Spring 1989


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COMMENT


I. Introduction

On November 10, 1988 the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ or Department) released the final draft of its Antitrust Guidelines for International Operations (1988 Guidelines).1 This is the culmination of a two and a half year review2 conducted by the Department to expand and update its 1977 guidelines (1977 Guide).3 This Comment examines the changes in form and substance proposed by the Department, compares these changes to those suggested by critics of the 1977 Guide,4 and offers a few suggestions for improving the new guidelines further.

A comparison of the two guidelines is important for several reasons. First, it shows how the purpose, structure, and style of Department guidelines have changed over time. Second, the 1977 Guide and the 1988 Guidelines are paradigms for studying the effect the Chicago School has had on DOJ antitrust policy over the last dec-

ade. Third, the two guides help in isolating and analyzing the political aspects of international antitrust policy—the 1977 Guide was an early major statement by the Carter Administration on antitrust while the 1988 Guidelines are the Reagan Administration's final policy. Fourth, the two documents highlight Department trends and provide a glimpse of the future for international antitrust.

II. Changes In Form

The basic organization of the 1988 Guidelines is the same as that of the 1977 Guide. There are two main parts, an overview portion giving general guidance, and illustrative cases giving specific examples of how the overview's policies are applied. The overview sections of both the 1977 Guide and the 1988 Guidelines describe the purpose of the guidelines, the applicable antitrust laws enforced by the DOJ, enforcement policy, jurisdictional considerations, factors affecting DOJ's discretion in asserting jurisdiction, and foreign sovereign compulsion. The 1988 Guidelines, however, offer one more topic, international trade friction and the U.S. trade laws. The 1988 Guidelines break out each topic much more neatly under separate headings and cover the subjects in greater depth. This is more in keeping with the style of the Department's Merger Guidelines which commentators have said is a good example of a relatively clear, straight-forward exposition of DOJ policy.

The structure of the illustrative cases is basically unchanged in the 1988 Guidelines. Each one consists of a short fact pattern followed by a discussion section which analyzes the facts in light of policies described in the overview. The cases are not simply a rework of the material in the overview; as in the 1977 Guide, these examples often provide as much or more new information about Department policy as the overview itself.

5 The 1988 Guidelines' initiator was Douglas H. Ginsburg then the Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division and a noted defender of the Chicago School. The Assistant Attorney General hired Professor Diane P. Wood as a special consultant to oversee the project while on leave from the University of Chicago where she taught Antitrust and International Antitrust. Division Hires Consultant to Revise Guide for International Operations, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) Vol. 50, No. 1247, at 72 (Jan. 9, 1986).
9 See Seki, supra note 4, at 1635-36. See also Fugate, supra note 4, at 645-46.
10 The examples are of the typical "straw-man" variety which tends to make them overly simplistic and unrealistic. Nevertheless, they serve fairly well as illustrations of policy. The 1988 Guidelines are more formal than the 1977 Guide (e.g. no silly names are used for corporations—letter designations such as Beta Company or Product X are used instead). See Seki, supra note 4, at 1635. The breadth and depth of the examples combined with the much improved overview should answer concerns about the guidelines' utility. See id. See also Fugate, supra note 4, at 645-46.
III. Changes In Substance

The 1977 Guide was "intended to help businesses plan transactions which the Department of Justice is not likely to challenge, and to see which transactions are likely to require detailed factual inquiry by the enforcement agencies." The guide was a statement of DOJ policy, not all government agencies enforcing antitrust policy, such as the Federal Trade Commission or the International Trade Commission. The 1977 Guide's policies did not apply to private, state, and foreign antitrust actions. The vagueness about the role of the 1977 Guide in overall antitrust policy was criticized as being unnecessary.

The purpose of the 1988 Guidelines is basically unchanged from the earlier document. The 1988 Guidelines are more careful to note that other agencies may have different policies and also to highlight that DOJ policies do not apply to private, state, and foreign antitrust actions. It is unlikely DOJ could do much more to clarify the reach of its policies without actually issuing its guidelines in a coordinated fashion with guidelines from all the other relevant agencies—a massive undertaking that would be far beyond the scope of the current project.

Of greater importance is the nonbinding nature of the policies

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12 Griffin, supra note 4, at 217. The 1977 Guide tended to use language which made it appear to be an all-encompassing statement of federal policy. "[W]e try here to provide a working statement of government enforcement policy . . . ." 1977 Guide, supra note 3, at E-1 (emphasis added). "This [guide] is intended to help business plan transactions which the Department of Justice is not likely to challenge, and to see which transactions are likely to require detailed factual inquiry by the enforcement agencies . . . ." Id. (emphasis added). "Antitrust enforcement by the United States Government has two major purposes . . . ." Id. at E-2 (emphasis added).
13 This was a criticism of the 1977 Guide by Griffin. Griffin, supra note 4, at 220.
14 Griffin, supra note 4, at 217.
15 The Department has stated that one of the purposes is "to ensure that uncertainty about enforcement policy does not cause businesses to limit unobjectionable transactions or to avoid efficient arrangements that benefit consumers." New Guidelines on International Antitrust Enforcement Issued by Justice Department, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) Vol. 5, No. 46, at 1542 (Nov. 28, 1988).
16 The 1988 Guidelines do not explicitly state in the body of the text that other enforcement agencies may have different policies or guidelines. They do, however, mention FTC jurisdiction in a footnote. 1988 Guide, supra note 1, at S-3 n.4. The 1988 Guidelines avoid the use of ambiguous terms found in the 1977 Guide.
17 The 1988 Guidelines state, "[T]hese Guidelines do not express any view regarding the applicability of the laws of other nations." 1988 Guide, supra note 1, at S-3. The 1988 Guidelines also advise that "readers should separately evaluate the risk of private litigation by competitors, consumers, and suppliers, as well as the risk of enforcement by state prosecutors under state and federal antitrust laws." Id. at S-3.
stated in the 1977 Guide and 1988 Guidelines. This has been called economically inefficient\(^{18}\) and misleading.\(^{19}\) To be sure, the 1988 Guidelines are much more detailed and thorough than the 1977 Guide,\(^{20}\) yet the new guidelines still reserve the Justice Department’s right to ignore any or all of the guidelines’ considerations when expedient.\(^{21}\) This point is reemphasized by the change in titles from “Guide” in 1977 to “Guidelines” in 1988.\(^{22}\)

### A. Relevant Antitrust Laws

The first subsection of the 1988 Guidelines’ overview is titled “Relevant Antitrust Laws.”\(^{23}\) In the 1977 Guide the equivalent subsection, called “Applicable Antitrust Laws,”\(^{24}\) only gave a sketchy description of the Sherman Act\(^{25}\) and the Webb-Pomerene Act.\(^{26}\)\(^ {27}\) The 1988 Guidelines give a similar, albeit somewhat more generic, definition of the Sherman\(^{28}\) and Webb-Pomerene Acts,\(^ {29}\) but also in-

\(^{18}\) Silverstein, \textit{supra} note 4, at 699 (“The key . . . is a willingness on the part of the Justice Department, not presently evident, to make binding advance determinations of the legality of certain kinds of proposed transactions so businesses could operate within the framework of relatively fixed guidelines.”). \textit{See also id.} at 694. Silverstein does note, however, that the Antitrust Division has a “Business Review Procedure,” 28 CFR § 50.6 (1988), but points out several problems with this including:

- delays of six weeks or more in obtaining a response, drawing attention to a transaction which might otherwise escape notice, public disclosure of the review letter, and, most significantly, the fact that a “clearance” from the Justice Department under this procedure creates no immunity from subsequent prosecution even if the actual transaction is exactly as described.

\(^{19}\) \textit{Id.}\(^ {19}\)

\(^{20}\) Griffin, \textit{supra} note 4, at 219. Nevertheless, Griffin goes on to state, “The Guide’s nonbinding nature is obviously reasonable in light of the accepted rule that one government administration’s antitrust enforcement policy does not bind a subsequent administration and in light of the evolving nature of the law in the international business area.” \textit{Id.} at 220. \textit{Compare Silverstein, supra} note 4, at 694 and note 18, \textit{supra}.  

\(^{21}\) The 1988 Guidelines are nearly three times as long as the 1977 Guide, contain four more illustrative cases than the 1977 Guide, and more than double the number of footnotes.

\(^{22}\) “These Guidelines are intended only to provide general guidance as to how the Department analyzes certain commonly occurring issues affecting its own enforcement decisions.” 1988 \textit{GUIDE, supra} note 1, at S-3. “[T]hese Guidelines are not intended to be a restatement of the law . . . .” \textit{Id.} “[A]lthough these Guidelines should improve the predictability of the Department’s enforcement policy . . . , it is not possible to remove the exercise of judgment from the evaluation of conduct . . . and the determination whether to assert jurisdiction . . . .” \textit{Id.} at S-3.

\(^{23}\) Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary defines “guide” as “to direct, supervise, or influence usually to a particular end” whereas “guideline” is “an indication or outline (as by a government) of policy or conduct.”

\(^{24}\) 1988 \textit{GUIDE, supra} note 1, at S-3.

\(^{25}\) 1977 \textit{GUIDE, supra} note 3, at E-1.


\(^{27}\) The bulk of the subsection described how the rule-of-reason approach might vary in the international context and reemphasized the importance of the particular facts of each situation. Both of these points fit more naturally under the next subsection “Enforcement Policies,” which is where the 1988 Guidelines placed them.

\(^{28}\) 1988 \textit{GUIDE, supra} note 1, at S-3.
clude the Clayton Act and Hart-Scott-Rodino Act of 1976 as well as two newer laws, the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984 (NCRA) and the Export Trading Company Act of 1982 (ETC Act). Finally, in a footnote the Wilson Tariff Act is mentioned almost pro forma as being essentially parallel in language and coextensive in scope to Section 1 of the Sherman Act.

The 1988 Guidelines state in an introductory footnote that in addition to the laws described which the Department enforces, there are applicable laws which may be enforced by the FTC: the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Robinson-Patman Act—the 1977 Guide was criticized for omitting these. It seems logical that since two exemptions to DOJ enforcement are described (the Webb-Pomerene Act and the Export Trading Company Act of 1982), others probably should be at least footnoted, for example the Shipping Act of 1984.

Neither the 1977 Guide nor the 1988 Guidelines state how much enforcement effort is placed behind each law. For both theoretical and practical reasons it isn’t wise for the Department to be too explicit on this point, at least in the guidelines. Nonetheless, the amount of emphasis placed on various statutes is markedly different. For example, it has been claimed that section 7 of the Clayton Act has been essentially abandoned because of the Chicago School’s philosophy, while the Department has renewed interest in pursuing price-fixing and bid rigging. In lieu of DOJ direction, legal counsel

29 Id. at S-5.
32 Both the Clayton Act and the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act should have been included in the 1977 Guide.
36 1988 GUIDE, supra note 1, at S-3 n.5.
37 1988 GUIDE, supra note 1, at S-3 n.4.
40 Griffin, supra note 4, at 217-19 (“It ‘does not describe the Federal Trade Commission’s [FTC’s] enforcement policies [and] . . . does not deal with either the Federal Trade Commission Act or the Clayton Act, as administered by the FTC.’ ” footnote omitted).
42 In all fairness, the Department did state that it was limiting its discussion to major legislation. The number of potential exemptions that could have been included is quite large, for example: insurance, banking, farm associations, and even baseball.
43 “After sifting through cases, enforcement performance, and rhetoric, one must conclude that Chicago is very close to accomplishing de facto repeal of Clayton 7, if not antitrust.” Austin, Antitrust Reaction To The Merger Wave: The Revolution Y’s. The Counterrevolution, 66 N.C.L. REV. 931, 961 (1988).
44 Adler, Hands-Off Antitrust Policy Likely to End, Whoever Wins the Presidential Election,
must stay in the habit of looking beyond the guidelines for the current status of various laws and policies.

B. Enforcement Policy

The 1977 Guide and 1988 Guidelines both follow their descriptions of applicable antitrust laws with a subsection called “Enforcement Policy.”

The similarities between the two documents end at the title, however. The 1977 Guide’s Enforcement Policy subsection consists of just three paragraphs. In them, the Department describes the two main purposes of antitrust laws in an international context: (1) “protect the American consuming public by assuring it the benefit of competitive products and ideas produced by foreign competitors as well as domestic competitors,” and (2) “protect American export and investment opportunities against privately imposed restrictions.”

The 1988 Guidelines replace these paragraphs with a similar general discussion of competition, market power, and the role of per se and rule-of-reason analysis. But, the 1988 Guidelines then go on to give a detailed, fourteen-page description of the Department’s method for analyzing the competitive effects of specific acts. Six topics are covered: criminal offenses under the Sherman Act, monopolization, mergers, joint ventures, vertical nonprice distribution restraints, and intellectual property licensing arrangements.

1. Criminal Offenses Under the Sherman Act

The 1988 Guidelines makes it clear that any naked restraint of trade is prosecuted as a criminal violation of the Sherman Act. No express agreements or overt acts are necessary and any form of

Wall St. J., Oct. 24, 1988, at B1, col. 3 (citing comment by Antitrust Division head, Charles F. Rule, that the administration has been particularly tough in enforcing these laws).

45 1977 GUIDE, supra note 3, at E-2; 1988 GUIDE, supra note 1, at S-5.


47 Id.

48 1988 GUIDE, supra note 1, at S-5 to S-6.

49 Id. at S-7 to S-20.

50 1988 GUIDE, supra note 1, at S-7.

51 Id.

52 Id. at S-8.

53 Id. at S-11.

54 Id. at S-14.

55 Id. at S-16.

56 An agreement is “naked” if its sole purpose and effect is to restrict output and/or raise (or depress) price—that is, if it is not plausibly related to some economic integration of the parties’ operations (beyond simply the coordination of price and/or output) that may result in increased production.

57 Id.

58 Id.
price coordination is illegal\textsuperscript{59} regardless of whether the agreement is successful in creating an anticompetitive effect.\textsuperscript{60}

This is identical to the analysis used in domestic cases;\textsuperscript{61} the only significant contribution over the 1977 Guide is that all this is explicitly stated. In the 1977 Guide, for example, although the per se illegality of price fixing was mentioned, its criminal nature and the test for its illegality were not.\textsuperscript{62} The 1977 Guide did provide some insight through three illustrative cases,\textsuperscript{63} but essentially the analyses used were the same as those now in the 1988 Guidelines.

2. Monopolization

According to the 1988 Guidelines, unlawful monopolization consists of the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power.\textsuperscript{64} The three elements of attempt to monopolize are specific intent to monopolize, anticompetitive acts, and a dangerous probability of success.\textsuperscript{65} These definitions hold no surprises; they are identical to domestic analyses of monopolization.\textsuperscript{66} In the only real reference to international operations, DOJ highlights the two cases where monopolization or attempt to monopolize are most likely to occur: (1) when a foreign firm sells a product at predatory prices in the United States; and (2) when U.S.-based firms stymie foreign imports

\textsuperscript{59} For example, naked agreements among competitors to raise their individual prices by a specified amount, to maintain a specified profit margin, to adopt a standard formula for computing price, or to notify one another before reducing price are also criminal violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act.

\textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{60} \textit{Id.}


\textsuperscript{62} Certain types of agreements are regarded as illegal per se—including, most notably, agreements among competitors to fix prices at which their offerings are sold, or to allocate territories or customers in order to avoid competing with each other. This is done because experience generally has established that such agreements' "pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue" makes an "elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm [that individual restraints] have caused or the business excuse for their use" generally not worth the effort.


\textsuperscript{63} In Case A, the Department reiterated the Supreme Court position in \textit{Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. U.S.} that naked territorial restraints between U.S. and foreign manufacturers are per se illegal. 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951), cited in 1977 \textit{GUIDE}, \textit{supra} note 3, at E-4. In Case K, the Department states that a U.S. manufacturer is guilty of horizontal group boycott if it agrees with other manufacturers, foreign or domestic, to boycott a retailer even if done under pressure from the government of a foreign nation supplying raw materials. \textit{Id.} at E-14 to E-15. Case L deals with a classic horizontal price-fixing cartel with foreign sovereignty overtones. \textit{Id.} at E-15 to E-16.

\textsuperscript{64} 1988 \textit{GUIDE}, \textit{supra} note 1, at S-7.

\textsuperscript{65} \textit{Id.}

through frivolous private actions under U.S. trade laws. The 1988 Guidelines contain one illustrative case, Case 13, which describes the latter situation.\footnote{67}

Curiously, monopolization and attempts to monopolize were omitted entirely from the 1977 Guide and the draft revision of the 1988 Guidelines. Possibly this is because there are very few DOJ prosecutions of these acts.

3. Mergers

The 1977 Guide does not mention mergers in its enforcement policy subsection, but does discuss them in Case B.\footnote{68} The guide lists a four-part test for determining their validity.

\[\text{[T]}\text{he inquiry will be whether (1) the U.S. market (or relevant local market) is highly concentrated; (2) the foreign firm is by virtue of its capability of entering the market one of a relatively small group of potential entrants; (3) the foreign firm has the incentives to enter the U.S. market; and (4) the foreign firm has the capability of entering the market or is threatening to enter.}\footnote{69}

This also presumably applied to a merger of a foreign company and a domestic company or an acquisition of one by the other.

The 1988 Guidelines, in contrast, take their test from the Department’s Merger Guidelines\footnote{70} published in 1984. There are two basic parts. “The first step in the Department’s merger analysis is to identify the relevant market or markets that would be affected by the merger and the firms that compete in that market or those markets.”\footnote{71} To define the market the Department tries “to identify a group of products (the ‘product market’) and a geographic area (the ‘geographic market’) with respect to which sellers could exercise market power if they were able to coordinate their actions so as to act like a monopolist.”\footnote{72} In the second step, “[i]f merging firms compete in the same product and geographic markets the Department next determines whether the elimination of competition between them would likely create, enhance or facilitate the exercise of market power.”\footnote{73} The 1988 Guidelines also suggest several other factors which may affect the Department’s decision to contest a merger or acquisition.\footnote{74} Essentially then, the two tests cover the same ground,

\footnote{67} 1988 \textit{Guide, supra} note 1, at S-44.
\footnote{68} 1977 \textit{Guide, supra} note 3, at E-5.
\footnote{69} \textit{Id.}
\footnote{70} \textit{Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Merger Guidelines} (June 14, 1984), \textit{reprinted in 2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)} \textit{1152} 20,551-20,568.
\footnote{71} 1988 \textit{Guide, supra} note 1, at S-9.
\footnote{72} \textit{Id.}
\footnote{73} \textit{Id.}
\footnote{74} “One such factor is recent or ongoing changes in market conditions.” 1988 \textit{Guide, supra} note 1, at S-10. “Another factor is . . . a firm’s financial condition.” \textit{Id.} “The Department also considers special factors affecting the competitive significance of foreign firms, such as government restrictions on imports or foreign export restrictions.” \textit{Id.}
which means no significant changes for business.

In addition, there is not much that is actually unique to international operations in the new guidelines. For example, the Department states that the analysis "does not discriminate against or in favor of firms on the basis of their citizenship." Foreign competitors and potential competitors as well as the existence of effective trade barriers are taken into account when determining market power, but this would be true for a purely domestic merger. Thus merger analysis, whether domestic or international, is about the same.

The illustrative cases on mergers, Cases 1 through 4, do point out a growing problem for businesses, however. The cases try to describe the effects of various trade barriers such as Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs) and tariffs have on defining the relevant market. It is clear from the number and complexity of examples that determining markets is becoming much more difficult as the variety and volatility of barriers increases. Although the Department cannot do anything about the proliferation of arcane market barriers and must try to define relevant markets regardless of them, this leaves businesses with a great deal more uncertainty.

Merger policy has been one of the areas most heavily influenced by the Chicago School. An efficiency analysis dominates, resulting in far fewer challenges to businesses—not always to the approval of others. Future merger analysis may move back to a mix of economic, social, and political considerations. Robert B. Reich, an adviser to the Democratic Party, has stated that economic analysis alone is insufficient. Social and political factors must be explicitly taken into account. Lawrence Summers, another Democratic ad-
viser, also feels that there has not been enough enforcement. But, Timothy J. Muris, an advisor to the Republican Party, believes that "[b]y focusing on economic power, you satisfy the social and political concerns of § 7." One neutral authority believes merger policy "might change under a more liberal administration, but the likelihood is that the changes would be modest and the basic framework would be left intact."

4. Joint Ventures

This is one of the most important sections of the new guidelines. As with mergers, the 1977 Guide did not discuss joint ventures in its Enforcement Policy subsection, but did cover this subject extensively in Illustrative Cases C, D, E, and M. In Case C, the 1977 Guide listed three elements which generally determine the legality of joint ventures:

1. "whether the creation of the joint venture itself unreasonably restraints competition;"
2. "whether the joint venture has any unreasonable collateral restraints that must be struck down even if the venture is allowed;" and
3. "whether the joint venture is in essence a 'bottleneck monopoly' which is so important to those in the business that it must be opened to all on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms."

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80 "Allowing the 18 largest mergers in history to go through without raising questions almost certainly represents insufficient enforcement." Adler, supra note 45, quoting Professor Lawrence Summers of Harvard University.
81 Gellhorn, Climbing the Antitrust Staircase, 31 Antitrust Bulletin 341, 348 (1986). Professor Gellhorn later notes that a worsening international trade picture would, in fact, help efforts to limit antitrust enforcement of mergers. Id. at 350. Professor Summers concurs in this opinion. Adler, supra note 44.
83 1977 GUIDE, supra note 3, at E-6.
The 1977 Guide then added, "The creation of joint venture of the more permanent variety will in essence be looked at as if it were a merger between parties in the field covered by the venture."\textsuperscript{91}

This test was rather muddled. Step one could have been interpreted as making some joint ventures per se unlawful because of the amount of competition restrained, regardless of any offsetting procompetitive efficiencies. It could simply have meant that a balancing of pro- and anticompetitive effects was to be done. Step two had the same ambiguities for collateral restraints. Step three did not seem to address the legality of the joint venture at all, but rather the scope of participation required of the venture. The fundamental problem with the whole test was the total lack of detail on how the "unreasonableness" standard was actually implemented.

The 1988 Guidelines go a good bit further toward solving this problem. Most importantly, the Department downplays a per se unlawful analysis for true joint ventures. "Because joint ventures typically achieve integrative efficiencies, the Department judges the likely competitive effects of joint ventures under a rule of reason."\textsuperscript{92} This involves a four-step test somewhat different than the one outlined in the 1977 Guide.

"First, the Department determines whether the joint venture would likely have any anticompetitive effect in the market or markets in which the joint venture proposes to operate or in which the economic integration of the parties occurs. . . . Second, the Department determines whether the joint venture would likely have an anticompetitive effect in any other market or markets ('spill-over market(s)') in which the joint venture members are actual or potential competitors outside the joint venture. Third, the Department analyzes the likely competitive effects of any nonprice vertical restraints imposed in connection with the joint venture."\textsuperscript{93} "If . . . the Department's analysis under the first three steps reveals significant anticompetitive risks, then, under step 4, the Department considers whether any procompetitive efficiencies that the parties claim would be achieved by the joint venture would outweigh the risk of anticompetitive harm."\textsuperscript{94}

The first step's analysis concentrates on the venture's effect on independent decision making by participants in the joint venture market.\textsuperscript{95} If the members of the joint venture do not currently participate in the market and are not considered potential competitors in that market then there can be no threat. If the members are par-

\textsuperscript{91} Id.
\textsuperscript{92} 1988 \textit{GUIDE}, \textit{supra} note 1, at S-11.
\textsuperscript{93} Id.
\textsuperscript{94} Id. at S-11 to S-12.
\textsuperscript{95} Id. at S-12.
participants in the market then the Department looks at the increase in their market power using much the same techniques as for mergers. This includes defining the market, calculating market concentration, and examining offsetting factors like ease of entry. Unlike mergers, joint ventures are given wide latitude when analyzed because they operate for a limited time or can more easily be undone.

The 1988 Guidelines' second step, analysis of spill-over markets, is barely touched upon by the 1977 Guide. According to the 1988 Guidelines, an active inquiry into this area is now made when analyzing joint ventures. But, "[t]he use of effective safeguards may . . . eliminate the need to conduct an elaborate structural analysis of the spill-over market." If conditions in the spill-over market make successful collusion unlikely, the Department again does not investigate further. If market characteristics show the potential for anticompetitive effects, the Department weighs the restraint against the effect to determine whether it must be disallowed. This is, once again, a pure rule of reason approach reflecting the Chicago School perspective that spill-over effects cannot be anticompetitive per se and that there should be a presumption that these sorts of restraints are more beneficial than not.

The third step is to check for vertical nonprice restraints to be used by venture members. There is a potential for anticompetitive effects at either the primary or the secondary levels of the market, just as any business entity could cause.

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96 Id.
97 Id.
98 The only places spill-over markets come into play in the 1977 Guide are in Illustrative Cases C and D. "Any joint venture among competitors involves some antitrust risk that the cooperation may spill over into other areas. Accordingly the parties should use special care in policing the operations of a joint venture . . ." 1977 GUIDE, supra note 3, at E-6. "The Department obviously cannot police each research joint venture to ensure that production and marketing are not also discussed. Of course, in appropriate cases the Department may wish to make subsequent inquiries to confirm that the . . . collaboration has not extended into other areas." Id. at E-8.
99 1988 GUIDE, supra note 1, at S-12.
100 Id. at S-13. "Examples of safeguards . . . include . . . a requirement that certain types of sensitive business information be disclosed only to neutral third parties, a requirement that meetings involving representatives of the venture members be monitored by knowledgeable counsel, or a requirement that accurate and complete records of such discussions be maintained." Id.

The Department also cited a variety of other sources of examples in footnote 98: "The Antitrust Division's Approach to Shippers' Associations," Remarks of Charles F. Rule, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice Before the Chemical Manufacturers Association, Oct. 21, 1985 (setting forth guidelines for assessing the competitive effect of shipping associations); ETC Guidelines, 50 Fed. Reg. at 1794-1796 (discussing, inter alia, conditions of certification relating to exchange of competitively sensitive information).
101 Id. at S-13, citing Letter from William F. Baxter, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, to Irving B. Yoskowitz, Vice President and General Counsel, United Technologies Corp., Oct. 27, 1983 (identifying disincentives to collusion among joint venture participants in spill-over markets.)
The fourth step makes it clear that the 1988 Guidelines’ test is a balancing between pro- and anticompetitive effects. If the joint venture members can show that despite any anticompetitive effects discovered under steps one through three, there are more procompetitive effects then the venture will be permitted to proceed.

Note that the Department does not completely reject the per se unlawful concept. DOJ recognizes that naked agreements to restrain price or output are still per se unlawful regardless of whether they are labelled “joint ventures.” Thus there is actually a zeroeth step to the Department’s analysis: whether the agreement is, in fact, a naked price or output agreement.

A direct comparison between the 1977 Guide’s test and the 1988 Guidelines’ test is difficult. Essentially, the 1988 Guidelines collapse the first two elements of the 1977 Guide’s test then break them back out into the four step analysis. This treats the joint venture and ancillary restraints in an identical, parallel fashion while creating a more detailed analytical framework.

Overall, the 1988 Guidelines on joint ventures are still vague; there are no explicit safe harbors. In theory, a joint venture by companies which have not previously participated in the relevant market is safe. Nevertheless, the definition of the relevant market and participation in that market are flexible enough to trap joint ventures which might appear safe to the venture members. Presumably, another safe harbor is a joint venture which leaves the relevant market with an HHI of less than one thousand, but this is not clearly stated in the guidelines.

Joint venture participants do have reason to be optimistic though. This is an area in which both political parties seem to agree that a hands-off approach is warranted. Both parties believe that industrial competitiveness is becoming such an important social concern that antitrust policy must be adapted. Attorney General Thornburgh has proposed an exemption certification process à la the ETC Act for joint production ventures and an elimination of triple damage penalties for these actions. Although the Democrats generally agree there is a need for improvement, if the U.S. position in the world economy improved markedly, there might be a renewed interest in tougher enforcement.

5. Vertical Nonprice Distribution Restraints

Vertical restraints have most obviously been affected by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc., which approves of these restraints in some situations. The 1977 Guide was released just before this decision and described the Department's pre-Sylvania position in Illustrative Case J. In that example, the Department relied on United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. to assert that "terminating a domestic distributor who resells to customers in [a newly recruited] foreign distributor's territory may adversely affect the distributor's export opportunities" and be illegal. This is only true, per se, if the domestic manufacturer and the new foreign distributor are also competitors who had divided sales territories. Any other sort of arrangement was to be analyzed by the Courts under a rule of reason approach.

The 1988 Guidelines acknowledge this but specify three narrower conditions necessary for a vertical nonprice restraint to cause collusion: "(i) the [primary] market . . . must be . . . highly concentrated . . . ; (ii) firms in the [secondary] market . . . using or subject to the restraints . . . must account for most sales in that market; (iii) entry into the primary market must be difficult." The 1988 Guidelines also list three similar conditions which may lead to exclusion of rivals from the market by denying them access to necessary inputs or facilities: "(i) the market in which the firms imposing the restraint operate must be . . . very highly concentrated and leading firms . . . must use the restraint . . . ; (ii) the restraints must cover most of the capacity of the market . . . ; (iii) entry into the 'foreclosed' market must be difficult." The Department then lays out a two-step process for analyzing these situations. First, the Department takes a "quick look" at the degree of concentration in the relevant markets and at the market shares of firms employing the restraint to determine whether the restraint could plausibly have an anticompetitive effect. In most cases, the minimum necessary conditions will not exist. If these conditions do exist, however, the Department con-

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105 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (location restraint imposed on franchisees by franchisor is to be judged under the rule of reason).
108 1977 GUIDE, supra note 3, at E-13 n.79.
109 See generally Fugate, supra note 4, at 778-80.
110 Because vertical nonprice restraints hold significant potential for generating procompetitive efficiencies, the Department analyzes such restraints under a rule of reason." 1988 GUIDE, supra note 1, at S-14.
111 Id. This is an improvement over the 1977 Guide which was criticized for lacking a description of specific factors for determining whether anticompetitive effects were possible. Griffin, supra note 4, at 229.
112 1988 GUIDE, supra note 1, at S-15.
113 Id.
siders other relevant factors. The end result is that under the 1988 Guidelines vertical nonprice restraints which would have failed under the 1977 Guide easily pass muster, despite the fact that both guides say they use a rule of reason analysis.

The Department relies heavily on its Vertical Restraints Guidelines, published in 1985, for enforcement policy in this area. The Vertical Restraints Guidelines were roundly criticized by Congress as being a poor reflection of the state of the law at the time the Guidelines were released. Democratic Party advisor Robert Reich has said the Reagan Administration went too far in permitting vertical restraints without expressly considering their potential horizontal anticompetitiveness. Herman Schwartz criticizes the use of rule-of-reason analysis in this area as causing too much uncertainty. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has indicated that a lenient posture towards vertical nonprice restraints is probably justified. Given this endorsement, this policy is far less likely to change with a different administration than, for example, merger policy.

6. Intellectual Property Licensing Arrangements

Intellectual property licensing arrangements were covered by the 1977 Guide in cases F, G, H, and I. Case F described enforcement policy for know-how licenses and three common re-

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114 Id. These mitigating factors include: whether the restraint has an exclusionary effect; whether the restraint has survived for a long period; whether the restraint is airtight; whether market conditions are conducive either to collusion or to anticompetitive exclusion; whether use of the restraint results in significant integrative efficiencies producing benefits to consumer welfare that outweigh the risk of potential anticompetitive harm; and whether there is a history of collusion by firms at either level of the market. 1988 Guide, supra note 1, at S-15 to S-16.

115 ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, VERTICAL RESTRAINTS GUIDELINES (Jan. 23, 1985), reprinted in ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) Vol. 48, No. 1199, Special Supplement (Jan. 24, 1985). The vertical restraints guidelines are only cited in footnote 107, but the draft version of the 1988 Guidelines contained roughly the same substance as the final 1988 Guidelines and noted that the policy was derived directly from the vertical restraints guidelines. 1988 DRAFT, supra note 1, at S-10 n.86.


117 Presidential Advisers' Opinions, supra note 79, at 448. DOJ may have been sensitive to this criticism because vertical restraint analysis had been left out of the draft guidelines for joint ventures but found their way into the final version.

118 H. SCHWARZ, supra note 78, at 193-94.


120 1977 GUIDE, supra note 3, at E-10.

121 Id. at E-11.

122 Id. at E-12.

123 Id.

124 "Know-how" is defined as "useful technical information concerning productive activity that is not generally known or accessible but is not protected by a patent." 1988 GUIDE, supra note 1, at S-42.
strictions on them: territorial allocation, product tie-in, and trademark use.

First, the 1977 Guide stated that know-how licenses are subject to stricter antitrust safeguards than patents because know-how does not have the protection of the patent system behind it. The 1977 Guide then went on to describe factors which made the various restraints more or less objectionable. For example, in Case F the foreign licensee was barred from exporting products made under the license to the United States for twenty years. The Department stated that it would challenge this restraint unless the time theoretically necessary to reverse-engineer the licensed technology was greater than twenty years.

This position was sharply criticized and has been completely reversed in the 1988 Guidelines:

Because of the essentially similar roles that know-how transfers and patent licensing play in the competitive process, the Department generally analyzes them in the same way. In fact, precisely because know-how is not statutorily defined and protected by government grant, restrictions in agreements transferring know-how may be even more essential to protecting procompetitive investment in valuable technology.

There are two other issues that were mentioned in the 1977

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126 The concept of "time to reverse-engineer" as being the time limit to permit anticompetitive restraints has been called ambiguous and highly impractical:

       Aside from the technological difficulties in accurately forecasting when someone else can come up with a better mousetrap, there are questions of financial capability to support the necessary research and development to successfully complete such a project. Even if a comparable product is developed independently of the originally licensed product, there are marketing considerations which have to be overcome, including brand name loyalties and organization of sales and service outlets . . . .

Seki, supra note 4, at 1653-54. See also Fugate, supra note 4, at 676.

This concept has been dropped from the 1988 Guidelines. In fact, the 1988 Guidelines are in favor of such territorial restrictions. "[R]estrictions such as . . . exclusive territories may be used to encourage the licensee to make investments that are necessary to develop and promote the licensed technology." 1988 Guide, supra note 1, at S-16.

127 There are other examples of factors affecting the legitimacy of restraints. With regard to product tie-ins, the 1977 Guide stated in Cases F and G that tie-ins in other countries were not policed by the Department unless they substantially affected the ability of other U.S. exporters to compete as suppliers to that market or affect goods reexported to the United States. 1977 Guide, supra note 3, at E-10 and E-11.

Requiring the use of U.S. trademarks on foreign licensee's products was considered suspicious according to the 1977 Guide. This restriction could be used in conjunction with Section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1970), to keep these goods out of the United States.

128 The policy considerations tending toward the Department's current view are somewhat persuasive, yet common law rights in know-how are being enforced continually and, in many cases, are considered on par with patent rights. There is authority for the proposition that both patents and non-patented proprietary rights are worthy of equal protection under the law.

Seki, supra note 4, at 1653.

Guide, nonmarket enterprises and grantback licensing. Case H, in which the 1977 Guide described licensing to nonmarket (state-owned) enterprises, expressed concern that state-owned businesses have unfair competitive advantages over domestic firms. This has been termed more of a trade issue than an antitrust issue and probably for that reason was omitted from the 1988 Guidelines. It also has a murky economic basis which may have made it an unappealing position to take.

Case I of the 1977 Guide described exclusive grantback licensing. Three scenarios were posed: one in which the domestic company owned eighty-five percent of the foreign licensee's stock; one in which the domestic company owned thirty percent of the foreign licensee's stock; and one in which the domestic company licensed technology to an unaffiliated foreign firm. The Department cited two factors which influenced the decision to challenge a grantback under the 1977 guidelines: the scope of the licensee's obligation to grant back; and the competitive relationship between licensor and licensee.

In the first two proposed scenarios, the Department did not challenge the grantback under the 1977 guidelines so long as the domestic company did, in fact, exercise control over the licensee. In the third scenario, the Department stated that it would challenge the grantback. Notably, the 1977 Guide cautioned, "The Department . . . questions the . . . appropriateness of exclusive grantback provisions; and it may in an appropriate case wish to assert that an exclusive grantback requirement involving independent parties is per se illegal." This was criticized by observers outside the Department and the 1988 Guidelines now state that grantbacks are analyzed under the rule of reason.

The 1988 Guidelines' discussion of grantbacks is found in Case 11. The Department's new position is that unless the underlying technology transfer is a sham, grantbacks can serve important procompetitive purposes. The cumulative competitive effect of all licensing restrictions is assessed to determine whether the agreement will be challenged. The Department's analysis tends to be qualitative, focusing on other substitute technologies available, and

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130 1977 GUIDE, supra note 3, at E-12.
131 Griffin, supra note 4, at 240.
132 1977 GUIDE, supra note 3, at E-12.
133 Id. at E-13.
134 1977 GUIDE, supra note 3, at E-12.
135 Fugate, supra note 4, at 678.
136 1988 GUIDE, supra note 1, at S-40.
137 Id. at S-39.
138 Id. at S-40 and S-41.
139 Id. at S-40.
the time needed to bring them to market.\textsuperscript{140} Several factors are considered: whether the product produced using the licensed technology has a large or small share of the overall market; whether other firms possess similar technology; and whether the patents are soon to expire.\textsuperscript{141} In general, only grantbacks with extreme anticompetitive effects seem likely to be challenged.

\section*{C. Jurisdictional Issues}

The next section of both the 1977 Guide and the 1988 Guidelines is on subject matter and personal jurisdiction policy.\textsuperscript{142}

\subsection*{1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction}

The 1977 Guide stated, "[T]he U.S. antitrust laws should be applied to an overseas transaction when there is substantial and foreseeable effect on the United States commerce [sic] . . . ."\textsuperscript{143} Any conduct with a "direct or intended effect" on U.S. consumers or exporters is subject to Department scrutiny.\textsuperscript{144} There were strong domestic complaints that this antitrust policy was adversely affecting U.S. export business.\textsuperscript{145} In response to this, Congress enacted two pieces of legislation: The Export Trading Company Act of 1981 (ETC)\textsuperscript{146} and the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act (FTAIA).\textsuperscript{147} ETC expands Webb-Pomerene-type antitrust exemptions for U.S. exporters while FTAIA limits Sherman Act jurisdiction\textsuperscript{148} over non-import foreign commerce.\textsuperscript{149}

The 1988 Guidelines reflect this change in their jurisdictional policy statement. "[C]onduct relating to U.S. import trade that harms consumers in the United States may be subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S. antitrust laws regardless of where such conduct technically occurs or the nationality of the parties involved."\textsuperscript{150} However, under FTAIA, the Department can only pursue those export trade situations where the conduct results in injury to export business in the United States. These changes should eliminate concern over possible adverse effects of antitrust policy on exports.\textsuperscript{151}

\textsuperscript{140} Id. at S-40 to S-41.
\textsuperscript{141} Id.
\textsuperscript{142} 1977 GUIDE, supra note 3, at E-2; 1988 GUIDE, supra note 1, at S-20.
\textsuperscript{143} 1977 GUIDE, supra note 3, at E-2 to E-3.
\textsuperscript{144} This is basically the intent and effects test first described in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 432 (2d Cir. 1945).
\textsuperscript{148} It also limits FTC Act jurisdiction.
\textsuperscript{149} 1988 GUIDE, supra note 1, at S-21.
\textsuperscript{150} Id. at S-20.
\textsuperscript{151} See generally I. B. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL AN-
Nonetheless, there are several other issues that have been suggested: (1) Should foreclosure of U.S. exporters be enough to warrant Department action or should proof of anticompetitive effects in the United States be necessary? (2) How will foreclosure be measured? (3) What factors will be weighed when balancing policy between protection of competition and protection of competitors in export trade?\footnote{1988 GUIDE, supra note 1, at S-21.}

Unfortunately, the Department provides few answers. The guidelines cite two circumstances in which DOJ may act: (1) if the U.S. and foreign markets are highly inelastic and a substantial number of U.S. firms agree to increase exports in order to reduce supply and raise price in the United States; (2) if export conduct was actually intended to affect the price of products in the United States.\footnote{1977 GUIDE, supra note 3, at E-3.}

The first scenario seems to be just a specific instance of the second scenario, not a different class of conduct.\footnote{Moreover, the effects of the first scenario are just as likely to occur due to independent business judgment as from a horizontal agreement.} The second scenario is just a broad proscription against intent to affect prices or output.

There is ample room for political interpretation of this policy. Essentially, it is a protectionist mandate from Congress which may enable certain classes of exporters to be protected from self-defined unfair competition. The Department’s position is simply a bending of its will to the political reality that Congress expects to have significant input on which exporting industries may be disciplined.

2. Personal Jurisdiction

Unlike subject matter jurisdiction, the Department’s stance on personal jurisdiction has not changed much since the 1977 Guide was produced. That document asserted, “The general trend of modern history has been to expand personal jurisdiction of our courts to reach those who transact business in a certain place, even if they are not ‘found’ there in a traditional jurisdictional sense.”\footnote{1988 GUIDE, supra note 1, at S-21.} The 1988 Guidelines continue to use similar broad language.\footnote{See text accompanying note 150.}

The 1977 Guide was vague on subject matter and personal jurisdiction policy regarding foreign sovereigns. In 1976 Congress had passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act\footnote{28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1982).} which altered and
clarified existing judicial doctrine with respect to standards of immunity, personal jurisdiction, and remedies available against foreign sovereigns.158 The 1977 Guide did not mention this law by name. Rather, it referred to the doctrine of sovereign immunity and noted that although foreign governments are immune for acts within their "sovereign" capacity, they may be liable for acts done in their "proprietary" capacity. Later in Illustrative Case L, the 1977 Guide mentioned the sovereign immunity defense does not extend to "commercial" activity and cited FSIA in a footnote.159 It is not clear what distinction the Department meant by using the differing terms "proprietary" and "commercial." Presumably they were intended to be interchangeable. It is also surprising that the 1977 Guide seemed to view the sovereign immunity defense and FSIA as related solely to personal jurisdiction when, in fact, they also go to subject matter jurisdiction.160 All in all, this portion of the 1977 Guide was not well constructed.

The 1988 Guidelines cite FSIA directly in the overview and, like the 1977 Guide’s Case L, note that some sovereign actions may be pursued under exceptions to FSIA, especially the "commercial acts" exception. In Case 14, the 1988 Guidelines use almost identical language as the 1977 Guide to describe how the "commercial act" exception would be applied161 although the subject matter jurisdiction/personal jurisdiction confusion over FSIA is cleared up.162

D. Discretion in Asserting Jurisdiction

The 1988 Guidelines add three subsections not explicitly found in the 1977 Guide’s overview: Factors Affecting the Department’s Discretion in Asserting Jurisdiction;163 Foreign Sovereign Compulsion;164 and International Trade Friction and the U.S. Trade Laws.165 The 1977 Guide does cover these topics to some degree in Illustrative Cases K,166 L,167 M,168 and N.169

Discretion in asserting jurisdiction centers around the concept of comity—"the notion that foreign nations are due deference when

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158 See Hawk Treatise, supra note 151, at Vol. 1, ch. 5, p. 566; id. at 569.
162 This is implicit in Illustrative Case 14 because the discussion of personal jurisdiction does not begin until after the discussion of FSIA and sovereign immunity. See id.
164 Id. at S-23.
165 Id. at S-24.
167 Id. at E-15.
168 Id. at E-16.
169 Id. at E-17.
acting within their legitimate spheres of authority.”

Comity is an important public policy underlying two defenses to antitrust actions in international cases: the act of state doctrine and the foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine.

The 1977 Guide discussed comity in Case K. The Guide first stated that under principles of comity, “the laws of the nation with the more important national interest at stake, based upon its own laws and policies, should prevail.” The 1977 Guide then went on to say that the U.S. antitrust laws represent “a fundamental and important national policy.” This begs the questions of exactly what factors are to be used in weighing competing nations’ interests and what kinds of interests may outweigh those of the United States. Because other sovereigns will inevitably find their interests more “fundamental and important” than our own, the 1977 Guide’s policy causes the very foreign relations tensions that comity is intended to reduce.

In the years following the release of the 1977 Guide, the Department embarked on several antitrust enforcement actions involving foreign governments. This resulted in diplomatic and political fallout that has led to a careful softening of the Department’s comity policy in the 1988 Guidelines. The Department has now “committed itself to consider the legitimate interests of other nations.”

The basic policy is still the same, a balancing of nations’ interests, but at least the process is clearer. The 1988 Guidelines describe a two-part test for weighing interests. Before asserting jurisdiction or seeking remedies, the Department first considers whether any significant effect will be felt by the foreign nations involved. If so, six factors are weighed against U.S. consumer welfare loss including the significance of the conduct and effects, and

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172 Id. at E-15.
173 See generally Hawk Treatise, supra note 151, at Vol. 1, ch. 1, pp. 22-27.
174 “[A]ntitrust has been the chief focus of foreign complaints that application of United States laws to foreign conduct and persons is inappropriate, if not contrary to international law.” Id. at 29.
the degree of conflict expected with foreign law. These factors are still too nebulous for business planning purposes, but serve to confirm that the Department is taking a more cautious attitude.

Unfortunately, Case 14 in the 1988 Guidelines, which discusses comity, does not present a good example of the test's application.

As mentioned previously, one of two important defenses to international antitrust actions relying on the principle of comity is the act of state doctrine. It is a judicially created principle under which a court refuses to inquire into the validity of acts by a foreign sovereign within its own borders.179

The act of state doctrine received a great deal of attention in the 1977 Guide, but unfortunately the treatment is simplistic and confused. A major part of the confusion occurred because the act of state doctrine is blended with the foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine in the same discussion. Actually, these are separate although sometimes overlapping concepts. In Cases K and L, the 1977 Guide recognized the validity of the act of state doctrine and then laid out what the Department saw as basic limitations on it. First, the doctrine only protects foreign government directed activities occurring in foreign territory, not in the United States.180 Second, the activities must be performed by a truly sovereign entity acting within its own laws.181 An agent of the government is not protected. Third, the doctrine does not apply to commercial activities of a foreign government, only public, political actions.182

The 1988 Guidelines mention the act of state doctrine in a pair of footnotes.183 The Department believes that no government actions should be dismissed by the courts because of considerations of comity (which would occur through invocation of the act of state doctrine), although the doctrine should still be applicable to private actions.184 The Department's reasoning is simple: the conduct of

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178 The actual six factors listed are:
1. The relative significance, to the violation alleged, of conduct within the United States as compared to conduct abroad;
2. The nationality of the persons involved in or affected by the conduct;
3. The presence or absence of a purpose to affect United States consumers or competitors;
4. The relative significance and foreseeability of the effects of conduct on the United States as compared to the effects abroad;
5. The existence of reasonable expectations that would be furthered or defeated by the action; and
6. The degree of conflict with foreign law or articulated foreign economic policies.

181 Id.
182 Id.
183 1988 GUIDE, supra note 1, at S-22 n.169 & S-46 n.286.
184 Id. at S-22 n.167.
foreign relations is constitutionally reserved to the Executive Branch.\textsuperscript{185} Therefore, an action by the Justice Department, an arm of the Executive Branch, cannot be questioned by the Judiciary on grounds of foreign relations considerations.

The act of state doctrine has been rejected in the majority of international antitrust cases\textsuperscript{186} and the future of the doctrine in general has been questioned by the Supreme Court.\textsuperscript{187} This may explain the diplomatic manner by which the Department approaches the topic.

\textit{E. Foreign Sovereign Compulsion}

The foreign sovereign compulsion defense, described in the next subsection of the 1988 Guidelines, maintains that a private company cannot be liable for its acts under the antitrust laws where its conduct has been compelled by a foreign sovereign.\textsuperscript{188} The Department stated in the 1977 Guide's Case L that it recognized the defense, but with four limitations. First, foreign sovereign compulsion only protected foreign government directed activities occurring in foreign territory, not in the United States.\textsuperscript{189} This is called the territorial limitation. Second, the act must have been due to an order by a truly sovereign entity acting within its own laws.\textsuperscript{190} Third, referring back to comity, the balance of national interests must have been reasonable and, fourth, the response of the private company must have been reasonable in light of the degree of pressure applied to it.\textsuperscript{191}

There were several criticisms of this position. First a public policy in favor of fairness\textsuperscript{192} to private companies (particularly in light of possible criminal liability) augurs for a rule of reason approach versus absolute proscriptions such as the territorial limitation.\textsuperscript{193} Second, the fact that there is a wide spectrum of liability facing private companies, from civil damages to prospective relief to criminal sanctions, a flexible set of standards for conduct needs to be applied.\textsuperscript{194} Third, the comity balancing problem is similar to that under act of state. Actions against private companies which follow the commands of foreign sovereigns implicitly impune the com-

\textsuperscript{185} \textit{Id.} at S-23 n.171.
\textsuperscript{186} \textit{Hawk Treatise, supra} note 151, at 586.
\textsuperscript{187} \textit{Id.} at 581.
\textsuperscript{188} \textit{Id.} at 615.
\textsuperscript{190} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{191} \textit{Id.} at E-15 to E-16.
\textsuperscript{193} \textit{Hawk Treatise, supra} note 151, at 615.
\textsuperscript{194} \textit{Id.}
mands and the foreign sovereigns themselves. Thus the 1977 Guide’s poor formulation of comity policy was considered likely to create more problems than it solved.

The 1988 Guidelines’ foreign sovereign compulsion policy uses similar language to that in the 1977 Guide. Once again, the Department recognizes this defense but with two limitations. First a foreign sovereign must actually and unambiguously compel the conduct. Second, where conduct has clearly occurred primarily in the United States, the Department generally will not accept a foreign sovereign compulsion defense.

The second limitation is a slight softening of the Department’s former absolute territorial limitation. The Department’s milder stance is probably a pragmatic response to complaints by foreign governments of interference by the United States.

After describing the scope of the doctrine, the 1988 Guidelines carefully distinguish it from the state action doctrine. This delineation is not included in the 1977 Guide and is a valuable addition to the new one. The Department’s position is taken wholly from the Supreme Court’s opinion in Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States. Essentially, the state action doctrine’s lower standard for compulsion of private conduct is driven by considerations of federalism, which obviously are inapplicable to foreign sovereigns. In addition, the requirement under the state action doctrine of “active supervision” would be impossible to enforce in the international context without interfering with legitimate interests of foreign sovereigns.

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195 Id. at 616.
196 1988 GUIDE, supra note 1, at S-23. In its draft version of the new guidelines, the Department had additionally required that the command be within the foreign sovereign’s own legal authority and limited comity to those situations where the foreign sovereign’s acts were reasonably required. 1988 DRAFT, supra note 1, at S-14. These are identical to the second and third limitations in the 1977 Guide.
197 At first blush, this indicates acceptance of the fairness principle, however, in footnote 117 of the draft version of the guidelines, the Department stated, “In the absence of [comity] considerations . . . . abstract and undefined notions of ‘fairness’ to firms that engage in anticompetitive conduct should not obstruct the legitimate prosecution of antitrust offenses . . . .” Id. at n.117. That footnote was removed, but may still be the best statement of DOJ’s position.
198 See supra note 174.
199 The Sherman Act doctrine of state action “embodies the notion that the U.S. Congress should not be presumed to have intended to interfere with the authority of the states ‘constitutionally to regulate their domestic commerce.’ ” 1988 GUIDE, supra note 1, at S-23 (citing Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 56 (1985)).
201 HAWK TREATISE, supra note 151, at 619.
202 For domestic private conduct to be protected under the state action doctrine, there are two requirements. First, the conduct must be pursuant to clearly articulated state policies and subject to active supervision by the state. Second, the conduct must be actually compelled by the state.
203 1988 GUIDE, supra note 1, at S-23 n.179.
F. International Trade Friction

In the last subsection of the 1988 Guidelines, the Department provides its position on a Noerr-Pennington-like doctrine applicable in the international context. The stated policy is slightly changed from the 1977 Guide which took the position in Case N that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine itself applies internationally. The 1977 Guide listed three exceptions to the defense recognized in domestic cases: (1) sham activity intended to slow competitors without actually trying to seek government help; (2) providing false information to gain government help; (3) conspiracy with or bribery of a regulatory body. The 1988 Guidelines equivocate on Noerr-Pennington's direct applicability in the international context, but for reasons of comity the Department does not pursue legitimate petitioning of foreign sovereigns by U.S. or foreign firms under circumstances in which the U.S. Government protects similar activities.

The guidelines mention the sham exception noted in the 1977 Guide, but omit the other two. In Case 17 of the 1988 Guidelines, the Department also describes how trade arbitration agreements are affected by the antitrust laws. In effect, any agreement among international competitors to raise price or restrict output is exempt from the antitrust laws only so long as "the agreement is reached and carried out in accordance with the suspension agreement provisions of the antidumping law."

The guidelines go on to outline the basic procedures of the

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204 The Noerr-Pennington doctrine asserts that "the Sherman Act does not prohibit two or more persons from associating together in an attempt to persuade the legislature or the executive to take particular action with respect to a law that would produce a restraint or monopoly." Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 136 (1961); accord, United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). See also California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).

205 1977 GUIDE, supra note 3, at E-17.

206 The doctrine was formulated in cases of a purely domestic nature, but because the heart of the issue is the First Amendment right to petition, the doctrine or a very similar doctrine is believed by some to apply in the international context. HAWK TREArISE, supra note 151, 609-11. See Coastal States Marketing, Inc. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358 (5th Cir. 1983). But see Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972).


210 1988 GUIDE, supra note 1, at S-24 (citing Occidental, at 107-08 and Coastal States, at 1364-67).

211 1988 GUIDE, supra note 1, at S-24.

212 This makes sense because perjury, bribery, conspiracy, etc. are obviously illegal under other statutes and therefore intuitively create exceptions to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine or any similar doctrine.

213 1988 GUIDE, supra note 1, at S-46 to S-47.

214 Id. at S-47.
Commerce Department but add, "A detailed discussion of the provisions in various U.S. trade laws that allow agreements or other measures to restrict import competition is beyond the scope of these Guidelines." 215 This is probably the most serious gap in the new document. With the explosion of trade laws and regulations in the 1980s, it is becoming important to understand what the Department's role is. This is a very complex problem and it is understandable if the Department feels it is too soon to announce detailed policies, but follow-up to this guide is needed.

IV. Conclusion

The Department has generally done a good job in describing its current policies. There are no significant differences between the new international guidelines and current domestic guidelines for criminal offenses under the Sherman Act, mergers, and vertical nonprice restraints. Policies for joint ventures and intellectual property restraints are being liberalized under the new guidelines, but again, this will probably be as true for purely domestic situations in the future as for those involving international operations today. All in all, there are no significant surprises in the new guidelines.

Nevertheless, the Department has not been as successful in meeting one of its primary goals: defining safe harbors for business. For example, the Department has reiterated that mergers which leave the relevant market with an HHI of less than one thousand will not be challenged—a fairly objective criterion. Yet there is such a long list of nebulous ways to measure the relevant market, that businesses cannot be absolutely certain of the result. The Department admits that even with the guidelines, there is no substitute for experienced counsel. 216

The problem may be inherent in the Chicago philosophy which advocates the generous use of the rule of reason approach. The Reagan Administration intended this to open up the market, to give business every economic benefit of the doubt. Unfortunately, rule of reason is a means and not an end. The next administration or some other future administration can easily interpret rule of reason in a much stricter fashion as suits whatever ends they may wish to achieve. Mergers, and to a lesser degree possibly vertical nonprice restraints, are the most likely candidates for this treatment. International joint ventures may enjoy bipartisan support for several years to come, but even they will probably face resurgent protectionism or fears of collusion at some point.

These political realities of antitrust enforcement point out one major change that should be made to these guidelines as well as

215 Id.
216 Id. at S-1.
other Department policy statements. As a new administration enters office, timely notice of changes in policy must be given to the business community. Certainly, a full set of guidelines would be too difficult to produce immediately, but a letter of policy considerations should be required within six months after a change in administrations. A more complete rewrite of guidelines as necessary should then be delivered within two years.\textsuperscript{217} Guidelines are far less useful when delivered virtually at the end of an administration as occurred with these guidelines.

A second and much tougher part of the uncertainty problem alluded to early in this Comment is the lack of coordinated guidelines from the various government bodies overseeing international operations. It would be a tremendous advantage to have a series of linked policy statements from the FTC, the ITC, and even the States' Attorneys General on this topic so that a complete picture can be drawn.

Finally, it is heartening to note that DOJ does not see the guidelines as a final answer to business uncertainty. The Department has proposed limiting private suit damages and other actions which should minimize the penalty on a business for guessing wrong about antitrust policy and encourage more international activity.\textsuperscript{218}

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\textsuperscript{217} The Justice Department had initially promised to update the Merger Guidelines every two years. But when asked about a possible revision as the second year anniversary approached, then Assistant Attorney General Ginsberg stated, "I anticipate that [the Merger Guidelines] will largely be codified by then." \textit{Interview With Assistant Attorney General Douglas Ginsburg, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.} (BNA) Vol. 50, No. 1247, at 59 (Jan. 9 1986).

\textsuperscript{218} Thornburgh, \textit{supra} note 103.