84 (2007) (noting that China’s mandatory registration system for religious sites contributes to de facto state control of religious activities).
226 See IRFR, supra note 110.
227 Id.
and Hindus and Muslims often clashed. Although many of these instances were not related to sacred sites, the lack of enforcement is clear. "While the law generally provides a remedy for violations of religious freedom, it was not enforced rigorously or effectively in many cases pertaining to religiously oriented violence." Any new statutory protections for religious sites should include criminal penalties. More important than statutory penalties, however, is government commitment to enforce protections on holy sites, whether the violation is motivated by religious hatred or economic development. Although the West is not immune to religious violence, an increased emphasis on enforcement would boost India's desire to be viewed as a modern and civilized nation.

One potential enforcement difficulty lies in the Indian political system. Indian state governments have "exclusive jurisdiction over law enforcement and the maintenance of order, which limits the National Government's capacity to deal directly with state-level abuses, including abuses of religious freedom." This means that federal officials need the permission of the state government to investigate a crime, although the national government has "intervened to maintain order when state governments were reluctant or unwilling to do so." As a result, both federal and state government officials must commit to enforce protections on religious sites.

VI. Conclusion

The Sethusamudram Shipping Canal Project is by no means the only current conflict over a religious site. From expanding U.S. army bases to the contested Temple Mount, development poses a threat to holy places. Nevertheless, the high-profile nature of India's current dilemma highlights the need to balance religious beliefs with other political and societal values.

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228 Id.
229 Id.
231 IRFR, supra note 110.
232 Id.
International legal norms outline basic guarantees on religious freedom and exercise that can be extended to guarantees on the protection of holy sites. But what qualifies as holy? And what counts as a holy site? Both of these questions are at issue with Ram Sethu. Is this structure a true object of worship and veneration? And if so, is this the belief of all, or only some, Hindus? Even if some people consider Ram Sethu a holy place, should the remains of this underwater bridge be protected at all costs, particularly with disputed historical proof?

These are significant, and difficult, issues for a court. Regardless of whether the Indian Court permits the SSCP to go forward as is, suggests an alternate route, or halts the project altogether, additional religious protections are clearly needed to delineate a helpful framework for resolving future disputes. By incorporating the examples of other world countries, India will have a better opportunity to prevent religious disputes and encourage a peaceful state.

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