Investor Protection in the System of Capital Markets Law: Legal Foundations and Outlook

Thomas M.J. Mollers

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Investor Protection in the System of Capital Markets
Law: Legal Foundations and Outlook

Thomas M.J. Möllers†

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at the Center for European Legal Studies.
I. Introduction

It is no coincidence that the capital markets law we know today owes much of its existence to a financial crisis. Black Friday, October 24, 1929, prompted President Roosevelt to lay the foundations of United States capital markets law with the Securities Act of 1933 (SA) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (SEA). Important features of these two statutes were then adopted in the rest of the world. They were adopted, for example, in Europe in the 1970s. Moreover, United States law is not known for its systematic structure; rather, statutes are often developed as ad hoc reactions to crises. However, it is distinguished by a number of features, for example the fact that legislative competence for capital markets law rests with the federal government, while that for corporations law rests with the states.

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1 Besides the introduction of the Securities Act of 1933 (SA) and the Securities Exchange Act 1934 (SEA) by President Roosevelt, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act [SOX] also constitutes such a statute. On financial crises, see generally JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 3-7 (6th ed. 2006); CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY (1st ed. 2009); on the SOX, see generally Thomas M. J. Möllers, Creating Standards in a Global Financial Market – The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and other Activities: What Europeans and Americans could and should learn from each other, 4 EUR. Co. & Fin. L. Rev. 173 (2007).

2 See Möllers, supra note 1.
Another peculiarity, generous in comparison to Europe, is the general approach of leaving problems for the market to solve, as the market is perceived to have regulatory solutions more readily available than the legislature.

The Member States of the European Union are home to a corporations law that is relatively mature, but a capital markets law that is in relative infancy at only 20 years old. As a result of this, capital markets law is only taught at some European universities. Nonetheless, thousands of statutory provisions have arisen, so that it is already difficult to maintain an overview of them.

The current financial crisis has made clear the “fragility” of the financial markets in recent times. In the forum of the G20, efforts have been made to find the weak points and to react to them. The
novel feature of this process is that those involved possess the serious intention of creating uniform regulations at the international level. The following article seeks to sketch out some current flaws in capital markets law, in order to identify areas that need future action. To this end it might help to structure capital markets law more clearly than in the past. A distinction is sought to be made in this discussion between (I) market participants, (II) the financial products and information on listed companies, and (III) the relevant financial services of financial intermediaries. The final discussion will then deal with (IV) implementation and enforcement measures and (V) the legal methodology of capital markets law. In the process, the positive developments in capital markets law will be discussed, but above all gaps in investor protection will be addressed. Individual problems will be left for a deeper analysis in the future.

II. Market Participants

1. Private and Professional Investors

In banking and capital markets law, listed companies stand before a market that consists of both retail and professional investors. A third group, so-called “financial intermediaries,” gathers information about these companies and evaluates it. The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) has made a distinction between professional and private investors. A different standard is set for these two groups, and numerous duties of disclosure are reduced for the former. This is a convincing approach, as the alternative would give rise to transaction costs by imposing information paternalistically on informed investors. However, the financial crisis demonstrates that even the (purportedly) professional Landesbanken were not professional

7 See Art. 4(1), no. 11, in comparison with Annex II of the MiFID, transposed in §31(9) and §31a(2) WpHG.
9 Landesbanken is a group of state owned banks unique to Germany. They are
enough to accurately calculate the risks inherent in financial products. Numerous municipal treasuries are complaining about insufficient disclosure. Since they are professional investors, many of the duties imposed under Section 31 of the Securities Trading Act (WpHG) do not apply.

2. Larger and Smaller Listed Companies

European capital markets law is also full of gaps. Many disclosure obligations only apply to the regulated market, not to the curb market [Freiverkehr], such as the Entry Standard on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange or the over-the-counter markets of the other regional stock exchanges. The size of the listed companies correlates clearly with the different “market segments” of the exchange, such as the DAX, MDAX, SDAX and the Prime Standard of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. The three large exchanges in Europe all solicit small companies. The curb market has the advantage for small companies that it is not subject to strict

regionally organized and their business is predominantly wholesale banking. They are also the head banking institution of the local and regional bases Sparkassen or saving banks. See Michael Grison & Uwe H. Schneider, The German Landesbanken, 1995 COLUMB. BUS. L. REV. 337, 339-40 (1995).

10 See G-20, London Summit, supra note 6; G-20, Pittsburgh Summit, supra note 6; G-20, St. Andrews Summit, supra note 6.


reporting and disclosure requirements of the regulated market, and avoid the costs associated therewith. A number of disadvantages arise for smaller companies on the capital markets, which make the curb market segment more attractive. Smaller companies often cannot afford large investor relations departments to maintain the company website and provide financial analysts, funds and other investors with regular information. In addition, large investment services providers seldom produce financial analyses of small listed companies. Finally, the securities of these companies are traded far less relative to larger companies.

In turn, fewer turnovers of securities invite price manipulation. Even with so-called “spam emails,” retail investor “ripoffs” are not seldom. “Wild West” manners still remain to a certain degree, which is hardly beneficial to capital markets as an institution. The potentially higher risk of insider trading and market manipulation of the values of smaller listed companies, caused by their lower level of market capitalization, has not yet provoked an adequate legal response. While it is traditionally the larger market segments that have been regulated and supervised, in the future a better supervision of the trading values of smaller listed companies by the exchanges and the Federal Supervisory Authority, the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin), appears desirable.

3. Financial Intermediaries

Investors depend on the expertise of financial intermediaries such as rating agencies, financial analysts and investment services providers, and rely on the information they produce. Duties of disclosure still constitute the main instrument of capital markets law. In contrast to prohibitions, duties of disclosure have the

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16 According to information from the responsible departments, the BaFin has been directing particular attention to these problems recently. This increased pressure appears to have been effective at reducing the number of relevant delicts. See also, Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht [hereinafter BaFin], Jahresbericht 2008 at 156 (Bonn 2008). See also, KLAUS J. HOPT ET AL., BÖRSENFORM 372 (1997).

advantage that the transactions concerned are allowed subject
to only to a duty to provide an explanation of the risks involved.\(^\text{18}\) Surprisingly, conflicts of interest are not dealt with in the relevant
textbooks as a general instrument of capital markets law.\(^\text{19}\) This
notwithstanding, the avoidance, or at least disclosure, of conflicts
of interest is not just a duty of the banks towards their clients\(^\text{20}\)
organized within the framework of their compliance regime,\(^\text{21}\) but
also gives rise to duties incumbent on financial analysts,\(^\text{22}\) rating
agencies\(^\text{23}\) and accountants.\(^\text{24}\) It seems one could expand on this
approach further – misleading disclaimers are to be forbidden.\(^\text{25}\)
Breaches of these rules ought to give rise to civil causes of action.

III. Financial Products and Information from Listed
Companies

1. Complex Financial Products – Prohibition, Approval and
   Transparency

Banks, especially investment banks, are innovative. While
shares, as a dominant form of security, and corporate bonds used
to dominate the market, in recent years countless new financial
products have appeared, not only to save taxes, but to generate
new markets, new trade, and new profits. Common examples
include put- and call-options, as well as derivatives, short sales,

\(^{18}\) Id.

\(^{19}\) For examples of this not being addressed, see, e.g., PETRA BUCK-HEEB,
KAPITALMARKTRECHT (C.F. Müller, 2006); CARSTEN PETER CLAUSSEN, BANK-
UND BÖRSENRECHT (C.H. Beck 2008); SIEGFRIED KÖMPEL & RODIGER VEIL,
WERTPAPIERHANDELSGESETZ (Erich Schmidt, 2006).

\(^{20}\) WpHG §31(2) No. 2.

\(^{21}\) WpHG §33(1) No. 3.

\(^{22}\) WpHG §34b(1) No. 2; see also Thomas M.J. Möllers, Effizienz als Maßstab des
Kapitalmarktrechts - Die Verwendung empirischer und ökonomischer Argumente zur

\(^{23}\) Article 5, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Counsel on Credit Rating Agencies, at 20 COM 704 (Nov. 11, 2008); see also Thomas
M.J. Möllers, Regulating Credit Rating Agencies: the new US and EU law – important
steps or much ado about nothing?, 4 CAP. MARKETS L.J. 477 (2009).

\(^{24}\) Council Directive 2006/43 art. 22(22), 2006 O.J. (EC) (on the statutory audits of
annual accounts and consolidated account).

\(^{25}\) For such a disclaimer, see Thomas M.J. Möllers & Florian Holzner, Die
including naked short sales, and structured products such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS). As a result of these developments, products are no longer fully understood by buyers, whether retail investors or professional investors.\textsuperscript{26} As such, the benefits and risks of the financial product cannot be properly calculated.\textsuperscript{27} Additionally, complex financial products such as the CDO have given rise to certain risks.\textsuperscript{28} Residential mortgages were given to non-creditworthy clients, but the risks of these mortgages were not recorded on the books of the bank itself; rather they were transferred to third parties via the financial markets.\textsuperscript{29} Lastly, market fluctuations were intensified by speculation on rising or falling prices by the means of certain financial products.\textsuperscript{30} A well-known example is that of the Volkswagen shares, which in autumn of 2008 were driven up to €1,000 within a short time, but then fell back down to €200.\textsuperscript{31}

In particular, two regulatory mechanisms of capital markets law may be triggered here. On one hand, it must be discussed which products should be prohibited or allowed in more limited quantity and only with the approval of a regulatory authority.\textsuperscript{32} Certainly the industry’s livelihood lies, in part, in its constant creation of new and “innovative” financial products. Opportunity and risk are by nature bound together. Investors should just “gamble” on the market on a large scale, however, only when they are prepared to lose their investment. For this reason, future


\textsuperscript{27} See id.

\textsuperscript{28} See id.

\textsuperscript{29} See id.

\textsuperscript{30} See id.


\textsuperscript{32} Similar discussions are found in competition law. See, e.g., Wolfgang Fikentscher, Finanzkrise, Wettbewerb und Regulierung, 9 GRURINT 615 (2009); Joseph Straus & Simon Klopfasinski, Der Schutz von Geschäftsverfahren und andere patentrechtliche Fragestellungen im Lichte der aktuellen Finanzmarktkrise, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR PETER MES 327 (Gereon Rother et al. eds., 2009).
products should be prohibited which require no *capital investment* and which, because of *extreme leverage effects*, do more harm than good. WpHG Section 37g provides a good approach: under this section, the Federal Ministry of Finance can release regulations on the basis of which certain financial products can be prohibited. Unfortunately, use has not yet been made of this provision. Fortunately, however, short selling has been prohibited in the United States and by the BaFin in Germany, because this practice can cause the market to rise or fall without the actual investment of capital.\(^{33}\) Additionally, CDOs should only be allowed in the future if the trading partner assumes some risk of his own. For retail investors, limitations are already in place, namely that discount broking is only permissible for non-complex financial instruments.\(^{34}\) In a recently passed law, the German legislature prohibited naked short sales and certain trades with derivatives.\(^{35}\) This approach is inappropriate because alternatives were not discussed sufficiently: the non-stock market trade could also be transferred to the stock market or to multilateral trading facilities (MTFs). Alternatively, “failures to deliver”\(^{36}\) caused by naked short sales could be reduced by additional measures.\(^{37}\)

\(^{33}\) On July 15, 2008, the SEC prohibited “naked short selling” of the securities of particular financial institutions. Naked short selling refers to the practice of selling securities without actually buying them before hand, or determining that they can be borrowed. The SEC believes that panic sales lead to falls in price to levels that are significantly lower than that to which a normal supply-demand relationship would lead. *Emergency Order Taking Temporary Action to Respond to Market Developments, Exchange Act*, Release No. 58,166, 73 Fed. Reg. 42,379, 42,380 (proposed July 21, 2008) (notice). The BaFin has also prohibited this practice on the basis of §4(1) WpHG, and the German Minister of Finance Wolfgang Schäuble intends to introduce similar prohibition on the Federal level. *See* BaFin, Allgemeinverfügung der BaFin vom 21.09.2008 zum Verbot von Leerverkäufen (2008) (Ger.).

\(^{34}\) WpHG § 31(7) (transposing Art. 19(6) of the MiFID).

\(^{35}\) Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksache [hereinafter BT] 19/1952 (Ger.).

\(^{36}\) Failures to deliver occur if an investor or its broker-dealer do not deliver sold shares within three days. Following new SEC rules, failures to deliver in all equity securities have decreased by approximately fifty-seven percent since the fall of 2008. *See* SEC Takes Steps to Curtail Abusive Short Sales and Increase Market Transparency, SEC Press Release No. 2009-172 (July 27, 2009).

Alongside these developments, more transparency must be created. Further-reaching reporting duties should definitely be introduced, as Section 31 of WpHG does not sufficiently express the dangers presented by financial futures trading. Therefore, the abolition of Section 37 et seq. of WpHG, which warned about particularly dangerous futures trades until October 31, 2007, and 2002. Prior to 2002, WpHG even imposed writing requirements, constituting a step backwards at the cost of investor protection. Retail investors should be able to get an overview of the risk they are entering into. A development to celebrate, on the other hand, is the recent decision of the Federal Court of Justice that granted an award of damages because the investor was not made aware of the risk of total loss of investment.

A stronger classification of risks would also be helpful. Not every investor is aware of the danger of the Prime Standard. More transparency in complex products is definitely needed, especially for derivatives and certificates. A short information sheet that provides more than the price history of the product could be helpful. A draft bill has meanwhile been introduced in this context. Particular risk should be presented, not just in a

38 See WpHG § 31.

39 On the legal history, see GERHARD ROTH, KÖLNER KOMMENTAR ZUM WPHG (Heribert Hirte & Thomas M.J. Möllers eds., Carl Heymanns 2007) (commentary on § 37d ¶ 19); WERTPAPIERHANDELSGESETZ (Andreas Fuchs ed., C.H. Beck 2009) (commentary on § 37e and § 37g ¶ 92).


42 See Diskussionsentwurf für ein Gesetz zur Stärkung des Anlegerschutzes und Verbesserung der Funktionsfähigkeit des Kapitalmarktes, BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER FINANZEN (May 3, 2010, 10:01AM),
standardized form sheet, but also in the written record of financial advice, to ensure that specific risks have been expressly named.

2. Information on Listed Companies and Information Floods

a. Information Floods

Numerous reporting duties exist for listed companies. In recent years, these duties of disclosure have been extended extensively: one remembers the introduction of quarterly, half-yearly and yearly financial records, ad hoc reporting, reporting of "directors" dealings, transparency of financial interests, etc. However, it appears more and more that the limits of disclosure duties have been reached. They not only burden the company with high costs, but also lead to an insurmountable information overload which operates, rather, to the disadvantage of investors.

b. Bounded Rationality — Summary

The results of behavioral finance research can be applied here. They point to the limited understanding and information-processing capability of investors. An approach to solving
problems in the capital markets could be to avoid misleading or confusing information and to reduce the overall quantity of information. This would require the abolition of the yearly document under Section 10 of WpPG, though this would save but negligible costs and an overview of the yearly financial information of the company seems sensible as an investor relations measure. Revision of the yearly and half-yearly balances is also needed. These balances are not even read, let alone understood, by retail investors. What is required here is “translation” assistance, information that is simple and easy to understand. Currently, the legislature requires the production of a summary of prospectus information under Section 5(2) WpPG. This duty should be carried over to the secondary market. In the future, the yearly report is to be accompanied by a “short financial report,” to enable the comprehension of this important corporate information by investors better than has hitherto been the case.

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46 On the misuse of ad hoc reporting in the year 2000 and the reaction of the legislature with the introduction of §15(2) WpHG, see BÄFIN, EMITTENTENTLEITFADEN 59 (2005) (Ger.); see also WERTPAPPIERHANDELSGESETZ (Otto Schmidt, 2009) (commentary on § 15, ¶ 199). See also WpHG § 31(2) (introduced for securities trading companies on the basis of Art. 19(2) MiFID).

47 Id.

48 WpHG-E §37v(2).

49 In the United Kingdom, such financial reports have existed since 1995. See The National Archives, The Companies (Summary Financial Statement) Regulations 1995 (Dec. 31, 1995), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1995/2092/contents/made. This has been accepted on a voluntary basis by, for example, the BASF S.E. with the BASF Compact, available at http://berichte.basf.de/basfin/copsfiles/de/2008/kompakt/14586_BASF_Kompakt_2008.pdf; cf. Thomas M.J. Möllers & Eva Kernchen, Information Overload am Kapitalmarkt-Plädoyer zur Einführung eines Kurzfinanzberichts auf empirischer, psychologischer und rechtssvergleichender Basis, 40 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR UNTERNEHMENS- UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT [ZGR] (forthcoming Feb. 2011) (Ger.).
Besides the base price information, securities service providers could provide clients with short "information sheets" in the course of investment advisory service that are more tailored to the clients’ needs.\(^{50}\)

**IV. Financial Services of Financial Intermediaries**

1. **Selected Abuses of Financial Intermediaries**

   a. **Rating Agencies**

   Even today material deficits exist in this area.\(^{51}\) Rating agencies give ratings that are substantially too positive on structured financial products (collateralized debt obligations or CDOs) and operate with extensive conflicts of interests.\(^{52}\) These arise primarily because the same agencies are involved first in structuring products and then rating them.\(^{53}\)

   b. **Financial Analysts and Journalists**

   In contrast to the USA, retail investors in Germany do not generally have access to financial analyses. They turn to third parties, for example journalists, for analysis summaries. In terms of content, financial analyses must name the author and disclose any conflicts of interest. Journalists in Germany fall foul of this requirement on a regular basis at present.\(^{54}\)

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\(^{50}\) See Möllers, Europäische Methoden- und Gesetzgebungslehre im KapitalmarktrechtVollharmonisierung, Generalklauseln und soft law im Rahmen des Lamfalussy-Verfahrens als Mittel zur Etablierung von Standards, supra note 5.


\(^{52}\) Id.

\(^{53}\) Id.

c. Investment Services Providers

It is certainly positive for investors that, at the level of European law, investment advisers are obliged to make themselves familiar with the wishes and financial situation of the investor – the principle of “know your customer.” It is also positive for investors that advice is now to be documented in written form under Section 34(2a) clauses 3–5 of WpHG.55

It remains doubtful, however, whether the German legislature has competence at all to create a duty to keep records of this sort.56 And there exist many unresolved questions: the banks and financial advisors are not allowed to carry out the transactions planned in the consultation until the client has received the written protocol. However, particularly for investment advice, time can be of the essence. The production and communication of written advice can, at times, simply be too slow; who then bears the risk of market conditions that change in the meantime? Beyond this, the reversal of the burden of proof against the banks in the case of an action to challenge the memorandum hides several material risks, which could manifest themselves as outright abuses. The client has one week in which to challenge the protocol after its receipt. As the bank bears the onus of proof, the client could easily impugn the advice given, should market prices happen to change in that supervening period. The bank would then have to discharge the onerous burden of proving that the written advice was neither incomplete nor incorrect. The client should also be given the opportunity to waive the need for a written protocol.57 In

55 Comparable duties existed before under §6(1) II and §61(1) II VVG. However, these are substantially less extensive. See Michael Böhm, Regierungsentwurf zur Verbesserung der Durchsetzbarkeit von Ansprüchen aus Falschberatung, 6 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR BANK- UND KAPITALMARKtrecht [hereinafter BKR] 221, 224 (2009).


57 Michael Böhm, Regierungsentwurf zur Verbesserung der Durchsetzbarkeit von
such cases, investor protection overshoots the mark and leads to a disproportionate disadvantage for the banks.

Beyond this, many banking and investment services providers are capable of optimization. It is a statutory requirement that information and advice be provided with the required level of expertise.\(^58\) However, this has not been concretized further by statute, and often 16 to 30 year old bank employees give customers important advice - a task clearly beyond their capacity.\(^59\) Meanwhile, the German legislature created a new proposal to ensure that the quality of the adviser is supervised.\(^60\)

The MiFID concretizes financial services and creates a greater degree of legal certainty. At the expense of investor protection, and to this extent in a step backwards, it expressly allows “discount brokers” and standardized disclosure forms.\(^61\) In practice, hybrids exist between asset management and investment advisory services. To this group belong the so-called “grey” asset management and secondary advice after an initial investment. It is unclear to what extent these sorts of dealings give rise to judicial control.\(^62\)

Further, conflicts of interest exist because banks usually sell

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\(^58\) See WpHG § 31(1), No. 1.


\(^61\) On this point, see THOMAS M.J. MOLLERS, KÖLNER KOMMENTAR ZUM WpHG, commentary §31, ¶ 195 (1997); see also WERTPAPIERHANDELSGESETZ, commentary §§31-37(a), ¶ 70 (Andreas Fuchs ed., 2009).

their own products. Reported judgments on kick-backs\textsuperscript{63} only cover one aspect of this problem. Although the Federal Court of Justice postulates the avoidance of conflicts of interest as a general principle,\textsuperscript{64} it has not found such a conflict in cases where a bank only recommends its in-house products.\textsuperscript{65} This authority contradicts the "no conflicts" model, whereby financial services providers are bound to deal in the best interests of their clients.\textsuperscript{66} The market for fee-based advice from disinterested advisors who can inform investors neutrally about a range of different investment forms is still remarkably small.\textsuperscript{67} Insurance law provisions are more advanced in this regard — under Section 60(2) VVG, insurance brokers must disclose the limited selection of products they offer.\textsuperscript{68} A similar obligation would not be an unreasonable imposition on banks.

Banks, as financial intermediaries, also owe a minimum degree of disclosure, which takes the form of standardized disclosure in brochures. It should be considered insufficient when no current

\textsuperscript{63} \textit{Bundesgerichtshof} [hereinafter BGH], Dec. 19, 2000, 146 \textbf{Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen} [hereinafter BGHZ] 235 241 (Ger.); 170 BGHZ 226 (234) (regarding Kick Back II); BGH Jan. 20, 2009, 9 \textbf{Wertpapier-Mitteilungen} [WM] 405, 406, 2009 (Ger.) (regarding Kick Back III); 27 WM 1274 (Ger.) (regarding Kick Back IV); \textit{Hirte & Möllers, supra} note 39, commentary §31, ¶ 144.

\textsuperscript{64} See BGH, Jan. 20, 2009, \textit{supra} note 64, at 406. Reference to \textit{Hirte & Möllers, supra} note 39, commentary § 31, ¶ 23, does not apply with such generality. See Mathias Haas, Case Note on BGH judgment of 16 June 2009, (2009) LMK 277068.


\textsuperscript{68} \textit{See} Council Directive 2002/92, art. 12(1)(e)(ii) and (iii), 2003 O.J. (L 9) 9 (EC).
market price is provided in online brokering services. In such cases, the investor is often forced to estimate instead of being able to limit overly large spreads through the use of a stop-loss order.  

2. Fiduciary Duties of Finance Intermediaries and Other Market Participants

One thing that stands out is that the contractual duties of a financial intermediary only apply towards the company’s principal, the customer, but not towards third parties. While damages claims against banks are not infrequent, a gap exists where liability to third parties may be justified, for example, where financial analysis and rating agencies give ratings or recommendations that are far too positive.

In corporate law, the managerial organs of the company owe a duty of loyalty to the company.  

This fiduciary duty arises from the special power that company managers have over the capital of others. This concept also applies directly to asset management and to investment funds. In general, bank business is characterized according to German civil law as Auftragsrecht or agency law, by which the bank deals in its own name for the benefit of the client-principal, and is bound to put its own interests behind those of the principal. Whether this falls below the true fiduciary standard of duty, and to what extent, requires further dogmatic inquiry. Section 31(1) No. 1 of WpHG has also extended the principle of furthering another party’s interest to relationships that are not really for the benefit of that other party for example, with the provision of credit.

It is unclear whether the duties of financial intermediaries, who

69 See generally Banking and Stock Glossary, DEUTSCHE BANK (Nov. 9, 2010, 7:00 PM), http://www.db.com/lexikon/lexikon_de/content/index_e_1178.htm (defining a stop-loss order and briefly explaining its use in limiting investors’ losses).


71 Id.

72 For a detailed treatment, see ROLF SETHE, ANLEGERSchUTZ IM RECHT DER VERMOGENSVERWALTUNG 149, 618 (2005).

73 Investmentgesetz §22; see also Pfandbriefgesetz §7.


75 HIRTE & MÖLLERS, supra note 39, commentary § 31, ¶ 87.
often stand between investors and listed companies, can be transferred in weaker form to the company itself. On its face, this approach is to be rejected, as listed companies do not usually act in the interest of others, that is, their investors. Fundamentally, contractual relationships are absent, so that only delictual liability comes into question. It is conceivable that listed companies might be held subject to duties comparable to the professional liability of accountants, tax advisors and lawyers, as on the capital market a certain trust is put in the expertise of professionals. In the case of ad hoc reporting requirements, a particular duty is imposed on the management of a listed company because it bears a particular responsibility as "information monopolists." The information provided by the company influences the market price of its securities, but it also influences third party analyses. Do the number and nature of duties deemed to apply and the question of fault influence this role? This reasoning can be extended to yearly and half-yearly financial reporting, because the information content in these reports is significantly higher than content derived from ad hoc reporting.

76 For a survey of the argument, see Hirte & Möllers, supra note 39, commentary §§ 37b-37c, ¶ 18; see also Sethe, supra note 72, §§ 37b-37c, ¶ 18.


78 See id.

79 Möllers, supra note 37, at 282-83.

80 On the misuse of this information instrument, see Fuchs, supra note 39, at commentary on §37b and §37c ¶ 34; Patrick C. Leyens, Unabhängigkeit der Informationsintermediäre zwischen Vertrag und Markt, in Perspektiven des Wirtschaftsrechts 423 (Harald Baum et al. eds., 2008).

81 The Federal Court of Justice emphasizes correctly that documents such as the
As such, this must apply *a fortiori* to the duties arising from regular reporting requirements. The introduction of a "balance-sheet oath" has made the significance of the yearly financial report to the investing public even clearer.\(^8\)

The elements of the generally applicable insider trading and price manipulation provisions are completely vague. Does it increase the illegality of the action when professional market participants fulfill an element of proscribed conduct, for example price manipulation, or does it only have an influence on sentencing considerations? Put differently, is there a layman’s discount for insider traders?\(^8\)

V. Supervision and Enforcement

1. Public Supervision

   a. Efficiency at the European Level

Finally, some mention ought to be made of supervision. Here, too, we allow ourselves inefficient structures, with twenty-seven national supervisory authorities in Europe. Many of these are far too small to be equal partners with global players on the financial markets such as the three largest credit rating agencies.\(^8\)

Meanwhile, attempts have been made to create new European supervision structures and to make European Law more efficient. In this context, it becomes relevant to consider which problems are to be solved on the international, European or national level.\(^8\)

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\(^8\) WpHG §37v(2) No. 3, §37w(3) No. 3, §37y No. 1; *Handelsgesetzbuch* [hereinafter HGB], §264(2), sentence 3, §289(1), sentence 5. However, the sanctions imposed can now differ greatly from the criminal provisions of §331 No. 3a HGB to a lack of any sanction at all. See Fuchs, *supra* note 39 (Andreas Fuchs et al. eds.) (commentary on §37v - §37z ¶ 15); Peter O. Mülbert & Steffen Steup, *Das zweispurige Regime nach Inkrafttreten des TUG*, 20 *Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht* [hereinafter NZG] 761, 769 (2007) (Ger.).

\(^8\) If an investor organization makes a public statement, higher duties to conduct proper research exist to avoid the creation of rumors than when retail investors express a position on securities in an online forum.

\(^8\) For a critical commentary, see Thomas M.J. Möllers, *Regulierung von Ratingagenturen*, 64 *Juristenzeitung* 861, 869 (2009) (Ger.).

\(^8\) Concerning the problems in dealing with derivate, see *supra* note 34. European Member States such as France criticized Germany’s single-handed national approach.
b. Efficiency at the National Level

Banking and capital markets law is a complex constellation of public law, criminal law and civil law structures. Cooperation between the BaFin and the public prosecutors is still hindered by the fact that the corporate departments of the latter possess insufficient staff and expertise. In the future, the capacity of the public prosecutors to sanction insider trading and market manipulation offences with criminal proceedings should be enhanced to reflect the importance of the stock exchange. Finally, the number of BaFin employees must be increased.\footnote{86}

2. Civil Law Sanctions

a. Inadequate State of the Law

Recent developments in European competition law make clear that besides public law, the civil law actions of private individuals are indispensable to sanctioning violations and ensuring an open market economy with free competition.\footnote{87} If one regards functioning capital markets as a legal value comparable to functional competition, it is one that requires enhanced protection under civil law in order to build the required confidence in the capital markets. What is certainly positive is the abolition of the special statute of limitations in Section 37a WpHG\footnote{88} and the

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introduction of the Capital Markets Class Action Statute (KapMuG). Otherwise, however, much still lies in a sorry state. A specially provided cause of action only lies for incorrect *ad hoc* reporting. Because of the high test required to prove causation, it is hardly used. Other reporting duties are all too often denied the protective legislative intent required for a cause of action.\(^{89}\)

**b. Introduction of Further Reaching Causes of Action**

The legislature attempted to create a normative structure for comprehensive liability for false capital market information two legislative periods ago with the Capital Markets Information Liability Statute (KapInHG). Even if the liability envisioned in this bill was excessive,\(^{90}\) it represented a good starting point for further legislative initiatives.\(^{91}\) European law also requires the introduction of causes of action enabling claims in damages for incorrect capital market information.\(^{92}\) A purely internal cause of

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89 See the recent BGH judgment of Feb. 19, 2008, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 1734, 1735 ¶ 14, §34b and §37v of the WpHG.

90 See, e.g., HELLGARDT, supra note 77; Klaus J. HOPT & HANS-CHRISTIAN VOIGT, PROSPEKT- UND KAPITALMARKTINFORMATIONSHAFTUNG: RECHT UND REFORM IN DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION, DER SCHWEIZ UND DEN USA 9, 107 (Klaus J. Hopt & Hans-Christian Voigt eds., 2005); TILMAN WEICHERT, DER ANLEGERSCHADEN BEI FEHLERHAFTEN KAPITALMARKTVERTRÄGEN (2008); Thomas M.J. Möllers, *Die Infomatec-Entscheidungen des BGH – Marksteine auf dem Weg zu einem Kapitalmarktinformationshaftungsgesetz*, 60 JURISTENZEITUNG 75, 79 (2005) (Ger.).


action within the company, as Section 93 AktG provides, cannot be regarded as sufficient to meet this requirement of community law in several respects. European law remains, as a result, incorrectly transposed in German law to this day. 93 De lege ferenda, the introduction of a claim in damages for incorrect quarterly, half-yearly and yearly reports should be considered. 94

VI. Legislation and Legal Methodology in Capital Market Law

1. The Lamfalussy Process, Full Harmonization and Further Gaps

The Lamfalussy Process brings about full harmonization without calling it by name. Thus, full harmonization should be assumed by the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive. 95

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93 This applies, for example, to Article 7 of the Transparency Directive 2004/109/EC which reads:

Member States are to ensure that responsibility for the information to be drawn up and made public in accordance with Articles 4, 5, 6 and 16 lies at least with the issuer or its administrative, management or supervisory bodies and shall ensure that their laws, regulations and administrative provisions on liability apply to the issuers, the bodies referred to in this article or the persons responsible within the issuers.

Directive 2004/109, supra note 92. See also MICHAEL BRELLOCHS, PUBLIZITÄT UND HAFTUNG VON AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN IM SYSTEM DES EUROPÄISCHEN KAPITALMARKtrechts 95 (2005).

94 On the current state of this debate, see, e.g., supra note 39, at commentary on §37b and §37c ¶ 24; Fuchs, supra note 39, at commentary on §37b and §37c ¶ 69.

95 On the MiFID, see Thomas M.J. Möllers, Zur 'Unverzüglichkeit' einer Ad-hoc-Mitteilung im Kontext in, Festschrift für Norbert Horn 473, 485 (Andreas Schlüter et al. eds., 2006); TOBIAS BUCHMANN, UMSETZUNG VOLLHARMONISIERTER RICHTLINIEN 95 (2008); Fuchs (ed.), supra note 39, at commentary on §31 ¶ 254; Roman Jordans, Die Umsetzung der MiFID in Deutschland und die Abschaffung des § 37d WpHG, 37 WERTPAPIER-MITTEILUNGEN 1827 (2007) (Ger.); Carsten Herresthal, Die Pflicht zur Aufklärung über Rückvergütungen und die Folgen ihrer Verletzung, ZBB, at 348, 352 (2009) (Ger.). Roman A. Kasten, Das neue Kundenbild des § 31 a WpHG -
Market Abuse Directive,\textsuperscript{96} the Prospectus Directive,\textsuperscript{97} and the Transparency Directive.\textsuperscript{98} In this process, the jurisdiction of the ECJ to define unclear legal terms should also be considered. It is unclear, however, what jurisdiction the ECJ has to determine the level of harmonization brought about by an instrument when that is left undefined.\textsuperscript{99} This applies to another important question, namely, the extent to which the national civil courts, along with the duties arising from Section 31 et seq. of the WpHG, can concretize questions left open such as the post-contractual duty of advice.\textsuperscript{100}

Some are of the opinion that the national legislature is competent to answer particular questions that are not expressly dealt with.\textsuperscript{101} According to the opposing camp, recourse to

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{96} Christian Büche, Die Pflicht zur Ad-hoc-Publizität als Baustein eines integrierten Finanzmarkts 85 (2005); Buchmann, supra note 95, at 100; Thomas M.J. Möllers, Europäisches Finanzmarktrecht 473, 485 (Norbert Horn ed., 2003); Möllers, supra note 95, at 480; Mülbert, Auswirkungen der MiFID-Rechtsakte für Vertriebsvergütungen im Effektenhandel der Kreditinstitute, supra note 95, at 181.
\item \textsuperscript{97} On the Prospectus Directive, see Ellis Ferran, Building an EU Securities Market 136 (2004); Buchmann, supra note 95; Mülbert, supra note 95, at 181.
\item \textsuperscript{98} Holger Fleischer & Holger Schmolke, Das Anschleichen an eine börsennotierte Aktiengesellschaft, NZG 11 (2008) (Ger.); Mülbert, supra note 95, at 1157 (discussing maximum harmonization); see also Mülbert, Auswirkungen der MiFID-Rechtsakte für Vertriebsvergütungen im Effektenhandel der Kreditinstitute, supra note 95, at 182.
\item \textsuperscript{99} Möllers, Vollharmonisierung im Privatrecht, supra note 5, at 264.
\item \textsuperscript{100} See supra note 61.
\item \textsuperscript{101} See, e.g., RegE BT-Drs. 16/12814, at 28 on the question of professional memoranda of advice; Thorsten Voß, Geschlossene Fonds unter dem Rechtsregime der Finanzmarktrechtlinie (MiFID), BKR 45, 48 (2007) (Ger.) (regarding undefined legal
\end{itemize}
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national civil law should be excluded in cases of maximum and full harmonization.\textsuperscript{102} The fact that the \textit{Markets in Financial Instruments Directive} expressly excludes civil law from its scope of application stands against such a view.\textsuperscript{103} According to an intermediate opinion, one has to assume that the Directives released within the framework of the Lamfalussy Process are in the nature of regulatory law, and, to this extent, the national civil law subsists and national provisions are applicable.\textsuperscript{104}

Certain amendments to the \textit{Markets in Financial Instruments} and \textit{Market Abuse} directives should have brought about some clarification at the first or second level on the important question of civil claims. It is conceivable that a violation of the duties under WpHG Section 31 et seq. could also give rise to a civil claim in damages, as is the case under VVG Section 6(5).\textsuperscript{105}

\textsuperscript{102} Peter O. Mülbert, \textit{Auswirkungen der MiFID-Rechtsakte für Vertriebsvergütungen im Effektengeschäft der Kreditinstitute}, 172 \textit{ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DAS GESAMTE HANDELSRECHT UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [ZHR]} 170, 183 (2008) (Ger.).

\textsuperscript{103} See Commission Directive 2006/73, Recital 37, 2006 O.J. (L 241) 26, 29 (EC):

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Without prejudice to the provisions of this Directive relating to the production or dissemination of investment research, it is recommended that producers of investment research that are not investment firms should consider adopting internal policies and procedures designed to ensure that they also comply with the principles set out in this Directive as to the protection of the independence and objectivity of that research.
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{105} See Volker Lang and Andreas Otto Kühne, \textit{Anlegerschutz und Finanzkrise – noch mehr Regeln? – Zu den Gesetzessinitiativen des BMJ und des BMLB u.a im Rahmen des Gesetzes zur Neuregelung der Rechtsverhältnisse bei
that case, at least civil-law sanctions would apply that standard. Furthermore, it should be clarified to what extent civil law duties can go farther than the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive expressly regulates. Finally, the successor authority to the CESR, the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), will be established with the task of releasing binding technical standards, in consultation with the European Commission. This also contributes to legal certainty on the European level.

2. Legal Methodology in the Application of Law

An attempt has been made in the literature to present a systemic taxonomy of capital markets law with the internal and external system of Karl Larenz. The methodology of the 1960s was certainly helpful to create legal certainty after the confusion of the National Socialist period. The methodological approach now seems to be appropriate as a starting point in the administration of justice, but seems largely outdated and as such inappropriate in light of the following five considerations.

a. Capital Markets Law as an Interdisciplinary Field

It is beyond challenge that capital markets law has an interdisciplinary profile, implemented through administrative law, civil law and criminal law. It is also well known that different methodological considerations are required for each of these individual fields of law. In public law, for example, invasions of the citizen’s rights require a sufficient legal basis: in criminal law the maxim nulla poena sine lege applies. Filling gaps with the

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Schuldverschreibungen aus Gesamtemissionen und zur verbesserten Durchsetzbarkeit von Ansprüchen von Anlegern aus Falschberatung [SchVG], 28 WM 130, 137 (2009).


civil law can soon reach its limits. This can lead to disharmonious interpretation.110

b. Legal Development through Regulators and Private Parties

To this comes the fact that broad areas of capital markets law consist of the so-called non-binding internal administrative law of national or European financial supervisory authorities111 or of norms set by private bodies, such as the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) of the German Accountancy Standards Committee (the DRCS)112 or the Institut der Wirtschaftsprüfer (IDW) S4 of the accountants for the production of prospectuses. Here, too, the statutory interpretation methods of the civil law cannot be transferred directly. Moreover it is highly problematic whether, and to what extent private normative instruments hold binding force and how this law interacts with state law.113 Also being considered is the proposition that standards and recommendations are indirectly binding.114


112 See HBG § 342(2).


114 See Thomas M.J. Möllers, Sources of Law in European Securities Regulation – Effective Regulation, Soft Law and Legal Taxonomy from Lamfalussy to Larosdieré, 10
c. Capital Markets Law as European Law and a Research Area for Studies in Comparative Law

German capital markets law is, to a large extent, European law.\textsuperscript{115} The WpHG incorporates, for example, the Market Abuse Directive and the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive into German law, although the two directives have different audiences, namely listed companies and banks. To draw parallels between the two addressees on the basis of systematic considerations is unconvincing when one considers that the Markets Abuse Directive is concerned with all market participants and the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive is primarily concerned with securities service providers. To this comes the ECJ’s duty to interpret European law independent from national provisions and the national courts’ duty to interpret national provisions in accordance with directives.\textsuperscript{116} Time and again, national courts violate their duty to refer questions of European law to the ECJ.\textsuperscript{117} Some believe that European capital markets law is grossly incomplete and incapable of any systematic approach. However, from the German perspective, the goal remains valid to attempt a systematization at the European level.

The financial crisis has made clearer exactly how global the financial markets have become; the German Landesbanken bought the toxic papers of American banks in quantity, and as a result were forced to merge and only narrowly escaped bankruptcy. All too often provisions of US law are adopted blindly. The interpretation of European directives can often only work where the origin of the rule in question is known and it can be compared with the “mother” provision and cases applying it.\textsuperscript{118} As such it is

\textsuperscript{115} See, e.g., Norbert Horn, Europäisches Finanzmarktrecht (2003).


\textsuperscript{118} See, e.g., Holger Fleischer, Gutachten für den 64, Deutschen Juristentag (2002).
always necessary to warn against the blind reception of US law.


There remains one last criticism of the attempts at civil law systematization. Capital markets aim for efficiency. Numerous models are based on economic considerations. As such, the model of *homo economicus* still underlies much of capital markets law. This figure is a rational actor who processes all available information before investing, so that the market always reflects the correct price. With this model, however, bubbles cannot be explained, nor can the phenomenon of limited information-processing capacity. For this reason, what we need is not so much the ability to fill gaps systematically, but rather find a common language between the disciplines. This will allow us to take hypotheses that are based on incorrect premises, and correct them through the medium of law.


\[120\] See infra Section III.2.

\[121\] This call has been made by Christoph Möllers. CHRISTOPH MÖLLERS, *Vorsichtsregulative*, in 1 GRUNDLAGEN DES VERWALTUNGSRECHTS § 3 ¶ 42 (Wolfgang Hoffman-Riem et al. eds., 2006); MATTHIAS JESTAEDT, *DAS MAG IN DER THEORIE RICHTIG SEIN* 74 (2006) (explaining legal theory as a 'gatekeeper discipline' that determines which ideas and theories from other disciplines are allowed into the inner sanctum of legal theory). *See also* Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Die rechtswissenschaftliche Methodendiskussion und die Bewältigung des gesellschaftlichen Wandels*, 64 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT [RABELSZ] 60, 101 (2000) (calling for 'meta-dogmatik'); Stefan Grundmann, *Methodenpluralismus als Aufgabe - zur Legalität von ökonomischen und rechtsethischen Argumenten in Auslegung und Rechtsanwendung*, 61 RABELSZ 423 (1997) (also calling for 'meta-dogmatik').