Municipal Bonds: In the Shadow of an Underfunded Pension Crisis, Puerto Rico, and a Low Interest Rate Environment

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I. INTRODUCTION

With the United States stock market continuing to reach all-time highs and multiple foreign countries’ interest rates at a negative yield, many leading economists predict a recession in the coming years. This fear has caused domestic and international investors to search for security and safety in their portfolio holdings. Investment safety usually comes in the form of low-yield securities. These securities often include

2. Eshe Nelson, $12 Trillion of Negative-Yielding Bonds Are Sending a Clear Message of Distress, Q UARTZ (June 19, 2019), https://qz.com/1647791/12-trillion-of-negative-yielding-bonds-are-a-distress-signal/ (explaining that “[a]lmost $12 trillion of investment grade corporate and government bonds have negative yields” and “half of all European government bonds have a negative yield”).
municipal bonds. Municipal bond investment is meant to shield investors from the strains of global markets and depressed economic output. However, this shield of investment safety has underlying cracks emanating from an underfunded pension crisis in some cities and states.

As the fear of an economic slowdown continued to rise in 2019, the demand for bonds skyrocketed. In some cases, investors put in orders for 5.5 times the amount of bonds a municipality was issuing. The increasing demand for yield among investors allowed corporations,

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9. See Jessica Menton, Investors Pour Money into Bond Funds at a Record Pace, WALL ST. J. (July 25, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/investors-pour-money-into-bond-funds-at-a-record-pace-11564056000 [https://perma.cc/DJD9-ETVV] (“Investors are piling into safe-haven bonds at a record pace, a sign that caution remains despite stocks pushing toward records.”).


11. Menton, supra note 9; see Aaron Weitzman, At This Pace, It’s ‘Impossible’ for Issuance to Catch Up with Demand, BOND BUYER (Jan. 10, 2020, 3:14 PM), https://www.bondbuyer.com/news/at-this-pace-its-impossible-for-issuance-to-catch-up-with-demand [https://perma.cc/W2T4-F3ZU] (“Demand for municipal bonds is actually much stronger so far in 2020 than it was to end 2019, illustrated by record inflows into the asset class in the latest reporting week.”).

12. See, e.g., Alexandra Scaggs, Municipal Bonds Are in High Demand and Short Supply. Where Investors Should Look, BARRONS (June 21, 2019, 5:32 PM), https://www.barrons.com/articles/municipal-bonds-demand-supply-51561152617 [https://perma.cc/3S3C-3MJM] (explaining in a bond sale for the East Bay Municipal Utility District the “tallied up orders” were 5.5 times “the amount of the bonds on offer”).

universities,14 and municipalities15 to sell bonds earning record low interest rates.16 These factors have cumulatively blinded municipal bond investors to the growing risk of cities’ and states’ underfunded pension plans17 that may affect their municipal investments.18 Investors need to consider the risk of a pension crisis among states or municipalities that are unable to meet the obligations of their pension plans without defaulting on their bond debt.19

Proceeding in six parts, this Note examines the implications of underfunded pensions and past municipal bankruptcies on the safety of municipal bond investments and argues that investors inadequately consider this risk when buying municipal bonds. Part II provides background information on the municipal bond market.20 Part III examines the proliferation of underfunded pensions among the states and the implications of this trend.21 Part IV assesses the role of underfunded pensions in undermining the safety of municipal bond investments in two of the most significant municipal bankruptcy filings in the last two decades.22 Part V discusses the two states, New Jersey and Illinois, which are currently facing sizeable underfunded pension obligations and low


15. See, e.g., id. (“Miami-Dade County, Fla., sold almost $400 million in bonds in August for Miami International Airport . . . swapping old debt for taxable debt . . . saved money.”).

16. See id. (“Bankers and analysts said they are expecting issuance to remain strong in coming months.”).


20. See infra Part II.

21. See infra Part III.

22. See infra Part IV.
municipal bond ratings, resembling the conditions in other bankrupt municipalities.  

23. See infra Part V.

24. See infra Part VI.


27. Id.


29. Scaggs, supra note 12.


31. Id.

32. Id.
A. Types of Municipal Bonds

The two most commonly issued municipal bonds are general obligation (“GO”) bonds and special revenue bonds. When a municipality issues a GO bond, it is typically backed by the “full faith and credit” of the issuer. GO bonds are not entitled to post-petition interest and are treated as unsecured claims, which may be impaired during a bankruptcy hearing. When a bankruptcy court issues an automatic stay, it almost always applies to GO bondholders. An alternative type of bond, making up one-third of the municipal market, is the special revenue bond. Special revenue bonds are secured or backed by a specific revenue stream from a public project or entity. Some revenue bonds are non-recourse, which means if the bond’s revenue stream the bond is backed by no longer produces income, the municipality is not required to pay the bondholders.

A growing trend for municipalities is to secure some GO bonds with statutory liens that tie them to a specific sales tax. These bonds

34. Id.
36. The automatic stay applied in Chapter 9 bankruptcy proceedings stops all collection actions against the debtor and its property upon the filing of the petition. 11 U.S.C. § 922(a) (2018).
37. WELCH, KROOP & DAHL, supra note 35.
40. UNDERSTANDING CREDIT RISK, supra note 33.
41. See, e.g., Karen Pierog, Chicago Mayor Eyes Big Bond Refunding to Save $200 Million for Budget, REUTERS (Oct. 21, 2019, 5:46 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chicago-bonds/chicago-mayor-eyes-big-bond-refunding-to-save-200-million-for-budget-idUSKBN1X02CC [https://perma.cc/7KR7-2AFY] (explaining Chicago—in an attempt to balance its great deficit—issued subordinate lien bonds that gave investors a statutory lien on the city’s sales tax in order to receive an investment-grade rating).
allow the municipality to back the bonds with a statutory requirement paid out directly from the annual budget. GO bonds that are backed by statutory liens may be treated as secured claims and therefore are not cut off from post-petition interest. A municipality will issue GO bonds with higher protections to receive a better bond rating and, in turn, a lower interest rate because of the safety the statutory lien gives to the bondholder. The trend of issuing bonds with enhanced protections may seem to be in the bondholders’ interest, but it can indicate a municipality’s poor financial condition since the municipality gives up dedicated tax revenue streams.

B. Default Rate and Bond Ownership

The apparent safety of municipal bonds for investors is wrapped up in the historically low default rate. The municipality default rate of investment-grade bonds has consistently held at 0.8%. Non-

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43. Id. at iii.

44. See Nat’l Ass’n of Bond Holders, General Obligation Bond Payments: Statutory Liens and Related Disclosures 8 (Dec. 2017), https://www.nfma.org/assets/documents/RBP/wp_statliens_final_dec2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Z83-HAAW] ("The presence of a statutory lien influences the decisions of the various market participants, and is particularly important in the case of obligors with weaker credit profiles or an increased risk of defaulting or entering into bankruptcy.").

45. See, e.g., Martin Z. Braun, Once-Safest Muni Bonds Tainted as Investors Await Downgrades, Bloomberg (June 20, 2018, 8:28 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-20/once-safest-muni-bonds-tarnished-as-investors-await-downgrades [https://perma.cc/FLF7-NG8K] (explaining that Illinois issuance of sales tax bonds continue to take a hit due to the state’s financial health); see also Chung, supra note 28, at 1482 (“Municipal securities issuers also depend upon different, and less elastic, sources of funds for debt repayment.”).

46. See Chung, supra note 28, at 1460–61 ("Municipal securities are marketed to investors as ‘widow and orphan’ securities—i.e., safe for vulnerable and risk averse investors—because state and local government issuers rarely default or obtain discharge.").

47. James Chen, Investment Grade, Investopedia, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/investmentgrade.asp [https://perma.cc/FNC5-SP7Q] (last updated July 15, 2019) (explaining that investment grade bonds are rated as low as BBB- or Baa and indicate a lower risk of credit default).

investment grade municipal bonds have had a default rate of approximately 7.94%. Although the default rates are low, they do not accurately reflect the market risk and health of municipalities. Many cities cannot file for bankruptcy without permission and, if available, can only seek Chapter 9 bankruptcy to restructure debts. This inability to restructure debt outside of bankruptcy has skewed the default rate positively without taking into account the inner workings of a state’s attempt to illustrate health by shifting the burden of bond repayment to the taxpayers in order to maintain the status quo and investment-grade ratings of the state’s respective bonds.

Municipal bonds are owned by households, nonprofit organizations, mutual and closed-end funds, banks, broker-dealers, and exchange-traded funds. Households and nonprofits hold the most exposure to municipal bonds, with most citizens buying their state municipal bonds because of the bonds’ tax exempt status. Mutual funds carry the second-largest exposure to municipal bonds, followed by banks in third. Therefore, any municipal bond default will likely have an impact across financial sectors.

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49. What does Investment Grade Mean?, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/what-does-investment-grade-mean/ (explaining that non-investment grade bonds are risky assets and the probability of the issuer repaying the debt is “speculative”).

50. Kenny, supra note 48 (“From 1970-2011, 7.94% of below-investment-grade municipal bonds defaulted.”).


52. See Municipal Bankruptcy State Laws, GOVERNING, https://www.governing.com/gov-data/state-municipal-bankruptcy-laws-policies-map.html (outlining the various bankruptcy laws among the states); Vaneeta Chintamaneni, The Unraveling of an American City: Pensions, Municipal Debt, and Chapter 9 Bankruptcy, 22 ELDER L.J. 523, 539–40 (2015) (“In 1994, Congress amended Chapter 9 so that eligibility for Chapter 9 was required to be ‘specifically authorized,’ which means that states must explicitly permit Chapter 9 bankruptcy for cities to be eligible.”).


54. See Chintamaneni, supra note 52, at 539–40. (explaining municipalities are only allowed to file for chapter 9 bankruptcy, no other form of restructuring is available).

55. See Chung, supra note 28, at 1462. (“[Municipal bond] default risk does not tell the whole story for issuers and taxpayers, because it does not capture risks and costs that issuers and taxpayers incur to keep default and discharge rates low.”).


57. Id.; see Baldridge, supra note 30 (explaining tax-benefits of municipal bonds).

58. MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD., supra note 56, at 2.

59. See id. (showing the various stakeholders of municipal bonds).
C. Changing Landscape for Banks’ Municipal Bond Ownership

In the current low interest rate environment, some banks are preparing for the possibility that United States’ Federal Reserve interest rate will reach zero. President Donald J. Trump is a proponent of a zero-rate. This forces banks to find substitute sources of revenue to compensate for the smaller interest they receive on loans. Many banks are turning to non-interest dependent fees such as ATM fees, overcharge fees, and monthly service fees to provide a more stable source of income. These fees, along with others, could alienate some customers. Municipal bonds can provide an alternative source of income and healthy returns to banks with limited risk, especially in light of an amendment to liquidity rules.

On August 22, 2018, the three Federal Banking agencies—The Office of Comptroller of Currency, the Federal Reserve Board, and the

60. James Chen, Low Interest Rate Environment Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/low-interest-rate-environment.asp [https://perma.cc/8MRJ-YMZN] (last updated Apr. 26, 2019) (“A low interest rate environment occurs when the risk-free rate of interest, typically set by a central bank, is lower than the historic average for a prolonged period of time. In the United States, the risk-free rate is generally defined by the interest rate on Treasury securities.”).


62. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 11, 2019, 3:42 AM) https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1171735691769929728 [https://perma.cc/XC86-29CY] (“The Federal Reserve should get our interest rates down to ZERO, or less, and we should then start to refinance our debt . . . .”).

63. See Irina Ivanova, Bank Fees Around the U.S. Climb to Record Highs, CBS (Oct. 2, 2019, 6:03 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/bank-fees-hit-a-record-high-this-year-2019/ [https://perma.cc/V5YT-76UQ] (“And now that the Fed is lowering interest rates, which affects how much profit banks can make on loans, banks are likely to try adding or raising their fees . . . .”).

64. Id.

65. See Benoit, supra note 61 (“Banks would also have to grapple with whether to charge customers for their deposits without alienating them, a dynamic U.S. consumers and businesses haven’t yet dealt with.”).

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation—jointly adopted a rule that amends the agencies respective liquidity coverage ratio (“LCR”) applied to banks, and will now treat any municipal bond that is both (1) “liquid and readily marketable” and (2) “investment grade” as level 2B high-quality liquid assets (“HQLAs”). The initial rule, which became effective on January 1, 2015, did not consider municipal bonds liquid. The amended rule will allow municipal bonds, as now Level 2B assets, to be discounted at a 50% rate when calculating LCR, meaning if a bank holds $100 in municipal bonds that meet the two-prong criteria, then $50 counts towards the LCR ratio. This regulatory change has made the proper use of municipal bonds an attractive option for safe, partially-liquid income, netting higher interest rates compared to treasuries.

A problem for banks could arise in their lower-rated municipal bond holdings, as there are multiple recent examples of banks’ purchasing bonds from low-rated municipal issuers—Illinois and

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[https://perma.cc/W4FC-5X32].

68. The liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) “refers to the proportion of highly liquid assets held by financial institutions, to ensure their ongoing ability to meet short-term obligations. This ratio is essentially a generic stress test that aims to anticipate market-wide shocks and make sure that financial institutions possess suitable capital preservation, to ride out any short-term liquidity disruptions, that may plague the market.” Chris B. Murphy, Liquid Coverage Ratio, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/liquidity-coverage-ratio.asp [https://perma.cc/Y2Q9-KXUP] (last updated Dec. 12, 2019).

69. Liquid and readily-marketable means “that the security is traded in an active secondary market with: (1) more than two committed market makers; (2) a large number of non-market maker participants on both the buying and selling sides of transactions; (3) timely and observable market prices; and (4) a high trading volume.” 12 C.F.R § 249.3 (2018).

70. Investment grade means “the issuer of a security has an adequate capacity to meet financial commitments under the security for the projected life of the asset or exposure. An issuer has an adequate capacity to meet financial commitments if the risk of default by the obligor is low and the full and timely repayment of principal and interest is expected.” § 1.2(d)


72. Klotz, supra note 66.

73. See 12 C.F.R. Part 249.21(b)(3) (2018) (“The level 2B liquid asset amount equals 50 percent of the fair value of all level 2B liquid assets held by the Board-regulated institution as of the calculation date that are eligible HQLA.”).

74. Klotz, supra note 66.
Chicago—in large quantities. These bonds were rated a notch or two above investment-grade. Banks should weigh the risk of downgrade carefully if the purchase of these bonds are for liquidity purposes because low-rated bonds would likely no longer be eligible as HQLAs if downgraded below “investment grade” status.

Despite the August 2018 beneficial rule for municipal bond ownership, the corporate tax cut in early 2018 combined with the new accounting standard, have decreased banks’ appetite and holdings of municipal bonds sharply. As of the third quarter of 2019, banks’


76. *Illinois & Chicago Bond Sale* supra note 75; *Illinois Bond Sale*, supra note 75.

77. See 12 C.F.R. § 1.2(d) (2018) (explaining the requirements for investment grade securities).


municipal bond ownership continued its decline from its high of $572.6 billion to $469.8 billion.81

III. THE UNDERFUNDED PENSION CRISIS, “ACHILLES HEEL” FOR BOND HOLDERS

States’ underfunded pension liabilities will likely eventually lead to some municipal defaults without intervention.83 In 2017, there was a $1.28 trillion funding gap in pensions.84 On a market basis, the total pension debt in the U.S. is over $5 trillion.85 A healthy pension fund

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81. Id.
82. Data derived from the Federal Reserve as of the third quarter of 2019. Id.
83. See Greg Mennis, Susan Banta, & David Draine, Assessing the Risk of Fiscal Distress for Public Pensions: State Stress Test Analysis 1 (M-RCBG Associate Working Paper Series No. 9, 2018), https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/mrcbg/files/AWP_92_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/GE6L-8LSN] (concluding that public pensions “may be more vulnerable to an economic downturn than they have ever been” and “states like New Jersey and Kentucky, which are severely underfunded, are at high risk of insolvency”).
85. PENSION TRACKER, STAN. INST. FOR ECON. POL’Y. RES., https://us.pensiontracker.org/ [https://perma.cc/V5BC-Z63R] (last visited on Jan. 6, 2020); see Chuck DeVore, 5.2 Trillion of Government Pension Debt Threatens to Overwhelm State Budgets, Taxpayers, FORBES
should be maintained at a funded ratio of at least 80%. In states such as Illinois and New Jersey, however, the pension accounts cover approximately 35% of outstanding pension obligations. Pension plan funding methods help to explain this low ratio.

A. Pension Funding

Public employer pension plans for state and local government workers cover approximately 21 million full and part-time workers. State and local governments sponsor more than 55,000 pension plans state employees are enrolled in. These plans are funded by the employee over his career and by the city or state as administrator of the pension. The pension fund itself is considered an unfunded pension plan because it relies on a continuous stream of revenue from its state or local government sponsor. This form of funding allows the employee’s contributions to go into a single source that makes investments, the earnings from which pay benefits to the employee when he or she retires. The pensions are funded primarily by investment returns, with employer and employee contributions making up less than one-third of


86. See Ellman & Merrett, supra note 10, at 368–69 (“Public pension plans typically are considered to be adequately funded at the 80% level because, ironically enough, public employers are assumed to be more financially stable than private corporations.”); see, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO 08-983T, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT PENSION PLANS: CURRENT STRUCTURE AND FUNDED STATUS 18 (2008) (applying a 80% funded ratio when determining if a pension fund is healthy).

87. See PENSION FUNDING GAP, supra note 84, at 16–17.

88. Ellman & Merrett, supra note 10, at 369.


90. Id.


93. PENSION REQUIREMENTS, supra note 91, at 2.

94. Id. (explaining investments make up approximately 68% of contributions towards a pension fund.).
Therefore, pension funds rely on a healthy market to meet their obligations to retirees.96

At least once every two years,97 actuaries calculate the total cost needed to sustain the pension in full or the Annual Required Contributions (“ARC”).98 The ARC is composed of many factors, with the most influential being the assumed rate of return.99 The assumed rate of return is the rate at which the fund expects to earn on its investments during the year.100 Unlike corporate pension plans regulated by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), there is no regulator for state and local government plans;101 therefore, there is generally no federal legal obligation for the state to make the contributions set by the actuary unless required by state and local law or mandate.102 For this reason, the state may have no obligation to make up

95. Id.


98. Id. at 4, fn. 5 (“[The ARC] is based on a projection of covered payroll for the period to which the ARC will apply. Some employers make contributions based on projected covered payroll; others contribute based on budgeted or actual covered payroll for the year. Any of those measures of covered payroll, consistently applied, is acceptable for calculating annual pension cost and the NPO [net pension obligation], if any.”); see also PENSION REQUIREMENTS, supra note 91, at 2 (“These actuaries calculate the cost associated with new benefits earned in that year (also called the “normal cost”) plus any additional amount that might be required to make up for shortfalls that have developed in the past.”); see generally Ellman & Merrett, supra note 10, at 374–75 (“Unlike the strict accounting rules of private-pension plans, established by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”), GASB is much more flexible.”).

99. See Ellman & Merrett, supra note 10, at 369 (“These funding shortfalls are further compounded in many cases by the unrealistically optimistic assumptions used to calculate funding status in the first place.”).

100. PENSION REQUIREMENTS, supra note 91, at 2.

101. Ellman & Merrett, supra note 10, at 373 (2011) (“Neither ERISA nor the PBGC have any role in the creation, administration, modification, enforcement, or termination of public pension plans.”); see Chung, supra note 28, at 1486 (“The regulatory and financial reporting regimes applicable to municipal securities issuers and municipal securities offerings also make the market less transparent, and more opaque in terms of risk, compared to other market segments.”).

the difference when pension contributions fall short of meeting the funding needs. 103 Pensions become unhealthily underfunded in two ways: (1) when the plan sponsor does not contribute the ARC amount or (2) when the assumed rate of return ends up being above the actual investment return causing a shortfall regardless of the contribution. 104

Regarding the first way, during the 2008 recession, pension assets fell from $3.2 trillion to $2.3 trillion. 105 Since 2008, the majority of states and local governments have fallen short in making their ARC payments to their pension funds, causing remaining obligations for each year to turn into liabilities. 106 Regarding the second way, the overestimation of the assumed rate of return is broadly scrutinized by scholars and market participants. 107 Pension funds may overestimate their assumed rate of return to allow the state or city to make lower contributions in a given year. 108

The funds also use a discount rate 109 equal to the assumed rate of return when calculating the total underfunded status. 110 Therefore, the

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103. See Ellman & Merrett, supra note 10, at 373 (“[F]ederal law generally does not require municipal governments to maintain the funding or report on the funded status of their pension plans.”).

104. See PENSION FUNDING GAP, supra note 84, at 16–17 (explaining ways pension funds begin to become underfunded).

105. PENSION REQUIREMENTS, supra note 91, at 3.

106. Id.

107. See CONFERENCE OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS, THE CASE FOR NEW PENSION ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 12, (May 2019), https://www.ncpers.org/files/The%20Case%20for%20New%20Pension%20Accounting%20Standards_May%202019.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GQZ-XCPW] (“Though there are many finance officers and city council members across the country who have complaints to make about Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) rules, most of these complaints have to do with the issue of funding levels and assumed rates of return.”).

108. See Ellman & Merrett, supra note 10, at 369 (“These funding shortfalls are further compounded in many cases by the unrealistically optimistic assumptions used to calculate funding status in the first place.”); Chintamaneni, supra note 52, at 528 (“In addition, in recent decades municipalities used overly optimistic projections for rates of return and economic forecasts.”).


pension funds are assuming the investment return for the year, typically 7–8%, will continue indefinitely, going against standard financial principles that use a risk-free rate of return. Using the assumed rate of return as the discount rate causes the plan’s overall health to appear better on paper by lowering its total expected liabilities even while many plans continuously fail to meet their set assumed rate of return. In 2019, pension plans expected an average return of 7.25% from their investments, but some realized at least half a percentage point less. Even when pensions met their assumed rate of return, many funds’ liabilities continued to grow.

When pension funds begin to lower their assumed rate of return, which in practice equals their discount rate, the health of the pension

111. See id. (“[S]tandard financial principles of valuation suggest that a stream of future payments should be discounted at a rate which reflects the probability that the payments will be honored (i.e. at a rate reflecting the riskiness of future stream of payment.”); REPORT OF THE STATE BUDGET CRISIS TASK FORCE 16 (St. Budget Crisis Task Force January 2014), https://www.volckeralliance.org/sites/default/files/attachments/state_budget_crisis_task_force.pdf (“Economists and financial analysts generally discount future payments using rates that reflect the risk associated with the promised payments, relative to the broader market. Since most public pension benefits have strong legal protections, the appropriate discount rates should be comparable to other low risk assets.”).

112. See Lenney, Lutz & Sheiner, supra note 110 at 5 (“With lower discount rates, pension debt is typically much larger than stated in annual government accounting statements and most plans are far from being fully pre-funded – i.e. assets are well below the present value of future benefit payments.”); Ellman & Merrett, supra note 10, at 369 (“If more realistic (or at least more conservative) discount rates are used, the underfunding of public-pension plans becomes even more pronounced.”).


117. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Saret, Barbara Zhan & Subhadeep Mitra, Investment Return Assumptions of Public Pension Funds, PENSIONS & INVS. (Mar. 23, 2017, 1:00 AM), https://www.pionline.com/article/20170323/ONLINE/170319953/investment-return-
Each tenth of a percentage point decrease in the assumed rate of return causes an estimated 1–1.5% increase in the total pension obligation, thereby increasing the difference municipalities must reconcile each year. A municipality or state will commonly use two strategies to make up for underfunding in a pension plan: (1) issue more debt to cover the hole, or (2) increase its contributions through its taxing power.

Under the first strategy, some states have turned to a new form of bond, pension obligation bonds (“POBs”), to make up for inadequate contributions or investment returns. States issue POBs to shore up underfunded pension obligations, issuing municipal bonds under the belief that investment returns on the borrowed money will outpace the fixed interest rate on the bond payments. POB issuance has preceded the bankruptcies of Stockton, California; San Bernardino, California; and Puerto Rico. Many experts disfavor this type of issuance, arguing that

assumptions-of-public-pension-funds [https://perma.cc/6749-EEMR] (“The $311 billion California Public Employees’ Retirement System saw its funded status fall four percentage points to 69% and reduced its assumed investment rate of return to 7% from 7.5.


120. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 118 (showing that when the assumed rate of return lowers, as it did in New Jersey, for the pension plan, the obligations for the state or local government sponsor increases).

121. See Brian Chappatta, Pension Obligation Bonds May Soon Have Their Moment, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 10, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-10-10/pension-obligation-bonds-may-soon-have-their-moment [https://perma.cc/ZX9D-5NPT] (predicting pension obligation bonds will likely be used in the future as an alternative to increasing contributions).


123. Id.

municipalities’ assumed investment return rates typically do not exceed the cost of paying back the loan, and the issuance itself reflects the negative health of the issuer. Despite their unsafe nature, distressed municipalities continue to issue POBs to willing buyers.

Under the second strategy, state and local governments typically increase the tax burden of their citizens to help maintain pension funding. Usually, there is only so much a tax base can sustain before a state or city sees citizens leaving at a higher rate than moving in. One repeat of the fiasco that befell Puerto Rico, which issued POBs at the beginning of the 2008 crash—a move that contributed to the commonwealth’s bankruptcy.

125. See Schulze, supra note 124 (“Over the years, returns on POBs have often fallen below the interest rate the state or locality paid to borrow the money, digging the liability hole even deeper.”); Gov’t Fin. Officers Ass’N, Pension Obligation Bonds (Jan. 2015), https://www.gfoa.org/pension-obligation-bonds (“The Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA) recommends that state and local governments do not issue POBs.”).

126. See Alicia Munnell, Jean Puererr Aubry & Mark Cafarelli, An Update on Pension Obligation Bonds, CTR. FOR RETIREMENT RESEARCH BOS. C. (July 2014), https://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/slp_40.pdf (“The results show that governments are more likely to issue POBs if the plan represents a substantial obligation to the government, they have substantial debt outstanding, and they are short of cash...financial pressures play a major role.”); Alicia Munnell, Be Wary of Pension Obligation Bonds, MKT. WATCH (Apr. 15, 2015, 6:01 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/be-wary-of-pension-obligation-bonds-2015-04-15 (“Despite the risks, the data show that the issuance of a POB is driven not by careful planning among well-funded plans or by restructuring for sustainability among underfunded plans but rather by great financial stress among plans that have not been paying their pension bills.”).


of the most common taxes is a property tax, because it is easy for a governor to place. However, it can have a stifling effect on the housing market in the respective area.

B. Pensions’ Investment Concerns

Concerns about the risky investment portfolios of pensions that rely heavily on alternative investments have spanned at least two decades. In the early 2000s, pensions poured large amounts of money into hedge funds. In 2001, the Securities Exchange Commission issued a speech warning stating that pension plans’ movement into hedge funds, presents many reasons to be cautious. These investment concerns dealing with hedge fund investment included conflict of interest, lack of regulation, and lack of transparency.


131. See, e.g., A.K. Thompson, Property Taxes Stunt Chicago’s House Price Growth, FIN. TIMES (July 11, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/c579e7a2-9d88-11e9-9e06-a4640c9feeb [https://perma.cc/M52L-C3WA] (“[A]gents and brokers say the seemingly relentless increase in Chicago’s property taxes in recent years is one of several factors sucking dynamism from the market, which has long struggled to keep pace with other leading US metropolitan areas, such as New York and San Francisco.”).


133. See, e.g., Justin Dini, Off the Beaten Track, INST. INV. MAG. (Apr. 30, 2001), https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b15134g1jpzkpd/off-the-beaten-track [https://perma.cc/E59Q-R2EZ] (outlining the various pensions increasing investments in alternatives including, one of the largest, CalPERS).

134. Royle, supra note 132.

135. Id. (“[T]he nature of hedge fund investments and the relative lack of regulation mandates that you conduct adequate due diligence when considering these types of investments.”).

136. Id. (“Another problem is potential conflicts of interest. Consultants hired to identify hedge fund investments are sometimes involved on some level in servicing the hedge funds they promote.”).

137. Id. (“High debt and secrecy have become parts of the hedge fund culture. Many hedge fund managers make money because they are privy to information others do not have.”).
Some pensions have started to retreat from hedge funds, but from 2007 to 2017, alternative investments in pensions increased from making up 9% to 27% of total assets in public pension investment portfolios. Pension funds’ risky investments and behavior are largely attributed to the severity of their underfunding status and the persistence of low interest rates. The combination of both factors account for an estimated one-third of public pension funds’ total risk, with nearly 12% due to underfunded status alone.

C. The Legal Protections of Pensions

As pensions are pushed towards insolvency by missed contributions, the fund’s obligations to current and future pensioners need to be restructured. Current pensioners, however, have significant protections that inhibit impairment of any future payments. There are four main types of protections given to enrolled pensioners among the states: (1) common-law contractual, (2) common-law contractual and state statutory; (3) state statutory; and (4) state constitutional.

138. See, e.g., Rob Copeland, New Jersey Backs Away from Hedge Funds, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 3, 2016, 6:48 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-jersey-backs-away-from-hedge-funds-1470264516 [https://perma.cc/2M89-WNB4] (“New Jersey’s move is an about-face for a state that had been one of the more enthusiastic proponents of hedge funds, scattering billions of dollars across managers . . . . But the state’s hedge-fund investments collectively were down 3% through the end of May for the calendar year and 6% for the fiscal year.”).


140. Risky investments and behavior are defined as a pension’s choice to invest in risky assets as a “reach-for-yield” that include investments such as real estate and hedge funds. Lu et al., supra note 17, at 1.

141. Id. (“We find that funds on average took more risk when risk-free rates and funding ratios were lower, which is consistent with both the funding ratio and the risk-premia channels.”).

142. Id.

143. Id. at 37 (“On average across states, the risk component associated with underfunding represented about 12 percent of the total risk in 2016.”).

144. See Ellman & Merrett, supra note 10, at 369–70 (“If municipalities are going to solve their financial challenges, addressing these substantial pension liabilities in some fashion will be necessary.”).

145. See Diane L. Dick, Bondholders vs. Retirees in Municipal Bankruptcies: The Political Economy of Chapter 9, 92 AM. BANKR. L.J. 73, 87 (2018) (“In effect, these legal protections mean that public pension plan sponsors are obligated to provide promised benefits whether or not they have adequately funded the plan, and regardless of how plan investments have performed.”).

146. PEW CHARITABLE TRS., LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR STATE PENSION AND RETIREE HEALTH BENEFITS 3 (2019),
Michigan, New York, Illinois, Arizona, New Mexico, Louisiana, and Arkansas have state constitutional provisions which protect pension holders. 147 These state protections should be a concern for investors because courts are unwilling to budge on the interpretation of pension impairments pre-bankruptcy. 148

Alternatively, when a state attempts to reform its pension system for future pensioners and fails, the outcome can tend to lower the credit rating of the state. 149 This failure creates a snowball effect on the cost for future bond issuance because the lower credit rating increases the yield a state will be forced to pay on its bonds. 150 The legal and political safeguards that both maintain pensioners’ benefits and stall reform for future pensioners are important factors to be weighed when investing in municipal bonds. 151

Nevertheless, pension reform is a necessary step to municipal health. 152 It can look different depending on the state, but the trend seems to be similar to the corporate model. 153 One example is in New Jersey, where Governor Stephen Sweeney proposes to allow pensioners to

https://www.pewtrusts.org//media/assets/2019/05/prs_legal_protections_for_state_and_local_pension_and_retiree_medical_benefits_brief_final.pdf [hereinafter LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR PENSIONS].

147. Id.

148. On May 8, 2015, the Illinois Supreme Court unanimously ruled that a pension law meant to scale back pension benefits unconstitutional. See In re Pension Reform Litig., 32 N.E.3d 1, 22 (“The General Assembly may find itself in crisis, but it is a crisis which other public pension systems managed to avoid and, as reflected in the SEC order, it is a crisis for which the General Assembly itself is largely responsible.”). On December 3, 2018 the Kentucky Supreme Court unanimously struck down a pension law meant to reform pensions and lower cost striking a blow against the then-Governor attempt to address underfunded pension concerns. See Bevin v. Commonwealth ex rel. Beshear, 563 S.W.3d 74, 78 (Ky. 2018); see also Dick, supra note 145, at 87 (“Public pensions are famously viewed as “untouchable” outside of bankruptcy.”).


150. Id.

151. See Dick, supra note 145, at 87 (explaining how legal protections create an obligation for the city to pay into the plan regardless of any factor).

152. See Chintamaneni, supra note 52, at 550–51 (“While the fate of public pensions in municipal bankruptcy is uncertain, the need for reform in the operation and protection of public pensions is clear from the growing number of cities with public pension crises.”).

receive traditional pension benefits up to $40,000 of their salary.\(^\text{154}\) After this point, any additional earnings will be placed in a hybrid cash-balance savings plan, similar to a 401k,\(^\text{155}\) that would guarantee a 4% return for workers even if the investments perform worse.\(^\text{156}\) These types of proposals are crucial to solving mounting pension obligations in some states.\(^\text{157}\)

### IV. What Investors Should Learn from Municipal Bankruptcies

To better appreciate the complete relationship between underfunded pension plans and municipal bond safety, investors must understand how pension obligations lead municipalities into default.\(^\text{158}\) The two largest municipal bankruptcies—Detroit and Puerto Rico—reveal red flags that investors should be aware of when buying municipal bonds and the settlement outcomes that undermine the safety of municipal bond investments.\(^\text{159}\)

#### A. Detroit

Detroit’s bankruptcy came at a time when city pensions were $3.5 billion underfunded.\(^\text{160}\) Detroit’s pension problem fermented over

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\(^{156}\) Howley, supra note 154.

\(^{157}\) See Chintamaneni, supra note 52, at 550–51 ("While the fate of public pensions in municipal bankruptcy is uncertain, the need for reform in the operation and protection of public pensions is clear from the growing number of cities with public pension crises.").

\(^{158}\) See Dick, supra note 145, at 91 (explaining the role pensioners play in underfunded plans as they relate to bondholders).

\(^{159}\) See Matt Krantz, *Detroit Bankruptcy Rattles Muni Bond Investors*, USA TODAY (July 19, 2013, 1:07 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/markets/2013/07/19/detroit-muni-bond-investors/2568039 [https://perma.cc/G5ZE-QZ3H] ("Detroit’s bankruptcy protection filing is introducing the word fear to the vocabulary of investors who have sought shelter in the municipal bond market.").

decades. In 2005, Detroit issued $1.44 billion in 15-year, floating-rate quasi-POBs to fund the growing gap within the city’s pension funds for firefighters, police, and general employees. Once the financial crisis took its toll on pension accounts, the quasi-POB payments Detroit owed ballooned and continued to represent a substantial percentage of the city’s revenue.

In addition to Detroit’s increasing pension obligations, by 2011, the city lost one-quarter of its population over the decade. It was an unprecedented collapse of an American city, with 60% of its peak population gone. At the time, Detroit citizens faced one of the highest property tax burdens of any city. As the city neared bankruptcy in 2012, it was considered, the most dangerous city in America for the fourth year in a row. Detroit’s violent crime rate was five times the national average.

161. Dick, supra note 145, at 100 (“Like its bankrupt peer cities in California, Detroit’s major creditors included participants in the city’s almost entirely unfunded retiree health plan, participants in underfunded pension plans, and capital market creditors.”).

162. The Michigan Constitution states: “The accrued financial benefits of each pension plan and retirement system of the state and its political subdivisions shall be a contractual obligation thereof which shall not be diminished or impaired thereby.” MICH. CONST. ART. IX, § 24.

163. Dick, supra note 145, at 101 (explaining the bonds were called Certificate of Participation (“COP”) bonds but functioned the same way as POBs. Detroit could not issue POBs to shore up its pension fund because it had reached its constitutional debt limit. Therefore, it issued these COPs to “sidestep” laws enabling it to not call the issued bonds debt on its balance sheet.).

164. Id. at 100–01.


168. Id.


average. Nevertheless, the police force had let go of 200 officers, nearly 10% of its total force, and the fire department lost fourteen of its firefighting engines. With citizens feeling unsafe in their own homes and police officers holding an “Enter At Your Own Risk” rally, Detroit had no choice but to file for Chapter 9 bankruptcy on July 18, 2013.

B. Puerto Rico

Puerto Rico also experienced a huge pension crisis. In 2016, Puerto Rico had $2 billion in assets among its pension funds compared to $45 billion in pension liabilities. Residents left Puerto Rico in record amounts, shrinking a tax base necessary to cover the territory’s growing obligations. On July 1, 2016, Puerto Rico declared its intention to

171. Id.
172. See id. (stating that the City of Detroit cut some 200 officers from its 2500 strong police force).
174. Id. (noting that one citizen stated “I’m constantly on guard here due to the fact that police aren’t what they should be, the Fire Department is not what it should be”).
default on its GO bonds for the first time.\textsuperscript{180} Puerto Rico’s then-Governor Ricardo Nevares argued that funding teachers, emergency personnel, and other critical functions should take priority over Puerto Rico’s obligation to its bondholders.\textsuperscript{181} The night before Puerto Rico declared it was going to default, then-President Barack Obama signed the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act ("PROMESA"),\textsuperscript{182} which allowed the island to stop making payments to its bondholders.\textsuperscript{183} PROMESA created a committee to oversee the restructuring of all of Puerto Rico’s debt.\textsuperscript{184}

Shortly after PROMESA was formed, a 10-year-old boy was shot in the head near the pool of a popular hotel in Puerto Rico,\textsuperscript{185} casting light on the high crime rate the territory was facing.\textsuperscript{186} Puerto Rico had seen massive layoffs to teachers, police, and firefighters over the prior years.\textsuperscript{187} By 2017, Puerto Rico’s underfunded pensions increased to $50 billion, and its total debt was $74 billion.\textsuperscript{188} With no possible way to

of thousands of people are fleeing a Caribbean island in search of a better life in the United States.”).


\textsuperscript{181} See id. ("This administration continues to take historic steps to ensure the residents of Puerto Rico continue to receive essential services while the commonwealth continues to face a delicate financial situation," a spokesman said.).


\textsuperscript{183} Timiraos & Tau, supra note 182.

\textsuperscript{184} Id.

\textsuperscript{185} Child Killed at Puerto Rico Sparks Concerns over Rising Murder Rate, GUARDIAN (July 5, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/05/puerto-rico-hotel-child-murder-rate [https://perma.cc/VHK2-CSJD].

\textsuperscript{186} Id.


\textsuperscript{188} Martin Z. Braun & Johnathan Levin, Debt Island: How $74 Billion in Bonds Bankrupted Puerto Rico, BLOOMBERG (May 15, 2017, 5:00 AM),
continue to maintain public services, pension payments, and bond payments, Puerto Rico’s then-Governor filed for bankruptcy on May 2, 2017.\textsuperscript{189}

\textbf{C. Bondholders in Bankruptcy}

For bondholders, the primary lesson of Detroit and Puerto Rico’s bankruptcy was that pensioners come before bondholders, and Wall Street loses.\textsuperscript{190} In Detroit, Federal Court Judge Steven Rhodes showed concern for pension holders when making his final ruling: “[the] court emphasizes that it will not lightly or casually exercise the power under federal bankruptcy law to impair pensions.”\textsuperscript{191} In Detroit’s final settlement, pensioners received at least 60% of their pensions owed,\textsuperscript{192} with no more than 4.5% individual cuts to city retirees.\textsuperscript{193} In contrast,
Detroit’s GO bondholders received only 41% of their owed obligations.\(^{194}\)

In Puerto Rico, under the bankruptcy settlement, 61% of retirees would see no reduction in their pensions,\(^{195}\) and cuts to monthly pensions totaling more than $1,200 would be capped at 8.5%.\(^{196}\) However, GO bondholders received just 55% of their investment back,\(^{197}\) causing a downgrade for GO bonds in Puerto Rico.\(^{198}\) The outcome of both settlements reflects the unequal displacement of the payback to bondholders and pensioners, which legally had the “same priority.”\(^{199}\) This preference is largely due to politicians who, when deciding settlements, place a higher value on pensioners than bondholders.\(^{200}\)

Not only did bondholders receive a smaller percentage of their claims than pensioners, but the underlying safeguards for some of their bonds also changed during Puerto Rico’s bankruptcy.\(^{201}\) In particular, the bankruptcy completely shifted the market’s understanding of how

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\(^{194}\) Skeel, supra note 192.


\(^{196}\) Id.

\(^{197}\) Id.


\(^{199}\) Skeel, supra note 192.

\(^{200}\) See In re City of Stockton, California, 526 B.R. 35, 39 (Bankr. E.D. Cal.), aff’d in part, 542 B.R. 261 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2015). (In Stockton, California bankruptcy, the judge allowed pensions to be modified. In an oral opinion, the judge said the California Public Employee’s Retirement System “has bullied its way about in this case with an iron fist insisting it and the municipal pensions it services are inviolable. The bully may have an iron fist, but it also turns out to have a glass jaw.”); Although, the pressure from CALPERS made the politicians decide not to reduce pensions at all, and the bondholders took most of the cuts. Marc Lifsher & Melody Petersen, Judge Approves Stockton Bankruptcy Plan; Worker Pensions Safe, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2014, 1:13 PM), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-stockton-pension-court-ruling-cuts-20141029-story.html [https://perma.cc/5LTU-ZMW5].

special revenue bonds are viewed during a municipality’s bankruptcy. Before Puerto Rico’s insolvency, special revenue bonds were continuously paid out by a municipality during the bankruptcy period. This changed when the First Circuit Court of Appeals denied the special revenue bondholders relief during bankruptcy, calling continued payments permitted but not required. On July 31, 2019, the First Circuit denied rehearsing \textit{en banc} and issued an opinion affirming its holding on special revenue bonds. The impact of Puerto Rico’s bankruptcy on the safety of special revenue bonds caused rating agencies to review their grades on special revenue bonds for potential downgrades.

\textbf{D. Warnings for Municipal Bond Investors from Municipal Bankruptcies}

The bankruptcies of Detroit and Puerto Rico reveal two overarching themes: first, the red flags investors should look out for when determining the risk for an investment in municipal bonds; and second, the underlying preferential treatment for pensioners over bondholders in bankruptcy settlements.

The red flags an investor should look for before investing in municipal bonds become apparent as a municipality nears closer to default. A state or local government with a high underfunded pension liability leads to a decreasing population, an increasing tax, and

\footnotesize{202. Id.  
203. Id.  
204. \textit{In re} Fin. Oversight \& Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., 919 F.3d 121, 132 (1st Cir. 2019) (“In sum, Sections 928(a) and 922(d) permit, but do not require, continued payment during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings.”).  
205. \textit{In re} Fin. Oversight \& Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., 931 F.3d 111, 115 (1st Cir. 2019) (“Section 922(d) commands that “application of pledged special revenues” be done in a manner “consistent” with section 928—which in turn provides that liens on special revenues “shall be subject to the necessary operating expenses” of the project or system.”); \textit{see also} Assured Guar. Corp. v. Fin. Oversight Bd., No. 19-391, 2020 WL 129573, at (U.S. Jan. 13, 2020) (indicating the Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari on the case).  
206. \textit{See} Sasseen, \textit{supra} note 38 (explaining the uncertainty and fear Puerto Rico has caused the municipal bond market as it relates to special revenue bonds.).  
207. Scaggs, \textit{supra} note 201 (explaining that Moody’s is reviewing “$14 billion of municipal special-revenue bonds and that Fitch is reviewing “seven series of special-revenue bonds” in response to Puerto Rico ruling).  
208. \textit{See supra} Part IV.A–B.  
209. \textit{See supra} Part IV.A–B.  
210. \textit{See supra} Part IV.C.  
211. \textit{See supra} Part IV.A–B.
increasing crime rate, all accompanied by decreasing coverage of essential services. The red flag—a decline in essential services—is critical to the likelihood of a municipal bond default. In Detroit’s bankruptcy hearing in 2013, when weighing whether or not to approve Detroit’s Chapter 9 filing, Judge Rhodes stated: “It is the City’s service delivery insolvency that the Court finds most strikingly disturbing in this case.” In another hearing in 2014, Judge Rhodes stated: “[The service insolvency] is inhumane and intolerable, and it must be fixed.” When these red flags are present and eventually present themselves as unmet essential services, the chance of a municipality bankruptcy filing occurring and being accepted rises. The length of such bankruptcy may depend on the municipality’s ability to right its essential services.

The second theme, preference for pensioners, has been evident through the outcomes in municipal bankruptcy cases. Investors should heed this risk of being subordinated in payout preference as they were in Detroit and Puerto Rico. When a municipality defaults, investors will not come out whole, and the protections their bonds allegedly have and payments they expect could continue to change as more defaults occur in the future.

212. See, e.g., Shields, supra note 102 (explaining Illinois state mandate to increase its funding for pensions has caused municipal bond rating downgrades as well as cuts to essential services).


214. In re City of Detroit, Mich., 504 B.R. 97, 170 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013); see also Fehr, supra note 213 (“Neither city could pay their unsustainable debts, but officials’ failure to curb violent crime, spreading blight and decaying infrastructure was even more compelling to the federal bankruptcy judges who decided that Stockton and Detroit were eligible to file for Chapter 9.”).


216. See Fehr, supra note 213 (stating that service insolvency is a persuasive factor for a judge in allowing a municipality to successfully file for bankruptcy).

217. Id.

218. See Dick, supra note 145, at 77 (“Many chapter 9 debtors have simply chosen to be more generous to their employees and retirees, even if it requires cramming down a plan that severely impairs the rights of other creditors.”).

219. See supra Part IV. A-B; see also Skeel, supra note 192 (“Bankruptcy can work, but bankruptcy laws need to be changed to ensure fair treatment of creditors.”).

220. See Krantz, supra note 159 (“Detroit’s bankruptcy protection filing is introducing the word fear to the vocabulary of investors who have sought shelter in the municipal bond market.”).
V. HOW MUNICIPALITIES PITCH INVESTORS

Like Detroit and Puerto Rico, some states face major pension problems.\(^{221}\) Two states in particular, New Jersey and Illinois, are currently showing red flags that should concern investors about their municipal bond holdings.\(^{222}\) These states are experiencing budget deficits, vendor defaults, and troubling cuts to necessary public services in order to pay for pension liabilities.\(^{223}\)

A. The Struggling States with the Highest Pension Obligations

In 2019, Illinois had the worst fiscal health of any state.\(^{224}\) Further, Illinois is ranked as the third-worst state in its pension plan funding percentage,\(^{225}\) while holding the nation’s largest pension debt.\(^{226}\) Illinois’s adjusted net pension liability is $240.8 billion as of June 2018, which is five times the total state revenue.\(^{227}\) On top of its pension

\(^{221}\) See Andrew B. Dawson, Beyond the Great Divide: Federalism Concerns in Municipal Insolvency, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 31, 34 (2017) (“As more municipalities are sinking into financial distress, weighed down in large part by unsustainable legacy costs, there have been an unprecedented number of municipal bankruptcy filings.”); see also T. Leigh Anenson, Alex Slabaugh & Karen E. Lahey, Reforming Public Pensions, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 12 (2014) (“Even with an optimistic rate of return on pension fund investments, projections estimate that plans in seven states will be insolvent by 2020 and plans in half the states will be broke by 2027.”).


\(^{223}\) See Adam Schuster, Illinois Public Services Being Cut to Pay Unsustainable Pension Cost, ILLINOIS POL’Y, https://www.illinoispolicy.org/reports/illinois-public-services-being-cut-to-pay-unsustainable-pension-cost/ [https://perma.cc/M8HS-YF8B] (last visited Dec. 26, 2019) (“Public pensions are already eating away Illinois government services, increasing by more than 500% during the past 20 years as spending on core services including child protection, state police and college money for poor students has dropped by nearly one-third since 2000.”).


\(^{226}\) Id.

liability, the state has $25.8 billion in POBs outstanding.\(^{228}\) By 2020, Illinois’s required contributions to pensions will total $9.3 billion, one-quarter of Illinois’ general funds budget.\(^{229}\) Illinois likely has three options to begin to fill the underfunded gap: (1) a 25% tax hike; (2) a 689% increase in contributions; or (3) an 11.9% assumed rate of return.\(^{230}\)

In some of Illinois’s cities, pensions have become so underfunded that the worst-off pensions are allowed to compel the state Comptroller to withhold tax revenue from municipalities and reallocate that revenue to their cities’ pension plans.\(^{231}\) This pension-intercept law\(^{232}\) has

\(^{228}\) Illinois’ Pension Bonds: The Other $26 Billion Obligation You Shouldn’t Ignore, ILL. POL’Y https://www.illinoispolicy.org/reports/illinois-pension-bonds-the-other-26-billion-obligation-you-shouldnt-ignore/ [https://perma.cc/2WD8-QPAQ] (last visited Dec. 19, 2019); see also Statement No. 27 of the Governmental Accounting Standards Board, supra note 97 (“The ARC does not include payments of pension-related debt. Therefore, those payments should not be included in annual pension cost.”).


wreaked havoc on Illinois’ struggling cities as near depleted pensions intercept city revenues that would normally go toward essential services and payroll. With pensions in Illinois wavering at 35% funded, the intercept law has been used by pension funds in the cities of Harvey, North Chicago, Chicago, and East St. Louis. What was meant to hold municipalities accountable for underpaying their pension plans has caused these cities to become more cash-strapped and fiscally insolvent than ever before. 

Similarly, New Jersey has $239 billion of outstanding and anticipated debt. Of that debt, $45.16 billion is in municipal bonds, and the state needs $115 billion to cover future outstanding payments to the state pension fund. Taxpayers are expected to be burdened by $99.6 billion to support the underfunded public pension system in the state. New Jersey would have to raise its contributions by 521% or increase its tax revenues by 22% to begin to close the underfunded gap—but the vital change has yet to occur. The Governor of New Jersey, Phil Murphy, expects to make pension contributions of only 70% of the municipalities’ contributions to their police and fire pension funds fall short of what their contributions are supposed to be under state law.

See, e.g., KASS & CROSBY, supra note 232, at 1 (“Harvey finds itself pushed to the brink by a new law that allows pension funds to compel the state Comptroller to withhold state tax revenue that traditionally would go to the city.”).


Yvette Shields, Cash-Strapped East St. Louis Joins Illinois Pension Intercept Illinois, FIDELITY.COM (Sept. 19, 2019, 5:03 PM), https://fixedincome.fidelity.com/tgw/fi/FINewsArticle?id=201909191703SM______BND BUYER_0000016d-4a4d-4046-a3fd-cf73af0000_110.1 [https://perma.cc/2EU5-HTFD](explaining that the East St. Louis Firefighters submitting a pension intercept request of 2.2 million to the comptroller as their pension is only 11% funded).


Id.

Id.

Cembalest, supra note 222.
recommended ARC amount each year and by 2023 pay the full recommended amount. This promise came after Governor Murphy raised the assumed rate of return for New Jersey pensions after then-governor Chris Christie’s office previously lowered the return rate to reflect a more realistic assumption. Murphy’s action has allowed the state’s pension funds to appear healthier and, in turn, has lowered the state’s contributions.

Both Illinois and New Jersey’s pension obligations are massive and they alone cause concern for the future viability of the states. However, just as in Detroit and Puerto Rico, the pension obligations are one piece of a larger puzzle. Pension viability does not tell the full story of what is going on inside these states. To view the other red flags pointing towards bankruptcy, all an investor must do is look closely at cities within the two states.

B. The Reality Facing Citizens in Illinois and New Jersey

In Harvey, Illinois, employees in City Hall were left without air conditioning and threatened to leave work, citing unbearable conditions.

242. Id.
244. Robert Snyder, New Jersey Lowers Assumed Rate of Return to 7%, PENSIONS & INVS. (Dec. 21, 2017, 12:00 AM), https://www.pionline.com/article/20171221/ONLINE/171229973/new-jersey-lowers-assumed-rate-of-return-to-7 [https://perma.cc/LMB7-TQ36] (“The New Jersey Pension Fund’s assumed rate of return has been reduced to 7% from 7.65% by state Treasurer Ford M. Scudder, the second rate cut he has enacted this year.”).
245. Hilary Russ, New Jersey Treasurer Resets Public Pension Rate of Return, REUTERS (Mar. 1, 2018, 6:30 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-new-jersey-pensions/new-jersey-treasurer-resets-public-pension-rate-of-return-idUSKCN1GD6MF [https://perma.cc/A5T4-4TAN] (“The switch to a higher assumed rate means that the state, and participating local governments in New Jersey, will for now escape the higher costs that arise when investment return assumptions are lowered.”).
247. See supra Part III.C.
248. Shafroth, supra note 236.
249. See id. (explaining the fiscal trouble facing smaller cities in Illinois).
because the city failed to pay its electricity bill on time.\footnote{Zak Koeske \textit{Harvey Officials Are Scrambling After Police and Fire Non-emergency Phone Lines were Disconnected for Nonpayment}, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 23, 2019, 12:08 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/daily-southtown/ct-sta-harvey-phone-line-disconnection-st-0825-20190823-j6snchz5rhtftmkfxq7rfyp4-story.html [https://perma.cc/736E-FYXQ].} On another occasion, the non-emergency 911 number was cut off for three days because the city was $14,000 in arrears on its phone bill, leaving citizens and possible alarm systems calling for help with no response.\footnote{Id.} Even one of Harvey’s trash vendors allegedly demanded a check in full on the steps of City Hall to continue services.\footnote{Id.}

In concurrence with vendor defaults,\footnote{Id.} massive layoffs continue to occur in Harvey each year.\footnote{Id.} In 2018, due to a successful pension intercept request from the Harvey’s firefighter pension plan,\footnote{Zak Koeske, \textit{Harvey Lays off 40 Police and Fire Employees, Union Officials Say}, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 10, 2018, 4:25 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/daily-southtown/ct-sta-harvey-layoffs-st-0411-story.html [https://perma.cc/D25X-R6S9].} forty police and fire employees were let go, representing nearly half of Harvey’s force.\footnote{Id.} Therefore, Harvey’s firefighters’ attempt to secure their pensions resulted in a significant amount of firefighters in the department being fired.\footnote{Id.} All the while, Harvey maintains one of the highest per capita crime rates in the state.\footnote{John Dodge, \textit{The 10 ‘Most Dangerous’ Towns in Illinois}, CBSCHICAGO (Dec. 16, 2014, 12:11 PM), https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2014/12/16/the-10-most-dangerous-towns-in-illinois/ [https://perma.cc/RJS6-N7JU].} Furthermore, Harvey’s citizens face unbearable tax hikes, represented by approximately 4,000 outstanding property tax bills.\footnote{Shaftroth, supra note 236.} Harvey has even defaulted on GO bonds multiple times during the past three years.\footnote{The Editorial Board, \textit{Have We Got a Muni Bond for You}, WALL ST. J: OPINION (May 10, 2018, 7:02 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/have-we-got-a-muni-bond-for-you-1525993374 [https://perma.cc/33DM-C54L] (“Harvey has already defaulted on eight debt service payments over the past two years.”).} Even so, the city
cannot seek bankruptcy without permission from the state, leaving it with insurmountable obligations and declining revenues.261

Similarly situated to Harvey, is Camden, New Jersey, where the Camden’s School District plans to close schools and layoff approximately 300 teachers,262 as the city faced a $27 million budget deficit in 2019.263 Since 2016, the city has suffered a “dirty water problem”264 with lead leaking into the city’s public water and the cost of repair too high to afford.265 Schools have been forced to include a special line in their budget for water coolers and paper cups each year to provide clean water.266 Despite having one of the worst murder rates in America,267 police layoffs have occurred sharply in the past in Camden.268

All the red flags of prior bankruptcies currently exist in Illinois and New Jersey today, and there is no easy solution.269 The conditions in Harvey and Camden reflect the conditions in many cities in Illinois, New Jersey, and other underfunded states that are forced to make cuts to

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261. Id. (“Under Illinois law, cities cannot file for Chapter 9 bankruptcy, which provides a venue for impairing contracts.”).


263. See Stephen Danley, The Camden Education Crisis We All Knew was Coming, RUTGERS U.CAMDEN: LOC. KNOWLEDGE BLOG (Apr. 3, 2019), https://danley.camden.rutgers.edu/2019/04/03/the-camden-education-crisis-we-all-knew-was-coming/ [https://perma.cc/K5EZ-TFQH] (explaining the 27-million-dollar deficit is the start of “financial crisis” for the school district).


265. Id.

266. Id.


essential services to meet obligations for pension funds. While politicians are making efforts to close the underfunded pension gap, if the economy falls into a recession, it is hard to imagine how New Jersey or Illinois will be able to handle their obligations as cities within the states are already essentially bankrupt. Defaults have significant consequences for municipal bond investors, and if municipalities in New Jersey or Illinois file for bankruptcy, the cumulative effect on the market could be significant.

VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Underfunded pensions diminish the safety of investments in municipal bonds in part because they lead to a lower prioritization for bondholders should the municipality file for bankruptcy. As pensions are increasingly underfunded, ratings are lowered for the municipality’s bonds, creating higher interest rates for any debt issued by the municipality. The higher interest rate means the municipality’s debt

270. See, e.g., Shields, supra note 102 (explaining that Illinois state mandate to increase its funding for pensions has caused municipal bond rating downgrades as well as cuts to essential services).


272. Mennis, Banta & Draine, supra note 83, at 1.

273. See Krantz, supra note 159 (“Detroit’s bankruptcy protection filing is introducing the word fear to the vocabulary of investors who have sought shelter in the municipal bond market.”).

274. See Dick, supra note 145, at 77 (“Many chapter 9 debtors have simply chosen to be more generous to their employees and retirees, even if it requires cramming down a plan that severely impairs the rights of other creditors.”).

275. See, e.g., Robert Steyer, Moody’s Cuts New Jersey’s Credit Rating on Budget, Pension Funding Concerns, PENSIONS & INV. (Mar. 28, 2017, 1:00 AM), https://www.pionline.com/article/20170328/ONLINE/170329882/moody-s-cuts-new-jersey-s-credit-rating-on-budget-pension-funding-concerns [https://perma.cc/R77H-PDIZ] (“Moody’s Investors Service cut New Jersey’s general obligation bond rating by one notch due to ‘the continued negative impact of significant pension underfunding, including growth in the state’s large long-term liabilities, a persistent structural imbalance and weak fund balances,’ the firm said.”).

management obligation increases, leaving less state revenue to deal with the pension shortfall. In turn, a city ends up in a vicious cycle where its only means to catch up on pension contributions is to raise revenue with higher taxes or issue more debt. In most cases, cities increase taxes to raise revenue that provides limited improvement in tackling the underfunded pension obligations. Tax increases also drive residents to leave municipalities, resulting in a smaller base from which to raise revenue. By the time a municipality files for bankruptcy, its underfunded pension obligation is massive, its crime and tax rate is high, and its essential services have faced major cuts and setbacks.

The bull market has masked both pension insecurities and the insolvent cities within states. Continued investment returns above 7% are unlikely as research firms call for a reevaluation of investors’ expected yearly returns in the investment market. With pension funds
relying so heavily on investments, if a recession were to occur and the assumed rate of return for pensions is forced below 5%, the underfunded portions of the most stressed funds would likely amount to unsustainable liabilities.\textsuperscript{285} Municipalities within underfunded states may be left with no choice but to file for Chapter 9 bankruptcy to restructure debt.\textsuperscript{286}

Nevertheless, municipal bonds can still be viewed as a positive investment for individuals because of their tax benefits and yield.\textsuperscript{287} They are also useful tool for banks to purchase as assets for liquid capital purposes as well as income.\textsuperscript{288} There are healthy, high-rated municipal bonds outstanding within states that are managing their pension funds responsibly.\textsuperscript{289} However, the desire for “safe” risk-averse return in a low interest environment tends to push investors into less safe bonds that net a higher interest rate.\textsuperscript{290} In these cases, investors should monitor the municipalities in which their investments are issued and follow the states’ pension liabilities and reforms, because credit rating agencies look closely at a state’s pension health when assessing ratings.\textsuperscript{291} Credit agencies also use a lower discount rate when calculating a state’s total pension liability;\textsuperscript{292} therefore, numbers reported by the pension plan or media may not reflect the metrics the credit agencies apply.\textsuperscript{293} A state rated a notch or two above investment-grade, like Illinois, is most vulnerable to a rating change, which would have a large impact on the pricing and liquidity of its issued bonds.\textsuperscript{294}

Overall, municipal bond investors should heed the red flags of past bankruptcies and prepare for a higher default risk if the economy

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\textsuperscript{285} Cembalest, supra note 222.
\textsuperscript{286} Mennis, Banta & Draine, supra note 83 at 3.
\textsuperscript{287} See Bladridge, supra note 30 (explaining tax-benefits of municipal bonds).
\textsuperscript{288} See supra Part II.C.
\textsuperscript{289} See Pension Funding Gap, supra note 84, at 6–7 (explaining states like South Dakota and North Carolina are managing their pension funds appropriately).
\textsuperscript{290} See supra Part I.
\textsuperscript{291} Nolan, supra note 149.
\textsuperscript{292} See Healey, supra note 227 (explaining credit rating agencies find pension plans have larger total pension liabilities then the plans report, because they use a smaller discount rate).
\textsuperscript{293} Id.
\textsuperscript{294} See, e.g., Karen Pierog, Seller’s Market Seen Aiding Illinois and Chicago Bond Issues, Reuters (Mar. 25, 2019, 6:05 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-illinois-bonds/sellers-market-seen-aiding-illinois-and-chicago-bond-issues-idUSKCN1R60ZA [https://perma.cc/7KVE-BKA4] (“Budget measures, including the use of one-time revenue and a more than $800 million reduction in contributions to the state’s woefully underfunded pensions, could push Illinois closer to a junk credit rating.”).
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slows or pension reforms fail to matriculate quickly enough to fix the massive pension liabilities facing some states and municipalities.295

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295. See Mennis, Banta & Draine, supra note 83, at 2–3 (explaining the future viability of vulnerable states with exceedingly large pension debts).

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