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Forum Selection Clauses, Non-Signatories, and Personal Jurisdiction

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FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES, NON-SIGNATORIES, AND PERSONAL JURISDICTION

John F. Coyle* & Robin J. Effron**

Who is bound by a forum selection clause? At first glance, the answer to this question may seem obvious. It is black letter law that a person cannot be bound to an agreement without her consent. In recent years, however, courts have not followed this rule with respect to forum selection clauses. Instead, they routinely enforce these clauses against individuals who never signed the contract containing the clause. Courts justify this practice on the grounds that it promotes litigation efficiency by bringing all of the litigants together in the chosen forum. There are, however, problems with enforcing forum selection clauses against non-signatories. First, there is the unfairness of binding a litigant to a contract without her consent. Second, there is the danger that relying on a forum selection clause to assert personal jurisdiction over a non-signatory may be inconsistent with due process.

This Article critiques the rules that determine whether a non-signatory is bound by a forum selection clause. It first documents the emergence of a new doctrine—the closely-related-and-foreseeable test—that the courts have created to facilitate this practice. It then argues that the test serves as a portal to a parallel due process universe in which casual contacts and breezy assertions of foreseeability can connect a defendant to a forum selection clause in a way that would be, at best, highly scrutinized were they construed as potential minimum

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contacts with the forum. In a world of ever-tightening personal jurisdiction standards, courts have created a bubble of nearly unlimited jurisdiction for parties in close proximity to forum selection clauses. To address this problem, the Article proposes reforms that would provide more robust protections to non-signatory defendants and, as importantly, impose a degree of order on an increasingly fractured due process landscape.

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INTRODUCTION

In 1992, Robert Romano entered into a franchise agreement with Aamco Transmissions, Inc. (AAMCO).1 Romano was a resident of Florida. AAMCO was a Pennsylvania corporation. The agreement contained an exclusive forum selection clause selecting the state and federal courts of Pennsylvania. Twenty-one years later, in 2013, Romano and AAMCO mutually agreed to terminate the franchise agreement. Pursuant to the termination agreement, Romano promised that he would not engage in the transmission repair business within ten miles of any AAMCO repair center for at least two years.2 In 2014, AAMCO sued Romano and his wife, Linda, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging violations of the covenant not to compete.3 Linda appeared pro se to argue that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over her.4 The court disagreed. It held that Linda was subject to personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania by operation of the forum selection clause in the franchise agreement.4 Since Robert was a party to the agreement, the court reasoned, and since Linda was closely related to Robert, Linda was bound by the clause even though she herself was not a party to the agreement.

This anecdote encapsulates the modern puzzle of forum selection clauses.5 These provisions bring a welcome measure of efficiency and

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2 Id. at 704–05.
3 Id. at 703, 705–06.
4 Id. at 709. The court also stated that Linda was bound by the clause because she was “a third-party beneficiary of the knowledge and experience that Robert Romano gained in the course of his franchisee relationship with AAMCO.” Id. On the facts presented, it is difficult to understand why Linda would qualify as a third-party beneficiary under traditional third-party beneficiary doctrine.
5 A forum selection clause is a contractual provision that selects a court to resolve disputes between the parties. In recent years, scholars have considered such questions as when these clauses are enforceable, how they should be interpreted, and whether damages may be sought when they are breached. See, e.g., John F. Coyle, Interpreting Forum Selection Clauses, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1791 (2019); John Coyle & Katherine C. Richardson, Enforcing Inbound Forum Selection Clauses in State Court, 53 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 65 (2021); John F. Coyle & Katherine C. Richardson, Enforcing Outbound Forum Selection Clauses in State Court, 96 IND. L.J. 1089 (2021); Tanya J. Monestier, Damages for Breach of a Forum Selection Clause, 58 AM. BUS. L.J. 271 (2021). To date, however, the question of whether forum selection clauses apply to non-signatories in the United States has only been addressed in a pair of student notes. See Lukas A. Anton, Note, C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. v. FLS Transportation, Inc.: How Minnesota’s Closely-Related-Party Doctrine Undermines Long-Settled Principles of Contract Law, 35 HAMLING L. REV. 497 (2012); Monika L. Woodward, Note, Ghosts Have Rights Too! A New Era in Contractual Rights: Third-Party Invocation in Forum Selection Clauses, 26 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 467 (2014); cf. Vaughan Black & Stephen G.A. Pitel, Forum-Selection Clauses: Beyond the Contracting Parties, 12 J. PRIV. INT’L L. 26 (2016) (surveying Canadian cases analyzing this issue). The propriety of binding non-signatories to arbitration clauses,
predictability to litigation arising out of contractual relationships. At the same time, their existence has the potential to generate fragmented litigation proceedings. If Linda Romano is not bound by the forum selection clause, then AAMCO may have to bring two suits—one in Pennsylvania against Robert, the other in Florida against Linda—to enforce its rights. Such parallel litigation is inefficient and a waste of scarce judicial resources. To avoid this outcome, the courts will sometimes enforce forum selection clauses against contract non-signatories like Linda, thereby allowing the entire dispute to be resolved in the chosen forum.

The willingness of courts to enforce forum selection clauses against non-signatories, however, creates tension with other important values enshrined in U.S. law. The first value is personal autonomy. The law has long recognized that parties are generally free to contract by comparison, has attracted a significant amount of scholarly attention. See James M. Hosking, The Third Party Non-Signatory’s Ability to Compel International Commercial Arbitration: Doing Justice Without Destroying Consent, 4 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 469 (2004); Tamar Meshel, Of International Commercial Arbitration, Non-Signatories, and American Federalism: The Case for a Federal Equitable Estoppel Rule, 56 STAN. J. INT’L L. 123 (2020); Dwayne E. Williams, Binding Nonsignatories to Arbitration Agreements, 25 FRANCHISE L.J. 175 (2006); Matthew Berg, Note, Equitable Estoppel to Compel Arbitration in New York: A Doctrine to Prevent Inequity, 13 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 169 (2011); D. Scott Crawford, Note, Inextricably Intertwined: The Yin and Yang of the New York Convention, FAA, and Non-Signatory Third Parties, 43 TUL. MAR. L.J. 115 (2018); Alexandra Anne Hui, Note, Equitable Estoppel and the Compulsion of Arbitration, 60 VAND. L. REV. 711 (2007). We do not discuss the rights of third parties in the arbitration context in this Article for two reasons. First, courts in many jurisdictions have developed distinct doctrines that apply exclusively to determine the rights and obligations of non-signatories in the context of forum selection clauses requiring disputes to be resolved in court rather than in arbitration. See Zydus Worldwide DMCC v. Teva API Inc., 461 F. Supp. 3d 119, 132–37 (D.N.J. 2020) (surveying state rules relating to the rights and obligations of non-signatories to forum selection clauses and distinguishing rules applied in the arbitration context). Second, the scholarly literature on non-signatories and forum selection clauses is woefully underdeveloped. As a precursor to any project comparing how arbitration clauses and forum selection clauses deal with the problem of non-signatories, it is essential to know what, exactly, the courts are doing in the latter group of cases. It is our hope that the descriptive account in this Article will provide a basis for a future comparative study that analyzes the different ways that courts deal with the problem of non-signatories in arbitration clauses and forum selection clauses.

See Presidential Hosp., LLC v. Wyndham Hotel Grp., LLC, 333 F. Supp. 3d 1179, 1225 (D.N.M. 2018) (recognizing the possibility of “judicial inefficiency” if forum selection clauses are not enforced against non-signatories).

with one another. The law also recognizes, however, that parties are likewise free not to contract if they do not wish to do so. When the courts conclude that a litigant must abide by a provision in a contract that she never signed, the freedom not to contract comes under attack. The second value is due process. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes limits upon a court’s power to assert personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant. When a court asserts personal jurisdiction over a defendant on the basis of a forum selection clause in an agreement that she did not sign, it is not at all clear that this assertion of judicial power is consistent with due process.

Courts have been quietly but consistently grappling with these issues for nearly four decades with minimal input from scholars and no direct guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court. This Article fills that gap. It is the first to identify the tension between litigation efficiency, on the one hand, and personal autonomy and due process, on the other, in cases where the courts are asked to enforce forum selection clauses.

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8 See, e.g., ABRY Partners V, L.P. v. F & W Acquisition LLC, 891 A.2d 1032, 1059 n.66 (Del. Ch. 2006) (observing that “the right to contract is one of the great, inalienable rights accorded to every free citizen” and stating “that this freedom of contract shall not lightly be interfered with” (quoting State v. Tabasso Homes, Inc., 28 A.2d 248, 252 (Del. 1942))).

9 Cooper v. Meridian Yachts, Ltd., 575 F.3d 1151, 1169 (11th Cir. 2009) (As “a contractual right,” a forum selection clause “cannot ordinarily be invoked by or against a party who did not sign the contract in which the provision appears.” (citing Paracor Fin., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Cap. Corp., 96 F.3d 1151, 1165 (9th Cir. 1996)); Adams v. Unione Mediterranea di Sicurt, 364 F.3d 646, 652 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Under the general principles of contract law, it is axiomatic that courts cannot bind a non-party to a contract, because that party never agreed to the terms set forth therein.” (quoting EEOC v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 460 (6th Cir. 1999)); Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 1 N.H. 111, 125 (1817) (“[T]here can be no contract without consent.”), rev’d, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819); cf. AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986) (“A party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.” (quoting United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960))).

10 This is not to state that one can never be bound to an agreement that one does not sign. We discuss several traditional doctrines that permit this outcome in Section I.A.


12 The routine enforcement of forum selection clauses against non-signatories also generates other costs. If a person knows that he may be bound by a forum selection clause in a contract executed by a family member or a close business associate, for example, he must monitor the content of those contracts more closely. In other cases, one company may decide not to enter into an agreement with another company due to concerns that the contract will bring it within the ambit of a forum selection clause in a related contract. In still other cases, contracting parties may devote extra time to drafting contract language that seeks to protect them against this outcome. See Coyle, Interpreting Forum Selection Clauses, supra note 5, at 1820–26 (discussing drafting solutions to the problem of binding non-signatories to forum selection clauses). These costs must be weighed against the efficiency gains that flow from enforcing forum selection clauses against non-signatories.
clauses by or against non-signatories. It is also the first scholarly work to propose a conceptual framework for reconciling these competing values, thereby allowing courts to promote litigation efficiency without doing undue harm to principles of personal autonomy and due process. Drawing upon an exhaustive review of the existing caselaw addressing the enforceability of forum selection clauses against non-signatories, the Article maps the many different legal doctrines that the courts have invoked to determine when a clause may be given effect. It identifies scenarios where such clauses are routinely enforced and explains that the propriety of enforcing forum selection clauses against non-signatories will vary depending upon who, precisely, is invoking the clause and for what purpose.

The Article then goes on to argue that the most problematic cases are those in which a signatory plaintiff invokes the forum selection clause to obtain personal jurisdiction over a non-signatory defendant like Linda Romano. In contemporary practice, the courts rely on a new legal doctrine—the closely-related-and-foreseeable test—to decide whether a non-signatory is bound by a forum selection clause. Unlike the trajectory of minimum contacts analysis, in which courts have imposed an ever-escalating set of hurdles in front of plaintiffs who wish to connect the actions of a non-resident defendant to a harm or result in the forum state, the closely-related-and-foreseeable test constitutes a parallel due process universe. In that universe, casual contacts and breezy assertions of foreseeability can connect a defendant to a forum selection clause in a way that would be, at best, highly scrutinized were they construed as potential minimum contacts with the forum. The curious feature of this new test is that it reads like a wish list of everything that progressive commentators want that for the minimum contacts test to be, but currently is not. Hiding in plain sight is a doctrine of nearly unlimited jurisdiction.

In this parallel due process universe, we argue, the enforcement of forum selection clauses by or against third parties exists in a doctrinal “uncanny valley” of due process jurisprudence. The various standards and jurisprudential landscape are not a picture of uniformly bad or incorrect decisions. The results and reasoning in many of these cases are, in many instances, both correct and desirable. The problem, however, is that the doctrine, as a whole, is out of sync with the larger approach to due process considerations in personal jurisdiction. Judges confronting the problem of non-signatories in cases involving forum selection clauses have created a doctrine that is a rough

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13 See also Europa Eye Wear Corp. v. Kaizen Advisors, LLC, 390 F. Supp. 3d 228, 292 (D. Mass. 2019) (observing that “significant due process considerations [are] implicated where forum-selection clauses are applied to a non-signatory”).
facsimile of “ordinary” personal jurisdiction cases, but still out of alignment with the doctrinal approach of post–*International Shoe* jurisprudence.

The question of whether a forum selection clause is enforceable has been historically evaluated through the lens of “consent” rather than “minimum contacts.” To address the concerns outlined above, we argue that the enforceability of a clause should be evaluated within the rubric of minimum contacts for three reasons. First, it would better protect the rights of non-signatory defendants and, in so doing, promote the values of personal autonomy and due process. Second, it would replace the rubric of consent with the more familiar minimum contacts test, thereby serving to plug one of several cracks in the existing due process framework. Third, and finally, analyzing forum selection clauses through the lens of minimum contacts carries with it the potential to improve that doctrine.14 Instead of trying to bring the flexible jurisdictional inquiry exemplified by the closely-related-and-foreseeable test into line with narrow Supreme Court precedents, we argue, the courts should consider expanding these precedents to bring them into alignment with the closely-related-and-foreseeable test.

Part I of this Article provides a comprehensive overview of the traditional agency and contract doctrines that allow nonparties to be bound or advantaged by a contract and explains how they are used to bind non-signatories to forum selection clauses. It then offers a detailed account of the rise of the closely-related-and-foreseeable test and discusses the propriety of using this test across a number of different scenarios. Part II details the doctrinal problems that arise when the courts invoke the closely-related-and-foreseeable test to enforce forum selection clauses against non-signatory defendants. The rules governing the assertion of personal jurisdiction in this context, we argue, are generally inconsistent with the rules applied to ordinary non-resident defendants. Non-signatories are instead subjected to a different constitutional standard because of proximity to a forum selection clause that they did not sign. In Part III we suggest that courts can best align the application of the closely-related-and-foreseeable test with accepted contract principles—as well as due process—by bringing forum selection clauses within the framework of *International Shoe’s* minimum contacts analysis. The Article concludes by suggesting how these observations can contribute to a broader reimagining of the role of consent in the minimum contacts framework.

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14 In so doing, we are well aware of the problems with the minimum contacts test. The purpose of this Article is to demonstrate that non-signatories to forum selection clauses should receive the same constitutional treatment as other non-resident defendants. As bad as the minimum contacts landscape is, the closely-related-and-foreseeable test for non-signatories only adds to the chaos and disuniformity in personal jurisdiction doctrine.
I. THE PROBLEM OF NON-SIGNATORIES

The courts have historically addressed the question of whether a non-signatory is bound or advantaged by a forum selection clause by looking to traditional principles of agency and contract law, equitable estoppel, and the law of third-party beneficiaries. In recent years, however, the courts have developed a new doctrine—the closely-related-and-foreseeable test—that supplants these traditional doctrines to a significant extent. In this Part, we first chronicle this shift in practice. We then analyze several scenarios where modern courts routinely apply the closely-related-and-foreseeable test.

A. Agency and Contract Law

1. Traditional Doctrines

There are a number of legal doctrines by which an individual who never actually signed an agreement may nevertheless become bound by that agreement. First, an agent may bind a principal to a contract. If an agent signs a contract on behalf of a principal, and if that contract contains a forum selection clause, the clause is binding upon the principal even though the principal never signed the contract. Second, a person may be bound by the signature of its “alter ego.” If the agreement signed by the alter ego contains a forum selection clause, the clause is binding on the person (and vice versa). Third, a person may voluntarily assume the obligations of a contract concluded by another. When this occurs, the new party will be bound by a forum selection clause in the contract notwithstanding the fact that it never signed it. Fourth, a person who signs an agreement that

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16 See Dos Santos v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. Dist., 651 F. Supp. 2d 550, 557 (N.D. Tex. 2009) ("It may thus now be apparent that enforcement of a forum-selection clause by a non-signatory is an area of the law dominated by generalized statements that provide little guidance to this Court’s analysis.").

17 See Restatement (Third) of Agency § 6.01 (AM. L. INST. 2006).


20 See Interlogic Outsourcing, Inc. v. OneSource Virtual, Inc., No. 18CV300, 2018 WL 8800190, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 24, 2018); Hellex Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Dollar Sys., Inc.,
incorporates another agreement by reference is bound by the terms of the agreement so incorporated. If the incorporated agreement contains a forum selection clause, the clause is binding.\textsuperscript{21} Fifth, an entity that is a continuation of a prior entity is responsible for the obligations of its predecessor under a theory of successor liability. If the prior entity was a party to a contract containing a forum selection clause, that clause is binding upon the successor entity.\textsuperscript{22}

2. Equitable Estoppel

The doctrine of direct-benefit equitable estoppel “prevents a non-signatory to a contract from embracing the contract, and then turning her back on the portions of the contract, such as a forum selection clause, that she finds distasteful.”\textsuperscript{23} If a non-signatory has directly benefitted from one part of the agreement, in other words, he is estopped from arguing that he is not bound by a different provision in that same agreement. The core insight underlying this doctrine is that a contract is not an à la carte menu; the bitter must be taken with the sweet. The doctrine of direct-benefit equitable estoppel does not require a showing that the non-signatory was an intended beneficiary of the agreement at the time the contract was made.\textsuperscript{24} Instead, the doctrine focuses on the conduct of the non-signatory during the


\textsuperscript{24} Black v. Diamond Offshore Drilling, Inc., 551 S.W.3d 346, 355 (Tex. App. 2018) (“[U]nder direct-benefits estoppel, the non-signatory defendants could compel enforcement of the forum-selection clause only if appellant sought a benefit that stems directly from the Agreement. Here, the direct-benefits estoppel theory is inapplicable because appellant’s claims do not arise from the Agreement—i.e., there are no terms within the Agreement for which appellant must rely upon in order to pursue his Jones Act and general maritime law claims.” (internal citation omitted)).
period when the contract was in effect. If a non-signatory derives a direct benefit from the agreement containing a forum selection clause during this period, that person may be equitably estopped from denying the enforceability of the clause.

25 Some courts apply a distinctive version of equitable estoppel to determine the rights of non-signatories that is derived from cases that address this same issue in the arbitration context. The Eleventh Circuit, for example, has held:

Equitable estoppel allows a nonsignatory to enforce the provisions of a contract against a signatory in two circumstances: (1) when the signatory to the contract relies on the terms of the contract to assert his or her claims against the nonsignatory and (2) when the signatory raises allegations of interdependent and concerted misconduct by both the nonsignatory and one or more of the signatories to the contract.

Bailey v. ERG Enters., 705 F.3d 1311, 1320 (11th Cir. 2013). The theory underlying the first rule is that if the signatory is suing the non-signatory for breach of contract, the signatory is very likely “relying” on the contract to bring the claim. In light of this reliance, the signatory is said to be estopped from denying the enforceability of the forum selection clause in that same contract. The practical result of this rule is that a non-signatory defendant will typically be able to enforce a forum selection clause when the signatory plaintiff’s claim is “intimately founded in and intertwined with the underlying contract obligations.” Black, 551 S.W.3d at 354 (quoting In re Merrill Lynch Tr. Co. FSB, 235 S.W.3d 185, 193–94 (Tex. 2007)). The second rule provides that when a forum selection clause is invoked by a non-signatory defendant, the signatory plaintiff is equitably estopped from denying the enforceability of the clause when the signatory raises allegations of interdependent and concerted misconduct by both the non-signatory and one or more of the signatories to the contract. As a practical matter, this test will be applied in situations where the signatory plaintiff’s claim does not rely on the contract to bring its suit against the non-signatory defendant. In such cases, the non-signatory defendant may still invoke the forum selection clause if it is alleged to have conspired with a signatory defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff. This test bears a passing resemblance to the closely-related-and-foreseeable test. The key difference, of course, is that while that test focuses on the actions of the signatory and the non-signatory, the interdependent-and-concerted-misconduct test focuses on the relationship between the signatory and the non-signatory.

26 See Bundy v. Adesa Hous., No. 01-17-00863-CV, 2018 WL 6053602, at *5 (Tex. App. Nov. 20, 2018) (citing Carlile Bancshares, Inc. v. Armstrong, No. 02-14-00014-CV, 2014 WL 3891658, at *8 (Tex. App. Aug. 7, 2014)) (“Direct-benefits estoppel has been applied to allow a defendant nonsignatory to enforce a forum-selection clause against a nonsignatory plaintiff who is suing based on the contract that contains the forum-selection clause.”). The threshold for what qualifies as a “direct benefit” under this theory is lower than the one that applies in the third-party beneficiary context. The doctrine of direct-benefit equitable estoppel is, however, limited by the requirement that the benefit flow from the operation of the contract rather than its breach. In a few cases, the courts have concluded that a non-signatory defendant directly benefitted from the breach of a contract and that this breach provided a basis for invoking the doctrine of direct-benefit equitable estoppel. See, e.g., Peterson v. Evapco, Inc., 188 A.3d 210, 236–38 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2018). Such cases push the doctrine too far. In order for a non-signatory defendant to be bound under the doctrine, that defendant must derive a direct benefit from the agreement containing the forum selection clause. If the non-signatory derives no direct benefit from the agreement, there is no basis from estopping her from denying the enforceability of that clause. The
3. Third-Party Beneficiaries

The law of contracts has long recognized that a “nonparty becomes legally entitled to a benefit promised in a contract . . . if the contracting parties so intend.” 27 If a nonparty is able to present evidence showing a clear and definite intent on the part of the contracting parties to confer an enforceable benefit upon her, she attains the status of an intended beneficiary. 28 Thereafter, an intended beneficiary may go to court to enforce her third-party beneficiary rights to an agreement when she never signed. 29 When a person is a third-party beneficiary to a contract that contains a forum selection clause, that person may invoke the clause even though she is a non-signatory to the agreement. 30 Since third-party beneficiaries are subject to the same limitations in the contract as the signatories, however, that same individual may also find herself bound by the forum selection clause against her wishes by virtue of her status as a beneficiary. 31

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28 Section 302 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides that “a beneficiary of a promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition of a right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties and . . . the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance.” RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (AM. L. INST. 1981). This rule requires a showing that the contracting parties intended to confer a benefit upon the non-signatory. The mere fact that a person derives an actual benefit from an agreement to which she is not a party is not usually enough to confer third-party beneficiary status (though it may be enough to bind them under a doctrine of equitable estoppel). See id. § 302 cmt. c.

29 See Ramsdell v. Bowles, 64 F.3d 5, 10 (1st Cir. 1995).

30 In re W. Dairy Transp., L.L.C., 574 S.W.3d 537, 551 (Tex. App. 2019) (“Pursuant to a third-party beneficiary theory, a nonsignatory to a contract containing a forum-selection clause may be bound by the clause if he or she is deemed a third-party beneficiary of the contract. Contracts may be enforced by third-party beneficiaries so long as ‘the parties to the contract intended to secure a benefit to that third party and entered into the contract directly for the third party’s benefit.’ Neither general beneficence, nor indirect or incidental benefits, establish the necessary level of intent.” (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted) (first citing In re Citgo Petrol. Corp., 248 S.W. 3d. 769, 775-77 (Tex. App. 2008); then quoting Jody James Farms, JV v. Altman Grp., Inc., 547 S.W.3d 624, 635 (Tex. 2018)); see also Altimeo Asset Mgmt. v. Qihoo 360 Tech. Co., No. LA CV19-01619, 2019 WL 11274587, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2019) (concluding non-signatory was third-party beneficiary of forum selection clause).

B. The Closely-Related-and-Foreseeable Test

Each of the doctrines set forth above has a rich history in the common law. The use of these doctrines to enforce forum selection clauses by or against non-signatories is relatively unproblematic because it is of a piece with how other contractual issues involving non-signatories are resolved. As forum selection clauses have proliferated, however, the courts have developed a new doctrinal test to determine the rights of non-signatories to these clauses separate and apart from these existing doctrines. This test is generally known as the “closely-related-and-foreseeable test.”

The closely-related-and-foreseeable test posits that a party can enforce a contract’s forum selection clause against a non-signatory if the non-signatory is so closely related to one of the signatories “that enforcement of the clause is foreseeable by virtue of the relationship between them.”

Unlike the doctrines discussed in the previous Section, this test is used exclusively in the context of forum selection clauses; it is never applied to determine the rights and obligations of non-signatories in other parts of the contract. The purpose of the test is to “give[] parties who have come to an agreement the ability to enforce that agreement against the universe of entities who should expect as much—successors-in-interest, executive officers, and the like—without being overly persnickety about who signed on the dotted line.” In this Section, we first trace the origins of the closely-related-and-foreseeable test. We then show that this test is widely used by state and federal courts.

1. Origins

The first case to state the rule that was eventually incorporated into the closely-related-and-foreseeable test was Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tilghman Wheelabrator Ltd., which was decided by the Third Circuit in 1983. In this case, an American manufacturer named Coastal Steel had contracted with an English firm called Farmer Norton to purchase
steel. Farmer Norton then entered into a second agreement with a different English company—Tilghman—to purchase a blast unit to be installed in Coastal Steel’s factory in New Jersey. This second agreement between the English firms contained a forum selection clause requiring all disputes to be resolved by the English courts. When the blast unit malfunctioned, Coastal Steel sued Tilghman in New Jersey federal court. Tilghman moved to dismiss the case on the basis of the English forum selection clause. In response, Coastal Steel argued that it was not a party to the English contract containing the English forum selection clause and was therefore not bound by the clause.

In a lengthy decision, the Third Circuit held that the clause was enforceable against Coastal Steel even though that company never signed the agreement containing the clause. In support of this decision, the court observed that “Coastal chose to do business with Farmer Norton, an English firm, knowing that Farmer Norton would be acquiring components from other English manufacturers.” The court further observed that it was therefore “perfectly foreseeable that Coastal would be a third-party beneficiary of an English contract, and that such a contract would provide for litigation in an English court.” This case marks the first time a court specifically referenced “foreseeability” when evaluating whether to enforce a forum selection clause against a non-signatory. In referencing foreseeability, the Third Circuit appears to have been explaining why Coastal Steel was an intended beneficiary to the English contract under traditional principles of third-party beneficiary law. Indeed, the outcome in Coastal Steel is entirely consistent with the doctrine of third-party beneficiaries. In the years that followed, however, the casual reference to foreseeability in this case came to be incorporated into an entirely new doctrinal test for determining whether forum selection clauses apply to non-signatories.

In 1988, the Ninth Circuit contributed to the further development of the closely-related-and-foreseeable test in Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci America, Inc. In that case, an American perfume distributor sued an Italian perfume manufacturer along with several of its Italian affiliates in federal court in California. The affiliates argued that the
case against them should be dismissed because the distribution agreement contained an Italian forum selection clause. The American company argued in response that the affiliates were not parties to the distribution agreement and, accordingly, were ineligible to invoke the clause as a ground for dismissing the suit. The Ninth Circuit held that the non-signatory affiliates were covered by the clause. In reaching this decision, the court observed that “a range of transaction participants, parties and non-parties, should benefit from and be subject to forum selection clauses” and that “the alleged conduct of the non-parties is so closely related to the contractual relationship that the forum selection clause applies to all defendants.” In its decision, the Ninth Circuit emphasized the closeness of the relationship between the affiliates and the signatory defendant in explaining why the non-signatory affiliates should benefit from the clause. The court did not, however, discuss whether it was foreseeable that the affiliates would be bound.

In 1993, the Seventh Circuit brought the “foreseeability” prong of the test and the “closely related” prong of the test together in Hugel v. Corp. of Lloyd’s. In that case, Hugel and two companies controlled by Hugel sued Lloyd’s of London for breach of contract in federal court in Illinois. Lloyd’s moved to dismiss the suit on the grounds that the agreement contained a forum selection clause requiring litigation to be brought in England. The plaintiffs argued that the controlled companies had not signed the agreement and were therefore not subject to the forum selection clause. The Seventh Circuit disagreed. It stated that “[i]n order to bind a non-party to a forum selection clause, the party must be ‘closely related’ to the dispute such that it becomes ‘foreseeable’ that it will be bound.” Since both of the companies at issue were controlled by Hugel, and since the insurance policies that were the object of the policies related to these companies, the Seventh Circuit concluded that both of these requirements were satisfied. Accordingly, it enforced the clause and dismissed the case in favor of an English forum.

2. Modern Usage

In the years following the Hugel decision, the closely-related-and-foreseeable test was embraced by federal courts across the United States. The Second, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have all applied the test to determine the rights and

40 Id. at 514 n.5 (emphasis added) (quoting Clinton v. Janger, 583 F. Supp. 284, 290 (N.D. Ill. 1984)).
41 999 F.2d 206, 209 (7th Cir. 1993).
42 Id. (first quoting Manetti-Farrow, 858 F.2d at 514 n.2; and then quoting Coastal Steel, 709 F.2d at 203).
obligations of non-signatories to forum selection clauses. And while the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits have yet to adopt the test, federal district courts in each of these circuits routinely apply it. The test has also received an enthusiastic reception among state courts. The courts of New York regularly apply a version of the test to determine the rights and obligations of non-signatories. The courts of Delaware likewise apply a version of the test to assess when forum selection clauses may be invoked by and against corporate affiliates.

43 See Magi XXI, Inc. v. Stato della Città del Vaticano, 714 F.3d 714, 722–23 (2d Cir. 2013) (applying closely-related-and-foreseeable test); Wilson v. 5 Choices, LLC, 776 F. App’x 320, 329 (6th Cir. 2019) (applying closely related test); Stifel, Nicolaus & Co. v. Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians, 807 F.3d 184, 212 (7th Cir. 2015) (applying closely related test but framing the inquiry through the lens of “affiliation” and “mutuality”); Marano Enters. of Kan. v. Z–Teca Rests., L.P., 254 F.3d 753, 757 (8th Cir. 2001) (applying closely related test); Holland Am. Line Inc. v. Wärtsilä N. Am., Inc., 485 F.3d 450, 456 (9th Cir. 2007) (applying closely related test); Stiles v. Bankers Healthcare Grp., Inc., 637 F. App’x 556, 561 (11th Cir. 2016) (applying closely-related-and-foreseeable test). The Ninth Circuit recently clarified that the courts should focus on whether the defendant’s conduct was closely related to the contractual relationship rather than focusing on closeness of the relationship between the defendant and the contract signatory. See AMA Multimedia, LLC v. Sagan Ltd., 807 F. App’x 677, 679 (9th Cir. 2020).


46 The Delaware Court of Chancery nominally applies the doctrine of “equitable estoppel” to determine whether a non-signatory is bound to a forum selection clause. In practice, however, the court applies a hybrid test that combines elements of direct-benefits equitable estoppel, the closely-related-and-foreseeable test, and third-party beneficiary law. The formal test recited by these courts poses three questions: “First, is the forum selection clause valid? Second, are the defendants third-party beneficiaries, or closely related to, the contract? Third, does the claim arise from their standing relating to the...agreement?” Sustainability Partners LLC v. Jacobs, No. 2019-0742, 2020 WL 3119034, at *5 (Del. Ch. June 11, 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Cap. Grp. Cos., Inc. v. Armour, No. Civ.A. 422-N, 2004 WL 2521295 (Del. Ch. Nov. 3, 2004)). The Court of Chancery has held that the “closely-related” concept referenced in the second question “expands the availability of the
Some version of the test has also been applied by state courts in Alabama, California, Illinois, Minnesota, Mississippi, Ohio, Texas, West Virginia, and Wyoming.47

The closely-related-and-foreseeable test has been used to consider whether a non-signatory is bound or advantaged by a forum selection clause across a wide range of cases and against a diverse array of non-signatories. The test is frequently invoked in cases for breach of contract.48 It is also regularly applied in cases where an employer brings an action against its former employees or business affiliates.49 State and federal courts have also applied the test in cases alleging copyright infringement, defamation, employment discrimination, invasion of privacy, securities fraud, slip-and-fall torts, and wrongful death, among others.50 The non-signatories whose rights and equitable estoppel doctrine to encompass parties who would not technically meet the definition of third-party beneficiaries.” Id. at *6 (quoting Neurvana Med., LLC v. Balt USA, LLC, No. 2019-0034, 2019 WL 4464268, at *4 (Del. Ch. Sept. 18, 2019)). The court will therefore bind non-signatories to forum selection clauses if (1) the non-signatory receives a direct benefit from the agreement (equitable estoppel); or (2) it was foreseeable that he would be bound by the agreement (closely-related-and-foreseeable). In a 2019 decision, Vice Chancellor McCormick noted that “[a]lthough the direct-benefit and foreseeability inquiries have been articulated as disjunctive, many Delaware cases have relegated the foreseeability inquiry to a subordinate role.” Neurvana Med., 2019 WL 4464268, at *5.


obligations are most frequently affected by the closely-related-and-foreseeable test are corporate executives, subsidiaries, affiliates, and parent companies. In many cases, these individuals and entities would not qualify as intended beneficiaries under the traditional test for third-party beneficiaries. They will, however, frequently fall within the ambit of the closely-related-and-foreseeable test, thereby bringing the relevant corporate affiliate within the scope of the clause for purposes of consolidating litigation proceedings. In other cases, the courts have relied on the test to conclude that one spouse is closely related to another, as in the case of Linda Romano and her husband’s dispute with AAMCO. Attempts to bring outside auditors, outside attorneys, and independent contractors within the scope of a forum selection clause via the test have generally been unsuccessful.

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52 It is the rare corporate executive who will be able to present evidence tending to show a “clear and definite intent” that the parties to a merger agreement intended to confer an “enforceable benefit” upon the executive via the forum selection clause. Consequently, most corporate executives will not be deemed intended beneficiaries under the law of third-party beneficiaries.


As the closely-related-and-foreseeable test has gained acceptance, a number of courts have come to rely on it to the exclusion of the traditional doctrines of agency and contract law discussed above.55 In the past, courts would consider whether a shareholder was bound by a forum selection clause under an alter ego theory. In recent years, by contrast, the courts have turned to the closely-related-and-foreseeable test as a simpler, easier route to this same conclusion.56 A similar shift has occurred with respect to the doctrines of successor liability and assumption.57 In addition, the test has largely supplanted the traditional rules of agency in the context of a forum selection clause. Under the common law of agency, an agent is not a party to an agreement that she signs on behalf of a disclosed principal.58 Under the closely-related-and-foreseeable test, however, the agent may be bound by the forum selection clause in that agreement by virtue of her close relationship to the principal pursuant to the closely-related-and-foreseeable test.59

55 See Fitness Together Franchise, L.L.C. v. EM Fitness, L.L.C., No. 20-cv-02757, 2020 WL 6119470, at *5 (D. Colo. Oct. 16, 2020) (“Defendants are clearly bound to the forum selection clauses under not only the generic ‘closely related’ doctrine but under the more traditional doctrines of estoppel, successor liability, and principal-agent liability.”).


58 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 6.01 (AM. L. INST. 2006).

The closely-related-and-foreseeable test has a number of doctrinal cousins. Some courts apply a “transaction participant” test that allows corporate executives who are personally involved in a transaction to partake of forum selection clauses even if they are not intended beneficiaries of the agreements in question.\textsuperscript{60} Other courts apply a “global transaction test” to hold that “parties to an integrated, global transaction, who are not signatories to a specific agreement within the transaction, may nonetheless benefit from a forum selection clause in one of the other agreements.”\textsuperscript{61} Still other courts apply an “affiliation test” whereby non-signatory corporations are presumptively covered by forum selection clauses executed by their affiliates.\textsuperscript{62} Finally, some courts drop the “foreseeable” prong of the inquiry altogether and focus exclusively on the question of whether the non-signatory is “closely related” to the contract or the contracting parties.\textsuperscript{63} We do not discuss these doctrinal cousins at any depth in this Article. Our analysis and critique of the closely-related-and-foreseeable test, however, generally applies with equal force to several of these other doctrines.

C. Three Scenarios

The closely-related-and-foreseeable test is sufficiently novel that it has attracted virtually no attention from scholars to date. A careful review of the cases in which this test has been applied, however, suggests that the task of evaluating its overall utility is complex. On the one hand, the test helps to promote litigation efficiency by making it easier for courts to rope non-signatories into forum selection clauses to which they would not otherwise be bound. On the other hand, the test raises a number of issues with respect to personal autonomy and due process.

\textsuperscript{60} See Pinto Tech. Ventures, L.P. v. Sheldon, 526 S.W.3d 428, 444 (Tex. 2017) (discussing “transaction participant” test and noting its similarities to the closely-related-and-foreseeable test); accord Rieder v. Woods, 603 S.W.3d 86, 98–99 (Tex. 2020); see also Grott v. Jim Barna Log Sys.–Midwest, Inc., 794 N.E.2d 1098, 1105 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (concluding that owner who signed a contract containing a forum selection clause on behalf of corporation was bound by the clause because he was a transaction participant).


\textsuperscript{62} See Adams v. Raintree Vacation Exch., LLC, 702 F.3d 436, 442 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting connection between this test and the closely-related-and-foreseeable test).

Our core argument is that any evaluation of the closely-related-and-foreseeable test must consider who is invoking the forum selection clause and for what purpose. When the clause is invoked by a non-signatory, the use of this test presents no concerns. When the clause is invoked against a non-signatory plaintiff, the use of the test presents concerns because the non-signatory never consented to be bound by the clause. When the test is invoked against a non-signatory defendant, the use of the test presents additional concerns because there is no consent and there are due process issues. We explore the first three of these scenarios below. We defer our discussion of the fourth and final scenario—the invocation of the test against a non-signatory defendant as a means of obtaining personal jurisdiction—until the next Part.

1. Non-Signatory Defendant Invokes Clause Against Signatory Plaintiff

The closely-related-and-foreseeable test is sometimes invoked when a signatory plaintiff brings a lawsuit against a non-signatory defendant in a forum other than the one named in the forum selection clause. In such cases, the non-signatory defendant typically moves to dismiss or transfer the suit to the chosen forum. The plaintiff opposes the motion on the ground that the defendant is not a party to the contract containing the forum selection clause and hence ineligible to invoke it. The court then applies the closely-related-and-foreseeable test to determine whether the non-signatory defendant is so closely related to the signatory defendant that it can rely on the clause to obtain transfer or dismissal of the case.

It is important to emphasize that, in this scenario, the non-signatory defendant is actively seeking the benefits provided by the forum selection clause. The non-signatory defendant wants to litigate in the forum named in the clause. To determine whether the non-signatory defendant may benefit from the clause, the court would ordinarily apply the law of third-party beneficiaries. This law is, however, fairly strict in that it requires the non-signatory defendant to prove that it was an intended beneficiary of the agreement. To promote litigation efficiency, many courts would prefer a less demanding test that would enable them to bring more non-signatory

64 As we shall demonstrate below, the other tests are less likely to cause contract law or due process problems. To the extent that they do, however, the uniform due process approach that we recommend for the closely-related-and-foreseeable test would also apply to and guard against any stray due process problems that would arise from the application of the traditional non-signatory doctrines.

65 This was the fact pattern presented in Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci Am., Inc., 858 F.2d 509, 514 n.5 (9th Cir. 1988).
defendants within the scope of the clause. The closely-related-and-foreseeable test serves precisely this purpose.66 This test is easier to satisfy than the test for third-party beneficiaries. Using this test to determine whether a non-signatory defendant may take advantage of a forum selection clause, therefore, helps to ensure cases involving a mix of signatory and non-signatory defendants are heard in the same forum, i.e., the one named in the forum selection clause.

It is important to note that there is no problem with personal autonomy or due process in this context. The non-signatory defendant is clamoring to be covered by the clause and the Fourteenth Amendment is not implicated. When a non-signatory defendant invokes the clause against a signatory plaintiff, therefore, there is no issue with applying the closely-related-and-foreseeable test.67

66 The closely-related-and-foreseeable test is easier to satisfy than the traditional test for determining third-party beneficiaries because there is no need to prove that the contracting parties intended that the non-signatory benefit from the agreement at the time of contracting. See Leviton Mfg. Co. v. Reeve, 942 F. Supp. 2d 244, 258 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“The ‘closely related’ test is necessarily satisfied where the defendant is a third-party beneficiary of the agreement, but that situation is not required.”). It is sufficient to prove a close relationship after the fact. In addition, where the law of third-party beneficiaries seeks to determine whether a person was an intended beneficiary of the contract, the closely-related-and-foreseeable test seeks to determine whether a person is covered by the forum selection clause. Utilizing a less-demanding test that applies exclusively to forum selection clauses helps to promote litigation efficiency. See Adams, 702 F.3d at 441 (“Were it not for judicial willingness in appropriate circumstances to enforce forum selection clauses against affiliates of signatories, such clauses often could easily be evaded. For example, a signatory of a contract containing such a clause might shift the business to which the contract pertained to a corporate affiliate—perhaps one created for the very purpose of providing a new home for the business—thereby nullifying the clause.”).

2. Non-Signatory Plaintiff Invokes Clause Against Signatory Defendant

The closely-related-and-foreseeable test is also sometimes invoked when a non-signatory plaintiff brings a lawsuit against a signatory defendant. In such cases, the plaintiff cites the clause as a basis for asserting personal jurisdiction over the defendant in the chosen forum. The defendant opposes the motion on the ground that the plaintiff is not a party to the contract containing the clause. The court then applies the closely-related-and-foreseeable test to determine whether the non-signatory plaintiff may rely on the clause to assert personal jurisdiction over the signatory defendant.68

In such cases, it is clear that the defendant has consented to jurisdiction in the chosen forum with respect to claims brought by somebody. The question is whether the defendant has consented to jurisdiction in the chosen forum with respect to claims brought by this particular plaintiff. To resolve this question, the court may inquire whether the plaintiff may invoke this clause notwithstanding the fact that it was not a party to the relevant contract.69 There is no obvious reason why this question may be not resolved by the closely-related-and-foreseeable test. In such cases, the test may (again) be usefully conceptualized as a liberalized version of traditional third-party beneficiary doctrine. If the non-signatory plaintiff is so closely related to a contract signatory that it is foreseeable that he is covered by the clause, then it may invoke the clause to assert personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Again, there is no issue with consent or due process on these facts. The defendant has previously consented to jurisdiction in the chosen state via the forum selection clause. The only question is whether the non-signatory plaintiff is entitled to take advantage of that prior consent.

68 This was the fact pattern presented in Nutrimost, LLC v. Werfel, No. 15cv531, 2016 WL 5107730, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 2016).

69 Ball Up, LLC v. Strategic Partners Corp., No. 02-17-00197-CV, 2018 WL 3673044, at *7 (Tex. App. Aug. 2, 2018) (“[I]t is not [defendant’s] burden to disprove his alleged consent to be bound by the forum-selection clauses in the [contract]. It is [plaintiff’s] burden to prove how [plaintiff] is authorized to enforce a forum-selection clause in [the contract] when [plaintiff] is a nonparty and nonsignatory to the [contract].”).
3. Signatory Defendant Invokes Clause Against Non-Signatory Plaintiff

In cases where a signatory defendant invokes a forum selection clause against a non-signatory plaintiff, the use of the closely-related-and-foreseeable test is more troubling. Consider a case where a non-signatory plaintiff brings a lawsuit against a signatory defendant in a forum other than the one named in the clause. The signatory defendant invokes the clause and moves to dismiss or transfer the suit. The non-signatory plaintiff opposes the motion on the ground that he is not a party to the contract containing the clause. The court then applies the closely-related-and-foreseeable test to determine whether the non-signatory plaintiff is so closely related to a contract signatory that he is prohibited from suing in any court except the one named in the clause. After concluding that the non-signatory is, in fact, closely related to the signatory, the court dismisses the case.

In this scenario, the closely-related-and-foreseeable test operates somewhat differently than the two scenarios discussed above. In those scenarios, the forum selection clause was being invoked by the non-signatory. The non-signatory was seeking to take advantage of the clause to further its own interests in litigation. Here, the forum selection clause is being invoked against the non-signatory. The non-signatory is being forced to comply with a clause in a contract it never signed. In contrast to the first two scenarios, this scenario raises the question of whether a forum selection clause may be enforced against a non-signatory plaintiff without his consent.

This shift in perspective necessitates a shift in the way that we think about the use of the closely-related-and-foreseeable test. As discussed above, the test may in some cases be usefully conceptualized as a liberalized version of third-party beneficiary law that applies exclusively to forum selection clauses. When the non-signatory plaintiff derives no benefit from the agreement or the clause, however, it is inappropriate for the courts to rely on such a test to deprive him of his ability to bring a lawsuit in the forum of his choice. It is one thing to expand the scope of a forum selection clause to encompass individuals who are actively seeking its benefits. It is quite another to expand the

70 In Coastal Steel, for example, the Third Circuit considered whether a non-signatory plaintiff—the American manufacturer—was bound by a forum selection clause in a contract between two English firms. Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tilghman Wheelabrator Ltd., 709 F.2d 190, 203 (3d Cir. 1983). Similarly, in Hugel, the Seventh Circuit considered whether two non-signatory plaintiffs—the companies controlled by Hugel—were bound by a forum selection clause in a contract between Hugel and Lloyd’s. Hugel v. Corp. of Lloyd’s, 999 F.2d 206, 209 (7th Cir. 1993).

71 This was the fact pattern presented in Hugel, 999 F.2d at 209.
scope of a clause to bind unwilling non-signatories who want nothing to do with it.

As a general rule, we believe the courts should not utilize the closely-related-and-foreseeable test in situations when a signatory defendant invokes the clause against a non-signatory plaintiff. To be clear, this is a prudential policy recommendation grounded in notions of personal autonomy and fairness. It is not a constitutional argument. There is no provision in the U.S. Constitution that guarantees a plaintiff the right to sue in their forum of choice.72 Indeed, the courts routinely deny plaintiffs access to their preferred forum by transferring or dismissing the suit on the basis of forum non conveniens in cases where there is no forum selection clause. If refusing to allow a plaintiff to sue in a given forum absent a forum selection clause is constitutional under a forum non conveniens analysis—and the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held that it is73—then surely there is no constitutional problem when the courts refuse to allow a plaintiff to sue in a given forum because that plaintiff is closely related to a party bound by a forum selection clause requiring suit to be brought elsewhere.

Although there is no constitutional due process issue presented under this scenario, we still believe that the absence of any meaningful consent compels the conclusion that the courts should not apply the closely-related-and-foreseeable test in this context. In lieu of the test, we would urge the courts to adopt the following approach. They should first consider whether one of the traditional doctrines discussed in Part I provides a basis for concluding that the plaintiff is bound by the clause.74 If not, the courts should consider whether the action

72 There is a long-running academic debate as to whether judicial abstention doctrines such as forum non conveniens are constitutional. See, e.g., Maggie Gardner, Abstention at the Border, 105 VA. L. REV. 63, 67-68 (2019) (surveying the literature) [hereinafter Gardner, Abstention at the Border]; Fred O. Smith, Jr., Abstention in the Time of Ferguson, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2283, 2353–56 (2018) (same). However, the fact that the courts routinely rely on the doctrine of forum non conveniens “to dismiss, on a discretionary basis, cases they believe would be better heard by another [jurisdiction’s] courts,” suggests that most courts perceive no constitutional problems with the doctrine. Maggie Gardner, Retiring Forum Non Conveniens, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 390, 391 (2017) [hereinafter Gardner, Retiring Forum Non Conveniens].

73 See Gardner, Retiring Forum Non Conveniens, supra note 72, at 402–05 (collecting cases).

74 This list of doctrines includes agency, alter ego, assumption, incorporation by reference, successor liability, the global transaction test, equitable estoppel, and the law of third-party beneficiaries. With respect to third-party beneficiary law, we believe it is appropriate to bind a non-signatory plaintiff to a forum selection clause if it is an intended beneficiary of the contract as a whole. See Christensen v. Norman, No. 17-cv-01283, 2019 WL 2147011, at *3 (D. Utah Feb. 1, 2019) (“Plaintiff cannot have it both ways—he cannot allege he is a third-party beneficiary of the APA, but concurrently argue that although his agent PEMC executed the APA, he is not personally bound by the [forum selection clause
brought by the non-signatory should be transferred or dismissed on the basis of forum non conveniens using the usual criteria that apply in cases where there is no forum selection clause. In applying these criteria, the courts may of course consider the fact that some plaintiffs are bound by the forum selection clause while others are not.75 They should not, however, apply the closely-related-and-foreseeable test to determine the rights and obligations of any non-signatory plaintiffs.

* * *

The use of the closely-related-and-foreseeable test in the three scenarios discussed above presents a wide array of issues. The fourth and final scenario, however, presents issues that are exponentially more complex. This is the scenario where a signatory plaintiff invokes the clause as a basis for asserting personal jurisdiction over a non-signatory plaintiff.

75 Adams v. Raintree Vacation Exch. LLC, 702 F.3d 436, 443 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[N]otice that because Raintree was entitled to remove the case to Mexico under the forum selection clause irrespective of Starwood’s rights, the doctrine of forum non conveniens clicks in and would require the dismissal of the claim against Starwood as well, even if it weren’t entitled to enforce the forum selection clause. The suit would then be refiled in the Mexico court in which the plaintiffs would refile their claim against Raintree.”). Our preferred approach is broadly consistent with one recently adopted by the Third Circuit in In re Howmedica Osteonics Corp, 867 F.3d 390 (3d Cir. 2017). In that case, the court considered the question of “how district courts should apply Atlantic Marine when all defendants seek a transfer to one district under § 1404(a), but only some of those defendants agreed to forum-selection clauses that designate a different district.” Id. at 399. In answering this question, the Third Circuit gave short shrift to the argument that these parties were bound by a forum selection clause in a contract executed by persons to whom they were closely related. Id. at 407. Instead, the court held that it was appropriate to consider the “private and public interests relevant to non-contracting parties.” Id. at 404, 408.
signatory defendant. Since this scenario implicates issues of personal autonomy and due process, it is different from the three discussed above, as we explain in the next Part. In anticipation of this discussion in Part II, however, we wish to make our position clear on one point. We believe that concerns about personal autonomy, standing alone, are sufficient to counsel against the use of the closely-related-and-foreseeable test when a non-signatory seeks to assert personal jurisdiction against a non-signatory defendant based solely on the existence of a forum selection clause. In such cases, the freedom not to contract must take precedence over any gains to be derived from litigation efficiency and the court should refrain from asserting personal jurisdiction over a non-signatory defendant based solely on that defendant’s close proximity to a contract signatory. With that position clearly stated, we turn our full attention to the question of due process.

II. PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND NON-SIGNATORY DEFENDANTS

Over the past decade, the courts have increasingly relied on the closely-related-and-foreseeable test to conclude that the constitutional requirements of due process were satisfied in cases where a signatory plaintiff invoked a clause against a non-signatory defendant. In the case of Linda Romano, for example, the federal court in Pennsylvania expressly invoked this test to support its conclusion that it had personal jurisdiction over Linda because she was married to Robert. The court

76 See, e.g., McWane, Inc. v. Lanier, No. 9488, 2015 WL 399582, at *4, *11 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2015); Peterson v. Evapco, Inc., 188 A.3d 210, 238 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2018) (concluding that lower court “exercised personal jurisdiction over Mrs. Peterson properly because she was closely related to the Confidentiality Agreement such that she should have foreseen that [plaintiff] would seek to bind her by its forum-selection clause”); Solargenix Energy, LLC v. Acciona, S.A., 17 N.E.3d 171, 185 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014) (concluding that even in the absence of minimum contacts with the forum, a non-signatory “impliedly consents to the forum selection clause via its connections with dispute, the parties, and the contract or contracts at issue”).


78 AAMCO Transmissions, 42 F. Supp. 3d at 708 (“[A] non-signatory party may enforce a forum selection clause in a contract if the party . . . is closely related to the contractual
reasoned that “[g]iven her spousal relationship with Robert Romano, Linda Romano is so closely related to Robert Romano’s dispute with AAMCO that she should have foreseen being bound by the forum selection clause in the Franchisee Agreement.”\[79\] Within the universe of cases applying the closely-related-and-foreseeable test, this conclusion is unremarkable. If one looks at this case through a slightly different lens, however, the decision is rather surprising. Under the minimum contacts test laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court in its post–International Shoe jurisprudence, the fact that a person is married to someone over whom the court has personal jurisdiction is ordinarily not enough to support the exercise the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over that person.\[80\] And yet this spousal relationship was deemed largely sufficient to subject Linda Romano to personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania in AAMCO for purposes of the closely-related-and-foreseeable test.

In this Part, we argue that this and other decisions applying the closely-related-and-foreseeable test to cases involving non-signatory defendants are out of step with the ordinary rules relating to personal jurisdiction and due process. First, we argue that a close connection between the defendant and a contract is very different from the close connection between the defendant and the forum. Second, we argue that the concept of foreseeability is insufficient under existing doctrine to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant. Third, we argue that the contacts of a subsidiary cannot be imputed to a parent for purposes of establishing personal jurisdiction under current law.

Collectively, these arguments show that the routine use of the closely-related-and-foreseeable test to assert personal jurisdiction over non-signatory defendants is impossible to reconcile with recent Supreme Court precedents relating to personal jurisdiction with respect to out-of-state defendants. The mere fact that these decisions are inconsistent with this prevailing caselaw, to be sure, does not mean that they are undesirable. The Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence in the area of personal jurisdiction has many critics and it may well be that a more liberal approach to personal jurisdiction would be beneficial to society at large. It is merely to point out that the jurisdictional inquiry with respect to contract non-signatories is very

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\[79\] Id. at 709 (emphasis added).

\[80\] See Gognat v. Ellsworth, No. 08–CV–00100, 2009 WL 3486627, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 26, 2009) (“Neither party has cited, nor has the Court found, a case which states that personal jurisdiction is conferred merely based on a spousal relationship.”).
different from the jurisdictional inquiry that courts typically apply to other defendants.

A. Minimum Contacts and the Doctrinal Role of Relatedness

The U.S. Supreme Court has long held that a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in a state if the defendant has “minimum contacts” with that state. The minimum contacts test has always centered the question of whether a non-resident defendant has “sufficient contacts or ties with the state of the forum” to support a constitutional exercise of personal jurisdiction.82 The extent and strength demanded of such ties has waxed and waned over the decades, and most commentators agree that the Court’s most recent round of personal jurisdiction decisions have privileged the importance of the forum state’s exercise of territorial power and sovereignty over other analytical tools that would tie a defendant’s intention or conduct to the forum state.83

Since the Supreme Court’s decisions in *Goodyear* and *Daimler* restricted the application of general jurisdiction to the few

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81 In the arbitration context, the Court has held that a defendant who has not signed the agreement containing the arbitration clause has not agreed to submit the arbitrability of the dispute to arbitration. See *First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan*, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) (“Courts should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is ‘clear and unmistakable’ evidence that they did so.” (alterations in original) (quoting *AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers*, 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986))). It is beyond the scope of this paper to reevaluate the Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the enforcement of forum selection clauses in boilerplate contracts. Although there are strong arguments that assent via a boilerplate agreement that a party is likely to neither read nor understand is not a purposeful contact with the forum state, the current jurisprudence permits assent to such contracts, and it is the assent itself that is understood as purposeful. While it may be a welcome development to use a minimum contacts analysis to chip away at the use of such clauses, this paper does not take a position on that doctrinal move. And as we will expand on below, the strength of our argument depends, to some extent, on the ability of courts to apply minimum contacts to a small range of situations (non-signatories) without the fear that a single holding will directly overturn a half-century of settled precedent regarding signatories to forum selection clauses.


jurisdictions where a defendant is “essentially at home.”84 courts have focused most of their minimum contacts scrutiny on specific jurisdiction cases. These cases have probed the extent of relatedness between the defendant, the cause of action, and the forum state. The “closely-related-and-foreseeable” test, as per its name, has a relatedness inquiry. But this form of relatedness is out of sync with how courts treat relatedness in minimum contacts. First, the closely-related-and-foreseeable test does not inquire about the defendant’s relatedness to the jurisdiction—the relationship is to the contract which appears to serve as a tacit proxy for the forum state itself. Second, although the Supreme Court has embraced “relatedness” as an acceptable analytical tool for determining minimum contacts, the “relatedness” of minimum contacts is narrower than the breezy “relatedness” that suffices for applying forum selection clauses to non-signatories.

Although many scholars have resisted the trend toward a circumscribed understanding of minimum contacts, none have challenged the necessity of identifying the defendant’s contact that is the meaningful connection between the defendant and the forum state.85 Indeed, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed that minimum contacts demand a “substantial connection” between the defendant, the cause of action, and the forum state.86 The Court recently clarified in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana,87 that it is jurisdictionally sufficient for a plaintiff’s claims to relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum state without directly arising out of those particular contacts.88 However, it remains to be seen just how elastic the “relate to” standard will be. While the Court rejected a specific jurisdiction standard under which the defendant’s forum contacts must “give rise” to the cause of action, Justice Kagan emphasized that the forum contacts do need

84 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 517 U.S. 117, 127 (2014). These rulings limit general jurisdiction to a defendant’s state of incorporation (or organization) and to its principal place of business which, in all but the most exceptional circumstances, is the single state where a business has its “nerve center.” Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 95 (2010).
85 There are good reasons to question the minimum contacts framework altogether, and even to question whether personal jurisdiction is a matter of due process. See, e.g., Stephen E. Sachs, Pennoyer Was Right, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1249 (2017). The purpose of this Article is to show the unsettling asymmetry between the treatment of forum selection clause non-signatories and other non-resident defendants. This Article takes the continued use and existence of the minimum contacts test as a given. Although a wholesale rethinking of the constitutional personal jurisdiction framework may be normatively desirable, it is highly unlikely that the Supreme Court will move away from minimum contacts and due process. This Article thus situates the forum selection clause problem within the current doctrinal framework, flawed as it may be.
88 Id. at 1027–29.
to relate to the plaintiff’s claim.\textsuperscript{89} Free floating forum contacts will not do—that would effectively recreate the older general jurisdiction standard that the Court jettisoned in Goodyear and Daimler.

\textit{Ford}, then, stands for the proposition that a plaintiff need not show a \textit{causal} relationship between the defendant’s forum contacts and the lawsuit, but the relatedness must still run to the forum state, not a stateless or aterritorial proxy such as a contract. The closely-related-and-foreseeable test is not concerned with the existence of any connection between the defendant and the \textit{forum state}. Instead, that test focuses exclusively on the relationship between the defendant and the \textit{contract} containing the forum selection clause.\textsuperscript{90} This is problematic for at least two reasons. First, a non-signatory defendant who has some relationship to the contract will in many cases lack any meaningful relationship with the state named in the forum selection clause. Second, the state named in a forum selection clause will in many cases lack any connection to the parties or the contract. This disconnect is not significant when one contract signatory seeks to enforce a forum selection clause against another because the constitutionally relevant connection to the forum is the consent to the jurisdiction of the forum state manifested in the clause.\textsuperscript{91} When the defendant is a non-signatory, however, that cognizable connection to the forum is missing.

\textit{Fair Isaac Corp. v. Gordon} illustrates this problem well.\textsuperscript{92} An employer, Fair Isaac Corporation (FICO), sought to sue Gordon, its former employee, and his new employer, Callcredit, for breach of a confidentiality and non-solicitation agreement that he signed upon resigning from FICO. FICO, a Delaware corporation, had its headquarters in California. Callcredit was an English company with offices in several cities outside of the United States. Despite no other

\textsuperscript{89} Id. at 1026 (“Th[is] does not mean anything goes. In the sphere of specific jurisdiction, the phrase ‘relate to’ incorporates real limits, as it must to adequately protect defendants foreign to a forum.”).


\textsuperscript{91} The Supreme Court has been silent on the question of whether the use of consent as a basis for personal jurisdiction is itself subject to the minimum contacts framework. We consider that question below at Part III.

apparent connection to Minnesota, the contract that Gordon and FICO signed named Hennepin County, Minnesota, in the forum selection clause. 93 The defendant’s purposeful conduct that a court would typically look for in such a case was therefore absent. Assuming that Callcredit was, in fact, directing harmful acts at FICO, there is no indication that it directed its harmful conduct to Minnesota because FICO lacked any meaningful connection to Minnesota. Nevertheless, the Minnesota court relied on the closely-related-and-foreseeable test to conclude that it had personal jurisdiction over Callcredit on the basis of the forum selection clause. 94

In such cases, where the forum selection clause is itself the only link between the defendant and the forum state, the proximity to the forum selection clause would only be a constitutionally sufficient minimum contact vis-à-vis a closely related non-signatory if it amounted to “intentional conduct by the defendant that creates the necessary contacts with the forum.” 95 Although the Supreme Court has intimated that assent to a contract naming the forum state as the selected forum is a minimum contact for the signatory party, 96 it has never directly identified a forum selection clause, disconnected from its parties, and from the underlying concept of consent, as a constitutionally relevant contact with the forum state for non-signatories.

The use of the closely-related-and-foreseeable test thus produces a bizarre scenario in which the contract containing the forum selection clause becomes a proxy for the forum state itself. So long as the defendant is expressly aiming its conduct at the contract via a close relationship with a contract signatory, that defendant is targeting its conduct at the jurisdiction named in the forum selection clause. 97 As the Supreme Court and lower courts clarified over the past decade, were the forum selection clause a person rather than a contract, such purposeful conduct would be subjected to a much higher degree of scrutiny to ensure that the contacts were in fact with the forum state, and not just with a person or entity who, by happenstance, is located

93 Id. at *1–2. Callcredit was not a party to this agreement.
94 Id. at *2.
97 See, e.g., Canon Fin. Servs. v. ServeCo N. Am., LLC, No. 19-17910, 2020 WL 4035460, at *1, *5–9 (D.N.J. July 16, 2020) (asserting personal jurisdiction over two individual non-signatory defendants without once considering whether those defendants had directed their actions toward New Jersey); Diamond v. Calaway, No. 18 Civ. 3238, 2018 WL 4906256, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2018) (observing that non-signatory was “closely related” to a fraudulent scheme enabled by the signatory’s “execution of a Written Note and Written Guaranty with a New York forum-selection clause” and that the non-signatory was therefore subject to personal jurisdiction in New York).
within the territory of the forum state. When courts confront cases involving libel, defamation, copyright or patent infringement, and other intentional or “purposefully directed” causes of action, they inquire whether the “case involves both a forum-state injury and tortious conduct specifically directed at the forum, making the forum state the focal point” of the cause of action. A defendant might have sporadic or “fortuitous” contacts with the forum state, but courts have repeatedly rejected the idea that “any plaintiff may hale any defendant into court in the plaintiff’s home state, where the defendant has no contacts, merely by asserting that the defendant has committed an intentional tort against the plaintiff” who is located within the territory of the forum state.

This “injury plus” test is one in which the defendant must expressly target the forum state independently of the fact that it causes harm to the plaintiff in the forum state. Courts routinely demand that the defendant direct extra conduct toward the forum state, even when the plaintiff is incorporated in that jurisdiction and maintains headquarters in the forum state. Suppose, for example, that in Fair Isaac, FICO were incorporated in Minnesota with headquarters there. Those facts would not have, on their own, been enough for the assertion of personal jurisdiction over Callcredit in Minnesota but for the forum selection clause. If, for example, the defendant employee had worked in FICO’s California office and his employment and subsequent new job had nothing to do with Minnesota, the location of FICO’s headquarters and place of incorporation would not have been enough. Even under Ford, it would be a stretch to say that interacting with a party that is headquartered in a given state amounts to contacts related to the lawsuit. The fact that Callcredit and Gordon could foresee that FICO might also experience an injury at its headquarters would not satisfy the “injury plus” test that many jurisdictions have fashioned out of Calder and Walden.

Even in instances where the chosen forum does bear some relationship to the contract, its parties, or its performance, it is not a forgone conclusion that a non-signatory who has some relationship to

98 Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 702, 706 (7th Cir. 2010).
99 Mobile Anesthesiologists Chi., LLC v. Anesthesia Assocs. of Hous. Metroplex, 623 F.3d 440, 444–45 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Wallace v. Herron, 778 F.2d 391, 394 (7th Cir. 1985)).
100 See Wescott v. Reisner, No. 17-cv-06271, 2018 WL 2463614, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2018) (“Because Ms. Condon was not a party to the agreement . . . she cannot be said to have consented to the forum selection clause; thus, she did not submit to the jurisdiction of California courts.”).
102 See Tamburo, 601 F.3d at 705.
a contract would share that contract’s relationship to the forum, or that the relationship itself is sufficiently strong to pass minimum-contacts muster. To be clear, this gap is not an immutable feature of enforcement of forum selection clauses against non-signatories. There are situations in which a non-signatory defendant’s relationship to the contract can also be construed as a set of constitutionally sufficient contacts with the forum state. To conclude that a court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant based solely on that defendant’s connection to a contract, however, is to fundamentally misunderstand the Supreme Court’s recent caselaw in this area.

B. The Foreseeability Trap

Since at least the 1960s, courts have struggled to assimilate the concept of foreseeability into minimum contacts analysis. Foreseeability is an outgrowth of indirect forum contacts. The concept first emerged in the so-called “stream of commerce” cases in which a defendant manufacturer or seller would place an item in the stream of commerce, perhaps by selling it to another manufacturer that would incorporate that component into a larger product, or perhaps by selling the product to a wholesaler or other seller who would eventually sell the product to someone in the forum state where the product would cause an injury. In other permutations, a buyer might decide to take the product with them to yet another state where the product would cause an injury. In each of these scenarios, the plaintiff could make a persuasive case that it was foreseeable that the defendant’s conduct would lead to harm in the forum state.

In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Supreme Court announced that “‘foreseeability’ alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause.”\(^\text{103}\) It did not foreclose the usage of foreseeability altogether, but cautioned that “the foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis . . . is that the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.”\(^\text{104}\) Although the Court continued to flirt with the idea that a strong foreseeability of the defendant's conduct causing harm in the forum state would be sufficient for minimum contacts,\(^\text{105}\) a majority holding for a clear adoption of a “foreseeability” test for minimum contacts.

\(^\text{103}\) World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980).
\(^\text{104}\) Id. at 297.
never emerged. Time and time again, lower courts have shied away from relying on the “foreseeability” of conduct resulting in some sort of harm in or connection to the forum as a basis for constitutionally sufficient minimum contacts.

Despite the fact that foreseeability plays, at best, a supporting role in establishing minimum contacts in traditional in personam cases, foreseeability is front and center in the test that many courts now use to determine whether a non-signatory defendant is bound by a forum selection clause. While the “closely related” prong functions as a proxy for contact with the forum, the “foreseeability” prong appears to be a substitute for consent. A party that engages in activity with other individuals or entities bound to a forum selection clause can foresee that litigation between signatories would be confined to the named jurisdiction. Through knowledge of the prior actions of the signatories, in other words, the defendant has bound itself to the forum by purposefully engaging with parties who might later litigate in that forum. This is not necessarily an outrageous constitutional argument. The problem is that courts would not tolerate that use of foreseeability as a manifestation of purposeful availment of the forum or of fictitious consent in any other context. It is notable, for example that in Ford, the case in which the Supreme Court held that relatedness has constitutional minimum contacts significance outside of direct causation, the concept of foreseeability is totally absent from the opinion.

Take the facts of J. McIntyre Machinery as an example. There, the defendant, an English manufacturer sold a metal shearing machine to its Ohio distributor who then sold it to the New Jersey employer of the injured plaintiff. That a foreign manufacturer who engaged an exclusive distributor for the purposes of selling its products to U.S. customers in all fifty states could not foresee that its product might cause harm in one of the places of sale and use is laughable. It was this commerce-connected foreseeability that propelled Justice Brennan’s argument in Asahi that foreseeability in the stream of commerce was tantamount to purposeful availment of the forum. Foreseeability,
then, was taken as a given by all nine justices in *J. McIntyre*—no one could seriously argue that J. McIntyre could not foresee both harm and the possibility of litigation in a forum state. Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy used his plurality opinion to emphasize that “foreseeability[] is inconsistent with the premises of lawful judicial power.”111 No amount of clairvoyance by the defendant could overcome the deficit of other purposeful acts directed toward the forum state. Yet when a court binds a non-signatory to a forum selection clause in a state where the defendant otherwise has no other contacts on the basis that it was foreseeable that litigation involving other parties might involve a forum selection clause, it is doing exactly what Justice Kennedy denounced in *J. McIntyre*. It is using the defendant’s “expectations” rather than its “actions” to “empower a State’s courts to subject him to judgment.”112

To be clear, we do not endorse this conception of the limits on personal jurisdiction and the meaning of minimum contacts. Numerous commentators (and the New Jersey Supreme Court itself) have argued that it would be perfectly constitutional to subject J. McIntyre to New Jersey’s jurisdiction, and these arguments include a reanimation of Justice Brennan’s foreseeability arguments from *Burger King* and *Asahi*. The problem that we identify is a fundamental unfairness in the treatment of one class of non-resident defendants (non-signatories to forum selection clauses) as beholden to a foreseeability regime that does not apply to nearly all other non-resident defendants.

Reimagining the facts of *J. McIntyre* elucidates this asymmetry. Suppose that Mr. Nicastro’s employer had insisted on a forum selection clause naming New Jersey in the contract of sale when it purchased the metal shearing machine from the Ohio distributor. This contract could be implicated in a products liability lawsuit arising from J. McIntyre’s alleged negligence in the design and manufacture of the metal shearing machine.113 According to the closely-related-and-foreseeable test, J. McIntyre might have known of such a clause and should have foreseen litigation in that forum. Suddenly, its expectations matter more than its actions. Its actions are no more purposeful than in the world with no forum selection clause. Consent as a form of submission to the forum is just as fictional whether it is proximate to the consent of others or it is “consenting” by benefiting

111 *J. McIntyre*, 564 U.S. at 883.
112 Id.
113 Moreover, J. McIntyre would not be bound to either of these contracts because it was not in privity with the employer or the tort victim. When the Supreme Court has extended these sorts of contractual provisions “upstream” or “downstream” in a chain of sale, it has done so by deliberately discarding privity as a consideration. *See, e.g.*, Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. James N. Kirby, Pty Ltd., 543 U.S. 14, 18, 31, 34 (2004).
from the laws and economy of that forum. The arguments for litigation efficiency do not bridge this divide. While courts that apply the closely-related-and-foreseeable test often do so in the name of avoiding piecemeal litigation in multiple fora, plaintiffs have made the same arguments in non-forum selection cases to little avail. U.S. plaintiffs must file multiple lawsuits if all defendants cannot be found in a single forum. This seemingly exigent circumstance that justifies using foreseeability to connect non-signatories has found little purchase outside of the context of non-signatories and forum selection clauses.

To be sure, a few courts have rejected the centrality of “foreseeability” when called upon to enforce forum selection clauses against non-signatories. As one federal district judge bluntly stated, “[i]f foreseeability cannot establish minimum contacts, it should not be a sufficient basis for finding a waiver or implied consent either.” Such opinions highlight the possibility of alignment between foreseeability in minimum contacts and foreseeability in forum selection clauses. Indeed, the alignment might ultimately run in the other direction, as a signal to courts that a more forgiving minimum contacts standard could be beneficial to plaintiffs and, as a practical matter, not unnecessarily harsh to defendants whose foreseeable and purposeful conduct ties them to a forum state. At bottom, however, the “foreseeability” prong of the closely-related-and-foreseeable test falls prey to the same bootstrapping problem that has frustrated courts when trying to use foreseeability as a means for finding minimum contacts.

114 See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1783–84 (2017) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that the Court’s rejection of personal jurisdiction over defendant in cases like Bristol-Myers Squibb would result in, inter alia, the inability to bring a lawsuit in a single forum against multiple defendants).


116 See Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19, 94 (1990) (“Any expectation that a defendant has of avoiding an out-of-state court is a function of the jurisdictional rules themselves.”). One can detect a similar pattern in the closely-related-and-foreseeable cases. When the test is applied in a way that does not raise serious due process considerations, it is generally because the defendant already evinced significant connections to the forum state without the element for foreseeability.
C. Agency and Corporate Alter Egos

Courts regularly invoke the closely-related-and-foreseeable test to enforce forum selection clauses against non-signatories when there is a “close relation[ship]” between the non-signatory and the entities who own, operate, or manage the entity that executed the contract containing the clause. In *Pegasus Strategic Partners, LLC v. Stroden*, the court asserted personal jurisdiction over two directors in an LLC notwithstanding the fact that the LLC was the only signatory to the agreement. In *Universal Investment Advisory SA v. Bakrie Telecom Pte., Ltd.*, the court asserted personal jurisdiction over the parent company of the signatory entity even though the parent was a non-signatory to the agreement with the clause. And in *American Maplan Corp. v. Hebei Quanen High-Tech Piping Co.*, the court asserted personal jurisdiction over two non-signatory corporate officers on the basis of a forum selection clause in a contract executed by the entity that employed them.

In some instances, these cases do not present serious constitutional personal jurisdiction problems because the non-signatory is, in fact, quite intertwined with the signatory in its status and conduct. This creates room for two constitutional paths to personal jurisdiction. If consent alone forms the constitutional basis for personal jurisdiction, then the question should be wholly resolvable based on the generally applicable contract and agency principles discussed in Section I.A. Use of the closely-related-and-foreseeable test in these circumstances is unnecessary and undesirable. The test’s

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119 62 N.Y.S.3d 1, 8 (App. Div. 2017) (“If the nonsignatory party has an ownership interest or a direct or indirect controlling interest in the signing party . . . , or, the entities or individuals consulted with each other regarding decisions and were intimately involved in the decision-making process . . . , then, a finding of personal jurisdiction based on a forum selection clause may be proper, as it achieves the ‘rationale behind binding closely related entities to the forum selection clause [which] is to “promote stable and dependable trade relations.”’” (first citing *Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Canal & Distrib. SAS*, No. 07 Civ. 2918, 2010 WL 537583, at *5 (S.D.N.Y Feb. 9, 2010); and then quoting *Tate & Lyle Ingredients Ams., Inc. v. Whitefox Techs. USA, Inc.*, 949 N.Y.S.2d 375, 377 (App. Div. 2012))).

120 No. 17-1075, 2017 WL 5598262, at *15 (D. Kan. Nov. 21, 2017); see also *Ackerman v. Secdo, Inc.*, No. 17-Civ-7845, 2019 WL 12251911, at *5 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2019) (asserting personal jurisdiction over an individual because he was a corporate officer and because he was the principal negotiator for five sales contracts notwithstanding the fact that he did not sign any of these agreements in his personal capacity).
deployment here makes it less likely that the courts will rely on the solid contractual foundation for binding the non-signatory to the forum selection clause according to the usual criteria. Utilizing the test in this context also singles out forum selection clauses for special treatment, indicating that it may be easier to bind a non-signatory to a forum selection clause than to any other part of the contract or to the contract as a whole. Where the “close relationship” is one in which the non-signatory is working functions more or less as a unit with the signatory, the relationship should be expressed and analyzed using the more familiar tools of agency, third-party beneficiary law, and equitable estoppel.

The same insight may be applied to the question of when a corporate affiliate is subject to minimum contacts. If the non-signatory’s entangled relationship with the signatory entity is so totalizing, then existing minimum contacts doctrine already has sufficient tools for extending personal jurisdiction to the non-signatory. If the non-signatory’s conduct is so bound up in the conduct of the signatory, minimum contacts also provides the requisite analytical tools. To cite a “close relationship” between the signatory and the non-signatory as a constitutional shortcut to jurisdiction when the relationship is not totalizing and the non-signatory’s conduct is not bound up with the conduct of the signatory, however, flies in the face of even the most basic axioms of personal jurisdiction doctrine.

Service of process on a corporate director, officer, manager, subsidiary, or other affiliate cannot, in and of itself, suffice for personal jurisdiction. Service of process on a corporate director, officer, manager, subsidiary, or other affiliate cannot, in and of itself, suffice for personal jurisdiction. Service of process on a corporate director, officer, manager, subsidiary, or other affiliate cannot, in and of itself, suffice for personal jurisdiction. Service of process on a corporate director, officer, manager, subsidiary, or other affiliate cannot, in and of itself, suffice for personal jurisdiction. Service of process on a corporate director, officer, manager, subsidiary, or other affiliate cannot, in and of itself, suffice for personal jurisdiction. Service of process on a corporate director, officer, manager, subsidiary, or other affiliate cannot, in and of itself, suffice for personal jurisdiction. 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121 See, e.g., Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U.S. 518, 521–22 (1895) (finding that service of process only confers jurisdiction when service of process was made “in the first State upon an agent appointed to act there for the corporation, and not merely upon an officer or agent residing in another State, and only casually within the State, and not charged with any business of the corporation there.”); Rosenberg Bros. & Co., Inc. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923); Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding that the Supreme Court “has required an analysis of a corporation’s contacts with the forum state even when tag jurisdiction, if available, would have made such analysis unnecessary.”).

122 Martinez, 764 F.3d at 1068. Courts applying the closely-related-and-foreseeable test routinely overlook this fact. See Loma Linda Univ. v. Smarter Alloys, Inc., No. 19-CV-607, 2020 WL 5549986, at *15 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2020) (concluding that a corporate employee who was not a signatory to the agreement executed by the corporation was bound by a forum selection clause in that agreement—and hence subject to personal jurisdiction in
A “close relationship” between business entities is also an insufficient basis for a court to impute the forum contacts of one business entity to another. In *Daimler AG v. Bauman*, the Court held that for general jurisdiction, a subsidiary’s contacts may only be imputed to a foreign corporation if the subsidiary is the “alter ego” of the parent, a relationship that requires a finding that the businesses are “not really separate entities.” Courts have noted the parallel between imputing contacts for purposes of personal jurisdiction and the “corporate veil fiction[,] which] ‘isolates “the actions, profits, and debts of the corporation from the individuals who invest in and run the entity.”' It takes “extraordinary circumstances” to pierce the corporate veil, and simply acting in concert with another entity for certain purposes would not justify imposing liability on the second entity.

Although the forum selection clause cases are not themselves general jurisdiction cases, the closely-related-and-foreseeable test replicates the problem that Justice Ginsburg criticized in *Daimler*, namely, that it binds a non-resident to a forum without constitutionally meaningful specificity. If a person or company affiliates itself closely enough with one who has signed a forum selection clause, then they can be bound, regardless of whether other conduct or affiliation would be contact with the forum. Some of the entanglements and affiliations between companies do amount to the sort of affiliation with a forum that would be contractually and constitutionally significant. But the closely-related-and-foreseeable test allows the more attenuated contacts to slip through the cracks.

*Daimler* was a lawsuit involving Argentinian nationals who sued a German corporation for the human rights abuses that the German company’s Latin American subsidiary allegedly had perpetrated against the plaintiffs in the 1980s; the forum (California) was wholly unrelated to the cause of action and the parties. The only relevant affiliation to California was that of Daimler’s American subsidiary. Compare this, again, to a situation where the only connection between the parties, the cause of action, and the forum is a forum selection agreement signed by a resident of the forum state (because he “actively negotiated” the agreement and signed an “acknowledgement” of the agreement).

124 Ranza v. Nike, Inc., 793 F.3d 1059, 1072 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 926 (9th Cir. 2001)).
126 Dill, 474 P.3d at 183 (quoting *Sedgwick*, 456 P.3d at 68).
128 Id. at 120–21.
clause. The asymmetry is distressing—California might have had a stronger pull over the non-signatory new employer of an employee who signed a non-compete clause containing a California forum selection clause, even if the parties and employment had nothing to do with California, than it would have to offer itself as a forum to hear claims of serious human rights abuses.\footnote{Cf. Fair Isaac Corp. v. Gordon, No. A16–0274, 2016 WL 7439084 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 2016).}

\textit{Daimler} foreclosed the use of agency alone to impute contacts for general jurisdiction, but courts can still impute contacts between affiliated entities for purposes of specific jurisdiction.\footnote{\textit{Daimler}, 517 U.S. at 135 n.13 (“[A] corporation can purposefully avail itself of a forum by directing its agents or distributors to take action there. . . . [B]ut it does not inevitably follow . . . that similar reasoning applies to \textit{general} jurisdiction.”); see also Alcide v. Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha, 465 F. Supp. 3d 588, 607 (E.D. La. 2020) (“[A] subsidiary’s contacts may be imputed to subject its parent to specific jurisdiction.”); \textit{In re Platinum-Beechwood Litig.}, 427 F. Supp. 3d 395, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (concluding parent was bound by forum selection clause in contract executed by its subsidiary and agent and was therefore subject to personal jurisdiction in New York for claims relating to that contract); Viega GmbH v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 328 P.3d 1152 (Nev. 2014) (appropriate agency theory enough to impute contacts of subsidiary to parent for purposes of specific jurisdiction). \textit{But see} Griffith v. SSC Pueblo Belmont Operating Co., 381 P.3d 308, 310–11 (Colo. 2016) (determination of imputation of contacts from subsidiary to parent required for both general and specific jurisdiction).} Since a forum selection clause is itself a relevant forum contact, contact may be imputed for purposes of specific jurisdiction. Awareness of a forum selection clause by a non-signatory, in other words, could be one factor that helps to establish purposeful availment of the forum. But under the closely-related-and-foreseeable test, the presence of a forum selection clause allows a court to short-circuit the analysis of the connection between the defendant, the forum, and the cause of action that would be required of any other defendant. It is unclear why a forum selection clause should have such a gravitational pull in situations where agency law or other contract principles would not otherwise bind the non-signatory to the contract. As one District Court judge opined, “th[is] Court is skeptical that the ‘closely related’ doctrine adds meaningfully to existing agency and corporate law.”\footnote{See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 n.14 (1985).}

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In Part I, we identified a new legal doctrine—the closely-related-and-foreseeable test—and showed that this doctrine is now widely used by courts to bind non-signatories to forum selection clauses. In Part II,
we documented the existence of an asymmetry. In ordinary cases, a non-resident defendant’s amenability to jurisdiction is evaluated by looking at that defendant’s connections with the forum. In cases involving forum selection clauses, by contrast, a non-signatory defendant’s amenability to jurisdiction is evaluated by looking at that defendant’s connections with the contract. We further noted that this asymmetry threatens to destabilize traditional personal jurisdiction and minimum contacts analysis.

In Part III, we take a step back to explain why forum selection clause cases involving non-signatories have drifted into this parallel track of personal jurisdiction analysis. We then argue that a fundamental reconceptualization of the role that consent plays in personal jurisdiction doctrine holds the key to bringing these parallel tracks back into alignment. Our goal in Part III is not to solve any particular doctrinal problem. Instead, it is to encourage courts to bring forum selection clauses—as applied to signatories and non-signatories alike—within the umbrella of due process and minimum contacts as a first step in rethinking the broader law of personal jurisdiction.

III. TOWARD A MINIMUM CONTACTS STANDARD FOR FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES

Although many courts use the constitutional buzzwords of “consent,” “minimum contacts” and “due process,” very few courts have engaged in the deeper constitutional inquiry that is needed in order to determine where forum selection clause enforcement fits. Forum selection clauses are a subset of the broader category of consent, a category that has been relatively underexamined for its relationship to minimum contacts in particular and to due process writ large. At heart, this inquiry revolves around the question of whether personal jurisdiction based on consent is subject in whole or in part to the minimum contacts test and, if so, how consent via forum selection clause, or proximity thereto, should be analyzed as a matter of due process.

In this Part, we first explain the historical doctrinal development of the constitutional bases for enforcing traditional bases of jurisdiction and why this has resulted in conceptual confusion for forum selection clauses. We then evaluate several different conceptual frameworks for thinking through the problems posed by forum selection clauses and their enforcement against non-signatories. Finally, we make the case that the question of whether a forum selection clause provides a basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction over a non-signatory defendant should be evaluated through the lens of minimum contacts rather than consent.
A. Uncovering the Historical Basis for the Conceptual Confusion

This Article has described a parallel universe of faux-minimum-contacts for forum selection clause enforcement. How did this come to be? To understand how courts arrived at the current patchwork of opinions, and analytical frameworks that constitute the closely-related-and-foreseeable test, one must take a step back and appreciate the relationship of forum selection clauses and the due process limits on a forum state’s exercise of personal jurisdiction. The doctrinal chasm between the enforcement of forum selection clauses and other exercises of jurisdiction over non-resident defendants begins with a doctrinal and historical account of how courts have understood the place of so-called “traditional” bases of jurisdiction.

Prior to 1945, the Supreme Court limited the constitutional scope of personal jurisdiction to four traditional bases: (1) presence, (2) domicile or status, (3) in rem, and (4) consent. Courts and litigants stretched the use and boundaries of each of these categories to reach non-resident defendants and establish jurisdiction over businesses whose “location” was difficult to determine. In 1945, the Supreme Court introduced the minimum contacts test in *International Shoe*, which uses a defendant’s contacts with the forum state as an additional constitutionally acceptable basis for jurisdiction. The subsequent struggles to define the nature and sufficiency of minimum contacts are well-known. However, the scope of the minimum contacts test itself has also been a source of contention. *International Shoe* and its progeny concerned the use of minimum contacts to gain personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants who were formerly unreachable under the traditional jurisdictional bases. But *International Shoe* was silent on the question of whether the minimum contacts test applied to all exercises of jurisdiction, or only those long-arm statutes that did not use a traditional jurisdictional predicate. It is in this silence that the relationship between forum selection clauses and minimum contacts got lost.

More than three decades into the minimum contacts era, the Supreme Court began a piecemeal consideration of whether minimum contacts applies to the traditional bases of jurisdiction as well as to the modern era long-arm statutes. The use of intangible property as a basis for quasi in rem jurisdiction forced the first reckoning with the applicability of minimum contacts to personal jurisdiction outside of in personam exercises. In *Shaffer v. Heitner*, the Court held that the minimum contacts test applies to the use of the second type of quasi in

rem jurisdiction. Justice Marshall reasoned that the potential for attenuated contact between the non-resident property owner and a forum state called into question the “continued soundness of the conceptual structure” of treating traditional bases of jurisdiction as standing outside of minimum contacts analysis. This opened the door to the question of whether other traditional bases were subject to minimum contacts. The 1991 decision in *Burnham v. Superior Court of California* concerned the outer constitutional bounds of transient or “presence” jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held in a 9–0 decision that California could constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant, but the Court split 4–4 on the reasoning. Justice Scalia relied upon the nineteenth century understanding of transient jurisdiction as “among the most firmly established principles of personal jurisdiction in American tradition.” While the minimum contacts test relaxed the rigid *Pennoyer* framework, it did not mean that transient jurisdiction was “itself no longer sufficient to establish jurisdiction.” Rather, “jurisdiction based on physical presence alone constitutes due process because it is one of the continuing traditions

134 In rem jurisdiction stems from the same principles of state territorial sovereign power as in personam jurisdiction. The state has sovereign power over the disposition of property within its borders. This includes attaching property to adjudicate its status or disposition. These suits came to be known as in rem and the first type of quasi in rem suits. See Karen Nelson Moore, *Procedural Due Process in Quasi In Rem Actions After Shaffer v. Heitner*, 20 WM. & MARY L. REV. 157, 171–72 (1978) (distinguishing the two types of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction and stating that one type involves the attachment of property in the forum state that is completely unrelated to the claims of the plaintiff as long as “the plaintiff seeks to apply what he concedes to be the property of the defendant to the satisfaction of a claim against him” (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 n.12 (1958))). The second type of quasi in rem jurisdiction involves attaching property within the forum state because of its potential use in satisfying a judgment on a claim wholly unrelated to the property itself, the theory being that if the defendant is liable to the plaintiff, the state has the power to adjudicate the “status” of property located within the forum state as “belonging” to the plaintiff. See 4A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & ADAM N. STEINMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1070, at 441–42 (4th ed. 2015) (“[J]urisdiction also could be asserted in rem or quasi-in-rem by predicating the court’s ability to proceed on the basis of its power over the defendant’s local property or status relationships, rather than on the basis of the presence of the defendant himself.”); Matthew P. Harrington, *Rethinking In Rem: The Supreme Court’s New (and Misguided) Approach to Civil Forfeiture*, 12 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 281, 286 (1994) (“The purpose of the action in *rem* is to declare status . . . . [T]he court is asked to recognize a change in the status of [the property’s] ownership.”).  

135 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 196 (1977). “The fiction that an assertion of jurisdiction over property is anything but an assertion of jurisdiction over the owner of the property supports an ancient form without substantial modern justification.” *Id.* at 212.  


137 *Id.* at 610.  

138 *Id.* at 619.
of our legal system that define the due process standard.” Justice Brennan rejected this categorical approach, writing instead that “all rules of jurisdiction, even ancient ones, must satisfy contemporary notions of due process.”

The tacit assumption about the remaining traditional bases of jurisdiction is that they were conceptually shielded from serious constitutional challenges. In rem and the first type of quasi in rem use forum-state property that is also the subject of the lawsuit as a predicate for jurisdiction, thus the chances that the defendant-owner has no purposeful contacts with the forum state are remote. That leaves consent as the last unexamined traditional basis of jurisdiction. Courts have viewed consent as akin to in rem or the first type of quasi in rem jurisdiction: the basis of jurisdiction itself requires such a direct and purposeful connection to both the lawsuit and the forum that a formal minimum contacts analysis would be redundant. Since the Supreme Court’s 1991 *Carnival Cruise* decision, courts have upheld forum selection clauses against consumers or other parties who have “consented” to the forum via a boilerplate agreement that they may neither read nor comprehend. At no point, however, has the Court even considered whether a *Shaffer* or *Burnham*-style analysis is in order.

**B. Possible Conceptual Frameworks**

Despite a lack of formal engagement with the question of whether consent-based jurisdictional predicates should fall under minimum contacts, courts have rendered numerous opinions from which three possible approaches emerge. There is universal agreement among the courts that a forum selection clause may provide a valid basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction. The decisions in support of this proposition, however, lack a cohesive conceptual grounding. Courts splinter over the constitutional terms in which the test is couched, disagreeing on whether and how the test relates to the minimum contacts doctrine. This stems from the broader conundrum of

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139 *Id.*

140 *Id.* at 630 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).

141 See *Shaffer v. Heitner*, 433 U.S. 186, 208 (1977) (“[J]urisdiction over many types of actions which now are or might be brought in rem would not be affected by a holding that any assertion of state-court jurisdiction must satisfy the *International Shoe* standard.”).

142 While the merits of enforcing boilerplate clauses against consumers are beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that in skating past the minimum contacts question for consent, courts may be assuming a higher degree of purposeful conduct than is warranted for a basis of jurisdiction shielded from minimum contacts.

characterizing consent as a form of minimum contact or as a phenomenon with its own due process grounding that stands outside of minimum contacts. There are, broadly speaking, three approaches. The first holds that the enforcement of a forum selection clause should be analyzed as part of the minimum contacts inquiry. The second frames the issue through the lens of consent. The third posits that this basis for personal jurisdiction exists outside the due process framework altogether.

1. Consent as Minimum Contacts

Some courts apply a minimum contacts framework to the enforcement of forum selection clauses against non-signatories.144 These courts pair this with a tacit understanding that a valid forum selection clause satisfies the minimum contacts test in and of itself.145 Under this approach, any party bound by a forum selection clause is seen to automatically have minimum contacts with the forum state. The purpose of the closely-related-and-foreseeable test, on this account, is to establish which parties are bound to the forum selection clause, regardless of signatory status, and the status of a bound party is the totality of minimum contacts analysis. Courts applying this approach have reached different conclusions about the application of a forum selection clause to non-signatory defendants. Other courts have expressly rejected minimum contacts as a basis for application of the closely-related-and-foreseeable test, noting that “it seems safe to conclude that the doctrine is not based on minimum contacts, since it makes no use of the forum state’s long-arm statute and does not examine the constitutionally required minimum contacts with the forum.”146 What is worth noting is that courts taking this approach are the most likely to conclude that a non-signatory defendant is not bound by a forum selection clause in situations where it otherwise lacks minimum contacts with the forum.147 This constitutes a minority position in a world where application of the closely-related-and-foreseeable test frequently results in a finding that a non-signatory is bound to the forum selection clause and thus subject to the personal jurisdiction of the forum state.

146 M3 USA Corp., 2021 WL 2322753, at *11.
2. Consent as Due Process

The second approach posits that the minimum contacts analysis is unnecessary when a forum selection clause chooses a particular jurisdiction. This emanates from the general proposition that “[d]ue process is satisfied when a defendant consents to personal jurisdiction by entering into a contract that contains a valid forum selection clause,”148 or that the use of a forum selection clause indicates a “waive[r]” of minimum contacts.149 Courts have held that “[a]n express consent to jurisdiction . . . satisfies the requirements of Due Process . . . and an analysis of minimum contacts becomes unnecessary.”150

This framing of forum selection clauses—that they exist within due process but outside of minimum contacts—is premised on the idea that the defendant has agreed to submit itself to the power of the forum state and has waived the right to raise a due process defense. Courts that rely on this approach to explain the relationship of non-signatories to the enforceability of forum selection clauses do so by eliding the contract question with the constitutional question. Recall that many of the cases involving non-signatories do not raise obvious constitutional questions, namely, those situations in which a non-signatory plaintiff or defendant seeks to enforce the clause against a signatory. In both instances, the presumption is that there are no other due process barriers to exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendant who is either already subject to the court’s jurisdiction or has expressly consented by appearing in the action and not challenging the court’s personal jurisdiction. Thus, courts develop doctrines to explain when parties are bound by a forum selection clause without stopping to consider whether the question of the waiver of a constitutional right or consent to jurisdiction requires an additional set of doctrinal tools.

3. Consent as Conceptually Outside of Due Process

The last, and perhaps most startling, approach is to hold that forum selection clauses stand outside of due process constitutional analysis altogether. These courts have announced that “[w]hen parties choose a particular forum, their selection will be enforced without the need to engage in traditional personal jurisdiction analysis, including determining whether constitutional due process requirements have

been met,” 151 or that, “[w]here an agreement contains a valid and enforceable forum selection clause, it is not necessary to analyze jurisdiction under . . . federal constitutional requirements of due process.” 152 This puts non-resident, non-signatory parties to a forum selection clause on exceptionally precarious constitutional footing. Courts enforcing forum selection clauses against signatories generally refer to the due process grounding for such enforcement. 153 And, as we shall see, even non-residents served pursuant to transient jurisdiction principles are not thought to be outside of personal jurisdiction due process protection. 154 This approach would leave non-signatories in roughly the same constitutional position as foreign sovereigns who are not protected by due process because they are not considered “persons” within the meaning of the Constitution. 155

Other courts simply do not mention due process at all. While they avoid proclamations that due process is inapplicable, they omit any reference to either minimum contacts or due process, and instead analyze the closely-related-and-foreseeable test as if it were its own constitutionally sufficient criteria without directly invoking either a minimum contacts framework or a due process consent framework. 156 These due-process-sidelining approaches stem from the fact that the closely-related-and-foreseeable test has applications entirely outside of personal jurisdiction. For example, the test is useful when a non-signatory defendant seeks to invoke the clause against a signatory plaintiff, 157 or when parties do not challenge the personal jurisdiction of the court over the defendant, but seek a change of venue, a remand from federal to state court, or a dismissal based on forum non conveniens. Minimum contacts and due process are not relevant to these doctrines, so omission of these constitutional doctrines from the opinions is expected. The problems begin when analysis that is necessarily devoid of due process inquiry migrates into challenges to

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153 See supra Section III.A.


157 See supra subsection I.C.1.
forum selection clause enforcement that include challenges to the personal jurisdiction of the forum state. That is the point at which jurisdiction-granting forum selection clauses appear to be an exception to due process altogether, a position that is, at best, constitutionally questionable.

B. The Case for Minimum Contacts

1. Protecting Non-Signatory Defendants

In our view, the question of whether a forum selection clause provides a basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction over a non-signatory defendant should be evaluated through the lens of minimum contacts. The primary advantage of subjecting forum selection clauses to the minimum contacts standard is that it would impose some discipline on the fractured factual and legal landscape of forum selection clause enforcement against non-signatories. It must be noted, however, that the minimum contacts test itself is a difficult and convoluted set of doctrines. To bring forum selection clause enforcement under the minimum contacts umbrella would not be an instant cure-all for the knotty problems that courts face. It would, however, force courts to nominally treat all non-resident, non-signatory parties equally without letting forum selection clauses become a ticket to nearly unlimited exercises of jurisdiction so long as the plaintiff can show a modicum of foreseeability on the part of the defendant.

Indeed, defendants who are non-signatories to forum selection clauses are quite possibly the least protected litigants with respect to personal jurisdiction in the modern doctrinal landscape. They are not afforded the generic application of consent-as-due-process given to signatories. They do not benefit from the ever-narrowing world of permissible minimum contacts that govern the jurisdiction of non-resident defendants in ordinary litigation. They receive even less solicitude than resident plaintiffs whose interests in suing at home are at least nominally accounted for under the World-Wide Volkswagen fairness factors.158 In the most alarming framing, these defendants are on par with the “non-persons” who fall outside of constitutional protection altogether.159 Of course, not every non-signatory defendant finds itself in dire straits. Plenty of these parties would meet other criteria for jurisdiction in the forum state. But the assumption of constitutionality without a deeper structured analysis is troubling. If the question of whether a non-signatory is subject to personal

159 See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
jurisdiction on the basis of a forum selection clause is analyzed through the lens of minimum contacts, many of these issues fall away.

2. Plugging the Due Process Cracks

Courts have failed to rigorously and systematically address the due process and minimum contacts dimensions of forum selection clauses. By letting forum selection clauses fall by the wayside, courts have created a constitutional gray zone for certain litigants. Non-signatories against whom the closely-related-and-foreseeable test is applied are often parties who would not be bound to a contract, or even the remainder of the relevant contract, by ordinary contract principles. Although the binding of signatories to contracts of adhesion is still a subject of heated academic debate, the doctrine is quite clear—signatories may be bound to contracts of adhesion, and this principle extends far beyond forum selection clauses into all aspects of contractual enforcement.\textsuperscript{160} Thus, even though it may be worth urging courts to eventually reconsider the efficacy and fairness of consenting to jurisdiction via adhesion contracts, one can at least say that forum selection clause signatories are not singled out for a type of consent that would be unacceptable when applied to other aspects of a contract.

Unlike the implied or indirect forms of consent such as registration statutes, courts have assumed that forum selection clauses are rock solid examples of express consent. Having decided, for better or for worse, that forum selection clauses are enforceable, even in contracts of adhesion or other situations in which litigants had questioned the meaningfulness of a signatory’s consent,\textsuperscript{161} courts assumed that the constitutional questions about forum selection clauses were all but answered. A minimum contacts analysis would be unhelpful or duplicative. Without a coherent theory of consent and without the backstop of minimum contacts, non-signatories to forum

\textsuperscript{160} We do not endorse this doctrinal stance from a policy perspective, but simply note its pervasive existence as a doctrine of contract law that can be used to bind parties to an entire agreement.

selection clauses have fallen through the due process cracks. It is time for courts to begin analyzing forum selection clause personal jurisdiction based within this framework.\footnote{Although it might also make sense to locate the larger category of consent within minimum contacts, we reserve a more thorough exploration of this question for future work.}

The difference in treatment between these two categories of defendants is not the result of superficial analysis or benign neglect. Rather, it is part and parcel of the Supreme Court's fractured approach to the due process limits on the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Forum selection clauses lie at the unstable and unresolved crossroads of traditional bases of personal jurisdiction and due process, an issue that is part of a larger question of whether and how consent to jurisdiction fits into a minimum-contacts due process framework. The dominant approaches to the personal jurisdiction aspect of forum selection clause enforcement reflect courts' tacit assumptions about the force of forum selection clauses together with a failure to fully analyze the relationship between traditional bases of jurisdiction and the minimum contacts test. Courts have mostly (although not unanimously) assumed that a presumptively valid forum selection clause is such an uncomplicated connection to the forum state that the only remaining analytical questions concern whether the non-signatories are bound by the clause. While we argue that this approach is mistaken, it is the logical extension of the evolution of post--International Shoe due process jurisprudence.

Applying the minimum contacts doctrine to forum selection clauses is an easy extension of the existing doctrinal framework. As Shaffer and the Brennan plurality opinion in Burnham show, the Supreme Court has already held that traditional bases of jurisdiction beyond the modern long-arm statutes can be subject to minimum contacts scrutiny. And the phenomenon of forum selection clauses themselves suggest that Justice Scalia's reasoning in Burnham is less forceful here. One reason that the Scalia plurality believed that transient jurisdiction should not be subject to minimum contacts was that transient jurisdiction's "validation is its pedigree."\footnote{Burnham v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 621 (1990).} In Burnham, Justice Scalia distinguished Shaffer by arguing that the quasi in rem sequestration proceeding was a "new procedure[], hitherto unknown" which requires minimum contacts analysis.\footnote{Id. at 622.}

Forum selection clauses, like the sequestration of stock whose situs is determined by statute, likewise lack a long historical pedigree; the use and enforcement of these provisions only gained traction in the post–World War II period when courts began to let go of the "ouster"
doctrines that had, until that point, prohibited parties from making agreements that would “oust” a court of its power or jurisdiction.\(^{165}\) And as we have shown in this Article, the enforcement of forum selection clauses against non-signatories is an even more recent phenomenon, dating back to the early 1980’s. Forum selection clauses, being mostly unused and unenforceable in the pre- and post-*Pennoyer* eras, cannot be said to be a part of an ancient and historical form of consent that was a traditional basis of jurisdiction.

Instead, the quandary of enforcing forum selection clauses mirrors the factual world that the Court encountered in *Shaffer*. Most exercises of in rem jurisdiction appeared to be connected to the forum in some obvious or tangible way, and allowing states to exercise jurisdiction over the disposition of property within its borders did not strike most jurists as intuitively unfair. But for the small subset of cases in which plaintiffs used intangible property to reach distant, non-resident defendants, the Court concluded that the minimum contacts test could act as functional backstop.

The same can be said of forum selection clauses. For one thing, applying a minimum contacts test would not alter the Court’s current position regarding the enforcement of forum selection clauses as to signatories. Forum selection clauses have been enforced both in terms of conceptualizing consent as a *waiver* of the due process objection,\(^{166}\) but also as itself a meaningful, purposeful contact with the forum state. One way to preserve the waiver aspect of forum selection clauses would be to subject *only* non-signatories to the minimum contacts test.

Minimum contacts should be sufficient to maintain the status quo regarding signatories so long as courts continue to uphold contracts of adhesion writ large as enforceable. *Shaffer* itself contained a broad endorsement of tacit consent, noting that Delaware could have solved this problem by incorporating implied consent into its statutes regarding the fiduciary duties of corporate directors and officers.\(^{167}\) Bringing forum selection clauses within the minimum contacts fold might prompt some judges to reconsider whether such contracts really represent purposeful and voluntary forum-directed contacts. For those advocates interested in expanding plaintiffs’ jurisdictional


\(^{166}\) See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 n.14 (1985) (“[T]he personal jurisdiction requirement is a waivable right . . . . particularly in the commercial context, parties frequently stipulate in advance to submit their controversies for resolution within a particular jurisdiction.” (citing Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315–16 (1964))).

opportunities, this doctrinal foot-in-the-door would be a welcome change. But without broad, concomitant changes to contract law, courts are unlikely to categorically rethink the enforceability of forum selection clauses against signatories. Thus, skeptics should be reassured that an application of minimum contacts doctrine would be unlikely to disturb the doctrinal landscape as to forum selection clauses generally—any changes to this status quo would likely be part and parcel of a much larger revolution in prohibiting parties from using private contracts to alter procedural rights.168

To illustrate, consider again the scenario of non-signatories to a departing employee’s non-compete or confidentiality agreement. In some situations, the agreement contains a forum selection clause that has little to do with the contract, its parties, or its performance.169 As the Fair Isaac case discussed earlier shows, the fact that a defendant “knows” of a forum selection clause in the contract does not evince any targeted behavior toward the forum state that would count as a minimum contact but for the forum selection clause. But in other situations, the forum selection clause can act as a bridge of purposeful conduct to the forum. For example, in C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. v. FLS Transportation, Inc.,170 several former employees of C.H. Robinson were alleged to have wrongfully used Robinson’s confidential information in breach of their confidentiality agreements, all of which contained a forum selection clause for Minnesota. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant, FLS, “told the[] former employees that ‘... in the event legal action is commenced FLS will support and defend’ them.”171 Here, the closely-related-and-foreseeable test allowed the court to point to several aspects of FLS’s employment of the former Robinson employees as evidence that FLS was closely related to the dispute and the contract. But had the court also stopped to consider minimum contacts, it could have found that FLS’s promises to defend the employees constituted the sort of targeted forum conduct that truly tied FLS to Minnesota, as any lawsuits against the employees would necessarily be brought in that forum. Moreover, C.H. Robinson

168 The forum selection clause non-signatory is analogous to the intangible property owner in Shaffer. These are less common situations, but not so unusual that they should be ignored for constitutional purposes. And even here, the minimum contacts test would not demand a total reversal with respect to enforcing forum selection clauses against non-signatories. In many instances, a forum selection clause is a meaningful contact with the forum state with which non-resident, non-signatory defendants interact. In any number of cases, the business that these non-signatories undertake with signatory parties, or with respect to contracts and agreements that contain forum selection clauses, will indicate targeted conduct toward the forum state and purposeful availment of the forum.

169 See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text.

170 772 N.W.2d 528 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009).

171 Id. at 533.
itself was located in Minnesota, so a minimum contacts analysis would give the plaintiff room to argue that FLS directed its harm toward the plaintiff where it was located and did business. The problem with the closely-related-and-foreseeable test is that it puts *C.H. Robinson* on exactly the same footing as *Fair Isaac*, even though these cases would be treated quite differently had a forum selection clause not been in the mix.

3. Improving Minimum Contacts

We also believe that minimum contacts *itself* might have something to learn from the closely-related-and-foreseeable test. The test’s greatest due process failing is the way in which it singles out the presence of a forum selection clause as the reason to extend a far longer arm from the forum state to a non-resident defendant who has some entanglement with the parties who have initiated suit. But the rhythm and tone of many of the closely-related-and-foreseeable decisions should sound oddly familiar to the generations of lawyers who have struggled with the ebbs and flows of minimum contacts. It is the sound of the test that jurists like Justice Brennan have always wanted but could never quite achieve.172

To demand parity for forum selection clause non-signatories is not to unquestioningly doom them to the same unforgiving minimum contacts standard that has dominated personal jurisdiction for at least the past three decades. It is, instead, to invite judges and commentators to consider how persuasive the reasoning in the closely-related-and-foreseeable test can be. It centers litigation efficiency and the interests of the plaintiff in filing a lawsuit in a single and predictable forum. It often focuses on a common sense understanding of the defendant’s conduct toward the plaintiff and the situation without demanding “forum-directed” conduct that makes little sense.

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172 While this Article has identified the key doctrines and dimensions to non-signatory enforcement and articulated the need to bring these tests within a coherent due process minimum contacts framework, our analysis also demonstrates the potential for extending these arguments beyond forum selection clauses. For example, a renewed interest in corporate registration statutes has shown the limits of efforts to extract a business’s consent to jurisdiction, with most courts holding that such consent cannot form the basis of general jurisdiction. *See Monestier, supra note 5.* Should courts adopt a minimum contacts approach to forum selection clauses, it will be necessary to think about the broader category of consent and how it fits into a coherent due process framework. Likewise, thinking carefully about the non-signatory problem in forum selection clauses provides fertile ground for developing new arguments about the application and enforceability of arbitration clauses by and against non-signatories. We hope to explore these problems in future work.
in a national economy. It is a mode of analysis that should have its own gravitational force with regard to minimum contacts.

CONCLUSION

At the outset of this Article, we identified a deep and abiding tension between litigation efficiency, on the one hand, and personal autonomy and due process, on the other, when courts are called upon to determine whether a non-signatory is bound by a forum selection clause. After briefly reviewing traditional doctrines of agency and contract law, we chronicled the rise of a new test—the closely-related-and-foreseeable test—that the courts apply exclusively to determine the rights and obligations of non-signatories with respect to forum selection clauses. The propriety of relying on this test, we argued, varies depending upon who is invoking the clause and for what purpose. When the test is invoked by a non-signatory, there is no problem. When the test is invoked against a non-signatory, however, it has the potential to come into conflict with values such as personal autonomy and due process.

We then drew upon this insight to embark on a more general discussion of the law of personal jurisdiction. We argued that cases in which the courts have relied on the closely-related-and-foreseeable test to assert personal jurisdiction over non-signatories are out of step with existing Supreme Court jurisprudence in three respects. First, this test is not concerned with the existence of any connection between the defendant and the forum state. Instead, it focuses exclusively on the relationship between the defendant and the contract containing the forum selection clause. Second, the test places a great deal of weight on a concept—foreseeability—that the Supreme Court has never fully embraced in its personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. Third, the test makes it possible to assert personal jurisdiction over business affiliates in cases where this would not be allowed under the current minimum contacts framework. If the goal is to bring the treatment of contract non-signatories into line with that of out-of-state defendants, the closely-related-and-foreseeable test should be retired.

If the goal is to develop a better law of personal jurisdiction, however, the closely-related-and-foreseeable test actually has a lot to offer. Over the past decade, the Supreme Court has dramatically cut back on the ability of courts to assert personal jurisdiction over a wide range of corporate defendants. These decisions have attracted extensive scholarly criticism. The reasoning in the cases applying the closely-related-and-foreseeable test offers a heretofore unappreciated way forward. If consent were to be brought within the minimum contacts framework, and if the more flexible test embodied in the closely-related-and-foreseeable test were to be applied to cases that do
not involve forum selection clauses and non-signatory defendants, the law of personal jurisdiction would (in our view) be the better for it.