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The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. By Leon R. Yankwich. Los Angeles: Parker and Company, 1946. Pp. 194. $2.50.

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, With Notes and Institute Proceedings. New York University School of Law. Alexander Holtzoff, Editor. 1946. Pp. 335. $4.00.

As their titles indicate, both of these volumes are concerned with the new Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which became effective March 21, 1946, and which cover every stage of criminal proceedings in the federal courts. Both volumes are alike in that in each is printed the text of the sixty rules, together with the notes of the Advisory Committee which was appointed by the Supreme Court of the United States to help formulate the rules, and an appendix of Forms provided by Rule 58. (The second work also contains the Petty Offense Rules which were promulgated by the Supreme Court on January 6, 1941, governing the trial of petty offenses before certain United States Commissioners, and a two and one-half page bibliography of Articles on Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.) And both are alike in that they contain an appraisal of the work of the Advisory Committee and the Supreme Court as embodied in the new rules. The extent and method of the appraisals, however, differ considerably.

Judge Yankwich, judge of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, wrote his 60-page commentary very largely from the viewpoint of a judge of the United States District Court. Sometimes it appears that he is as much interested in smoothing the path for the trial judge as he is in the administration of justice from the standpoint of the public generally. For example, he complains that the "control of appeals [by the government] rests exclusively with the Solicitor General," the basis of the complaint being that such a situation doesn't give the judge an opportunity to attempt to have his rulings sustained by a higher court after being reversed by an intermediate appellate court. "I am certain," writes Judge Yankwich,[1] "that there are few federal district judges who have not had the experience of being led by some Attorney for the Government into error and not having the Government interested enough to submit the determination of the question to the highest court. I am not saying that the Solicitor General must try to sustain all the erroneous rulings of the trial judge. What I am insisting on is that, where the question is *doubtful,* and the judge was led, either by the state of the law at the time, or by the action

[1] Page 143, footnote 20.

of the United States Attorney, to do an act which the Circuit Court of Appeals later declared erroneous, justice to him requires that he have the satisfaction of having the highest court say he was in error. . . . As a fact, after the signing of the Bill of Exceptions, we do not even see printed records or the briefs on appeal. So we cannot tell how well our position is placed before the judges of the higher courts."

Judge Yankwich finds that "the most questionable provision of the chapter relating to trial is the one which compels the judge, on request, 'to find the facts specially.'[2] It is indicative of distrust of judicial discretion." He then proceeds to give an illustration from his own experience which might raise in some minds the question as to whether that distrust was entirely misplaced—a case in which he had rendered a general verdict of not guilty which was not appealable but which was admittedly contrary to the law and the evidence.[3] "The responsibility of a trial involving human liberty," says the judge, "is great enough without increasing it by requiring special findings. The only object that could be achieved is to lay foundation for questioning the general verdict. I cannot see why a judge, in trying a criminal case, should not be shielded by his general verdict just as jurors are."[4]

Of course, it may be said for the judge's viewpoint that defendants who are distrustful of a particular judge's judicial discretion and who fear that the lack of special findings might prove to be a shield between them and their freedom do not have to waive a jury trial. On the other hand, judges who fear that the responsibility of conducting a criminal trial without the intervention of a jury is too great without a shield between their general verdict and questions based upon their special findings do not have to approve the waiver.[5]

On the whole, Judge Yankwich likes the new rules, many of which are merely codifications or clarifications of previously existing law. He particularly likes such rules as Rule 26, which provides that the admissibility of evidence and the competency and privileges of witnesses shall be governed, except when an Act of Congress or these rules otherwise provide, by the principles of the common law "as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience" (thus "untying" federal rules of evidence in criminal cases from state rules and permitting the development of a uniform system to be applied to the uniform substantive criminal law). He also comments favorably upon such rules as the one allowing the withdrawal of a plea of *nolo contendere* or guilty after sentence[6] and the one which permits the trial judge to reduce a sentence within sixty days after the im-

[2] Rule 23(c): "Trial without a jury. In a case tried without a jury the court shall make a general finding and shall in addition on request find the facts specially."
[3] Page 166.
[4] *Ibid.*
[5] Rule 23(a).
[6] Rule 32(d).

position of sentence,[7] thus completing the abolition of the concept of a term of court as a limitation on the power of a judge.

Part II of the volume published by the New York University School of Law is a stenographic report of the proceedings of the Institute on Federal Rules of Criminial Procedure conducted by the New York University School of Law in collaboration with the Section of Criminal Law of the American Bar Association, the New York State Bar Association and the Federal Bar Association of New York, New Jersey and Connecticut. The purpose of the Institute, which was held on February 15 and 16, 1946, was to discuss the new Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which were to become effective the following month. The method followed was to hear explanations of various rules which had been previously assigned to members of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee and then to engage in general discussions under the guidance of "panel discussion leaders." The 172 pages of the report make interesting reading, especially when various participants relate personal experiences or actual incidents by way of illustration or comment upon the desirability of particular rules, but not too much light is thrown upon the reason for, the operation of, or the possible interpretation of the rules beyond that which might be obtained from reading the rules themselves with the accompanying notes of the Advisory Committee. This, however, is due to the natural limitations of such discussions, and not to any lack of first hand knowledge on the part of the lecturers and panel discussion leaders with respect to procedure in general and the Rules of Criminal Procedure in particular.[8]

However, the Institute discussions do reveal more intimately than the bare notes to the rules the background of many of the changes, or at least the ends apparently sought to be accomplished by the framers of the rules. As such, and taken in conjunction with the notes of the advisory committee, they furnish valuable guides to the "legislative intent" which should be helpful in construing the rules and in successfully applying them until a body of judicial decisions has been developed to

[7] Rule 35.

[8] All lecturers were members of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee: Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Dean of New York University School of Law (chairman); Alexander Holtzoff, Associate Justice of District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia (secretary); George Z. Medalie, Associate Judge of New York State Court of Appeals; G. Aaron Youngquist, Minnesota; Hugh G. McLellan, Massachusetts; Professor George H. Dession, Yale University School of Law; Professor John D. Waite, University of Michigan School of Law; and Frederick E. Crane, former Chief Judge of the New York State Court of Appeals. Panel discussion leaders were Fred E. Strine, Criminal Division, Department of Justice; Stanly H. Fuld, Chairman, Committee on Penal Law and Criminal Procedure of the New York State Bar Ass'n; James V. Bennett, Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, Secretary of the Section of Criminal Law of the American Bar Association; and Nathan April, Co-Chairman of the Committee on Federal Criminal Rules of Procedure of the Federal Bar Association of New York, New Jersey and Connecticut.

take their place. The discussions further serve to point up the fact that the new rules by no means answer all questions. For one example, Rule 26 consciously breaks away from the concept of the common law rules of evidence as construed by the state courts in the state where the trial is held, and embarks upon a program of judicial legislation in this field in the hope of building up uniform rules of evidence in all of the federal courts. This means that for some time attorneys may not know whether the rule in North Carolina, New Jersey or California on a particular point may commend itself to the federal trial or appellate court as being more nearly conceived "in the light of reason and experience."

Another example of an unanswered question is that concerning the power, if any, and the means of bringing a corporation into the criminal court. Rules 4 and 9 provide for the issuance of a summons instead of a warrant upon request of the attorney for the government, and it was agreed that a summons could be properly issued against a corporate defendant. But suppose the corporation fails to appear, either "personally" or by its attorney? If a defendant fails to appear in response to a summons, the only recourse is to issue a warrant for his arrest. But as Professor Waite put it: "With an individual you can drag him in by the scruff of the neck, but you can't drag in a corporation by the seat of the pants." The problem is practical, as Rule 43 requires the defendant to be present except in certain instances, such as voluntary absence after trial has begun in the defendants' presence, and waiver of the right to be present where permitted. A corporate defendant "may appear by counsel for all purposes." But suppose it refuses to appear or to send in a lawyer? After some discussion, Professor Waite summed up as follows: "It [Rule 43] provides that a corporation may appear by counsel for all purposes, but neither this rule nor any other rule provides how you are going to get the corporation into court for the arraignment if it doesn't want to come."

Judge Medalie fairly expresses the opinion of the members of the Advisory Committee as to the merits of their handiwork as gathered from the discussion: "We think we have given you the true concensus of the bar's opinion. We are sure that it will work. At least we hope it will. We have made it possible for it to work by the simplicity of language, the paucity of words, the careful urge to expression; with eighteen critical pairs of eyes on every word, or every sentence, on every rule. It is heartening to find that there is a flaw here and there, and for that we say thank goodness, we are human after all."

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Trial of William Joyce ("Lord Haw-Haw"). Edited by J. W. Hall, Barrister-at-Law. London, Edinburgh and Glasgow: William Hodge and Company, Limited, 1946. Pp. viii, xii, 312. 15/-net.

"By and by comes W. Joyce, in his silke suit and cloake lined with velvett: staid talking with me, and I very merry at it. He supped with me; but a cunning, crafty fellow he is, and dangerous to displease, for his tongue spares nobody."

—SAMUEL PEPYS: Diary, 14th. August, 1664.

With this peculiarly apt quotation, editor J. W. Hall, M.A.B.C.L. (Oxon), of the Middle Temple, Barrister-at-Law, begins his presentation of the trial which marked the final chapter in the life of the American national who had become Nazi Germany's most celebrated and scorned short-wave radio news propagandist in World War II.

Trial of William Joyce ("Lord Haw-Haw") is Volume Sixty-eight of *Notable British Trials,* a series which begins with *Mary Queen of Scots* (1586) and includes such other historic characters and cases as *Guy Fawkes* (1605-6), *King Charles I* (1649) and *Captain Kidd* (1701). It is an interesting circumstance that a point of law determined in *Sir Roger Casement* (1916), Volume 53 in the series, to the effect that, under the original British treason statute, treason may be committed abroad, was cited by the Attorney General frequently in the Joyce case.

As arranged by Mr. Hall, *William Joyce* consists, consecutively, of the usual brief preface (expressing appreciation to many helpful sources, including the United States Embassy, but not the British Home Office which refused assistance), an unusual listing of the volume's contents (outlining the trial and listing appendices, illustrations and reference cases), a 36-page "introduction" (setting forth forcefully Mr. Hall's views on the law established in the Joyce trial, the trial's outcome and related matters), a chronological table (of events in Joyce's life), a 187-page verbatim, all-inclusive trial record (from indictment through sentence), and a final 82-pages covering 9 appendices (including trial exhibits, the Treason Act of 1945, transcripts of appeals, Joyce's German radio broadcaster's contract, specimen broadcasts, public reactions to the broadcasts and a transcript of shorthand notes on the broadcasts "taken by Inspector Hunt at BBC").

This arrangement has the merit of thoroughness and orderliness within each division, but it has the demerit of complexity, repetition and inverted presentation of material. To contemplate Mr. Hall's pungent analysis in proper perspective and full comprehension, the reader is compelled to re-read his "introduction" *after* completing the later sections of the book. The editor apparently has an oblique appre-

ciation of reader difficulties. In his preface he writes: "I realize that more drastic editing would have improved the literary form but unless the meaning was obscured, or the record clearly wrong, I have preferred to leave what was actually said in the stress of the trial than to subsitute what counsel might have said if they had composed their speeches at leisure." Contrary to this apprehension, it is not the verbatim record which causes trouble. The hearings, although compressed overmuch in tiny, eye-ruining type, provide a fascinating insight into British criminal law and procedure, the lines of reasoning of Crown and defense counsel, the intricacies of British speech, and the personalities of the presiding Judge (Mr. Justice Tucker), the Attorney General (Sir Hartley Shawcross), the defense counsel (Mr. G. O. Slade) and the various witnesses. The reader's problems arise rather from reading the editor's evaluations of the trial prior to having an opportunity to digest fully the evidence, facts and law through which he must appraise the editor's conclusions and formulate his own. In this case, unlike that of the chicken and the egg, there can be little doubt which should have come first. The editor guessed wrongly.

From almost the moment that the British-accented "Lord Haw-Haw" who, for almost five years, broadcast German war propaganda from the Hamburg radio station was identified as William Joyce, erstwhile resident of England, University student and member of Sir Oswald Moseley's Union of British Fascists, the prevailing opinion was that Joyce would be tried and hanged as a British traitor at war's end. It was not until Joyce was brought to trial for treason on 17th of September, 1945, that a circumstance which made uncertain the application of the ultimate penalty, or indeed any legal penalty, became public knowledge.

Evidence presented at the trial proved conclusively that Michael Joyce, a native of Ireland and William's father, had become a naturalized American citizen twelve years prior to William's birth in Brooklyn in 1906. William Joyce, therefore, was an American citizen, owing natural allegiance to the Stars and Stripes. There was no evidence that he ever had changed his citizenship until he obtained official German citizenship papers on July 2, 1940. Confronted with "really overwhelming" evidence on this point the trial justice, with the approval of the Attorney General, decided to direct a "not guilty" verdict on the first two counts which were based upon the assumption that Joyce was a British subject.

The remaining count, on which Joyce was tried, charged that William Joyce, "being *a person owing allegiance to our Lord the King* (italics mine), and while a war was being carried on by the German realm against the King, did traitorously adhere to the King's enemies in parts beyond the seas, that is to say, in Germany, contrary to the

Treason Act 1351, by broadcasting propaganda on the 18th. September, 1939, and on days between that day and the 2nd. July, 1940." The dates of Joyce's treasonable activities are far more limited in this count than in the two abandoned counts, due to his assumption of German citizenship which presumably terminated his allegiance to the King. In fact, they permitted the introduction in evidence as proof of treason little more than the sworn testimony of a Scotland Yard inspector, that he was familiar with and had identified Joyce's voice on the Hamburg "wireless" in September or early October, 1939, and that Joyce had said falsely that Folkestone and London had been destroyed by German bombs. Despite this flimsy evidence, no one doubted that on the single question of adherance to the King's enemies, a jury would find Joyce "guilty." There remained to be determined whether the question of allegiance was one for a jury.

The two important legal issues upon which the trial turned were:

1. Does a British Court have jurisdiction to try an alien for a crime committed abroad (with the exception of piracy which, "by the *jus gentium*," is triable anywhere)?

2. Assuming that there is jurisdiction, did the fact that Joyce applied for and obtained a British passport (renewed August 24, 1939, a week before the outbreak of war) impose on him a duty of allegiance during its effectiveness, even when he was outside the British dominions?

The Crown argued that Joyce, by deliberately applying for and obtaining a British passport, whether by fraud or mistake, had placed himself under the protection of the British Sovereign and had thereby undertaken the correlative duty of allegiance so long as the right to claim the protection of the passport continued. Lord Coke had said: *"Protection trahit subjectionem et subjectio protectionem."* Blackstone in *Calvin's Case* (1608) had affirmed the mutuality of protection and allegiance, apparently using an implied contract basis. Foster's Crown Cases had defined local or temporary allegiance, owed by a resident alien in exchange for the King's protection, and had had declared that such protection and allegiance would continue with regard to an alien leaving the realm, provided his family and effects remained in the realm. This rule was first laid down in the vague Judge's Resolution of 1707. The Attorney General contended that, although Joyce had not left family and effects within the realm (Joyce's wife accompanied him to Germany, his father, mother, brother, sister remained in England), he had, nonetheless, by obtaining a British passport "enveloped himself in the Union Jack" and put himself in a position to claim British protection. That protection involved the corresponding duty of allegiance which Joyce violated by broadcasting for the enemy. He was therefore guilty of treason, for which he could be tried and executed in England.

Among the cases cited by the Crown was *Carlisle v. The United States* (1872), 16 Wallace 147 in which the United States Supreme Court approved the conviction of an alien (British subject) domiciled in a Confederate State for selling saltpetre to be used in making gunpowder for the Confederate Army. Justice Field held: "The alien whilst domiciled in the country owes a local and temporary allegiance, which continues during the period of his residence." No United States cases going beyond this conservative doctrine appears to have been discovered by the Joyce case counsel.

The defense claimed that British Courts could have no jurisdiction. The Judge's Resolution of 1707 was, it said, pure dictum. In any event it did not support the Crown's case, because Joyce did not leave his family or effects in England. The protection necessary to attract the duty of allegiance, argued the defense, is de jure protection, the protection of law, not de facto protection, the protection of the Crown. Protection runs only where British law runs within the King's Dominions. A passport is not a document granting any right of protection, nor is there any evidence that Joyce ever used a British passport to claim protection. A passport is mere recognition of the status of an individual as a national, and a request to foreign governments to give the passport holder such rights as flow from that status. Like other documents certifying status, a passport is not conclusive, but could be displaced by proof that the asserted status does not exist. (Defense counsel, by way of illustration, points out that Joyce's passport and passport rights could have been withdrawn immediately by any British diplomatic official, at home or abroad, had it been discovered he was not a British subject, or properly entitled to a passport). To submit that Joyce, having wrongly obtained a British passport, therefore owed allegiance to the Crown, even though an alien, introduces into British law the doctrine of "crime by estoppel." The duty of local allegiance, in the contention of the defense, continues only so long as an alien is resident within the King's Dominions.

Mr. Justice Tucker decided both counts as a matter of law in favor of the Crown. Only the question whether Joyce had adhered to the King's enemies was left to the jury, which took only twenty-three minutes to return the verdict: "Guilty." On September 19, 1945, Joyce was sentenced to death. An appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal was filed on four grounds: (1) The Court had wrongly assumed jurisdiction. (2) The learned judge was wrong in law in holding and directing the jury that the appellant owed allegiance to the King during the period in question. (3) The appellant's passport afforded no protection. (4) If the passport did afford protection, the issue was one for

the jury. The appeal was heard on the 30th and 31st of October and dismissed November 1, 1945.

Under the British Criminal Appeal Act, no further appeal could be brought unless the Attorney General was prepared to certify that the decision "involved a point of law of exceptional public importance, and that it was desirable in the public interest that a further appeal should be brought. The Attorney General so certified. On the 10th and 13th of December the House of Lords, five members sitting, heard the second appeal. The appeal was dismissed. Lord Porter dissented on the grounds that the question of allegiance should have gone to the jury. The majority opinion, read by the Lord Chancellor (Lord Jowett of Stevenage to whom Mr. Hall's volume is "by his kind permission respectfully dedicated"), follows the chain of law and reasoning set forth by the Attorney General for the Crown. He cites the Treason Statute of 1351, Foster's Crown Law, and the Judge's Resolution of 1707. On the matter of jurisdiction, the Lord Chancellor held that a proper regard of the State for its own security required that all who committed the crime of treason, whether within or without the realm, should be amenable to its laws. "There is no principle of comity to the contrary." This reasoning which assumes the commission of the crime of treason in determining jurisdiction seems specious. The reciprocal duties of allegiance and protection were established at common law as existing between the Sovereign and the resident alien. The protection, therefore, is not that of law, but of the Sovereign to whom the alien owes temporary allegiance. The Lords admit that an alien can withdraw allegiance upon leaving the realm, but find no evidence that Joyce surrendered his passport or did any other overt act to withdraw his allegiance. Joyce was executed January 3, 1946, at Wandsworth. The Lordships released their reasons for dismissing his appeal on February 1, 1946, almost a month later.

Mr. Hall's commentary on the Joyce decision is critical. He writes: "It will be observed . . . that their Lordships have expressly decided that a passport is not merely an evidential document, but one which gives rights and imposes duties; and that an alien in possession of a passport may be tried (in England) for crimes committed abroad.

"*Directly,* the importance of the Joyce decision may well be small, for only in the infinitesimal number of cases in which an alien obtains, by fraud or mistake, a British passport, and then goes abroad and commits treason, can it be directly in point. A British subject is covered by his general duty of allegiance, and the passport is immaterial.

"*But indirectly,* the case may well prove of vast importance. It has introduced into our jurisdiction, for the first time, the doctrine that a British Court has, in certain circumstances, the right to try an alien

for a crime committed abroad. It does not need much imagination to see that, unless those circumstances are very precisely and narrowly defined, this may be the thin edge of a very large wedge indeed.

"Secondly, it has introduced, or at least declared, the doctrine that the holder of a British passport *ipso facto* owes allegiance to the British Crown. This may have far-reaching repercussions—I am told that there are signs of them already—in British-mandated territories, and among 'British protected' persons, where persons who are not British subjects may be entitled to hold British passports.

"It is also possible to envisage a perfectly honest person being involved in a conflict of allegiance, where it is completely impossible for him to avoid committing treason! Suppose, for instance, that Joyce, instead of being American, had been German by birth, but had lived here and honestly believed himself to be British, and went abroad with a British passport. On the outbreak of war he is claimed as a German subject, liable to military service. If he obeys, he is (under this decision) liable to be hanged by the British; if he refuses, he will certainly be shot by the Germans.

"The decision is no longer open to argument: the reason underlying it is a legitimate subject of legal discussion, and it would be untrue to pretend that it meets with unanimous acceptance among lawyers, many —possibly a majority—of whom thought the appeal would succeed."

To this analysis, Mr. Hall adds a less objective finding. Asking what useful purpose was served by hanging Joyce or John Amery (son of the British Home Secretary), he concludes: "If it be said, 'There would have been a public outcry if Joyce had been reprieved,' my answer would be that the first function of a legal system is to substitute the reasoned and dispassionate judgment of the law for the clamour of popular prejudice. It may, however, be doubted whether there would have been any popular clamour, for very much to my surprise I have found, with a universal reprobation of Joyce's conduct, an almost equally universal feeling, shared by lawyers and laymen, servicemen and civilians, that (with the utmost respect to the eight out of nine learned judges) the decision was all wrong, and that an unmeritorious case has made bad law. The feeling . . . is not so much that Joyce, having been convicted, should have been reprieved, but that he should not have been convicted. . . . It is, I think, fair to say that the conviction and execution of Joyce has caused more disquiet than satisfaction in the minds of the public."

On this point, United States public opinion, where aroused at all, took an opposite turn; the obliteration of "Lord Haw-Haw" seemed in the nature of a minor good turn to peaceful humanity.

It will occur to some that Joyce might have been turned over to the

United States Government and tried as an American citizen for his misdeeds. Conviction on charges of high treason might have been impossible in our courts, however, if only because Joyce's radio propaganda was beamed directly to England and designed for the British mind. Joyce was far more English than American in all but natural allegiance. His family returned to Ireland when William was 3 and he moved to England in 1921 when he was 15. Once in an application for membership in the British Army, Joyce described Britain as "the country I love so dearly."

The irony of this statement was not overlooked by Editor Hall, whose book is enriched by frequent touches of wit and wry humor. Joyce's accent, says the editor, was not "oxonian" though "it may have been some sort of hybrid between a Yankee twang and an Irish brogue." Joyce's nickname, which helped make his broadcasts more laughingstock than feared in Britain, was invented by a clever British journalist, Jonah Barrington. The passport statute, which permitted Joyce to obtain and renew passports without proof of citizenship, is ridiculed by Mr. Hall. He notes that the long list of persons entitled to verify passports concludes as follows: ". . . , Notary, Solicitor, Physician, Surgeon, &c," and he comments: "That '&c' in the circumstances is delicious. What on earth does it mean?" The British Treason Act, 1945, he terms a "shocking and wholly unnecessary example of 'legislation by reference.'" If Mr. Hall has not welded together a homogeneous, smooth-running whole, he has captured between covers a mass of integrated, non-integrated and perhaps, in a few instances, disintegrated British law, custom and tradition.

In his impassioned conviction that Joyce should not have been executed, he states: "Treason, it is true, is the greatest of crimes, but there are degrees even in treason, and the crime of treason by broadcasting propaganda is hardly comparable to that of treachery in the field." This brings to mind the relationship, which existed between Hans Fritzsche, recently acquitted at Nuremberg, and Joyce. Fritzsche, chief of Nazi radio propaganda, was adjudged not guilty on criminal counts of conspiracy to wage aggressive war, crimes against humanity, crimes against peace, and war crimes. Fritzsche, held the Big Four German War Crimes Tribunal, was merely a tool of Goebbels, so, Fritzsche was freed, while Joyce, a tool of Fritzsche, was executed. The new German administration in the American zone has asked permission to try Hans Von Papen, another acquitted Nazi leader, on charges of treason under Germany's old Treason Law. Fritzsche, on his record, seems to rate a similar charge and trial. If a Fritzsche, who betrayed the people of his native Germany and the world, cannot be tried under German law, if a Joyce can be convicted under British law only by means of

devious legal fiction, is there not a strong argument for world federation, in which an international tribunal might hold the Fritzsches and the Joyces who, through spreading misinformation and hatred, invite aggressive war, accountable for breach of a natural allegiance to a world government—a government which would hold in public trust our hopes and dreams for peace and justice through world law?

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