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Bankruptcy's Lorelei: The Dangerous Allure of Financial Institution Bankruptcy

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The idea of a bankruptcy procedure for large, systemically important financial institutions exercises an irresistible draw for some policymakers and academics. Financial institution bankruptcy promises to be a transparent, law-based process in which resolution of failed financial institutions is navigated in the courts. Financial institution bankruptcy presents itself as the antithesis of an arbitrary and discretionary bailout regime. It promises to eliminate the moral hazard of “too big to fail” by ensuring that creditors will incur losses rather than being bailed out. Financial institution bankruptcy holds out the possibility of market discipline instead of an extensive bureaucratic regulatory system.

This Article argues that financial institution bankruptcy is a dangerous siren song that lures with false promises. Instead of instilling market discipline and avoiding the favoritism of bailouts, financial institution bankruptcy would likely simply result in bailouts in bankruptcy garb. It would encourage bank deregulation without the elimination of the moral hazard that produces financial crises. In particular, it would undermine the federal regulators’ single most powerful tool for managing systemic risk, the living wills power, even while imposing a resolution process that is doomed to failure.

A successful bankruptcy is not possible for a large financial institution absent massive financing for operations while in
bankruptcy, and that financing can only reliably be obtained on short notice and in distressed credit markets from one source: the U.S. government. Government financing of a bankruptcy would inevitably come with strings attached, including favorable treatment for certain creditor groups. This would result in bankruptcies that resemble those of Chrysler and General Motors, which are much decried by proponents of financial institution bankruptcy as having been disguised bailouts.

The central flaw with the idea of financial institution bankruptcy is that it fails to address the political nature of systemic risk. What makes a financial crisis systemically important is whether its social costs are politically acceptable. When they are not, bailouts will occur in some form because crisis containment inevitably trumps rule of law. Resolution of systemic risk is a political question, and its weight would warp the judicial process. Financial institution bankruptcy will merely produce bailouts in the guise of bankruptcy while undermining judicial legitimacy and the rule of law.

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INTRODUCTION

Financial institution bankruptcy is the Lorelei of the restructuring world. The idea of financial institution bankruptcy calls out in a golden voice, singing, “I am Law, I am Law. I brook no favoritism or cronyism, I permit no bailout. My rules are neutral, predictable, and generally applicable. I answer not to the whim of unaccountable bureaucrats, but am Law.” With this siren song of false promises, the tempting concept of financial institution bankruptcy (“FIB”)—the use of federal bankruptcy courts as a forum for resolving large, failed financial institutions—lures unwitting policymakers to the rocky shoals of a financial crisis, for FIB is not workable as a restructuring system. Ultimately, the real work an FIB procedure would do would be to undermine the “living wills” process that gives federal regulators substantial discretion to impose additional regulatory requirements on or even break up the largest banks. FIB thus threatens to weaken financial regulation while providing an unworkable process for dealing with the consequences, a formula that all but guarantees bailouts.

The lure of the FIB Lorelei comes not from her inherent beauty but from her apparent, comparative attractiveness relative to the alternative method of dealing with the failure of large financial institutions—bailouts. Nobody likes a bailout. Bailouts are messy by nature. They do not follow rules or law. Instead, they are ad hoc,

1. Heinrich Heine, Lorelei, in His Wit Wisdom Poetry 42, 42–43 (Newell Dunbar ed., Boston, J. G. Cupples Co. 1892) (naming the siren who, from her perch atop a mountain overlooking the River Rhine, draws the gazes of sailors upwards and away from the treacherous rocks in their course).
improvised, and unpredictable responses to crises that are readily open to abuse. Bailouts are messy mainly because they have a singular goal to which all other concerns, including rule of law, are temporarily subordinated: containing financial crises so they do not wreak broader havoc on the economy. Implicit in bailouts is the idea that the rule of law is a means to social welfare, not an end in itself. In a bailout, if rule of law impedes social welfare, the law will be stretched, changed, ignored, or jettisoned, at least temporarily.²

Revolusion toward bailouts is not just a function of their lawlessness. It is also because bailouts create opportunities for government favoritism, as some have alleged regarding the General Motors (“GM”) and Chrysler bankruptcies.³ By deciding whom to bail out and on what terms, the government is not just picking winners and losers in the economy but also potentially enriching particular parties at taxpayer expense.⁴ Given that bailouts are often undertaken through independent regulatory agencies that are not directly answerable at the ballot box, this cronyism is all the more distressing because there is not even an ex post disciplinary mechanism.

Moreover, to the extent creditors of large financial institutions believe ex ante they will be bailed out if a large financial institution fails, they will be more reckless in their lending to large financial institutions and extend too much underpriced credit.⁵ The expectation

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³ See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki, Economic Uncertainty, the Courts, and the Rule of Law, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 195, 200 (2012) (“When politicians are not constrained they take advantage of that freedom of opportunity to benefit themselves. The General Motors and Chrysler bailouts might be the most obvious and egregious examples of this dynamic from the financial crisis.”); Paul Roderick Gregory, American Airlines Shows the Corruption of Obama’s GM Bailout, FORBES (Feb. 6, 2012, 2:16 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/paulroderickgregory/2012/02/06/american-airlines-shows-the-corruption-of-obamas-gm-bailout/#48a8730d5eb8 [https://perma.cc/MTD3-UCP7] (arguing that the Obama Administration’s bailout of GM was the result of political favoritism toward the United Auto Workers labor union).
⁴ See Zywicki, supra note 3, at 200 (“With Chrysler, the government intervened to take money from the company’s creditors—which included the pension funds for teachers and policemen—and give it to the retirement and health care funds of the politically powerful United Auto Workers, who had an unsecured claim in the case.”).
of bailouts not only creates a moral hazard for lenders but it also incentivizes financial institutions to grow to be too big to fail—that is, to grow to a size and importance where their creditors are likely to be bailed out if they fail because the social costs and disruption from not doing so would be politically unacceptable. The result of anticipated bailouts is a downward spiral of reckless lending and bailouts.

FIB is conceived of as a totally private regime, but such a totally private resolution system for large financial institutions is an ideological pipedream that has become an unhealthy distraction in financial regulatory policy debates. This Article argues that the idea of FIB functioning without extensive government involvement is a pernicious market fantasy, a siren song that is not workable. FIB poses a number of insurmountable practical obstacles and irreconcilable policy goals, most notably the inability of a large failed financial institution to obtain the “debtor-in-possession” (“DIP”) financing required to preserve the value of its assets during bankruptcy. Attempting to resolve a large systemically important financial institution’s failure through an FIB process without DIP lending would result in a value-destroying disaster that would exacerbate the spillover effects from the institution’s failure. Thus, while FIB holds out the promise of being an alternative to bailouts, any viable FIB process would inevitably be little more than a bailout masquerading as a bankruptcy. Nonetheless, all FIB legislation to date has been for wholly private FIB processes.

The first of these obstacles is that failed financial institutions would require enormous liquidity support while in bankruptcy—tens if not hundreds of billions of dollars. To be sure, it is possible to construct a bankruptcy based on a high-speed sale process. But a curtailment of the failed firm’s time in bankruptcy prior to an expedited sale is no solution to the liquidity problem. Instead, it merely shifts the liquidity problem to the asset purchaser, which lacks the protection of the automatic stay because it is not a debtor subject to bankruptcy court jurisdiction. If the purchaser is insufficiently


liquid, it will be subject to a creditor run, in which case the FIB process will have accomplished nothing in terms of financial stability.

The enormous level of liquidity support required to ensure a smooth FIB process would have to be obtained on extremely short notice in distressed financial markets. Realistically, it could come from one source and one source only: the U.S. government. As DIP lender (or as the lender to the asset purchaser in the event of a high-speed sale), the U.S. government would get to call the shots in the bankruptcy—that is what DIP lenders do. For example, DIP lenders routinely dictate detailed timelines for asset sales with bidding procedures to their liking and impose corporate officers of their choosing on debtors.\(^7\) The U.S. government as DIP lender would be able to dictate which assets would be transferred to and which liabilities would be assumed by the solvent purchaser and therefore effectively paid in full. In other words, the executive branch of the U.S. government would be determining the effective distributional consequences of the bankruptcy, which would not necessarily be in accord with formal statutory distributional requirements.

This scenario is exactly what occurred in the Chrysler and GM bankruptcies. In both cases, the U.S. government, as DIP lender, required fast asset sales that complied with the terms on which it insisted,\(^8\) and the assets were sold to entities partially owned by the U.S. government. Moreover, in both cases, the asset sales were conditioned upon the buyer assuming certain favored liabilities of the debtor, particularly obligations owed to the firms’ unionized employees and retirees who would have received nothing in a liquidation. Ironically, proponents of FIB have been among the leading critics of those bankruptcies, but Chrysler and GM are the template for what can be expected with an FIB process. FIB will result in precisely what its proponents despise—a bailout that rewards some favored creditors (here, the unionized employees)—albeit in the form of bankruptcy.

Because of financial institutions’ massive liquidity needs, the only way FIB could realistically function is with government involvement. Such government involvement would warp the bankruptcy process to produce results that are indistinguishable from


bailouts. And it would do so with the added harm of being done under color of law, thereby undermining the very rule of law virtue that makes bankruptcy attractive in the first place.

None of this may matter to some FIB proponents, however. For some FIB supporters, the ultimate goal may be bank deregulation. Generally, the existence of an FIB process would facilitate the argument that private market discipline can substitute for public regulation. The operational problems with FIB would not become manifest until a large financial institution fails. In the interim, however, the availability of an FIB process would serve as a cudgel to push for bank deregulation based on claims of adequate market discipline through bankruptcy.

More specifically, however, FIB legislation undermines the single most powerful tool regulators have for policing systemic risk: the “living wills” provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The living wills power requires the largest financial institutions to present plans for their resolution in bankruptcy to federal regulators. If regulators do not deem a resolution plan credible, then regulators have substantial discretion to impose additional regulatory requirements on the financial institution or even to break it up. But enacting a special FIB procedure would mean that Congress believes it possible for these large institutions to resolve themselves in bankruptcy, making it all but impossible for regulators not to deem credible these institutions’ living wills.

Thus, FIB proposals would simultaneously tie regulators’ hands in terms of preventing crises ex ante while imposing an unworkable process for managing crises ex post. This means FIB is ironically a recipe for a bailout, for that will be the only response possible in the wake of a failed FIB.

FIB proponents also fail to grapple with the inappropriateness of the courts as a venue for dealing with systemic risk. The failure of a systemically important financial institution is materially different from that of most nonfinancial businesses. The failure of a nonfinancial business is a private matter between the business and its creditors. The spillover effects from such nonfinancial bankruptcies are likely to be more limited in most situations. While there can be

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11. See Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, supra note 6, at 446–50.
domino effects up and down supply chains and across an industry due to single-sourced suppliers, the failure of nonfinancial firms does not pose a threat to the credit market and payment system that are the lifeblood and arteries of the economy.

Systemically important financial institutions are another matter. Their failure threatens disruption to the entire global financial system. It is, then, not simply a private matter but a matter of public policy concern, both because of its broad-ranging economic effects and its likelihood of triggering federal government involvement in the form of financial support. Put another way, the public is affected by the distribution in the bankruptcy of a systemically important financial institution, even though it is not a “creditor.” Resolution of systemically important financial institutions is thus a political question because it implicates the public fisc and general distributional questions, not simply firm-specific ones.

The courts, however, are a poor venue for resolving political problems—as the political question doctrine recognizes—because political pressures can corrupt the judicial process and generally undermine its legitimacy. FIB would turn bankruptcy into a political process for which it is wholly unsuited.

Bankruptcy is a process suited for addressing the microconcerns of individual firms, not macropolicy concerns. It is not a transparent, participatory forum capable of giving effective voice to noncreditor constituencies who may nevertheless be significantly affected by the bankruptcy. Furthermore, bankruptcy is not a democratic forum. Many key issues are decided solely by a non-Article III judge and are, as with many issues, effectively unreviewable on appeal. To the

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12. See id. at 453–61 (explaining how nonfinancial firms can pose systemic risk).
15. Given the dysfunction of the formal legislative process in Congress, one might reasonably argue that the courts are a preferable forum for addressing political issues, insofar as they are a forum that will in fact address issues, even if the process is less than democratic.
17. Some issues are effectively unreviewable because of statutory limitations on appellate remedies. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) (2012) (prohibiting review of consummated sale orders on appeal); id. § 364(e) (prohibiting review of consummated
extent there is a vote, it is a vote only of classes of impaired creditors and shareholders, not affected third parties. If the government were involved in the process, it would participate by contract through a court order approving a nonappealable DIP financing agreement. The terms of such an agreement are not subject to the normal procedural safeguards of Administrative Procedure Act rulemaking or to any constraints beyond some minimal requirements in the Bankruptcy Code. Bankruptcy is thus a particularly nontransparent, nonparticipatory form of policymaking.

This does not mean that the politics disappear from bankruptcy, only that they function differently outside the legislative process. The distributional concerns that are so intense when dealing with systemic financial crises mean that political pressures will inevitably corrupt the FIB process and turn FIB into nothing more than a bailout in judicial garb.

This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I lays out the background against which FIB proposals have emerged: the inadequacy of Chapter 11 for resolving systemically important financial institutions; discontent with the bailouts following the 2008 financial crisis; and unease with the post-2008 legislative response, the “Orderly Liquidation Authority” regime created by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Part I also explains how FIB proposals would function to undermine the living wills process that provides the most potent tool in the arsenal of the existing financial regulatory regime. Part II explains the basic form that FIB would likely take before addressing the fundamental tension

financing orders on appeal). But see id. § 1144 (allowing revocation of confirmation orders if procured by fraud). Other issues become functionally moot because they are not appealable—absent leave of the bankruptcy court—until the issuance of a final order. Id. § 158(a). Additionally, most circuits recognize some form of the doctrine of equitable mootness, which limits appellate review. See, e.g., Ullrich v. Welt (In re Nica Holdings, Inc.), 810 F.3d 781, 788–90 (11th Cir. 2015); R2 Investments, LDC v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc. (In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc.), 691 F.3d 476, 481–82 (2d Cir. 2012); In re Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 559 (3d Cir. 1996). Further, critical questions such as valuation are appealed on a clear error basis, which means that the bankruptcy court receives deference for its valuation determination. See LEVITIN, supra note 7, at 325.

18. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(a), (f) (2012) (providing the holders of claims and equity interests the right to vote on a bankruptcy plan but conclusively deeming unimpaired classes of claims and interests to have voted to support the plan).

19. See id. § 364(a)–(c).

20. See id.

between trying to reduce both moral hazard and systemic disruption through bankruptcy. Part III then turns to a discussion of the practical obstacles to using bankruptcy to restructure financial institutions: lack of DIP financing, international coordination difficulties, problems concerning derivatives and other financial contracts, and the lack of a mechanism for addressing the valuation uncertainty that would chill the market for buyers of the failed institution’s assets. The only way to overcome these obstacles is through federal government intervention in a bankruptcy, turning bankruptcy into a bailout. Part IV demonstrates how the resolution of systemically important financial institutions is a political question and therefore best avoided by the courts. Accordingly, the Article concludes by suggesting that rather than follow FIB’s siren song onto jagged rocks, we would do better to devote our energies to crafting a procedural mechanism for bailouts that imposes transparency, basic procedural checks, and ex post accountability on government and bailout recipients.

I. THE SIREN SONG OF BANKRUPTCY

The government’s response to the 2008 financial crisis was varied but can largely be characterized as an ad hoc series of bailouts of a wide range of financial institutions and markets. Some of these bailouts were marred by a sense of cronyism or deliberate action to protect favored financial institutions. Aversion to the capricious and cronyistic nature of the bailouts has prompted calls to revise the Bankruptcy Code to provide an effective mechanism for the resolution of large financial institutions in bankruptcy.

A. The Inadequacy of Chapter 11 for Resolving Financial Institutions

Bankruptcy has always been available as a forum for resolving certain failed financial institutions, but only in the sense of a well-ordered liquidation. Restructuring such institutions, however, whether through a plan of reorganization or through a going-concern asset sale, is not currently practically possible in bankruptcy.

As a preliminary matter, some financial institutions are not eligible for bankruptcy in the first place. Banks and insurance companies cannot file for bankruptcy and are instead resolved under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) bank receivership or applicable state insurance insolvency regime. These

 resolutions are facilitated by the availability of funding from the FDIC’s Deposit Insurance Fund and state insurance insolvency funds.

In addition, banks and insurance companies are rarely stand-alone corporations. They are usually part of larger corporate conglomerates. In such conglomerates, while the bank or insurance company subsidiary is not eligible for bankruptcy, the holding company and other affiliates are able to file. Holding companies, however, typically liquidate in Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Liquidation is often the only option since there is generally no business left to restructure after the subsidiary bank or insurance company has been taken into receivership in which it is either wound down or sold. Likewise, securities and commodities broker-dealers are eligible for bankruptcy, but only for Chapter 7 liquidation, although this can be transformed into a liquidation run by the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (“SIPC”). Reorganization in bankruptcy is not allowed for securities and commodities brokerages.

Thus, if a financial conglomerate were to fail, its various pieces would be resolved under several different regimes: Chapter 11 for the holding company, Chapter 7 and possibly SIPC liquidation for the broker-dealer subsidiary, FDIC receivership for the bank subsidiary, and a state insurance receivership for the insurance company receivership. (This assumes an entirely domestic firm; foreign subsidiaries would further complicate the picture.) The result of this piecemeal resolution regime is the loss of any synergies that exist within the conglomerate. In addition, depending on the details of the firms’ structuring, there could be serious operational disruptions.

In theory, then, one might attempt to resolve the firm in a single Chapter 11 proceeding at the holding company level. If the holding company were to guarantee the obligations of its subsidiaries, then structural priority would subordinate the holding companies’ creditors to those of its subsidiaries. With all losses concentrated on holding company creditors, there would be no need to put any subsidiaries into a receivership. The holding company could then attempt to use the Chapter 11 process to arrange a going-concern sale of its various subsidiaries, which, if successful, would preserve any

23. See id. § 109(d).
25. See infra Section III.B.
26. For example, disruptions might result if there were centralized cash or IT management, intercompany licensing arrangements, or intercompany leasing arrangements.
synergies within the affiliate constellation and also prevent any operations disruptions.

It is unlikely, however, that such a resolution could work under the existing Chapter 11 bankruptcy process. Chapter 11 is inadequate for resolution of a financial conglomerate through a going-concern sale of all of the operating subsidiaries because of the exception to the automatic stay for certain financial contracts. The filing of a bankruptcy petition triggers the “automatic stay,” a federal injunction against most collection activities outside of the bankruptcy claims process. The stay only applies to the actual debtor, not to its nondebtor affiliates, so it would not protect the subsidiaries in the event of the parent holding company’s bankruptcy.

There are also numerous exceptions to the automatic stay, most notably a set of exceptions that allow the debtor’s counterparties on various types of financial contracts—swaps, repos, forward contracts, securities contracts, commodities contracts, and master netting agreements—to accelerate, terminate, and liquidate these agreements and any collateral posted by the debtor to guarantee their performance. Even in the best circumstances, a sale would not be instantaneous upon the bankruptcy filing. As a result, the debtor’s counterparties could always accelerate and terminate their contracts and then liquidate any collateral the debtor posted, if they are in the money. Thus, the counterparties could deprive the debtor of critical assets that would be necessary to continue to operate as a going concern and thereby frustrate any sale. Instead, there would be a disorderly, piecemeal liquidation of the debtor that might impair its operations and result in its subsidiaries being taken into receivership themselves.

To the extent that a financial firm is not systemically important, the disruptions caused by its failure and piecemeal resolution are no more concerning than any other market inefficiency. In this regard, Chapter 11’s shortcomings as a process for one-stop shopping for quotidian financial institution resolution are unfortunate, but not a critical policy concern. But for systemically important firms, avoidance of disruptions and spillover effects from the resolution process is of paramount importance as a financial regulatory policy matter.

28. Id. § 362(b)(6)–(7), (17), (27); id. §§ 555, 559–561.
B. Calls for a Financial Institution Bankruptcy Process

In light of the shortcomings of existing bankruptcy law as a method for resolving systemically important failed financial institutions, there has been considerable interest in revising the Bankruptcy Code to facilitate financial institution resolution, although to date bankruptcy law remains unchanged in this regard. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, the major legislative response to the 2008 crisis, called for a study of bankruptcy alternatives for resolving large financial institution failures.\textsuperscript{29} The House of Representatives has since thrice passed a version of a “Financial Institutions Bankruptcy Act.”\textsuperscript{30} An FIB procedure has also appeared in both versions of the CHOICE Act,\textsuperscript{31} the Republican Dodd-Frank Act alternative, the second iteration of which passed the House.\textsuperscript{32} Another FIB bill has been repeatedly introduced in various versions in the Senate.\textsuperscript{33} Likewise, various academics and the Hoover Institution have called for the creation of a “Chapter 14” in the Bankruptcy Code for an FIB procedure.\textsuperscript{34} These proposals would cover all bank and financial holding companies, not just systemically important ones (however measured). But the policy

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{29} Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 216, 124 Stat. 1376, 1519 (2010).
\item \textsuperscript{32} H.R. 10.
\item \textsuperscript{33} Taxpayer Protection and Responsible Resolution Act, S. 1841, 114th Cong. (2015); Taxpayer Protection and Responsible Resolution Act, S. 1861, 113th Cong. (2013). A third version of the legislation was discussed at a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing in November 2018, but had not yet been formally introduced by the time this Article went to press. Big Bank Bankruptcy: 10 Years After Lehman Brothers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2018) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
impetus for these proposals is driven by concerns about large, systemically important institutions.

Bankruptcy, according to the logic behind FIB proposals, ensures the rule of law.\textsuperscript{35} It is a transparent, judicially supervised process, with public court filings and hearings in open court. In bankruptcy, all transactions outside of the ordinary course of business require judicial approval,\textsuperscript{36} and bankruptcy law gives all parties in interest a general right to be heard and to challenge proposed transactions in court.\textsuperscript{37} Furthermore, any sort of FIB regime would draw on well-established rules from corporate bankruptcy.\textsuperscript{38}

Bankruptcy, FIB backers argue, would prevent discretionary, cronyistic intervention by government and would allow for the restructuring of failed financial institutions without disruptions to the wider economy.\textsuperscript{39} Any resolution of a failed financial institution would be determined efficiently by private ordering in the context of bankruptcy, not by government fiat.\textsuperscript{40} At the same time, FIB proponents believe that bankruptcy would ensure that a failed financial institution’s creditors would internalize their losses, and the

\textsuperscript{35} See, e.g., Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act of 2015: Hearing on H.R. 2947 Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 2 (opening remarks of Tom Marino, Chairman, Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law) (“The bankruptcy process has long been favored as the primary mechanism for dealing with distressed and failing companies. This is due to its impartial nature, adherence to established precedent, judiciary oversight, and grounding in the principles of due process and the rule of law.’’); Jackson, Resolving Financial Institutions, supra note 34.

\textsuperscript{36} 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(c), 364(b)–(d), 365(a) (2012).

\textsuperscript{37} Id. § 1109(b).


\textsuperscript{39} See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 1667, supra note 5, at 3 (statement of John B. Taylor, Professor, Stanford University) (“The goal of these provisions is to let a failing financial firm go into bankruptcy in a predictable, rules-based manner without causing disruptive spillovers in the economy while permitting people to continue to use its financial services without running.’’).

\textsuperscript{40} See, e.g., Jackson, Resolving Financial Institutions, supra note 34 (“In bankruptcy, it is market-discipline first and foremost; in Title II, there inevitably is a heavier layer of regulatory overlay and control.’’); John B. Taylor, It’s Time to Pass the Financial Institutions Bankruptcy Act, ECON. ONE (Mar. 23, 2017), https://economicsone.com/2017/03/23/its-time-to-pass-the-financial-institutions-bankruptcy-act/ [http://perma.cc/N6PM-PGD9] (noting that, in contrast to government decisionmaking in an OLA resolution, “under bankruptcy reorganization, private parties, motivated and incentivized by profit and loss considerations, make key decisions about the direction of the new firm’’).
credible threat of this loss internalization would incentivize creditors to demand that financial institutions assume less risk.  

C. The Orderly Liquidation Authority as a Response to the 2008 Bailouts

Despite these supposed virtues of bankruptcy, Congress has so far declined to pursue it as the venue for resolving systemically important failed financing institutions. Congress instead opted to leave in place the hodge-podge combination of Chapter 7, Chapter 11, SIPC liquidation, FDIC bank receivership, and state insurance receiverships as the venues for resolving the various pieces of non-systemically important financial institutions. For systemically important institutions, Congress instead adapted the FDIC bank receivership process into a broader financial conglomerate resolution procedure known as the Title II Orderly Liquidation Authority ("OLA").

OLA gives federal regulators broad powers to place failing “financial companies”—not just insured depositories—that pose systemic risk into a receivership administered by the FDIC. OLA, which has not been used to date, has numerous statutory limitations, but it would also give federal regulators substantial discretion in whether to trigger the authority. Triggering OLA would require the turning of “three keys” by various regulators: (1) the Treasury Secretary, in consultation with the President, must determine that the firm is in default or in danger of default, that its resolution outside of OLA would have “serious adverse effects on financial stability in the United States,” and the effect on creditors is “appropriate” given the threat to financial stability; (2) two-thirds of the Federal Reserve Board must approve the receivership; and (3) two-thirds of the FDIC Board (or two-thirds of the SEC for broker-dealers or the Director of the Federal Insurance Office for insurance companies) must approve the receivership. The requirement of the three keys ensures that OLA would not be triggered without broad buy-in from

41. See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 1667, supra note 5, at 2 (statement of John B. Taylor, Professor, Stanford University) (“Chapter 11 ensures that creditors bear losses and this reduces moral hazard and excessive risk-taking.”).
43. See, e.g., id. § 5386 (imposing mandatory terms on all orderly liquidation actions, including a priority of distributions).
44. Id. § 5383(b)(1)–(2), (4).
45. Id. § 5383(a)(1).
46. Id.
both a politically accountable party and politically-insulated independent agencies. In other words, OLA is designed to be a consensus-based procedure.

Once OLA is triggered, the FDIC would have substantial discretion in implementing a receivership.\footnote{Id. §§ 5384, 5386, 5390.} For example, while the FDIC is directed to “ensure that unsecured creditors bear losses in accordance with” a statutory order of priority that is substantially similar to that of Chapter 7 bankruptcy,\footnote{Id. § 5386(3). The order of priority for creditor claims is set out in § 5390(b). Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 726 (2012) (detailing priority of claims in Chapter 7).} the FDIC is also authorized to sell some or all the assets of the failed financial institution.\footnote{12 U.S.C. § 5390(a)(1)(A) (2012) (giving the FDIC, as receiver, all powers of the failed financial institution); id. § 5390(a)(1)(G) (authorizing the transfer of any asset or liability or merger of the failed financial institution); id. § 5390(a)(9)(E) (providing directions for the disposition of assets of failed financial institutions); id. § 5390(h)(5) (authorizing a bridge company to acquire assets or assume liabilities of the failed financial institution).} Such a sale may be to a third-party buyer or to a “bridge” financial institution formed by the FDIC, the stock of which could then be sold to a third-party purchaser, thereby enabling a stock sale rather than an asset sale.\footnote{Id. § 5390(a)(1)(F) (authorizing the FDIC to create a “bridge company”); id. § 5390(h)(3)(A) (permitting a bridge financial company to assume or acquire assets and liabilities of the failed financial institution); id. § 5390(h)(5)(A) (authorizing the FDIC, as receiver, to merge the failed financial institution with another company or “transfer any assets and liabilities” of the failed financial institutions). A stock sale is a simpler and cheaper transaction because the only asset that needs to be transferred is ownership of the stock. In contrast, an asset sale might require separate formal deed recordings and transfer taxes to be paid on individual assets, particularly in the case of real estate transfers.}

An asset sale may be accompanied by an assumption of select liabilities as a form of consideration from the buyer.\footnote{Id. § 5390(h)(3)(A).} Greater assumption of liabilities would reduce the purchase price paid in other forms of consideration. To illustrate, a purchaser might pay $50 billion in cash and stock for the assets of a failed financial institution, or it could pay only $40 billion in cash and stock and assume liabilities of $10 billion. A creditor whose obligation is assumed by a buyer or by the bridge financial institution will get paid in full by the buyer or bridge institution (unless it too fails) and no longer has a claim in the receivership. That creditor, therefore, would not be subject to the distributional priority limitation on the FDIC in the receivership.\footnote{Id. § 5390(a)(1)(G) (authorizing a merger or transfer of any asset or liability of the failed financial institution); id. § 5390(b) (setting forth priority of claims).}
The only generally applicable material limitation on the FDIC’s ability to transfer liabilities of the failed financial institution to a bridge company is that “similarly situated creditors”—an undefined phrase with several statutory exceptions—must be treated the same in most situations. However one interprets the phrase “similarly situated creditors,” no such limitation applies to assumption of liabilities in sales to third-party buyers.

The federal government is also authorized to provide financing to continue operating the failed financial institution in OLA. This financing, which would ultimately be recouped from other large financial institutions, facilitates the entire resolution process and ensures that value is not lost because of illiquidity. Notably, OLA does not provide statutory restrictions on the terms of financing beyond a provision detailing the priority of the government’s funding claim on the failed firm’s assets. This means that the government could set the terms of its financing simply as a matter of contract, not statute.

Indeed, given that the enormous situational leverage the government will have over a failed firm in an OLA proceeding, the government would get whatever terms it wants—the government’s offer is one that the failed firm cannot refuse. As such, the terms of government financing in an OLA proceeding would likely be at least as onerous as DIP financing agreements in Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Government-provided financing in OLA, therefore, would come with various contractually negotiated provisions that both determine the shape of any restructuring and which could effectively benefit certain creditor constituencies at the expense of others. Not surprisingly, the discretion vested in federal regulators has led to criticisms that OLA is nothing more than a codified bailout regime.

53. Id. § 5390(b)(4) (requiring claims of similarly situated creditors to be treated similarly); id. § 5390(b)(5)(E) (requiring similarly situated creditors to be treated in a similar manner when assets or liabilities are transferred to a bridge company). Other limitations apply to particular types of asset transfers. See, e.g., id. § 5390(c)(9) (requiring qualified financial contracts with a counterparty, if transferred at all, to be transferred as a complete book of business).

54. Id. § 5384(d) (authorizing funding for OLA); id. § 5390(b)(2) (providing priority for DIP financing); id. § 5390(n) (creating an “Orderly Liquidation Fund”); id. § 5390(o) (providing for assessments on financial institutions to fund an Orderly Liquidation Fund).

55. Id. § 5384(d).

56. LEVITIN, supra note 7, at 409–12.

D. FIB’s Relationship to OLA and Living Wills

The relationship between FIB proposals and OLA varies depending on the version of legislation proposed. In some bills, FIB proponents have paired financial institution bankruptcy legislation with a repeal of OLA and various prudential regulatory safeguards.\(^{58}\) Other FIB bills would leave OLA intact. But even FIB bills that preserve OLA still effectuate a significant regulatory rollback, however, because the creation of an FIB procedure would allow banks to satisfy the Dodd-Frank Act’s living wills requirement\(^ {59}\) and thereby allows financial institutions to avoid the imposition of additional, discretionary derisking regulation.

Indeed, the political attraction of FIB may be less in its inherent benefits as a resolution mechanism than in its collateral effect of undermining the case for ex ante prudential bank regulation. Advocates of FIB never explicitly tie FIB to bank deregulation, but the connection may be seen in the inclusion of an FIB proposal as part of the first title in the major House Republican-sponsored bank deregulation bill, which would have repealed OLA along with various prudential regulatory tools.\(^ {60}\) FIB may in fact be a deregulatory Trojan Horse.

Indeed, there has always been an important subtext to all FIB proposals, namely the claim that a proper bankruptcy system vitiates the need for prudential regulation of financial institutions. The thinking is that the threat of ex post losses for creditors in bankruptcy creates adequate ex ante incentives for them to lend prudently and thereby reduces risk within the financial system in general. In other words, FIB is ultimately premised on the conviction that market


\(^{60}\) See H.R. 10; \textit{id.} §§ 131–152 (repealing various prudential regulatory tools provided by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2011).
discipline can substitute for government regulation as a mode of reducing systemic risk.\textsuperscript{61}

More recent FIB legislation has not included a repeal of OLA, and OLA includes a provision allowing the FDIC as OLA receiver to dismiss other insolvency proceedings.\textsuperscript{62} This raises the question of what FIB accomplishes if it co-exists with OLA. It is hard to imagine regulators preferring the FIB process in which they have less control than OLA, not least because they will take the political blame for any problems that occur in either mode of resolution. If regulators have the choice, they would likely either trigger OLA at the outset or take over an FIB and convert it to OLA. The pointlessness of having OLA and FIB co-exist suggests that eschewing the repeal of OLA is a tactical move by FIB advocates. Enacting FIB will get the camel’s nose under the tent, and those advocates can separately repeal OLA after passage because FIB would render it superfluous.

At the very least, however, the presence of an FIB procedure would undermine the Dodd-Frank Act requirement that the certain very large financial institutions prepare living wills that must be approved by regulators. These living wills require financial institutions to demonstrate that the financial institution could be resolved in a case under Title 11 (the Bankruptcy Code).\textsuperscript{63} Failure to do so can result in more stringent capital, leverage, and liquidity requirements, restrictions on growth, activities, and operations, or even divestiture orders.\textsuperscript{64}

The point of living wills is not to be actual resolution plans. As discussed above, it is not credible to resolve a large financial institution under Title 11, including in Chapter 11 thereunder.\textsuperscript{65} (Indeed, if it were possible, then there would be no need for FIB proposals.)\textsuperscript{66} Instead, living wills are a tool that allows federal regulators discretion to force the very largest financial institutions to simplify their structures and operations or to impose greater

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{61} Ironically, this market discipline is imposed through government regulation in the form of bankruptcy law.
\item \textsuperscript{62} 12 U.S.C. § 5388 (2012).
\item \textsuperscript{63} Id. § 5365(a), (d).
\item \textsuperscript{64} Id. § 5365(d)(5).
\item \textsuperscript{65} See supra Section I.A.
\item \textsuperscript{66} The persistence of FIB proposals should cast doubt on the findings of credibility of living wills by the Federal Reserve and FDIC. The fact that regulators have found living wills that would utilize Chapter 11 credible, however, suggests that they are unlikely to suddenly find the backbone to insist that a special FIB process would not work for an institution that could not demonstrate the availability of committed liquidity.
\end{itemize}
regulatory requirements on these institutions. From the perspective of such big banks, living wills are potentially the most threatening tool in the regulatory arsenal. While regulators have not yet exercised the full extent of the living wills power to break up big banks, the ability of regulators to order divestment without additional legislative authorization is the single greatest threat to the banks’ business model of being too big to fail.

As things currently stand, any proposal to resolve a complex financial institution in bankruptcy is a questionable proposition. There is no public law that prevents the debtor’s qualified financial contract (“QFC”) counterparties from running on the debtor and its subsidiaries upon the parent company’s bankruptcy filing. Rather, there is only a set of contractual provisions in the QFCs of the largest financial institutions that create a very limited stay. The stay is likely too short to enable a successful restructuring in most cases, and it is uncertain if it would even be specifically enforceable. It is even less certain whether the ability to enforce the contractual stay would prevent disruptive runs in the first place. Thus, it is easy to imagine foreign counterparties in particular simply grabbing collateral and forcing the debtor to attempt to recover it later through the slow engine of litigation, by which point it might be too late.

The obstacles to resolving complex financial institutions under Title 11 mean that regulators currently have significant ability to claim that any proposed resolution plan under Title 11 is not credible, and thereby have the authority to impose additional discretionary regulatory requirements by exercising the living wills power. Having a specific FIB process, however, would enable the largest financial institutions to argue that they necessarily satisfy the living wills requirement because, by definition, any financial institution eligible for FIB could resolve itself using that process under Title 11. The creation of any FIB procedure would therefore deprive federal regulators both of a key regulatory tool for derisking the largest financial institutions.

67. Since 2017, federal regulations have required that all globally significant bank holding companies and their depository subsidiaries conform their QFCs to certain mandatory terms. 12 C.F.R. § 47.3(b)(1), (2) (national bank subsidiaries); id. § 252.82(b)(1), (2) (global systemically important banks (“GSIBs”) and member bank subsidiaries); id. § 382.2(b)(1), (2) (state insured bank subsidiaries). Those terms include a stay until the later of forty-eight hours or 5 p.m. the next business day and the applicability of U.S. resolution law. Id. § 47.5(g) (national bank subsidiaries); id. § 252.84(g) (GSIBs and member bank subsidiaries); id. § 382.4(g) (state insured bank subsidiaries). No equivalent requirement exists for QFCs that do not involve globally significant bank holding companies and their depository subsidiaries.
financial institutions as well as of the possibility of ultimately breaking up the biggest banks. And this may be precisely what some FIB proponents want.

II. IMAGINING FINANCIAL INSTITUTION BANKRUPTCY

A. The Good Bank/Bad Bank Transaction

An FIB process could take many forms, but any FIB process is likely to include certain features, and which are the focus of this Article. The key feature of any FIB process would likely be an asset sale that partitions the assets of the failed financial institution between a new “good bank” and the old, failed “bad bank.” In recent years sale-based reorganization has frequently replaced the traditional form of Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization, in which the reorganization is undertaken pursuant to a plan subject to a creditor vote and various statutory requirements.68 In the sale-based reorganization, some or all of the failed firm’s assets are sold, moving them into a new capital structure, with any remaining assets then liquidated in bankruptcy.69 Unlike a plan, a sale is not subject to a creditor vote or to the other statutory requirements for plan confirmation.70

The sale-based reorganization method in bankruptcy is essentially the same as a long-standing bank resolution technique, known as a “good bank/bad bank” (“GB/BB”) structure. Although the terminology originated in the bank resolution context,71 the transaction structure is in no way specific to banks. Understanding the GB/BB structure is essential for understanding the practical difficulties with FIB as well as the policy tensions that lie within it.

Financial institutions often run into trouble with a particular type of debt overhang problem: uncertain asset valuation. If a financial institution has assets, such as a book of mortgages or mortgage-backed securities, whose value declined by an uncertain although material amount, the effect is a solvency problem for the institution. The valuation uncertainty means that the institution might be insolvent, and that will make it difficult for the institution to continue

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68. LEVITIN, supra note 7, at 825–27.
69. Id.
contracting—no one wants to assume the risk of trading with an insolvent financial institution.72

A common solution for the valuation uncertainty problem is to divide the failed firm’s good assets from its bad ones using a GB/BB structure. While a GB/BB structure can be used even when there is no valuation uncertainty, a GB/BB structure can address valuation uncertainty by partitioning the assets of the financial institution through a sale that separates the assets of uncertain value from those of certain value: the “good” assets (those of certain value) are sold to a new entity, the “Good Bank” that serves as the acquisition vehicle for new equityholders.73 The Good Bank will also assume certain favored liabilities of the financial institution. These liabilities might be favored for any of the following reasons: they are necessary for the Good Bank to maintain the ongoing good will of certain creditors, such as suppliers and employees; the creditors on the favored liabilities are simply preferred for personal reasons, such as insiders; or because of the favored creditors’ political connections.

The failed financial institution thus becomes the “Bad Bank,” as it is left with the “bad” assets of uncertain or negative value plus the proceeds of the sale transaction. The Bad Bank also remains obligated on the disfavored liabilities. The Bad Bank is still of uncertain solvency because of the uncertain valuation of the bad assets (and possibly of the disfavored liabilities), but the Good Bank is not, and that is critical. The assets of the Good Bank can be productively deployed because the Good Bank will not suffer from the debt overhang problem, so counterparties will not eschew doing business with it. Thus, the GB/BB format liberates the good assets from the bad assets and from disfavored liabilities.74

72. For example, a firm that used asbestos products in its manufacturing might have significant contingent liabilities. The extent and timing of the firm’s liability is currently unknown, but any potential liability diminishes the firm’s ability to obtain unsecured debt because of the possibility of large competing tort claims.


74. The single-point-of-entry (“SPOE”) mechanism that is frequently used in the living wills required of certain large financial institutions, 12 U.S.C. § 5365(d) (2012), is a GB/BB structure. In SPOE, the equity and certain debt obligations of the debtor holding company are left behind with any undesirable assets, while the good assets are transferred to a new holding company along with other (favored) liabilities. Dept’ of the Treasury, Orderly Liquidation Authority and Bankruptcy Reform 10–11 (2018), https://home.treasury.gov/sites/default/files/2018-02/OLA_REPORT.pdf [https://perma.cc/2DPG-SXHG]. While SPOE often focuses on the equity and long-term debt of the debtor
A GB/BB structure can be implemented in a variety of ways, including in bankruptcy. In bankruptcy, a GB/BB structure is implemented through a sale of the Good Bank assets under § 363(b) and (f) of the Bankruptcy Code, presumably prior to the confirmation of a bankruptcy plan. The Bad Bank assets are then subsequently liquidated pursuant to a plan of liquidation. Such a format capitalizes on the speed of bankruptcy sales, which must be held “after notice and a hearing,” a phrase defined to mean only such notice and hearing as is appropriate under the circumstances, and which may mean that no notice or hearing is required if time is of the essence. Thus, if the Good Bank assets are flighty customer relationships—the financial institution equivalent of melting ice cream—they are preserved through a fast sale. Moreover, the ultimate liquidation of the Bad Bank is largely done automatically by adherence to the liquidation priorities in Chapter 7 bankruptcy, even if the liquidation is carried out in Chapter 11. Creditors have few grounds and even less reason to attempt to hold up the post-sale liquidation, because they cannot use it to unwind the prior asset sale.

For the GB/BB structure to work, however, two conditions must hold. First, creditors must be prevented from undertaking collection actions while the asset sale is pending, or else the sale may fall apart as key assets might no longer be available for creditors. In bankruptcy the automatic stay generally prevents such creditor actions, except in the case of certain financial contracts; swaps, repos, securities and commodities futures contracts, forward contracts, and master netting agreements may all be terminated, accelerated, and liquidated without running afoul of the automatic stay. This presents few obstacles for most debtors, but is an issue for financial institution debtors as discussed below.

holding company getting “bailed-in”—that is, left behind—the key to SPOE is really in the selective transfer of favored assets and liabilities to a new firm, which is just the GB/BB structure.

76. See id. § 102(1).
78. 11 U.S.C. §§ 725–726 (2012) (Chapter 7 distribution baseline); id. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) (requiring a Chapter 11 plan to, at a minimum, adhere to the Chapter 7 distribution limits).
79. See id. § 363(m) (providing that the “reversal or modification on appeal” of a sale order “does not affect the validity of a sale . . . to an entity that purchased . . . in good faith”).
80. Id. § 362(b)(6)–(7), (17), (27); id. §§ 555, 559–561.
Second, the asset purchaser—the Good Bank—must have confidence in the valuation of the assets it purchases. If the assets’ value is too uncertain, a buyer would be unlikely to step forward. One way around this problem is by enabling prospective buyers to have sufficient time to conduct due diligence on the assets, such that they can come up with a valuation on which to base a bid. But if time is of the essence with the GB/BB transaction—the ice cream is melting—then such diligence will not be possible. In such a case, either the purchase price would be severely depressed or the transaction would not happen, unless a third-party would be willing to guarantee the purchased assets. The automatic stay generally provides the breathing room for the necessary diligence to occur. But, as noted above, the stay does much less work for financial institution debtors.

The result of a GB/BB structure is that the holders of the favored liabilities assumed by the Good Bank would be paid in full, so long as the Good Bank remains solvent. The holders of the disfavored liabilities, however, recover in bankruptcy only from the bad assets and the sale proceeds from the good assets. This means that the risk of loss on the bad assets, as well as the risk of underpricing the good assets, lies with the creditors who hold the disfavored liabilities. A GB/BB structure thus operates as a type of priority system that ensures 100% repayment for favored liabilities and does not guarantee any particular repayment for disfavored liabilities.

For example, suppose that a bankrupt company has $150 of assets and $300 in total liabilities as follows: $100 to a class of unsecured bondholders, $100 to a class of tort claimants, and $100 to a class of employees. These three classes of claims are all general unsecured claims of equal priority and should be paid out pro rata in a bankruptcy liquidation, with all three classes receiving 50¢ on the dollar.\(^8\)

Suppose then that the assets were purchased by a third party. If the third party paid fair market value in cash for the assets—$150—there would be no effect on the distribution to the creditors. The old assets would simply have been transformed into cash from other forms of property. The plain asset sale does not change the distribution. The creditors would assume the risk, however, that the sale is underpriced. If the assets are really worth $200, then they should receive a 66.7% dividend. Of course, if the assets are really worth $200, then one would expect another buyer—perhaps a

81. See id. § 726(b).
creditor—to bid more than $150 for them, but this presupposes no limitations on bidding procedures and other transactional and informational frictions.

Now, however, suppose that the purchaser wants to keep the existing workforce and wants to ensure labor peace. The purchaser therefore reduces its offer from $150 in cash to an offer of only $50 in cash and the assumption of the $100 in employee claims. If the purchase is approved, the debtor would be left with $50 in assets and $200 in claims, so the bondholders and tort claimants are paid 25¢ on the dollar. In contrast, the employees’ claims would be assumed by a solvent third-party purchaser, so they would be paid in full, 100¢ on the dollar. The assumption of liabilities in the asset purchase effectively gives the employees priority over the bondholders and tort claimants despite all parties formally having the same priority.

Finally, assume that there is some uncertainty about the valuation of some of the assets. The buyer might be willing to assume the valuation risk on those assets, but if the buyer purchases only the good assets, then the remaining assets—and the valuation uncertainty—remain with the creditors whose claims were not assumed in the sale. In other words, the valuation risk not just of the sale price but also of the remaining assets is concentrated on the bondholders and tort claimants. The employees, whose claims the buyer assumed, have escaped the risk of an underpriced sale as well as the valuation risk of the assets left behind.

The GB/BB structure is already the preferred transactional form for many large, nonfinancial business bankruptcies. Many large bankruptcies now use an asset sale, rather than a plan, as their primary means of effectuating a reorganization. Some version of a GB/BB structure would likely be used in an FIB for two reasons.

First, the GB/BB structure allows for the quick redeployment of the good assets, which is important to minimize disruptive spillover effects. A GB/BB transaction has both a sale and a subsequent liquidating plan, but the key part of the transaction is the sale; it is not critical that the liquidating plan be achieved with particular alacrity. Indeed, the GB/BB approach effectively divides the bankruptcy process into two parts: an asset sale process that supposedly maximizes the value of the debtor’s assets, followed by a separate, subsequent process for evaluating claims and distributing value to allowed claims. The former is a process that has little role for a judge,

82. LEVITIN, supra note 7, at 825–27.
while the latter is an adjudicative process in terms of claims evaluation. Distribution, however, may then be done robotically according to a statutory cashflow waterfall.

The alternative to a sale followed by a plan-based liquidation is a plan-based reorganization. The timeline for a plan in an FIB need not follow the current Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. Nonetheless, any sort of plan-based reorganization would necessarily be slower than the sale component of a GB/BB transaction because a plan-based reorganization must provide some time for dissemination and consideration of a disclosure statement, as well as for voting (meaning dissemination of ballots and counting of ballots cast), a confirmation hearing, and a post-confirmation appellate period.

Second, in contrast to a bankruptcy plan, a sale is not a procedure that is vulnerable to holdouts, at least under current bankruptcy law. Consensual confirmation of a bankruptcy plan requires obtaining consent of the majorities of all impaired classes of claims and interests, as well as satisfaction of a number of other statutory requirements. A bankruptcy plan may also be confirmed via the “cramdown” procedure with consent of only a single impaired class (excluding insiders). Neither type of confirmation, however, may happen as quickly as needed. In contrast, the standards for a preplan asset sale are much looser; no creditor consent whatsoever is required, and the debtor merely has to show an “articulated business justification.”

B. The Resolution Dilemma: Reducing Moral Hazard or Reducing Systemic Spillovers

FIB proposals seek to simultaneously achieve two irreconcilable goals. On the one hand, FIB proposals seek to reduce moral hazard

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83. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3017(a) (requiring twenty-eight days’ notice before a disclosure statement hearing).
84. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3020(e) (requiring a fourteen-day delay after a plan is confirmed before it is effective, which matches the fourteen-day window for filing an appeal under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a)(1)).
86. Id. § 1129(a).
87. Id. § 1129(b).
by forcing creditor loss internalization.\textsuperscript{89} If creditors incur losses as a result of poor lending decisions, they will be incentivized to take more care in the future. Conversely, if creditors are bailed out of their bad deals, they have no incentive to take care, as they are left with a “heads I win, tails you lose” bargain. Thus, to reduce moral hazard, it is imperative that creditors (or at least adjusting ones) bear losses in an FIB (or at least that they credibly believe that they will bear losses). The whole point of the moral hazard reduction is to encourage better ex ante behavior by creditors; it is not meant to be punitive. In a GB/BB transaction, loss internalization can be achieved by leaving creditors’ obligations behind in the Bad Bank.

At the same time, however, FIB seeks to ensure a “smooth landing” for the economy by minimizing the spillovers from the failure of a large financial institution.\textsuperscript{90} The failure of a large financial institution can result in a domino chain of failures as questions of solvency metastasize throughout the financial system. A GB/BB transaction can be used to achieve such a smooth landing and head off spillovers by having the Good Bank assume creditors’ obligations.

If the goal is to eliminate moral hazard, it is necessary for bankruptcy to impose losses on creditors that can adjust ex ante. Yet the most certain way to prevent such spillovers is to ensure that creditors do not incur losses in a bankruptcy. This means it is not possible to simultaneously prevent moral hazard and prevent spillovers in regard to the same creditor. In a bankruptcy, either the creditor will bear losses or it will not.

One way around this conundrum is to differentiate between types of creditors—some creditors will bear losses and provide the market discipline that will limit future bank risk-taking, while others will not bear losses and will be effectively bailed out because the Good Bank will assume their obligations. Such a differentiation of creditors is politically problematic. It means picking winners and losers, an issue FIB supporters avoid discussing entirely, because the moral hazard problem they seek to eliminate will persist if any

\textsuperscript{89} See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 1667, supra note 5, at 2 (statement of John B. Taylor, Professor, Stanford University) (“Chapter 11 ensures that creditors bear losses and this reduces moral hazard and excessive risk-taking.”).

\textsuperscript{90} See, e.g., id. (“The goal of these provisions is to let a failing financial firm go into bankruptcy in a predictable, rules-based manner without causing disruptive spillovers in the economy while permitting people to continue to use its financial services without running.”).
creditors have their obligations assumed (or even think that they will have their obligations assumed).

Consumers, tax authorities, tort creditors, and vendors are basically nonadjusting creditors, so it makes no sense to place losses on them because they do not present a moral hazard problem. That leaves as the adjusting creditors only the financial creditors, such as unsecured bond debt, any secured debt, and repo and derivatives counterparties. Yet these financial creditors are exactly whom we are most worried about being the channel for a domino effect of failures throughout the economy. Protecting these financial creditors, or a subset of them, is exactly the type of crony capitalism problem that bailout critics raise. There is no way to both create market discipline and prevent domino effects that cascade throughout the economy. Ultimately, a choice must be made. This is the “resolution dilemma.”

The choice should be easy: reduce the economic dislocation caused by the failure of a financial institution. Market discipline is a wonderful thing, but it should not become a fetish. It is not an end in and of itself but rather a means toward achieving greater economic stability. There are other tools available for reducing excessive risk-taking by financial institutions—namely, prudential regulation. Prudential regulatory regimes are not fail-safe, and particular features may impose costs that outweigh their benefits. But given the difficulty in credibly committing ex ante to impose losses on creditors no matter the economic consequences, prudential regulation is the only realistic alternative. No matter how many laws proclaim “no bailouts,” no one believes that the government will follow through when doing so becomes an economic suicide pact.

Once we recognize the resolution dilemma, however, one has to ask: Why bother with the bankruptcy? To the extent that a bankruptcy system protects creditors from incurring losses, it is just another form of a bailout, hiding in bankruptcy’s clothing. If the reluctant choice is to go with bailouts, why try to disguise them in the garb of bankruptcy? Let the wolf come as a wolf, not in sheep’s garb.

One could make a more sophisticated argument that using a bankruptcy procedure will create the impression, or at least uncertainty about the likelihood, that there will be loss internalization even if there ultimately will not be, and this deke will improve market discipline. While this is not an argument actually made by FIB proponents, it has some virtue. The uncertainty would reduce moral hazard without having to surrender the smooth landing when a financial institution actually fails. Yet such an argument relies on
sophisticated financial institutions being snookered by the system’s design, and if they are not fooled, they will double down on reckless lending. Moreover, it is an argument for completely cynical legislation—for creating an FIB regime not intended for actual use but instead to scare bank counterparties that it could be used. This argument also runs against the concern about lack of transparency in bailouts: What is less transparent than disguising a bailout as a bankruptcy? The tension between reducing moral hazard and reducing spillover effects points to the pointlessness of financial institution bankruptcy.

III. THE IMPRACTICABILITY OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTION BANKRUPTCY

Beyond the conceptual problem inherent in a GB/BB framework for restructuring a financial institution in bankruptcy, there are also four core practical obstacles: the inability to obtain adequate financing for a restructuring; problems with international coordination; the difficulty of dealing with derivatives and other financial contracts; and the lack of a mechanism for addressing valuation uncertainty for potential Good Bank purchasers. Any one of these obstacles alone should throw cold water on dreams of FIB. Together, however, they show that a private FIB process is a fantasy. FIB can only possibly work with massive government involvement, at which point its supposed virtues dissipate and it compares less favorably to bailouts, whether executed ad hoc or through a previously authorized administrative device like OLA.

A. DIP Financing Is Not Feasible for Large Financial Institutions

1. Normal Sources of DIP Financing Will Not Be Available

For a debtor to have any chance of successfully restructuring itself in bankruptcy, it must have adequate liquidity to pay its operating costs. The debtor needs to have the cash to keep the lights on, retain employees, maintain insurance coverage, pay taxes, and more.

For a financial institution, such liquidity demands are even greater. Financial institutions trade on trust and confidence. Counterparties will enter into contracts with these institutions only if they feel reasonably confident that the financial institution will meet its obligations. For a financial institution to operate, it must constantly be able to access the market. For example, if a bank were
to make a fixed-rate loan, it also would have to be able to access interest rate swap markets to hedge its interest rate risk. But if swap counterparties do not think the bank will be able to honor its commitment on the swap, they will not contract with it.

This means that, for a financial institution to continue operating in bankruptcy, it must have essentially the level of liquidity that it would have if it were not financially distressed. Anything less will result in a self-fulfilling prophecy of a run, as creditors will raise prices, demand more collateral, or refuse to roll over debts because of a lack of confidence in the survival of the debtor. This is precisely what occurred with Lehman Brothers in 2008—its clearing bank, JPMorgan Chase & Co. ("JPMorgan"), demanded that Lehman post more collateral. 91 And, as the 2008 crisis clearly demonstrated, the liquidity demands on a financial institution in bankruptcy will be extraordinary. 92

Yet the nature of most debtor firms is that they lack liquidity when they file for bankruptcy. Most firms do not file for bankruptcy until they absolutely have to do so. They will only file when there is an acute liquidity crisis pending, such that they will not be able to make a debt payment or meet payroll.

There is every reason to think the same would be true with financial institutions. As long as a financial institution is liquid, it can keep operating even if insolvent. Indeed, the financial institution’s management would be strongly incentivized to do so, as management loses nothing by “gambling on resurrection.” 93 If the company’s fortunes turn around, everything would return to normal, the firm’s equity retains value, and the managers are heroes for fixing the company. If the firm still fails, the managers have not lost shareholder

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92. Large financial institutions are already subject to a “liquidity coverage ratio” intended to ensure that they will not find themselves pressed for liquidity. 12 C.F.R. § 50.10 (2018) (covering national banks); id. § 249.10 (covering insured state banks); id. § 329.10 (covering state member banks). But if the liquidity coverage ratio is simply the financial regulatory equivalent of building a higher levy, it is always vulnerable to being wiped out by a strong enough hurricane, or here, financial crisis. See Adam J. Levitin, Prioritization and Mutualization: Clearinghouses and the Redundancy of the Bankruptcy Safe Harbors, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 129, 139 (2015) [hereinafter Levitin, Prioritization and Mutualization].

93. See LEVITIN, supra note 7, at 315.
funds but value that would otherwise go to creditors.\textsuperscript{94} It is possible, of course, to conceive of an FIB regime that permits the filing of an involuntary petition, perhaps triggered by regulatory action. But there is a real possibility that regulators will be reluctant to pull the trigger lest they do so prematurely, with the result that they pull it too late and face a worse crisis than otherwise.

Thus, by the time a financial institution ends up in bankruptcy, it would likely have very little liquidity, probably not enough to keep operating. To the extent it still has enough liquidity to operate, it would assuredly evaporate as creditors (particularly those funding repo lines of credit) demand payment on existing obligations and refuse to extend new credit out of fear that the debtor would lack the liquid funds to pay on its obligations as they come due.

The liquidity crisis a financial institution is likely to face when it files for bankruptcy necessitates a fresh source of liquidity. In this regard, an FIB is not materially different from any other business bankruptcy. In a typical business bankruptcy, the debtor will address the liquidity problem by obtaining DIP financing—a new, post-petition financing facility that will provide the debtor with the funds to continue operations.\textsuperscript{95}

Adequate DIP financing, however, is not possible for a financial institution of any size.\textsuperscript{96} An enormous DIP financing facility would be required for a financial institution, far more than for a Main Street company such as a manufacturer. Moreover, particularly for a financial institution whose ability to do business depends on customers’ confidence in its ability to honor its commitments, a DIP financing facility would need to be in place immediately, on day one of the case. Without a DIP facility in place at the time of filing, counterparties would flee a financial institution, resulting in a self-

\textsuperscript{94} Notably, corporate law in most states imposes no liability on corporate directors and officers for gambling on resurrection. Directors do not bear fiduciary duties to creditors, see N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 99 (Del. 2007), and Delaware does not recognize the tort of “deepening insolvency,” Trenwick Am. Litig. Tr. v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168, 174 (Del. Ch. 2006), aff’d sub nom. Trenwick Am. Litig. Tr. v. Billett, 931 A.2d 438 (Del. 2007).

\textsuperscript{95} See LEVITIN, supra note 7, at 389–90, 397–98.

\textsuperscript{96} This fact alone should call into question the credibility of all resolution plans filed under the Dodd-Frank Act’s living wills provision. 12 U.S.C. § 5365(d) (2012). As noted above, however, the purpose of the living wills requirement may be less about ensuring that living wills are actually credible than about giving regulators extra discretion to impose additional regulatory requirements on the largest financial institutions, including the option of breaking up these institutions. See supra Section I.D.
fulfilling collapse. Both requirements present insurmountable problems.

A large financial institution would require a DIP facility of tens if not hundreds of billions of dollars. JPMorgan, for example, has around $560 billion in high quality liquid assets that cover peak short-term cash outflows. To maintain counterparty confidence to continue operations and not cause a creditor run, a firm like JPMorgan would need to maintain its nondistressed level of liquidity, in this case around $560 billion. Similarly, Bank of America and Citigroup would each require around $425 billion in liquidity to maintain their nondistressed financial profile, while Goldman Sachs would require $210 billion. While a financial institution would not enter bankruptcy with zero liquidity, it is not likely to enter into bankruptcy until its liquidity position is dire, so it would likely still need a liquidity source for a substantial portion of its predistressed liquidity level, likely in the tens of billions of dollars if not more.

Private lending markets are not capable of providing such large amounts of liquidity to a bankrupt firm, even for a very short period of time. The largest private syndicated loan in history, $75 billion, was raised in November 2015 for AB InBev’s takeover bid for SABMiller, but that syndicate took weeks to assemble for a solvent firm. A failed megabank does not have the luxury of that time.

Perhaps the best yardstick is past DIP lending. The largest private DIP financing ever assembled was a mere $9 billion loan for


Energy Future Holdings in 2014.\textsuperscript{101} Even the U.S. government’s DIP loan to GM, the largest DIP loan ever, was only $33 billion.\textsuperscript{102} None of these past DIP loans come close to approaching the level of DIP financing a large financial institution would require to continue operating in bankruptcy. Furthermore, the emergency nature of DIP liquidity provision would preclude syndication because of the time needed to market the loan (here, in secrecy) to potential syndicate members, each of which would have to conduct its own diligence.

DIP loans are also almost always first lien, superpriority loans. No DIP lender wants to lend on an unsecured basis because the borrower is, by definition, bankrupt and a serious credit risk. A bankrupt financial institution would be hard-pressed to offer a new DIP-lending consortium for unencumbered collateral, as most valuable assets would likely already be pledged.

Bankruptcy law contemplates the possibility of priming liens for DIP loans,\textsuperscript{103} meaning that the DIP loans would get a lien with priority over existing liens. Such priming liens, however, would likely be bitterly contested. At the very least, approval of priming liens would require a lengthy valuation hearing, delaying the financing, as well as evidence that the debtor had tried and failed to find financing on other terms.\textsuperscript{104}

Further complicating DIP financing for complex bankruptcies is that it must be arranged in advance to be available at the start of a case. Large, multibillion-dollar loans are never made by single institutions. Instead, they are syndicated facilities in which numerous financial institutions each provide the funding for a part of the facility.\textsuperscript{105} Lining up a syndicate, much less one so large, takes time. The $75 billion loan for AB InBev took weeks to arrange for a solvent firm.\textsuperscript{106}

A financial institution, however, does not have the luxury of time. First, it might be in trouble in part because of market-wide


\textsuperscript{104} See id.

\textsuperscript{105} LEVITIN, \textit{supra} note 7, at 71–75.

\textsuperscript{106} Reilly & Walsh, \textit{supra} note 100.
problems. If markets have frozen, DIP financing will not be available. And the failure of a large financial institution is itself likely to result in a market freeze. Second, DIP financing would likely come from other financial institutions—the failed institution’s current counterparties because nearly all large financial institutions trade with each other. As soon as a firm began to attempt securing DIP financing, it would be advertising to its creditors that it will be filing for bankruptcy, which would precipitate a run on the firm, resulting in a premature bankruptcy.

Private capital markets are simply incapable of coming up with enormous liquidity for a potentially insolvent company, much less overnight and when markets are in turmoil. Now consider the possibility that multiple financial institutions fail simultaneously, as occurred in 2008. There’s simply no chance of adequate DIP financing from the private sector.

2. Alternative Sources of DIP Financing Are Problematic

The federal government could, in theory, provide the massive DIP financing required with the necessary limited notice to creditors, but the whole point of FIB proposals is to keep the government out of the process and let the restructuring be a private ordering. Once the government is involved, it will assuredly flex its muscles and insist on favorable terms for its loan or for favorable treatment for particular, politically favored creditors. If OLA is any guide, none of this would be restricted by statute, not least because no one wants to constrain the flexibility of a response ex ante without knowing the particular circumstances involved. Even if there were statutory restrictions, however, there would be strong pressure to figure out a way around them in the FIB procedure or else FIB simply would not be used for resolution. Instead, the terms of the DIP loan would be contractually determined and presented to the court for approval on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. The court’s only option when faced with such terms is to approve them because denying the DIP loan means triggering a serious financial crisis, something no judge wants to do.107 It is hard to see an FIB operating without government DIP lending, which undermines the entire point of FIB.

It is true that an FIB with a GB/BB structure could take the form of a very quick asset sale (and liability assumption) from the failed financial institution to some buyer, and that buyer might agree to

107. See, e.g., Baird, supra note 8, at 290.
supply liquidity during the interim before the sale’s closing. But consider who the buyers might be. To swallow up the good assets of a large financial institution—an institution that might have tens of billions if not hundreds of billions or even trillions of dollars in assets—a buyer would need to be of similar or greater size. For example, as of the end of 2017, JPMorgan reported assets of just more than $2.5 trillion,108 while Citigroup reported assets of around $1.8 trillion.109 There are few such buyers around to begin with, and in a global financial crisis, the potential buyers would themselves possibly be in financial difficulty or reluctant to assume additional risk, much less without the opportunity for serious diligence. Thus, in the 2008 crisis, Lehman Brothers was unable to find a buyer.110 The shotgun marriages between Bank of America and Merrill Lynch, JPMorgan and Washington Mutual, JPMorgan and Bear Stearns, and Wells Fargo and Wachovia were all done with a heavy (and sometimes heavy-handed) dose of governmental involvement.111 And those deals sometimes included government loss-sharing agreements,112 which is presumably anathema to FIB proponents because of its supposed private-ordering virtues and lack of involvement of the public fisc.

Another possibility would be a standby DIP facility for financial institutions. No financial institution would willingly pay for such a facility in part because the lack of a DIP lending facility and thus the unavailability of a viable bankruptcy process increases the likelihood of a bailout, so it would have to be required by regulation. Conceptually such a facility is possible with a credit-linked note structure. First, a financial institution sponsor could create a special-purpose entity (“SPE”). The SPE would then issue notes and escrow the investment proceeds from the note, investing the proceeds in liquid, safe assets like Treasury securities. The SPE would also enter into a swap with the financial institution that would be triggered by the financial institution’s bankruptcy filing. Until the financial institution filed for bankruptcy, it would make periodic payments to the SPE. The SPE would in turn pay the noteholders, who would also receive the investment earnings on the escrowed funds. Upon a bankruptcy filing, however, the flow of funds would reverse: the SPE would pay out the escrowed funds to the financial institution in the form of a pre-negotiated DIP facility.

While credit-linked notes are a common financing structure, they have never before been used for a DIP lending facility, and such a facility would not be cheap. Credit-linked notes would function as a type of insurance for a financial institution to ensure that it would have funding in the event that it failed. If the financial institution filed for bankruptcy, then the DIP facility would be funded automatically, like an insurance payment triggered by a loss. The periodic payments to the SPE are essentially insurance premiums for DIP lending insurance. If this process was workable, it would add substantial costs to running a financial institution simply by virtue of the volume of credit-linked notes that would have to be issued. Such cost might in fact be desirable if the credit-linked note requirement were triggered only upon a certain size or complexity threshold. A regulatory requirement of a standby DIP facility through credit-linked notes would serve as a type of tax on systemically important financial institutions, which would create an incentive for those firms to reduce their size and complexity. But all this presupposes that there would even be a market for such credit-linked notes.

One can get some sense of market appetite for this sort of credit risk by looking at the market for catastrophe bonds. Catastrophe bonds are a type of security that provides a capital-market-funded type of insurance for firms concerned about exposure to natural disasters such as hurricanes and earthquakes.\footnote{For a general description of catastrophe bonds, see Thomas Berghman, Note, \textit{A Market Under\textasciitilde writing) the Weather: A Recommendation to Increase Insurer Capacity}, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 221, 250–51 (2013).} The bonds work similarly to credit-linked notes, where a transaction sponsor forms an SPE with no assets or noncontractual liabilities. The SPE then issues catastrophe bonds; the investors in the bonds have no recourse against the sponsor, only against the SPE. The funds used by investors to pay for the bonds are held in escrow by the SPE. If a specified catastrophe event does not occur, the funds remain in escrow, and the investors receive periodic interest payments from the transaction sponsor plus the investment earnings on the escrowed funds. The escrowed funds are ultimately returned when principal payments are due on the bonds. If a specified catastrophe does occur, however, the escrowed funds are released by the SPE to the transaction’s sponsor. Because the bonds are nonrecourse against the sponsor, the effect of the release of the escrowed funds to the sponsor is that the catastrophe bond investors will incur a loss; the SPE has no other assets to repay the bondholders. Thus, the catastrophe bond investors assume the risk of the catastrophe up to the level of their investment.

Catastrophe bonds tend to be issued by reinsurance companies as a way of using capital markets to reinsure the risks they have assumed.\footnote{See James Ming Chen, \textit{Correlation, Coverage, and Catastrophe: The Contours of Financial Preparedness for Disaster}, 26 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 56, 70 (2014).} The total global catastrophe bond market has never had more than $31 billion of bonds outstanding, and issuance has never exceeded $12.5 billion per year in a market where there is unlikely to be substantial correlations between catastrophes.\footnote{\textit{Catastrophe Bonds and ILS Issued and Outstanding by Year}, ARTEMIS, http://www.artemis.bm/deal_directory/cat_bonds_ils_issued_outstanding.html [http://perma.cc/2UMC-39SU].} For example, a hurricane in the Caribbean is not correlated with an earthquake in California.

Another measure of market appetite for this type of risk is the market for contingent convertible (“co-co”) bonds. Co-cos are a type of “bail-in-able” capital—debt that converts to equity upon the occurrence of a specified trigger event. The conversion de-levers the
debtor, immediately increasing its solvency. It also helps the debtor’s liquidity as the conversion reduces its debt service. Such co-co bonds are fairly popular among European banks, but the total amount outstanding has never exceeded $140 billion. Critically, co-cos do not themselves provide liquidity to the debtor upon conversion. They simply change where they sit in the debtor’s capital structure. Nonetheless, they provide a measure for the appetite among investors for assuming credit risk on large financial institutions.

The largest financial institutions in the United States would require a couple magnitudes more of credit-linked notes than the entire catastrophe bond market or co-co bond market to finance a bankruptcy. JPMorgan alone, for example, would need up to $560 billion of liquidity support. Given the high correlation risk between credit-linked notes for large financial institutions, it is doubtful that there would be sufficient demand from global credit markets for such credit-linked notes to be sellable at a nonprohibitive rate.

Ultimately, if a firm is too big to finance in bankruptcy or “too big to DIP,” it’s also too big to fail. If the private market cannot provide the DIP financing, that is a strong indicator that the firm is systemically important. There is only one source in the world capable of credibly providing a DIP loan of tens or hundreds of billions of dollars with minimal notice. That is the U.S. government. No other entity in the world has this sort of financial strength. Yet it is inconceivable to imagine the federal government acting as a DIP lender without attaching strings to the extension of credit, such as demanding particular treatments for favored creditor constituencies. And that

117. Justin Yang, Co-Co Bond Market Pulls Through Recent Setbacks, WALL ST. J. (June 25, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/coco-bond-market-pulls-through-recent-setbacks-1498477962 [http://perma.cc/VU7M-SWYS (dark archive)]. That total is likely inflated in part because it reflects the relatively high yields on co-cos in a low interest rate environment. When rates rise, investors seeking to achieve certain return hurdles will have more options for higher-yielding investments and thus less interest in co-cos.

118. JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., supra note 97, at 1.

119. Indeed, this suggests that perhaps bankruptcy could be used as a systemic risk shibboleth: if a firm is capable of prearranging standing DIP financing on a level that regulators believe is sufficient (presumably its maximum liquidity needs over the past several years), then bankruptcy might be a reasonable regime for the firm. But if the firm is too big to DIP, then it is also too big to fail and should be dealt with outside a bankruptcy regime.

120. In theory, conditions for DIP lending could be legislated, but it is difficult to do ex ante, and any such legislation would likely have a hydraulic effect on contractual terms—
takes us right back to the bailout situation, which has simply been moved into the bankruptcy system.

B. Lack of International Coordination Will Frustrate Financial Institution Bankruptcy

A second problem an FIB would face is international coordination, most critically because of a lack of agreement about loss distribution. Large financial firms often operate internationally and have cross-border assets that may be a critical component of a financial firm’s value. Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code provides a voluntary mechanism for international coordination between U.S. and foreign insolvency proceedings. The coordination at issue in a U.S. FIB may well be with other foreign regulatory processes rather than with bankruptcy, and foreign financial regulators are hardly guaranteed to cooperate with a U.S. bankruptcy court.

Foreign regulators are likely to face domestic political pressure to ringfence the assets of the debtor firm’s foreign affiliates, meaning that they would not make these assets available to support U.S. creditors’ claims. In such a case, substantial going-concern value could be lost as foreign creditors dismantle the financial institution’s foreign assets.

C. Financial Contract Safe Harbors Will Frustrate Financial Institution Bankruptcy

Large financial institutions have substantial books of QFCs. All of these financial instruments are potentially valuable assets. As to the extent that one term is forbidden, it will likely be recreated synthetically through other terms.


122. 11 U.S.C. § 1501(a) (2012). Chapter 15 authorizes the filing of an “ancillary case” by a foreign representative—such as a foreign trustee or court—to seek U.S. recognition of a “foreign proceeding.” Id. § 1504. If granted, the U.S. automatic stay immediately comes into effect, and the foreign representative is authorized to operate the U.S. debtor’s business in the ordinary course. Id. §§ 1520(a), 362(a). Additionally, Chapter 15 enables U.S. bankruptcy trustees to be authorized “to act in a foreign country on behalf of a [U.S. bankruptcy] estate.” Id. § 1505. This mechanism enables coordination between U.S. and foreign insolvency proceedings, but it is not self-executing, nor does it guarantee any particular result. It simply creates a mechanism for U.S. judicial recognition of foreign proceedings, but it does not bind U.S. courts to cooperation with foreign proceedings.

123. Westbrook, supra note 121, at 346–47.
noted previously, under current bankruptcy law, non-debtor QFC counterparties may accelerate, terminate, and liquidate their positions without violating the automatic stay that otherwise stops creditor collection efforts upon the filing of a bankruptcy. This means that if at any point post-petition the counterparty is in the money, the counterparty can terminate the contract and seize any collateral that has been posted for the transaction. Thus, as soon as a financial institution is in trouble, QFC counterparties can run. The rationale for this treatment of QFCs is to limit systemic risk by ensuring that a firm’s failure does not lock counterparties into a bankruptcy, thus resulting in a domino effect of failures as the counterparties are left illiquid and ultimately insolvent.

An FIB system need not keep with current law, of course. Every version of FIB legislation has proposed a stay of the longer of forty-eight hours or until 5 p.m. the next business day for QFCs, in keeping with the International Swaps and Derivatives Association’s forty-eight-hour Universal Resolution Stay Protocol. This term is required to be incorporated into the contractual terms of most swaps contracts, as well as in the other QFC contracts for globally

124. See supra Section I.D.
126. LEVITIN, supra note 7, at 301.
127. H.R. REP. NO. 97-420, at 1 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 583, 583 (noting that “certain protections are necessary to prevent the insolvency of one commodity or security firm from spreading to other firms and possibly threatening the collapse of the affected market”). The report goes on to note that “[t]he prompt liquidation of an insolvent’s position is generally desirable to minimize the potentially massive losses and chain reaction of insolvencies that could occur if the market were to move sharply in the wrong direction.” Id. at 4, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 585.

Whether the safe harbors continue to limit systemic risk post-Dodd-Frank Act is another matter. In other work, I have observed that the Dodd-Frank Act’s requirement that most swaps clear through clearinghouses eliminates the financial contagion concern for cleared swaps, Levitin, Prioritization and Mutualization, supra note 92, at 132, while most other QFCs, other than repos, are already cleared through clearinghouses, id. at 154. The use of clearinghouses prevents domino effects and renders the safe harbors duplicative. Id. at 146.

systemically important bank holding companies and their depository subsidiaries, but it is not in all QFC contracts. The goal of the forty-eight-hour stay is to facilitate a transfer of the failed institutions' derivatives book to a solvent institution through a “weekend” bankruptcy that will not disrupt global financial markets.

But what if a buyer cannot be found on such short notice? If all large financial institutions are distressed, there might not be any buyers capable of assimilating a large QFC book. In such a case, a temporary stay, no matter what the length, merely would delay the start of a run. Unless the stay were to last beyond the time of the sale in a GB/BB transaction, it would not be adequate to protect the debtor’s QFC book. The longer the stay, however, the less work the QFC exceptions would do to prevent systemic risk.

The bigger problem with QFCs, however, is that the value of a debtor’s individual QFC positions, much less the value of its total QFC book or segments thereof, is often not immediately known. This is especially true when some of the QFCs are hedges of various loans and others are simply free-standing gambles. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. had, as of March 31, 2018, over $56 trillion in derivative exposures in what are surely thousands of contracts. Citibank, N.A. had over $55 trillion in derivative exposures at the same time.

It would take substantial time to responsibly sort through those positions, particularly at a time when the firm is in disarray and key personnel in the debtor’s organization may be looking for or have already taken other employment opportunities. This means that there would be substantial valuation uncertainty about the QFC book of the financial institution, even if its problems do not stem from that...
book of business.\textsuperscript{134} Because of that valuation uncertainty, a potential buyer in a GB/BB structure would either not purchase the QFC book or would insist on a steep discount because of the valuation uncertainty. Either situation would likely magnify the losses in bankruptcy and thus would increase the likelihood of a domino effect as impaired creditors themselves fail.

\textbf{D. FIB Lacks a Mechanism for Addressing Valuation Uncertainty like the Orderly Liquidation Fund}

The valuation uncertainty problem is particularly acute for QFCs, but it is hardly limited to them. The failed financial institution might have a large book of residential or commercial mortgages of uncertain value, and the need for speed created by the automatic stay exceptions for QFCs also creates a valuation uncertainty problem for non-QFC assets.

In FDIC receiverships, including under OLA, the valuation uncertainty problem for QFCs and other types of assets can be addressed through an FDIC shared loss agreement. A common form of FDIC bank resolution is through a Purchase and Assumption agreement in which a solvent bank agrees to take over certain assets of a failed bank. Sometimes the FDIC guarantees the performance of some of the purchased assets under such agreements.\textsuperscript{135} The result is that the purchased assets are on the books of the purchaser, but the valuation risk, at least to the extent that it is due to the credit performance on the purchased assets, lies at least in part with the FDIC. Nothing, however, prevents the FDIC from expanding loss sharing agreements to cover risks beyond credit performance.

The FDIC uses such shared loss agreements in part because of the need for speed in the FDIC resolution process. The FDIC likes, when possible, to maintain the operations of a failed bank without interruption. That means finding a buyer between the time when the FDIC takes over a bank (often at the close of business on Friday) and when the bank is next scheduled to open for business. Such a speedy

\textsuperscript{134} The all-or-nothing assumption requirements that require the transfer as a block of all or no QFCs with any given counterparty only add to the valuation uncertainty problem. While these provisions are designed to prevent cherry-picking and create pressure for the transfer of all QFCs, they also mean that the transferee has no idea what it is taking. Notably, such an all-or-nothing assumption is also required in OLA. 12 U.S.C. § 5390(c)(9)(A) (2012).

\textsuperscript{135} See, e.g., FDIC, RESOLUTIONS HANDBOOK 18 (2014), https://www.fdic.gov/about/freedom/drr_handbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/84ZP-6SL7].
turnaround precludes meaningful diligence of the assets—and hence a precise valuation—by the purchaser. The use of shared loss agreements enables the transaction to close quickly by shifting valuation risk onto the FDIC.

The limited stay for QFCs generates a similar need for speed in FIB proposals. There is no provision for FDIC shared loss agreements in FIB proposals, however, because this sort of use of government funds (even if they are only of a mutual insurance fund administered by the government) is anathema to the whole “private” FIB concept. In contrast, OLA expressly provides for an Orderly Liquidation Fund that could be used to address the valuation uncertainty in quick-turnaround GB/BB transactions that preclude careful buyer diligence of assets.136

Thus, not only does FIB lack a credible mechanism for financing a bankruptcy, even a very fast one, but it also lacks a mechanism to overcome the valuation uncertainty problem that the GB/BB transaction structure is meant to overcome. A GB/BB problem is supposed to address valuation uncertainty by separating good assets from a debt overhang. But if the assets to be transferred to the Good Bank are of uncertain value, it is unlikely that there will be a purchaser readily available within forty-eight hours absent a regulatory shotgun to the back.

IV. SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL RISK AS A POLITICAL QUESTION

A. The Political Nature of Systemic Risk

The failure of a large financial institution is not merely a private matter between the debtor and its creditors. It is a matter of public concern because of the possibility of a systemic financial risk externality—that the failure of a financial institution would impose costs throughout the financial system, potentially resulting in a domino effect of financial institution failures and, ultimately, a contraction of economic activity in the real economy because of a lack of liquidity from financial markets. As I have argued elsewhere, there is no meaningful economic definition of “systemic risk.”137 It is not a measurable concept. Instead, the term is only sensible as a label for the political importance of a firm’s financial failure in terms of political unwillingness to allow the social consequences from the

137. See Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, supra note 6, at 439–40.
institution’s failure to materialize without intervention. Systemic risk is a political question, but the bankruptcy court system is not built to handle political questions.

American courts have a long-standing political question doctrine—the courts will not insert themselves into political questions properly committed to another branch of government.138 There are two related reasons underlying this prudential doctrine. First, if the courts insert themselves into political issues, they might simply be disregarded, thereby eroding the standing of the courts. Second, the political question doctrine protects the legitimacy of the courts for when they rule on nonpolitical questions.

We should see systemic financial problems as political questions. The failure of large financial institutions creates a high likelihood of spillover effects into the broader economy and a response that involves the public fisc. Thus, systemic financial crises are ultimately distributional matters writ large and affect the general public, not just disputes between private parties. Such policy questions are not appropriate for the courts, much less for non–Article III courts. The courts are designed for conducting an adversarial process to resolve cases and controversies among litigants, not for determining broader questions of economic distribution in society that may affect third parties. Those parties have no voice in the court whether because of lack of legal standing, lack of knowledge of the case, or lack of wherewithal to participate in the case. Such broader distributional policy questions are therefore best left to the political branches of government.

It is true that courts regularly adjudicate matters involving the public fisc—all tax cases for example139—but these are adjudicated within a statutory framework that deals with the liability of individual entities to the government or vice versa. It is never in the context of general distributional questions, such as which groups of creditors should be paid and which should not be. That sort of distributional decision should be reserved for the legislature, which may delegate the ultimate decision to an administrative agency, as with OLA. The combination of the use of the public fisc outside normal government

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139. See, e.g., Fredericks v. Comm’r, 126 F.3d 433, 435, 449 (3d Cir. 1997) (adjudicating a dispute between appellant and IRS about whether appellant’s tax deficiency assessment resulting from disallowance of tax shelter deduction was valid and analyzing the impact of the doctrine of estoppel on the public fisc).
spending processes with distributional decisions about who should benefit directly or indirectly from the use of those public funds is a fundamentally different matter than courts are used to addressing.

**B. The New Bankruptcy: Bankruptcy as a Public Policy Forum**

Since 2008, however, bankruptcy has changed. It has ceased to simply be a forum for readjusting financial obligations of private firms and individuals and has also become a forum for resolving thorny political problems. The Chrysler and GM bankruptcies were the first and most explicit instances of this. The auto manufacturers’ bankruptcies provided an avenue for the federal government to intervene to support the industrial economy throughout the Rust Belt. Likewise, post-2008 bankruptcy has been used as a way to provide a lifeline to the struggling domestic coal industry by enabling coal producers to shed their environmental liabilities and continue production.\(^{140}\) To be sure, bankruptcy law always played a role in addressing public policy questions, such as how to allocate the risk of mass toxic torts or how to deal with the volatile finances of the airline industry. But post-2008 bankruptcy has been used more explicitly and deliberately by the executive branch as a forum for implementing policy.

Also starting in 2008, the use of Chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy began to change. Prior to 2008, there were only two hundred non-erroneous Chapter 9 filings, only thirty-four of which were by general-purpose municipalities.\(^{141}\) Most were by special-purpose hospitals,\(^{142}\) water or sanitary districts,\(^{143}\) or other specialized local governments with discrete financial problems. The only general-purpose government of any size to file prior to 2008 was Orange County, California, which governs the unincorporated areas of the county; most other general-purpose municipalities had fewer than one thousand residents.\(^{144}\)

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141. This data is based on the Author’s analysis of PACER. For a discussion expressing doubts about bankruptcy’s utility in the municipal context, see generally Omer Kimhi, *Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem*, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 351 (2010).


144. For example, Moffett, Oklahoma, population 128 in the 2000 census, filed for bankruptcy after it lost its revenue from operating an illegal speed trap on the interstate.
Since 2008, however, Chapter 9 has been used by large, general-purpose municipalities: Detroit, Michigan; San Bernardino, Stockton, and Vallejo, California; and Jefferson County, Alabama, have all gone through Chapter 9. Navigating these cities’ insolvencies was not just a matter of financial decisionmaking but also involved political decisions. All bankruptcies involve distributional choices between creditor constituencies: Will money go to bondholders, vendors, or tort creditors for their prepetition claims? But with municipal bankruptcies there are also taxpayers who are not creditors, yet whose interests are very much implicated by any sort of payment plan: What level of municipal services will be offered going forward? What will municipal tax rates be? Will prized municipal assets that add substantially to quality of life, such as the artwork in the Detroit Institute of Arts, be sold to pay creditors or retained? Chapter 9 cases require navigating the politics of failed cities.

Bankruptcy scholarship has only just started grappling with the increased use of bankruptcy to manage political problems. Melissa Jacoby and Edward Janger have both recently written about how bankruptcy can manage the politics of decisions in Chapter 9.


I have suggested that bankruptcy is generally an inherently political process because of its distributional nature, but when bankruptcy affects more than creditors, its politics become unmanageable. Likewise, in other work with Aurelia Chaudhury and David Schleicher, I consider this problem in the context of simultaneous financial crises for overlapping municipal governments.

All of this work recognizes the fundamental difficulty of managing politics in the bankruptcy process. While bankruptcy judges have figured out creative ways to do this in Chapter 9, it is far from an ideal process because it gives an unelected judge tremendous discretion and is ultimately not at all a democratic process. This observation does not commend the expansion of bankruptcy to political cases like those of too-big-to-fail financial institutions.

Ironically, some of those who support the idea of FIB, such as Professors David A. Skeel, Jr. and Mark J. Roe, were sharp critics of the Chrysler and GM bankruptcies. The Chrysler and GM bankruptcies both used a GB/BB format with the firms’ good assets and certain politically favored liabilities—such as obligations to the firms’ unionized workforces—assumed by the “Good Chrysler” and “Good GM,” and the bad assets and disfavored liabilities left behind in “Bad Chrysler” and “Bad GM” for liquidation. The Chrysler and GM bankruptcies were harshly criticized as having violated bankruptcy rules of priority and for being sub rosa reorganization plans.

149. See Mark J. Roe & David Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 MICH. L. REV. 727, 729–31 (2010) (criticizing the Chrysler bankruptcy for failing to adhere to bankruptcy priorities). While Professor Skeel has strongly endorsed FIB, see, e.g., Skeel, supra note 5, at 329, Professor Roe rightly recognizes the problems with FIB but argues it should exist as an option alongside a regulatory resolution scheme, see Mark J. Roe, Why Regulators Are Needed to Handle Failed Banks, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/06/business/dealbook/why-regulators-are-needed-to-handle-failed-banks.html [https://perma.cc/S5MY-5A55 (dark archive)].
151. See Roe & Skeel, supra note 149, at 741; see also Barry E. Adler, A Reassessment of Bankruptcy Reorganization After Chrysler and General Motors, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 305, 308 (2010); Ralph Brubaker & Charles Jordan Tabb, Bankruptcy
While these criticisms are arguably incorrect, they underscore a more fundamental point: the bankruptcy system is not designed for dealing with systemic financial crises. When the bankruptcy system is used to handle systemically important firms, it is very likely to be warped by the weight of political concerns and cease to be the neutral, fair process that FIB advocates imagine it to be. This will be all the more true if DIP financing comes from the only realistic source, the U.S. government.

Contemporary bankruptcy practice often follows the “golden rule”—he who has the gold makes the rules. This means that it is often the DIP lender calling the shots on things such as whether there will be an asset sale, what assets will be sold, and what the bidding procedures will be. Sometimes these issues have to be decided at the very beginning of a case before creditors have managed to organize themselves.

In such a situation, the only party capable of staring down an over-reaching DIP lender is the bankruptcy judge, but bankruptcy judges are not well suited for this role. Bankruptcy judges are not Article III judges with life tenure. When a non–Article III judge who likely has no expertise regarding the particular debtor firm or financial markets generally is presented with a situation in which he is told that he must immediately approve a transaction or else the global economy will collapse, the judge is put in an untenable position. The judge is likely to approve the transaction, whether or not it complies with the law. The judge might make some noise but will ultimately be rolled.


152. The absolute priority rule applies only in a cramdown confirmation, and then only to nonconsenting classes of unsecured claimants and equity interests. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)–(C) (2012). By its own terms, it does not apply to asset sales or to consensual plans. The objecting creditors in Chrysler were part of a consenting class of secured creditors. In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 104 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d, 576 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009), appellate decision vacated as moot sub nom. Ind. State Pension Tr. v. Chrysler LLC, 558 U.S. 1087 (2009). For a convincing argument that there was nothing particularly unusual or illegal about the transaction structures used in the GM and Chrysler bankruptcies, see generally Stephen J. Lubben, No Big Deal: The GM and Chrysler Cases in Context, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 531 (2009).

153. See, e.g., Brubaker & Tabb, supra note 151, at 1405.

154. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 151, at 308, 313–14. This alone should call into question the desirability of bankruptcy as a mechanism for dealing with any problem.

155. See id.

156. See, e.g., Baird, supra note 8, at 290.
The rule-of-law virtues of the bankruptcy system will inevitably become warped if the system is dragooned to handle systemic risks that trump any law. Put differently, it is bad for bankruptcy courts to deal with systemic risk, and it is bad for systemic risk to have bankruptcy courts managing the resolution process. Political questions like resolution of systemic financial distress should be resolved in the political forum, not the courts.

CONCLUSION

What would happen if we go down the FIB rabbit hole? One of three things. First, the bankruptcy process would be abused, as alleged to have occurred in the GM and Chrysler bailouts, to achieve the financial stability end sought by whatever administration is in office. In other words, a bailout would occur through bankruptcy. Second, there would be a questionably illegal, ad hoc bailout, with lots of finger-wagging, clucking, and tsk-tsking after the fact, as occurred with the use of the Exchange Stabilization Fund to aid Mexico in 1995, or the Federal Reserve’s Maiden Lane structures in 2008, or the use of the Exchange Stabilization Fund in 2008 to bail out money market mutual funds. Or third, Congress would rapidly pass bailout-authorization legislation, much as it did with the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act in 2008.

None of these are desirable outcomes. Nobody likes bailouts. But realistically they are inevitable when things get bad enough because no one wants to deal with the political consequences of a true economic meltdown. The realistic goal is not avoiding bailouts altogether but finding a predictable legal framework for the bailouts that distributes as much of the cost as possible to the beneficiaries of the bailout at a time when it will not cause systemic disruption.


Insisting on bankruptcy as a bailout alternative is ideologically-driven self-deception. The pursuit of the Fool’s Gold of FIB will ultimately result in bailouts whether in the guise of bankruptcy or otherwise.

Furthermore, it does no favor to the rule of law to saddle legal procedures like bankruptcy with political questions like bailouts. No end is served by pretending that bailouts are creatures of law; a wolf in sheep’s clothing is still a wolf. Yet that is precisely what the pipedream of FIB would do. We need to accept that as distasteful as bailouts may be, as long as there are systemically important financial institutions the resolution dilemma will always be resolved with a bailout.

We do not want to be comfortable with bailouts, and we should not be. The best way to avoid bailouts is through better ex ante regulation. If risk is adequately managed on the front end, there will be no need to deal with the consequences on the back end. Yet markets change and innovate, and there is constant political pressure for deregulation. Even without these pressures, no system of regulation is foolproof, so bailouts may be unavoidable in some circumstances.

Avoiding the resolution dilemma and its inevitable outcome means ensuring a robust prudential regulatory regime that can reduce systemic risk and prevent crises in the first place. Regulators’ single most potent tool for managing risk is the living wills process, including the authority for regulators to break up the biggest banks before they break the economy. An FIB process would neutralize the living wills power, thereby both preventing regulators from managing systemic risk and saddling them with a resolution process that is doomed to fail. Most importantly, FIB would require regulators to step in with a bailout to contain the resulting crisis—simply put, FIB all but guarantees bailouts rather than being an antidote. We should plug our ears to the bankruptcy Lorelei’s louche song before it lures us onto the financial rocks and call out FIB for the fib it is.