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DYNAMIC FEDERALISM AND WIND FARM SITING

H. Brendan Burke*

An “all-of-the-above” energy policy has led to the emergence of wind power as an energy resource of choice. But despite their considerable environmental and economic advantages, wind energy systems do have drawbacks. Among these, the mechanical and electromagnetic properties of wind turbines encroach on U.S. Department of Defense (“DoD”) military installations and activities. These encroachment concerns, including interference with air traffic control and other radar systems, create tension between national security and the development of renewable energy sources. Because utility siting decisions are made at the state and local level, the federal government’s ability to guard against encroachment by wind farms is limited to advisory determinations issued by the Federal Aviation Administration.

In 2013, North Carolina enacted a statute requiring consultation with DoD officials as a prerequisite to applying for and issuing a wind farm permit. This statute effectively allows the DoD to prevent the state from issuing such a permit. This Article explores wind farm siting law in general and explains how North Carolina’s law empowers the DoD in this regard. The Article also analyzes whether it is advisable for a state to yield such authority

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to a federal government agency and considers whether it is appropriate for the DoD to exert this level of influence over the state permitting process.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION	3
II. TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS.....	8
III. STATE AND LOCAL REGULATION OF ELECTRIC POWER GENERATION FACILITIES.....	20
IV. FEDERAL INFLUENCE ON STATE OR LOCAL PERMITTING OF WIND FARM SITING	24
V. NORTH CAROLINA'S WIND ENERGY FACILITY PERMITTING STATUTE	36
VI. A WORTHWHILE CONCESSION OF STATE AUTHORITY? ...	43
VII. AN UNAUTHORIZED VETO EXERCISED BY A FEDERAL AGENCY?	50
VIII. A MODEL FOR STATES TO EMULATE.....	57
IX. CONCLUSION	60

I. INTRODUCTION

Concerns about climate change and energy security have fundamentally changed the electric utility landscape in the United States. Policymakers charged with selecting energy resources face difficult decisions affecting competing interests. Just as fossil fuels and nuclear reactors come with social and ecological price tags that many observers believe make them unsustainable as sources of utility power, renewable energy sources each bring economic, environmental, and other burdens along with their benefits. Wind energy conversion systems are no exception.

Wind power systems use elevated turbines to capture mechanical energy from the wind to generate electricity.¹ In utility applications, the turbines are grouped together in large facilities commonly known as “wind farms.”² Because wind is a free “fuel,” wind farms (once they are constructed and operational) are considered reliable, low-cost hedges against fluctuating fossil fuel prices.³ But the great advantage of wind farms over fossil-fuel power plants is that wind turbines emit no greenhouse gases.⁴ According to the American Wind Energy Association, for every megawatt-hour of electricity generated by a wind facility rather

¹ AM. WIND ENERGY ASS'N, *Wind 101: The Basics of Wind Energy*, <http://www.awea.org/Resources/Content.aspx?ItemNumber=900&navItemNumber=587> (last visited Mar. 7, 2014). Wind turbine technology will be described more fully in the next section of this article. See *infra* notes 36–50 and accompanying text.

² See, e.g., WORLD WIND ENERGY ASS'N, *WIND ENERGY - Technology and Planning*, <http://wwindea.org/technology/ch02/estructura-en.htm> (last visited Mar. 7, 2014). For the purpose of this article, the term “wind farm” refers to any utility scale wind energy generation facility.

³ AM. WIND ENERGY ASS'N, *The Cost of Wind Energy in the U.S.*, <http://www.awea.org/Resources/Content.aspx?ItemNumber=5547> (last visited Mar. 7, 2014).

⁴ AM. WIND ENERGY ASS'N, *Wind Energy & Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions*, <http://awea.rd.net/Resources/Content.aspx?ItemNumber=5097> (last visited Mar. 7, 2014).

than a fossil-fuel power plant, 1,300 fewer pounds of carbon dioxide (“CO₂”) are released into the atmosphere.⁵ This results in a reduction of 3,500 metric tons of CO₂ per single turbine every year.⁶ In 2013, the collective reduction credited to all U.S. wind farms totaled ninety-six million metric tons—as much CO₂ as sixteen million automobiles would emit in a year.⁷ Wind turbines also use and discharge essentially no water—a distinct advantage over fossil-fuel and nuclear plants, which require vast amounts of water for cooling.⁸ No water used, no water polluted.⁹

Wind energy systems do have drawbacks, however. While wind is free, it is not constant.¹⁰ When the wind is not blowing, the rotors do not turn, and the turbines do not generate power.¹¹ Given the technology presently available, excess electricity that wind turbines generate when the wind *is* blowing cannot be stored cost-effectively for later transmission and distribution.¹² Utility companies cannot then rely exclusively on wind and must supplement wind farms’ output with other resources, generally conventional fuels.¹³ Additionally, the startup costs for wind

⁵ *Id.*

⁶ *Id.*

⁷ *Id.* These figures represent a 3.6% reduction in CO₂ emissions from the utility power industry across all fuel sources. *Id.*

⁸ AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, *supra* note 1.

⁹ NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC SOC’Y, *Wind Power Information, Wind Power Facts*, <http://environment.nationalgeographic.com/environment/global-warming/wind-power-profile/> (last visited Mar. 7, 2014).

¹⁰ Patricia E. Salkin & Ashira Pelman Ostrow, *Cooperative Federalism and Wind: A New Framework for Achieving Sustainability*, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1049, 1061–62 (2009).

¹¹ 3 ALTERNATIVE ENERGY 326 (Neil Schlager & Jayne Weisblatt eds., 2006) (providing an equation for the relationship between wind energy available and wind speed where if wind speed is zero no energy is generated).

¹² Eric Jelinski, *The Inconvenient Truth about Wind Turbines*, <http://www.windturbinesyndrome.com/2012/the-inconvenient-truth-about-wind-turbines-from-an-engineer-canada/> (last visited Mar. 7, 2014).

¹³ Salkin & Ostrow, *supra* note 10, at 1062.

facilities are high,¹⁴ especially given the need for redundant generation capacity. Transmission costs are also high, because geographic locales suitable for wind farms are often far from population centers.¹⁵ There is no consensus that wind energy is economically viable in the long term.¹⁶

Wind energy also has environmental drawbacks. Utility-scale wind farms require large swaths of usually pristine land or water.¹⁷ Outdoors enthusiasts, adjacent landowners, and other parties interested in such areas often consider the turbines to be eyesores.¹⁸ Neighbors complain about the noise from the turbines and the flicker effect caused by the sun shining through the rotating blades.¹⁹ The turbines can interfere with television and radio reception.²⁰ Wind farms are known to kill birds and bats.²¹

¹⁴ ExploringGreenTechnology.com, *Wind Energy Facts*, <http://exploringgreentechnology.com/wind-energy/wind-energy-facts/> (last visited Mar. 7, 2014). One wind energy opponent asserts that per megawatt (“MW”), wind facilities require five times or more the amount of construction material than is required to build a nuclear plant. Jelinski, *supra* note 12.

¹⁵ See 3 ALTERNATIVE ENERGY, *supra* note 11, at 321.

¹⁶ See, e.g., *Wind Energy Pros and Cons*, <http://energyinformative.org/wind-energy-pros-and-cons/> (last visited Mar. 7, 2014) (noting that “[t]he cost-competitiveness of wind power is highly debatable”).

¹⁷ 3 ALTERNATIVE ENERGY, *supra* note 11, at 321.

¹⁸ *Id.* at 321–22.

¹⁹ *Id.* at 331.

²⁰ *Id.* at 332.

²¹ NAT’L WIND COORDINATING COLLABORATIVE, WIND TURBINE INTERACTIONS WITH BIRDS, BATS, AND THEIR HABITATS: A SUMMARY OF RESEARCH RESULTS AND PRIORITY QUESTIONS 2 (2010), available at http://www1.eere.energy.gov/wind/pdfs/birds_and_bats_fact_sheet.pdf. See also R. Kyle Evans, Recent Development, *Wind Turbines and Migratory Birds: Avoiding a Collision Between the Energy Industry and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act*, 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 32, 46–49 (2014), available at http://ncjolt.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Evans_final.pdf (explaining in detail the risks that wind turbines pose to birds and describing the case of California’s Altamont Pass Wind Resource Area, a wind farm known to have caused over 4,000 avian kills annually).

These fatalities result from collision as well as habitat and behavior disruptions.²²

The mechanical and electromagnetic properties of wind turbines (which will be explored in detail in the next section of this Article)²³ pose significant hazards and complications to DoD military installations and activities.²⁴ These encroachment²⁵ concerns, many of which also pose problems for civil aviation,²⁶ include interference with air traffic control and other radar systems.²⁷ One ramification of these hazards and complications is the very real potential for conflict between the public's requirement for national security and its interest in developing renewable energy sources to protect the environment and achieve energy independence.

Despite these drawbacks and the various disputes about its relative merits, wind energy figures very prominently in U.S. energy policy. President Barack Obama described that policy in March 2012: "We can't have an energy strategy for the last century

²² NAT'L WIND COORDINATING COLLABORATIVE, *supra* note 21.

²³ *Infra* notes 43–50 and accompanying text.

²⁴ See generally OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF DEF. RESEARCH & ENG'G, U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., THE EFFECT OF WINDMILL FARMS ON MILITARY READINESS (2006), available at <http://www.acq.osd.mil/dodsc/library/Congressional%20Report%20Impact%20of%20Wind%20Turbines%202006%20AFRL.pdf> (reporting the findings of a 2006 DoD study "on the effects of wind farms on air defense and missile warning radars and the resulting potential impact on military readiness").

²⁵ "Encroachment" refers to "[i]ncompatible development surrounding military installations that threatens the ability to carry out the training [or] testing mission." U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., & ASS'N OF FISH & WILDLIFE AGENCIES, DOD NATURAL RESOURCE PROGRAMS & INRMP IMPLEMENTATION: ENCROACHMENT slide 5-2 (2009), available at http://www.dodworkshops.org/files/Training/SikesModules/Mod5_Encroachment_FINAL_july09_1_.pdf.

²⁶ See generally AIRSPACE & SAFETY INITIATIVE WINDFARM WORKING GROUP, MANAGING THE IMPACT OF WIND TURBINES ON AVIATION 10–24 (2013), available at http://airspace-safety.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/20130701ManagingTheImpactOfWindTurbinesOnAviation_Script_FINAL_V1.pdf (surveying wind turbine effects on aviation).

²⁷ OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF DEF. RESEARCH & ENG'G, *supra* note 24, at 26–41.

that traps us in the past. We need an energy strategy for the future—an all-of-the-above strategy for the twenty-first century that develops every source of American-made energy.”²⁸

But electric utility siting decisions are made at the state and local level, so this national policy is implemented on an ad hoc basis.²⁹ Regarding hazards to civil and military aviation and other military activities, the federal government’s ability to protect its interests is limited to advisory determinations issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”).³⁰

In 2013, North Carolina enacted a statute³¹ requiring early and frequent consultation with DoD officials as a prerequisite to applying for or issuing permits to construct wind farms.³² This article will explain how this statute operates to effectively allow the DoD—a federal agency³³ with no independent federal authority to influence wind siting actions—to prevent the state from issuing a wind farm construction or expansion permit.³⁴

Part II of this Article examines the physical characteristics of wind turbines and explains how they affect air traffic control and military activities. Part III discusses the development of electricity

²⁸ The White House, Energy, *New Report: The All-of-the-Above Energy Strategy*, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/05/29/new-report-all-above-energy-strategy-path-sustainable-economic-growth> (last visited Sept. 11, 2014).

²⁹ See *infra* notes 118–53 and accompanying text.

³⁰ See *infra* notes 158–87 and accompanying text.

³¹ 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 51 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.115 (2013)).

³² See *infra* notes 230–68 and accompanying text.

³³ The term “agency” is subject to varying connotations with a breadth of specificity, but is used broadly here and is not intended to convey any specific adjudicative authority or other distinct status. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 63 (7th ed. 1999) (defining “agency” as “[a] department or other instrumentality of the executive branch of the federal government . . .”). See also Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2012) (defining “agency” to include “each authority of the Government of the United States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency . . .”).

³⁴ See *infra* notes 248–68 and accompanying text.

generation regulation in the United States, including a survey of how wind farm siting regimes vary among the states. Part IV addresses the ways in which the federal government, with special emphasis on the FAA and the DoD, can influence state wind farm siting actions to protect aviation and military interests. Part V explores the recent North Carolina statute and explains how it could allow the DoD to effectively prevent the state from issuing a wind farm construction permit. Part VI analyzes whether it is advisable for a state to grant this type of *soft veto*³⁵ to a federal government agency. Part VII considers whether it is appropriate for the DoD to exert this level of influence over the state permitting process. Part VIII argues that the North Carolina law can serve as a model for other states with installed or potential wind energy capacity and significant military presence.

II. TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Before considering the relationship between wind energy facility siting and military operations, it is necessary first to understand the physical characteristics of wind turbines and how they operate, how radar systems operate, and how wind turbines affect radar and other military aviation systems.

Wind turbines evolved from windmills, which have been in use for over a millennium.³⁶ The earliest windmills, originating in the Middle East and spreading to Europe, were used to mill or grind wheat and other grains.³⁷ Europeans later adopted the technology for other purposes, such as using the mechanical energy captured by the rotating sails to reclaim wetlands by pumping water away

³⁵ The term “veto” describes the “power of one governmental branch to prohibit an action by another branch” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1558 (2014). The term “soft veto” in this article represents the author’s conceptualizing the DoD’s ability to influence a state wind facility permit decision, especially in the negative.

³⁶ PAUL A. LYNN, ONSHORE AND OFFSHORE WIND ENERGY: AN INTRODUCTION 9 (2011).

³⁷ *Id.*

from low ground.³⁸ Windmills were ubiquitous until the industrial revolution, when steam power, electric motors, and internal combustion provided more reliable sources of mechanical power, not subject to variations of wind direction and speed.³⁹

But the advent of utility electric power did not signal the end for wind energy. The turn of the twentieth century saw the development of turbines designed to use wind-powered rotors to turn dynamos that generated electricity for local use, transmission, or storage in batteries.⁴⁰ Wind turbine technology languished to some extent, however, because of the assumption that fossil fuels and nuclear power would serve the world's energy needs indefinitely.⁴¹ It was not until the 1970s—when faced with the confluence of a burgeoning environmental movement and the reality of limited oil supplies subject to political and other societal instability—that the United States and other nations began in earnest to develop wind turbines for electricity generation at the utility scale.⁴²

The typical wind turbine today uses a three-bladed design on a horizontal axis.⁴³ Blades can vary from thirty-four to fifty-five meters in length, depending on the turbine's generation capacity.⁴⁴ The rotor is mounted to a nacelle or housing situated atop a tower.⁴⁵ Utility-scale turbines (those rated 100 kilowatts or higher) in the United States have towers ranging from 80 to 100 meters tall.⁴⁶ A height of 100 meters is fairly typical for a 2-megawatt

³⁸ *Id.* at 9–10.

³⁹ *Id.* at 12–13.

⁴⁰ *Id.* at 13.

⁴¹ *Id.*

⁴² *Id.* at 13–15.

⁴³ *Id.* at 15.

⁴⁴ AM. WIND ENERGY ASS'N, *Anatomy of a Wind Turbine*, <http://awea.rd.net/Resources/Content.aspx?ItemNumber=5083&RDtoken=29819&userID=4379> (last visited Mar. 7, 2014).

⁴⁵ LYNN, *supra* note 36, at 15.

⁴⁶ AM. WIND ENERGY ASS'N, *supra* note 1.

("MW") wind turbine,⁴⁷ which is about the average output for turbines installed in the United States.⁴⁸ Taking the rotor diameter into consideration, then, an average U.S. wind turbine's total height would be approximately 114 meters (374 feet) to 155 meters (509 feet).

For onshore installations, the towers are mounted on concrete foundations or secured to existing rock formations using long steel rods.⁴⁹ Offshore turbines are either secured to the sea floor with pilings, built into gravity foundations that sit on the bottom, or set to float on the surface while tethered or anchored to the bottom.⁵⁰

Of particular concern to the DoD is the effect that these towering vertical structures have on radar systems that serve its installations and training and operating areas.⁵¹ Radar⁵² systems use radio signals to remotely measure location, velocity, and shapes of objects.⁵³ The basic principle involves a transmitter that emits a pulse of radio energy into the atmosphere.⁵⁴ When the radio signal contacts an object (such as a cloud, mountain, airplane, wind turbine, or any other "target"), some or all of the signal is reflected back in the direction from which it originated.⁵⁵ A receiver or scanning antenna, which may be located with or

⁴⁷ LYNN, *supra* note 36, at 66.

⁴⁸ AM. WIND ENERGY ASS'N, *supra* note 44.

⁴⁹ LYNN, *supra* note 36, at 98.

⁵⁰ *Id.* at 162-66.

⁵¹ See generally OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF DEF. RESEARCH & ENG'G, *supra* note 24.

⁵² Although its usage has evolved to that of a common noun or common adjective, the term "radar" is an acronym dating from World War II meaning "radio detecting and ranging." THE FACTS ON FILE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORD AND PHRASE ORIGINS 604 (Robert Hendrickson ed., 3d ed. 2004) (emphasis in original).

⁵³ 14 HOW IT WORKS - SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 1893 (3d ed. 2003).

⁵⁴ *Id.* at 1894-95.

⁵⁵ *Id.* at 1894.

separate from the transmitter, detects the returning pulse of radio energy.⁵⁶ This arrangement is depicted in Figure 1.




Figure 1 - Basic radar system operation⁵⁷

By analyzing the time elapsed from transmission until the receipt of the returned pulse, the system ascertains the distance the pulse traveled and, therefore, the distance from the station to the object.⁵⁸ Because many radar antennae rotate 360 degrees, by accounting for angular position the system can determine the azimuth or direction from the station to the target object.⁵⁹ Similarly, an antenna rotating on a horizontal axis or designed with other advanced properties can also determine an object's altitude.⁶⁰

The foregoing description pertains to systems known as primary surveillance radar ("PSR").⁶¹ Besides relying on PSR, air-

⁵⁶ *Id.*

⁵⁷ Image reproduced from OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF DEF. RESEARCH & ENG'G, *supra* note 24, at 11 fig.2.

⁵⁸ 14 HOW IT WORKS - SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, *supra* note 53, at 1894.

⁵⁹ *Id.*

⁶⁰ *Id.* at 1895.

⁶¹ *Id.* at 1897. See also OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF DEF. RESEARCH & ENG'G, *supra* note 24, at 17 (discussing PSR).

traffic control organizations employ secondary surveillance radar (“SSR”) systems.⁶² For an SSR system, the target object (usually an aircraft) is equipped with a transponder—a device that transmits a radio signal to supplement the reflected pulse with amplifying information such as identity, flight number, and altitude as measured within the aircraft.⁶³ Federal aviation regulations require that aircraft operating in the busiest classes of airspace be equipped with transponders.⁶⁴ PSR and SSR image returns combine to give air controllers a real-time, four-dimensional representation of the airspace for which they are charged to route aircraft and maintain separation.⁶⁵

The accuracy—and therefore utility—of either type of radar system relies on the strength of the returned signals.⁶⁶ A number of factors can decrease signal strength, such as increased distance, decreased target size, atmospheric conditions, and intervening physical objects—whether natural or man-made.⁶⁷ Objects like hills or buildings can block transmitted radar energy outright, resulting in the system’s inability to detect a desired target (such as an aircraft) in the intervening object’s radar “shadow.”⁶⁸ Figure 2 depicts the radar shadow effect.

⁶² HOW IT WORKS - SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, *supra* note 53, at 1897.

⁶³ *Id.*

⁶⁴ 14 C.F.R. § 91.215(b) (2014).

⁶⁵ Raytheon Co., *Air Traffic Control Wind Farm Interference Mitigation at Raytheon*, Technology Today (2012), available at http://www.raytheon.com/newsroom/technology_today/archive/2012_i2.pdf.

⁶⁶ OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF DEF. RESEARCH & ENG’G, *supra* note 24, at 11.

⁶⁷ *Id.* at 10.

⁶⁸ *Id.* at 13.




Figure 2 - Radar signal blockage⁶⁹

Even if the intervening object does not altogether block a radar signal, its size or shape may cause the signal to diffract and weaken.⁷⁰ These shadowing effects and diffractions (depicted in Figure 3) contribute to unwanted return that operators call “clutter.”⁷¹ Radar clutter and signal weakness detract from the system’s ability to detect intended targets, differentiate between objects close to one another, and accurately measure objects’ movement.⁷²

⁶⁹ Image reproduced from *id.* at 14 fig.5.

⁷⁰ *Id.* at 13–14.

⁷¹ *Id.* at 11. “Clutter” is “any unwanted reflected signal that enters the radar receiver and can interfere with the determination of the desired attributes of the target of interest.” *Id.*

⁷² OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF DEF. RESEARCH & ENG’G, *supra* note 24, at 11.




Figure 3 - Radar signal diffraction⁷³

PSR systems rely heavily on Doppler frequency shift to locate and track air targets.⁷⁴ Put simply, Doppler frequency shift refers to the change in the returned radio wave frequency due to the changes in the relative distance between the station and the target.⁷⁵ For a stationary radar site and a stationary target, or when the distance between both is otherwise unchanging, the frequency of the reflected return signal should be roughly the same as the transmitted signal.⁷⁶ If the target is moving closer to the station, the frequency of the returned signal “shifts” slightly higher.⁷⁷ Likewise, if the target is moving away from the station, the return

⁷³ Image reproduced from *id.* at 14 fig.6.

⁷⁴ Raytheon Co., *supra* note 65, at 28.

⁷⁵ OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF DEF. RESEARCH & ENG'G, *supra* note 24, at 16.

⁷⁶ *Id.*

⁷⁷ *Id.*

frequency is slightly lower.⁷⁸ The magnitude of the shift indicates the relative speed of the target.⁷⁹

Rotating wind turbine blades display Doppler frequency shifts similar or identical to those associated with moving aircraft.⁸⁰ This is one of the primary challenges that wind farms pose if they are situated near airport approach or departure patterns or under low-altitude military air training areas.⁸¹ To a radar operator, “a wind turbine looks like a real aircraft”⁸² The operator may track a false target, delete a real target, or move a real target to an incorrect position because of the faulty information displayed.⁸³ In 2008, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit characterized the problem as follows:

Because each wind turbine has a radar “signature approximately that of a jumbo jet,” the wind farm “could likely appear as a fleet of jumbo jets” on the radar screen and confuse air traffic controllers. In addition, the turbines could intermittently disappear from the screen and reappear a few seconds later—hampering “the ability of the air traffic controller to successfully control aircraft in the area.”⁸⁴

Further, in some cases air traffic controllers have mistaken radar returns from large wind farms to be adverse weather

⁷⁸ *Id.* at 16–17.

⁷⁹ *Id.* at 17.

⁸⁰ Raytheon Co., *supra* note 65, at 28.

⁸¹ *See id.*

⁸² *Id.* At peak generating efficiency, turbine blade tips spin at 78–158 knots (nautical miles per hour), a speed similar to that exhibited by a helicopter or light airplane. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF DEF. RESEARCH & ENG'G, *supra* note 24, at 28. The spinning blades themselves present a radar cross section as big as or larger than such aircraft. *Id.*

⁸³ Raytheon Co., *supra* note 65, at 28.

⁸⁴ Clark County, Nev., v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 522 F.3d 437, 442 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting an expert study offered by petitioner). The proposed wind farm in question, to be located a few miles from a planned airport near Las Vegas, Nev., was to include 83 turbines that were 400 feet high. *Id.* at 438.

conditions.⁸⁵ At least one radar manufacturer characterizes wind turbines' effect on air traffic control systems as "severe."⁸⁶

Radar applications are not limited to the air traffic control context.⁸⁷ Other uses include air defense, missile warning, and weather detection.⁸⁸ Obstructional interference and clutter can degrade the performance of all these radar applications.⁸⁹ For example, the lowest point of a radar signal transmitted 15 kilometers from a missile defense early warning radar is approximately 510 feet above the ground,⁹⁰ virtually the same height as a typical utility-scale wind turbine as discussed above.⁹¹

In 1994, the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence ("MoD") launched a series of studies into wind farms' effects on radar system.⁹² Importantly, and unexpectedly, a 2004 trial demonstrated that PSR ability to track and detect aircraft was degraded even if the aircraft were flying at an altitude as high as 2,000 feet above ground level (approximately four or more times the height of typical turbines).⁹³ Besides the inability to effectively track different types of aircraft used in the trial, several false contacts were reported at all altitudes.⁹⁴ Later MoD trials confirmed these

⁸⁵ See generally Felix A. Losco & Thomas F. Collick, *When Wind, Wind Turbines, and Radar Mix—A Case Study*, 68 A.F. L. REV. 235 (2012) (detailing radar interference observed by air traffic controllers at Travis Air Force Base, Calif., caused by a 700-turbine wind farm).

⁸⁶ See generally Raytheon Co., *supra* note 65 (describing air traffic control problems resulting from wind turbine farms).

⁸⁷ OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF DEF. RESEARCH & ENG'G, *supra* note 24, at 15.

⁸⁸ *Id.*

⁸⁹ *Id.* at 16.

⁹⁰ *Id.* at 20 tbl.3.

⁹¹ See *supra* text accompanying notes 48–50.

⁹² OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF DEF. RESEARCH & ENG'G, *supra* note 24, at 33–36.

⁹³ *Id.* at 33.

⁹⁴ *Id.* at 34.

findings.⁹⁵ The degradations were attributed to shadowing and diffraction caused by the wind turbines.⁹⁶

To supplement the data accrued in the U.K. trials, the DoD conducted tests in Tyler, Minnesota, in 2004.⁹⁷ The results were consistent with the MoD's.⁹⁸ The Tyler results also suggested that in adverse weather conditions, wind farm-induced radar capability degradations occurred over a larger geographic area—even beyond the limits of the wind farm itself.⁹⁹

While the studies discussed above focused on land-based wind energy systems, offshore wind turbines present the same radar interference issues that onshore systems pose.¹⁰⁰ Offshore wind energy facilities also bring additional challenges.¹⁰¹ For example, a 2013 study determined that marine surface-search radars could have difficulty tracking vessels in or near wind farms.¹⁰²

Industry and government stakeholders have achieved limited success mitigating wind-turbine-induced radar interference.¹⁰³

⁹⁵ *Id.* at 35.

⁹⁶ *Id.* at 36.

⁹⁷ *Id.* at 38. Earlier U.S. testing (at King Mountain, Texas, in 2002) had suggested that wind farm effects on air traffic control radar were minimal, but the methodology of those tests were later determined to be deficient. *Id.* at 36–37. Specifically, the low number of flights performed and the profiles of the flights (altitude and distance from radar station) resulted in biased results. *Id.* at 37.

⁹⁸ OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF DEF. RESEARCH & ENG'G, *supra* note 24, at 39–40.

⁹⁹ *Id.* at 40.

¹⁰⁰ Samuel D. Perkins & Melanie A. Everett, *Offshore Wind Strategy Rollout: FAQs*, in OFFSHORE WIND POWER: CHALLENGES, ECONOMICS AND BENEFITS 227, 231 (Samuel D. Perkins & Melanie A. Everett eds. 2011).

¹⁰¹ See generally HAO LING ET AL., FINAL REPORT DE-EE0005380 - ASSESSMENT OF OFFSHORE WIND FARM EFFECTS ON SEA SURFACE, SUBSURFACE AND AIRBORNE ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS (2013), available at http://www1.eere.energy.gov/wind/pdfs/assessment_offshore_wind_effects_on_electronic_systems.pdf (reporting the results of a study commissioned by the U.S. Department of Energy ("DoE") regarding offshore wind turbine effects on electronic systems).

¹⁰² *Id.* at vii.

¹⁰³ Nat'l Renewable Energy Lab., *Large-Scale Offshore Wind Power in the United States: Assessment of Opportunities and Barriers*, in OFFSHORE WIND

Measures implemented on the radar side include hardware and software upgrades and installing “gap-filling” radar stations to cover the wind farms’ radar shadows.¹⁰⁴ Regarding the turbines themselves, manufacturers have applied “stealth” coatings to the exterior of the rotor blades.¹⁰⁵ But these measures have not proven to be panaceas, especially considering their increased costs and engineering requirements.¹⁰⁶

Radar interference is not the only way that wind turbines can affect military operations.¹⁰⁷ As is the case with most large electromechanical machinery, wind turbines have distinct electromagnetic signatures.¹⁰⁸ This unintended effect on the electromagnetic spectrum in the area around a wind farm can interfere with communications gear, surveillance systems, and offensive and defensive electronic warfare equipment.¹⁰⁹ Further, offshore turbines can interfere with underwater acoustic detection systems.¹¹⁰

Setting aside the risks associated with radar and other electromagnetic interference, wind turbines and wind farms also pose a far less technologically abstruse hazard to aviation—the risk of collision by low-flying aircraft.¹¹¹ Air traffic approaching and

POWER: CHALLENGES, ECONOMICS AND BENEFITS 1, 163 (Samuel D. Perkins & Melanie A. Everett eds. 2011).

¹⁰⁴ *Id.* The “gap-filling” radar sites serve “to fill in for radar coverage that may be lost due to wind farm clutter.” Perkins & Everett, *supra* note 100, at 231.

¹⁰⁵ *Id.*

¹⁰⁶ Raytheon Co., *supra* note 65.

¹⁰⁷ OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF DEF. RESEARCH & ENG’G, *supra* note 24, at 48–51.

¹⁰⁸ *Id.* at 50.

¹⁰⁹ *Id.* Electronic warfare is “[m]ilitary action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy.” DEP’T OF DEF., *Electronic warfare*, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2013).

¹¹⁰ HAO LING ET AL., *supra* note 101, at ix.

¹¹¹ Nat’l Renewable Energy Lab., *supra* note 103, at 163. These risks are similar to those posed by buildings, cellular phone towers, and radio broadcast antennae. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF DEF. RESEARCH & ENG’G, *supra* note 24, at 49. In April 2014, a single-engine privately owned and operated aircraft struck a

departing from airports operates at altitudes equivalent to or lower than the heights of common utility-scale wind turbines discussed above.¹¹² Military aircraft use certain training routes at similarly low altitudes to practice low-level navigation and other maneuvers.¹¹³ For the most part, these risks are well understood and can be mitigated by proper planning, installing warning lights, publishing notifications of the hazards, and classifying affected airspace appropriately.¹¹⁴

Wind farm construction activities, as well as the steady-state vehicular and personnel traffic associated with operational wind farms, bring security concerns to nearby military bases and other sensitive DoD infrastructure.¹¹⁵ Additionally, the height of the towers can allow enhanced visibility or sensor access over DoD facilities and operations that would otherwise be unobservable from ground level by unauthorized personnel.¹¹⁶

The technological and other risks to civil aviation, military aviation, and other military activities are but a small sample of the environmental, economic, and social impacts that a permitting authority must consider when reviewing a proposed wind farm

wind turbine near Highmore, S.D., during inclement weather. Joel Ebert & David Rookhuyzen, *Four dead after plane strikes wind turbine*, CAPITAL JOURNAL (Apr. 28, 2014), http://www.capjournal.com/access/four-dead-after-plane-strikes-wind-turbine/article_fef0a122-cf5b-11e3-a984-0019bb2963f4.html. The pilot and all three passengers were killed. *Id.*

¹¹² FED. AVIATION ADMIN., AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION MANUAL 4-3-1 (2014), available at http://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publications/atpubs/aim/aim0403.html#aim0403.html.1.

¹¹³ *Id.* at 3-5-2.

¹¹⁴ Nat'l Renewable Energy Lab., *supra* note 103, at 162–63. Warning lights, however, invite additional challenges from neighboring land owners and citizens' groups. PHILIP WARBURG, HARVEST THE WIND: AMERICA'S JOURNEY TO JOBS, ENERGY INDEPENDENCE, AND CLIMATE STABILITY 137–38 (2012). The lights also could attract migratory birds, increasing the already substantial likelihood of avian kills associated with wind farm operation. *Id.*

¹¹⁵ OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF DEF. RESEARCH & ENG'G, *supra* note 24, at 50.

¹¹⁶ *Id.*

site.¹¹⁷ The next section of this article explores the development of electricity generation facility permitting in the United States, both in general and in the specific context of wind turbines.

III. STATE AND LOCAL REGULATION OF ELECTRIC POWER GENERATION FACILITIES

When Thomas Edison flipped the switch, so to speak, at the Pearl Street Station in New York City on September 4, 1882, the U.S. electric utility industry was born.¹¹⁸ Pearl Street Station is recognized as the first commercial electricity generation facility in the United States.¹¹⁹ Servicing eighty-five customers, this facility and those like it, which developed soon afterward, could only be characterized as local interests.¹²⁰ They were therefore initially subject only to municipal regulation, if any.¹²¹ As the industry grew with increased demand, smaller producers combined to form or were absorbed by larger firms.¹²² This growth led to the emergence of state, rather than local, regulation of the electric industry, including the siting of generation facilities.¹²³

¹¹⁷ See generally Patricia E. Salkin, *Facility Siting and Permitting*, in THE LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY: EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLES 95 (Michael B. Gerrard ed. 2011) (surveying site permitting considerations for renewable energy projects).

¹¹⁸ JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, ET AL., ENERGY LAW AND POLICY 446 (1989).

¹¹⁹ *Id.*

¹²⁰ THE ENERGY LAW GROUP, ENERGY LAW AND POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 12-8 to 12-9 (2000).

¹²¹ TOMAIN ET AL., *supra* note 118, at 448.

¹²² THE ENERGY LAW GROUP, *supra* note 120, at 12-9.

¹²³ TOMAIN ET AL., *supra* note 118, at 448. The electric industry comprises three distinct phases: generation, transmission, and distribution. THE ENERGY LAW GROUP, *supra* note 120, at 12-1. Because wind farms are electricity generators, this article is most concerned with the generation phase, and therefore the discussion and analysis will deal primarily with permitting schema and other regulations on generation facility siting. It bears noting, however, that *facility siting* for all three phases of the industry is subject to state regulation. See Amy L. Stein, *The Tipping Point of Federalism*, 45 CONN. L. REV. 217, 219 n.2 (2012) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2012)). But see 16 U.S.C. § 824p (2012) (granting the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) authority

Congress moved to clarify the distinctions between federal and state responsibilities in the regulation of the electric industry in 1935.¹²⁴ The Federal Power Act¹²⁵ resolved a perceived “gap” in the regulation of interstate transmission and distribution of electricity,¹²⁶ but left generation (as well as *intrastate* transmission and distribution) in the purview of the states.¹²⁷ It has remained there for nearly eight decades.¹²⁸ This reservation of authority applies to the siting of renewable energy generation facilities as well.¹²⁹

There is no uniform approach to wind farm site permitting among the states.¹³⁰ In approximately a quarter of states, facility

to issue construction permits for transmission facilities to “be used for the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce” in areas designated by the Secretary of Energy as “national interest electric transmission corridor[s,]” provided that no state may approve the project in question, that the project does not meet state permitting criteria due to its interstate nature, or that a state commission or other permitting entity has withheld approval or imposed conditions on approval which would undercut national interests).

¹²⁴ Stein, *supra* note 123, at 220.

¹²⁵ 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a–828c.

¹²⁶ See THE ENERGY LAW GROUP, *supra* note 120, at 12-11 to 12-12 (discussing Pub. Utils. Comm’n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927), and the “Attleboro Gap” as the impetus for the Federal Power Act).

¹²⁷ See generally 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (reserving jurisdiction “over facilities used for the generation of electric energy or over facilities used in local distribution or only for the transmission of electric energy in intrastate commerce, or over facilities for the transmission of electric energy consumed wholly by the transmitter”).

¹²⁸ Stein, *supra* note 123, at 221.

¹²⁹ Salkin, *supra* note 117, at 103. Another reason that state and local governments have a preeminent role in wind farm siting is because of its land-use-planning implications—traditionally an area of local control. Salkin & Ostrow, *supra* note 10, at 1051.

¹³⁰ ASS’N OF FISH & WILDLIFE AGENCIES & U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., WIND POWER SITING REGULATIONS AND WILDLIFE GUIDELINES IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2007), available at <http://www.fws.gov/habitatconservation/windpower/afwa%20wind%20power%20final%20report.pdf>.

permitting is a local zoning matter.¹³¹ In others, the state public utilities commission issues permits.¹³² Still others divide responsibility based on the size of the prospective facility, with local governments permitting smaller scale projects while state agencies site the larger facilities.¹³³

Only a handful of states have statutory code provisions or administrative rules specifically addressing wind power siting.¹³⁴ These states include Colorado,¹³⁵ Minnesota,¹³⁶ North Carolina,¹³⁷ North Dakota,¹³⁸ Oregon,¹³⁹ South Dakota,¹⁴⁰ Vermont,¹⁴¹ and Wisconsin.¹⁴² Other states deal with wind farm siting as a matter of local government jurisdiction, apply conventional electric generation site permitting authorities, or apply siting authorities applicable to renewable energy generally.¹⁴³

¹³¹ *Id.* Local wind turbine ordinances may address issues including height restrictions, setback requirements, color limitations, and noise limits. Salkin, *supra* note 117, at 104–05.

¹³² ASS'N OF FISH & WILDLIFE AGENCIES & U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., *supra* note 130, at 2.

¹³³ Salkin & Ostrow, *supra* note 10, at 1066.

¹³⁴ See generally ASS'N OF FISH & WILDLIFE AGENCIES & U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., *supra* note 130 (surveying wind power information for all 50 states, including points of contact, installed power in MW, renewable portfolio standards, renewable energy incentives, siting authorities, and wildlife guidelines).

¹³⁵ COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30.7-101 (2013).

¹³⁶ MINN. STAT. § 216F.01 (2013); MINN. R. 7854.0100 (2013).

¹³⁷ N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.115 (2013). This Article will discuss the North Carolina statute in detail below.

¹³⁸ N.D. ADMIN. CODE 69-06-10-01 (2013). The North Dakota rules only apply to facilities generating 20 MW of electricity or less. *Id.*

¹³⁹ OR. ADMIN. R. 345-024-0010 (2013).

¹⁴⁰ S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 49-41B-1 (2013); S.D. ADMIN. R. 20:10:22:33.02 (2013).

¹⁴¹ VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 2480 (2013); tit. 18-ch. 1 VT. CODE R. 18-1 § 20 (2013).

¹⁴² WIS. STAT. § 196.378(4g) (2013); WIS. ADMIN. CODE, PSC § 128.01 (2013).

¹⁴³ Salkin, *supra* note 117, at 103–04. The legislature of Alabama considered, but did not pass, a wind-specific siting bill in April 2014. Chris Marr, *Alabama*

Some states, like New York, require comprehensive environmental reviews similar to those executed by the federal government under the National Environmental Policy Act¹⁴⁴ (“NEPA”).¹⁴⁵ NEPA and its state equivalents require permitting agencies in certain circumstances to take a “hard look” at how proposed projects may affect wildlife, water quality, aesthetics, and other environmental concerns.¹⁴⁶

The foregoing survey of permitting authorities pertains to geographic areas under the sovereign jurisdiction of the states. While the United States presently has no offshore wind generation capacity, many offshore projects are being financed, planned, or considered for permitting.¹⁴⁷ In the offshore context, the Submerged Lands Act of 1953¹⁴⁸ defines a coastal state’s geographic jurisdiction to extend to a line three nautical miles from the coast.¹⁴⁹ Wind turbines situated within these state territorial waters would be subject to state or local permitting as described above.¹⁵⁰ The Coastal Zone Management Act¹⁵¹ (“CZMA”) provides that, even in federal waters seaward of the three-mile line, states with approved coastal zone management plans can require that federal permitting actions affecting the state’s coastal zone be consistent with the state’s planning efforts and regulations.¹⁵² These consistency

Puts Strict Limits on Wind Farms in Two Counties but Passes No State Rules, BLOOMBERG BNA DAILY ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT (April 7, 2014).

¹⁴⁴ 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2012).

¹⁴⁵ Salkin, *supra* note 117, at 96.

¹⁴⁶ *Id.* at 96–97.

¹⁴⁷ Nat’l Renewable Energy Lab., *supra* note 103, at 7.

¹⁴⁸ 43 U.S.C. § 1301 (2012).

¹⁴⁹ 43 U.S.C. § 1312. States’ sovereignty within the three-mile zone remains subject to federal preemption in the areas of “commerce, navigation, national defense, and international affairs . . .” § 1314(a).

¹⁵⁰ Nat’l Renewable Energy Lab., *supra* note 103, at 133–34.

¹⁵¹ 16 U.S.C. § 1451 (2012).

¹⁵² 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c) (2012). A detailed consideration of federal wind farm siting (where states’ interests are not involved) is beyond the scope of this article.

reviews will almost always come into play for offshore wind farms because, among other possible effects, the transmission lines by necessity will traverse the coastal state's jurisdictional waters.¹⁵³

The following section explains the ways in which the federal government can protect its interests in state wind siting actions, especially regarding the risks to aviation and military activities described earlier.

IV. FEDERAL INFLUENCE ON STATE OR LOCAL PERMITTING OF WIND FARM SITING

Even in areas where the state has sole jurisdiction to permit constructing a wind farm, a variety of federal agencies may also be involved.¹⁵⁴ For example, turbines erected on wetlands or in navigable waters may require a Clean Water Act¹⁵⁵ permit from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ("CoE").¹⁵⁶ Outside of permitting, several federal programs offer financial subsidies or tax credits for development of renewable energy sources.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵³ Adam Vann, *Wind Energy: Offshore Permitting*, in OFFSHORE WIND POWER: CHALLENGES, ECONOMICS AND BENEFITS 213, 215 (Samuel D. Perkins & Melanie A. Everett eds. 2011). Note that the siting of the transmission infrastructure may be subject to state permitting requirements independent of both the CZMA consistency review and the federal permitting for constructing the generation facility. *Id.*

¹⁵⁴ Salkin & Ostrow, *supra* note 10, at 1076–77.

¹⁵⁵ 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2012).

¹⁵⁶ Salkin & Ostrow, *supra* note 10, at 1077. *See generally* 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2012) (detailing CoE's program for permitting discharges of dredged or fill materials into U.S. waters). Other agencies that have limited preemption or review obligations regarding state wind farm permitting include the DoE, the FERC, the Bureau of Land Management, the National Park Service, the Forest Service, the Minerals Management Service, the Fish and Wildlife Service, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, and the Environmental Protection Agency. Salkin, *supra* note 117, at 103; Salkin & Ostrow, *supra* note 10, at 1066.

¹⁵⁷ Salkin & Ostrow, *supra* note 10, at 1078–1080.

Regarding wind farms' effects on aviation, including physical obstruction and interference with radar, the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") is the de facto lead agency to voice the federal government's concerns.¹⁵⁸ In the Federal Aviation Act,¹⁵⁹ Congress required the Secretary of Transportation to assess any proposed construction or alteration of structures that could "result in an obstruction of the navigable airspace or an interference with air navigation facilities and equipment or the navigable airspace . . ."¹⁶⁰ The statute prescribes the following standards:

[T]he Secretary shall conduct an aeronautical study to decide the extent of any adverse impact on the safe and efficient use of the airspace, facilities, or equipment. In conducting the study, the Secretary shall consider factors relevant to the efficient and effective use of the navigable airspace, including-

- (A) the impact on arrival, departure, and en route procedures for aircraft operating under visual flight rules;
- (B) the impact on arrival, departure, and en route procedures for aircraft operating under instrument flight rules;
- (C) the impact on existing public-use airports and aeronautical facilities;
- (D) the impact on planned public-use airports and aeronautical facilities; and
- (E) the cumulative impact resulting from the proposed construction or alteration of a structure when combined with the impact of other existing or proposed structures.¹⁶¹

The FAA implements these statutory requirements through its Obstruction Evaluation/Airport Airspace Analysis ("OE/AAA") program.¹⁶²

¹⁵⁸ *Id.* at 1078.

¹⁵⁹ 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (2012).

¹⁶⁰ 49 U.S.C. § 44718(b)(1).

¹⁶¹ *Id.*

¹⁶² See generally FED. AVIATION ADMIN., *Obstruction Evaluation / Airport Airspace Analysis (OE/AAA)*, <https://oeaaa.faa.gov/oeaaa/external/portal.jsp> (last visited Mar. 8, 2014) (providing an overview of the OE/AAA process). Title 14, Part 77, of the Code of Federal Regulations, "Safe, Efficient Use, and Preservation of the Navigable Airspace" ("Part 77"), sets forth the OE/AAA program.

The OE/AAA program requires notification to the FAA before constructing or altering any structure higher than 200 feet above ground level, regardless of location.¹⁶³ It also applies to lower structures if they are within certain horizontal distances of an airport runway and the structure vertically intersects an imaginary graded slope from the runway.¹⁶⁴ Proponents of the construction or alteration (termed “sponsors” by FAA Form 7460-1, “Notice of Proposed Construction or Alteration”)¹⁶⁵ must submit the required notice to the FAA no later than 45 days before commencing construction or applying for a permit, whichever comes first.¹⁶⁶

The threshold determination the FAA makes in the OE/AAA process is whether the structure in question would be an “obstruction to air navigation” within the meaning of the implementing regulation.¹⁶⁷ Chief among the applicable standards is whether the structure is 499 feet high or higher regardless of location—if it is, then it is an obstruction.¹⁶⁸ Lower heights apply to structures that are closer to airports.¹⁶⁹ The FAA presumes obstructions to be “hazards to air navigation” (an OE/AAA term of art discussed in detail below) unless a later aeronautical study concludes otherwise.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶³ 14 C.F.R. § 77.9(a) (2014).

¹⁶⁴ § 77.9(b). At larger airports (with runways longer than 3,200 feet), the slope is 100 to 1, out to a distance of 20,000 feet horizontally from the runway. § 77.9(b)(1). So a tower one mile (5,280 feet) away from a large airport would trigger Part 77’s notice requirement if it was higher than 52.8 feet. Smaller airports have a steeper (therefore more lenient to proposed structures) slope—50 to 1, out to a distance of 10,000 feet. § 77.9(b)(2). At heliports, the slope is 25 to 1, out to 5,000 feet. § 77.9(b)(3).

¹⁶⁵ See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., *Notice of Proposed Construction or Alteration*, http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Form/FAA%20Form%207460-1_2012.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2014).

¹⁶⁶ 14 C.F.R. § 77.9(b) (2014).

¹⁶⁷ See § 77.17 (promulgating the standards by which the FAA determines that structures are obstructions).

¹⁶⁸ § 77.17(a)(1).

¹⁶⁹ § 77.17(a)(2)-(5).

¹⁷⁰ § 77.15(b).

Even if a proposed project would not qualify as an obstruction due to its height, it may still require an aeronautical study if it “is found to have physical or electromagnetic radiation effect on the operation of air navigation facilities.”¹⁷¹ The term “air navigation facilities” is understood to include air traffic control radar systems.¹⁷²

The aeronautical study’s purpose “is to determine whether the aeronautical effects of the specific proposal and, where appropriate, the cumulative impact resulting from the proposed construction or alteration when combined with the effects of other existing or proposed structures, would constitute a hazard to air navigation.”¹⁷³ A study can be initiated at the sponsor’s request or by the FAA’s unilateral decision.¹⁷⁴ The FAA evaluates a variety of factors in any given study, including “[t]he potential effect on [air traffic control], direction finders, [air traffic control] tower line-of-sight visibility, and physical or electromagnetic effects on air navigation, communication facilities, and other surveillance systems.”¹⁷⁵ The process provides an opportunity for public comment during the aeronautical study.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷¹ FED AVIATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., ORDER JO 7400.2J, PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING AIRSPACE MATTERS ¶ 6-3-3 (2012). *See also* Town of Barnstable, Mass. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 740 F.3d 681, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (affirming FAA’s internal policy treating electromagnetic radiation effect as a coequal threshold factor along with the obstruction determination).

¹⁷² *See* Town of Barnstable, 740 F.3d at 688 (equating “radar interference” with electromagnetic radiation effect).

¹⁷³ § 77.25(b).

¹⁷⁴ § 77.25(c).

¹⁷⁵ § 77.29(a)(6). The complete list of factors is as follows:

- (1) The impact on arrival, departure, and en route procedures for aircraft operating under visual flight rules;
- (2) The impact on arrival, departure, and en route procedures for aircraft operating under instrument flight rules;
- (3) The impact on existing and planned public use airports;
- (4) Airport traffic capacity of existing public use airports and public use airport development plans received before the issuance of the final determination;

Based on its assessment of the prescribed factors, the FAA will either issue a "Determination of Hazard to Air Navigation" or a "Determination of No Hazard to Air Navigation."¹⁷⁷ The FAA may premise a "No Hazard" determination on the study's outright conclusion that the structure will not have a substantial impact on aviation, or it may subject the determination to conditions like marking or lighting, supplemental notice obligations, or other mitigating measures.¹⁷⁸ Sponsors or other interested parties may appeal the FAA's determination by submitting a petition for discretionary review within 30 days.¹⁷⁹ The FAA may deny the petition for review altogether,¹⁸⁰ or, if it grants review, may "revise, affirm, or reverse" its original determination after further study.¹⁸¹

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- (5) Minimum obstacle clearance altitudes, minimum instrument flight rules altitudes, approved or planned instrument approach procedures, and departure procedures;
 - (6) The potential effect on ATC radar, direction finders, ATC tower line-of-sight visibility, and physical or electromagnetic effects on air navigation, communication facilities, and other surveillance systems;
 - (7) The aeronautical effects resulting from the cumulative impact of a proposed construction or alteration of a structure when combined with the effects of other existing or proposed structures.

Id.

¹⁷⁶ R. Patrick Phillips, *Oh No! Not Another Tower!*, EXPERIMENTAL AIRCRAFT ASS'N (May 1999), <http://209.83.103.25/home/govt/legal/articles/Oh%20No!%20Not%20Another%20Tower!.asp>.

¹⁷⁷ § 77.31(c)–(d). *See generally* FED AVIATION ADMIN., *supra* note 171, at chapter 7 (laying out the FAA's determination procedures in greater detail than does Part 77).

¹⁷⁸ § 77.31(d).

¹⁷⁹ § 77.37(a). To be eligible to submit a petition for discretionary review, non-sponsoring parties must have "provided a substantive aeronautical comment on a proposal in an aeronautical study" or have such a comment without having had an opportunity to submit it. *Id.* *See also* § 77.39(b).

¹⁸⁰ § 77.41(b).

¹⁸¹ § 77.41(c).

A Determination of Hazard, in and of itself, does not preclude the contemplated construction or alteration, at least as a matter of federal law.¹⁸² But the OE/AAA program requires the FAA to “advise all known interested persons” of the aeronautical study results.¹⁸³ FAA determinations are exceptionally persuasive and have a high likelihood of being dispositive factors in other agencies’ deliberations on permitting.¹⁸⁴ Those other agencies—federal, state, or local—may deny construction permits or operating licenses based on a Determination of Hazard or a sponsor’s failure or refusal to comply with any conditions placed on a Determination of No Hazard.¹⁸⁵ Such denial may be required by local or state law, or may be discretionary.¹⁸⁶ If a structure is built or altered despite a Determination of Hazard, the FAA could alter or eliminate air traffic patterns and an individual airport’s approach or departure procedures in light of the proposed hazards, which in turn could increase travel costs or otherwise impede airport users’ ability to travel to or from the local airport.¹⁸⁷

In 2011, Congress amended the Federal Aviation Act to require the FAA to give voice in the OE/AAA aeronautical study process to the DoD and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security

¹⁸² Phillips, *supra* note 176.

¹⁸³ § 77.31(a).

¹⁸⁴ See *Town of Barnstable, Mass. v. Fed. Aviation Admin.*, 659 F.3d 28, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (finding it likely that the U.S. Department of the Interior would revoke or modify a federal wind lease for the Cape Wind project in Nantucket Sound if the FAA had issued a Determination of Hazard to Air Navigation). The court noted that “Interior would take an FAA finding of hazard very, very seriously.” *Id.* at 32.

¹⁸⁵ Phillips, *supra* note 176. For example, the Federal Communications Commission may not issue an operating permit if the FAA has determined that a broadcast tower is a hazard to air navigation. *Id.*

¹⁸⁶ See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.120(c) (2013) (providing that “[n]o permit for a wind energy facility or wind energy facility expansion shall become effective until the Department [that may grant the permit] has received and reviewed the ‘Determination of No Hazard to Air Navigation’ issued by the [FAA] for the facility”).

¹⁸⁷ *Id.*

("DHS").¹⁸⁸ One year earlier, the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011¹⁸⁹ ("NDAA 2011") required the DoD "to ensure that the robust development of renewable energy sources and the increased resiliency of the commercial electrical grid may move forward in the United States, while minimizing or mitigating any adverse impacts on military operations and readiness."¹⁹⁰ This legislation helped refine the role of the DoD Siting Clearinghouse ("the Clearinghouse") in the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment ("DUSD-I&E").¹⁹¹ The Clearinghouse's mission is to "[p]rotect DoD mission capabilities from incompatible development by collaborating with DoD Components and external stakeholders to prevent, minimize, or mitigate adverse impacts on military operations, readiness, and testing."¹⁹²

The DoD implemented the relevant NDAA 2011 requirements in Title 14, Part 211, of the Code of Federal Regulations, "Mission Compatibility Evaluation Process" ("Part 211"). Section 211.4(b) of that part ties the Clearinghouse's mission directly to the FAA's OE/AAA program: "The participation of the DoD in the process of

¹⁸⁸ National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 332, 125 Stat. 1298, 1369 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 44718(e)). Note that the DHS is the parent cabinet department of the U.S. Coast Guard, the only branch of the U.S. armed forces not organizationally located within the DoD. 14 U.S.C. § 3(a) (2012).

¹⁸⁹ Pub. L. No. 111-383, 124 Stat. 1298.

¹⁹⁰ *Id.* at § 358, 124 Stat. at 4198.

¹⁹¹ *Id.* at § 358(b)(1)(B), 124 Stat. at 4198. The Clearinghouse was actually established in 2010 to provide "a 'one-stop-shop' for comprehensive, expedited evaluation of energy projects and their potential effect on DoD operations." Dep't of Def. Siting Clearinghouse, U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, *DoD Siting Clearinghouse*, <http://www.acq.osd.mil/dodsc/> (last visited Mar. 9, 2014). The DUSD-I&E's mission is to "[p]rovide installation assets and services necessary to support [U.S.] military forces in a cost effective, safe, sustainable, and environmentally sound manner." Office of the Deputy Under Sec'y of Def. for Installations and Env't, *DUSD(I&E) – About I&E*, U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, http://www.acq.osd.mil/ie/ie_orgchart.shtml (last visited Aug. 22, 2014).

¹⁹² Dep't of Def. Siting Clearinghouse, *supra* note 191.

the [FAA] conducted pursuant to 49 U.S.C. [§] 44718 shall be conducted in accordance with this part. *No other process shall be used by a DoD Component.*”¹⁹³

NDAA 2011 requires the Secretary of Defense to designate a senior official to serve as executive agent and to establish a “clearinghouse” for OE/AAA review matters.¹⁹⁴ Part 211 assigns this senior official responsibility to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (“USD-AT&L”).¹⁹⁵ The Clearinghouse was established within the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment.¹⁹⁶

Where the OE/AAA process is designed to determine whether a project poses a hazard to air navigation, Clearinghouse functions and processes hinge upon the determination whether the project poses “an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States.”¹⁹⁷ Part 211 defines this term as follows:

The construction, alteration, establishment, or expansion, or the proposed construction, alteration, establishment, or expansion, of a structure or sanitary landfill that would:

- (1) Endanger safety in air commerce, related to the activities of the DoD.
- (2) Interfere with the efficient use and preservation of the navigable airspace and of airport traffic capacity at public-use airports, related to the activities of the DoD.

¹⁹³ Emphasis added.

¹⁹⁴ NDAA 2011 § 358(b)(1), 124 Stat. at 4198.

¹⁹⁵ 32 C.F.R. § 211.5(b) (2013).

¹⁹⁶ *Id.* at § 211.5(d).

¹⁹⁷ NDAA 2011 § 358(e)(2); *see also* 32 C.F.R. § 211.1(a) (stating that the purpose of Part 211’s procedures is “to provide [a] formal review of projects for which applications are filed with the Secretary of Transportation under 49 U.S.C. [§] 44718, to determine if they pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States”); OFFICE OF THE UNDER SEC’Y OF DEF. FOR ACQUISITION, TECH., & LOGISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON UNACCEPTABLE RISK TO NATIONAL SECURITY FROM COMMERCIAL ENERGY PROJECTS (2013), *available at* <http://www.acq.osd.mil/dodsc/library/RTC%20UR%20Final.pdf> (summarizing DoD’s implementation of NDAA 2011’s mission compatibility evaluation requirements).

- (3) Significantly impair or degrade the capability of the DoD to conduct training, research, development, testing, and evaluation, and operations or to maintain military readiness.¹⁹⁸

The first two factors align very closely with the traditional OE/AAA analysis as described above.¹⁹⁹ The third is far more expansive, to capture virtually all domestic military activity.²⁰⁰

Another key concept in the Clearinghouse's procedures is identifying mitigating measures.²⁰¹ Sponsors of projects can modify their proposals or change the proposed locations to remedy any adverse impacts on DoD activities.²⁰² Mitigation is not limited to actions the sponsor might undertake; the DoD itself must consider changing its activities, facilities, or equipment to accommodate the proposed project.²⁰³ Sponsors can elect to contribute financially to DoD's efforts in this regard.²⁰⁴

The Clearinghouse will assess proposed projects in one of two contexts. A "formal review" is triggered by the Clearinghouse's receipt from the FAA of a properly filed OE/AAA application.²⁰⁵ Upon receipt, the Clearinghouse will provide the application to any service branch or other DoD component that may have an interest.²⁰⁶ Those components then have twenty days to comment on or make recommendations regarding the application.²⁰⁷ Within thirty days of initial receipt of the application from the FAA, the Clearinghouse must either report to FAA that the project "will not

¹⁹⁸ 32 C.F.R. § 211.3(l) (2012).

¹⁹⁹ See *supra* text accompanying notes 158–87.

²⁰⁰ This is not to suggest that any impact whatsoever on any DoD activity will trigger an unacceptable risk finding. Recall that the Part 211 definition requires a *significant* impairment or degradation. § 211.3(l)(3).

²⁰¹ NDAA 2011 § 358(e)(1); see also 32 C.F.R. § 211.9 (discussing various types of mitigation).

²⁰² 32 C.F.R. § 211.9(b).

²⁰³ See *id.* § 211.9(a).

²⁰⁴ *Id.* § 211.9(b)(3).

²⁰⁵ *Id.* § 211.6(a).

²⁰⁶ *Id.* § 211.6(a)(1).

²⁰⁷ *Id.* § 211.6(a)(2).

have an adverse impact on military operations and readiness,”²⁰⁸ or if it may have such an impact, contact the sponsor directly with an offer to discuss mitigation strategies.²⁰⁹ If the DoD lead component and sponsor reach an agreement on mitigation, the sponsor must then amend his or her OE/AAA application accordingly.²¹⁰

If there is no agreement, or if the sponsor refuses to participate in mitigation discussions at the outset, the Clearinghouse will consider the comments and recommendations of the interested DoD components and make a recommendation up the chain of command regarding whether the project poses an unacceptable risk to national security.²¹¹ The first stop is with USD-AT&L, in his or her capacity as the “senior official” within the meaning of NDAA 2011.²¹²

²⁰⁸ *Id.* § 211.6(a)(3)(i).

²⁰⁹ *Id.* § 211.6(a)(3)(ii)(A). The Clearinghouse will designate an appropriate DoD component to take the lead on mitigation negotiations. *Id.* § 211.6(a)(3)(ii)(B). It will also invite the DHS and the FAA to participate. *Id.* § 211.6(b).

²¹⁰ *Id.* § 211.6(b)(1)(ii). The Clearinghouse publishes significant mitigation agreements on its web site. *See, e.g.*, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., U.S. DEP’T OF THE NAVY, & TEX. WIND GROUP, MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT ON RIVIERA I WIND TURBINE FARM, KINGSVILLE, TX (2012), *available at* <http://greenfleet.dodlive.mil/files/2012/04/TWG-MOA.pdf> (documenting an agreement regarding the Riviera I Wind Turbine Farm near Naval Air Station Kingsville, Texas); U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., U.S. DEP’T OF THE NAVY, E.ON CLIMATE & RENEWABLES, N. AM., & PETRONILLA WIND FARM, LLC, DEVELOPMENT OF A WIND TURBINE FARM IN NUECES COUNTY, TEXAS (2012), *available at* <http://greenfleet.dodlive.mil/files/2012/11/E.ON-NAS-Kingsville-Final-MOA-with-Signatures.pdf> (documenting an agreement regarding the Petronilla Wind project near Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, Tex.); INVENERGY WIND DEV., LLC, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., & U.S. AIR FORCE, PANTEGO WIND ENERGY PROJECT AGREEMENT (2014), *available at* http://www.acq.osd.mil/dodsc/library/Final%20Pantego%20agreement_6JAN2014%20As%20Amended%20for%20Public%20View.pdf (documenting an agreement regarding the Pantego Wind Energy Project near Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, North Carolina).

²¹¹ 32 C.F.R. § 211.6.

²¹² *Id.*

The senior official may either concur or not concur with the Clearinghouse's recommendation, and in turn will forward the application to the "senior officer" (not to be confused with "senior official") who is ultimately authorized to convey the DoD's position to the Secretary of Transportation.²¹³ The Deputy Secretary of Defense acts as senior officer for this purpose.²¹⁴ He or she will articulate to the Secretary of Transportation whether the proposed project poses an unacceptable risk to national security and, if it does, on what grounds the DoD reached that conclusion.²¹⁵ Formal determinations of unacceptable risk to national security by the senior officer require notification to Congress.²¹⁶

Besides the "formal review" procedure just described, the Clearinghouse can also informally review a proposal at the request of the project's proponent.²¹⁷ When a proponent submits a request for an informal review to the Clearinghouse, the Clearinghouse will in turn distribute the request to the service branches or other DoD components that may have an interest.²¹⁸ Those components will review, comment, and make recommendations.²¹⁹

²¹³ *Id.*; see also NDAA 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 358(e)(4), 124 Stat. 4200-01 (limiting delegation of "senior officer" status from the Secretary of Defense to the following three positions: Deputy Secretary of Defense, the USD-AT&L, and the Principal Deputy USD-AT&L).

²¹⁴ 32 C.F.R. § 211.5(a).

²¹⁵ *Id.* § 211.6.

²¹⁶ NDAA 2011 § 358(e)(3).

²¹⁷ 32 C.F.R. § 211.7; see also NDAA 2011 § 358(c)(3), 124 Stat. 4199 (requiring the DoD to "establish procedures for . . . the coordinated consideration of and response to a request for a review received from State and local officials or the developer of a renewable energy development or other energy project, . . . and ensure a coordinated Department response . . ."). The requester could also be a state or local government. 32 C.F.R. § 211.7(b)(2) (ii)(B).

²¹⁸ *Id.* § 211.7(b). If the request is made to a DoD organization other than the Clearinghouse (e.g., a nearby military installation), Part 211 requires the DoD component involved to forward the request to the Clearinghouse, unless it has been previously assigned by the Clearinghouse to conduct mitigation discussions regarding the project at issue. *Id.* § 211.8.

²¹⁹ *Id.* § 211.7(b)(1).

After reviewing those comments and recommendations, the Clearinghouse may determine that the proposal will not adversely impact DoD activities.²²⁰ If the Clearinghouse so determines, it will relay that determination to the requester with the caveats that the informal determination does not substitute for a completed OE/AAA determination by the FAA and that it is not binding on the DoD.²²¹ If the Clearinghouse determines that the proposed project *would* have an adverse impact, it will invite the requester to participate in mitigation discussions.²²²

In 2012, the DoD reported to Congress that the Clearinghouse had reviewed a backlog of 506 renewable energy projects, finding no adverse impact in 486 and entering mitigation discussions or further study in the remaining 20, but ultimately not determining that any were unacceptable risks to national security.²²³ Additionally, the Clearinghouse conducted formal reviews of 1,769 OE/AAA applications.²²⁴ Of those, 1,730 were determined “to have little or no impact on” DoD activities.²²⁵ The remainder, as of the date of the DoD’s report to Congress, were subject to further analysis.²²⁶ Again, the DoD reported no unacceptable risks to national security, but ten projects were subject to mitigation negotiations.²²⁷

²²⁰ *Id.* § 211.7(b)(2)(i).

²²¹ *Id.*

²²² *Id.* § 211.7(b)(2)(ii)(A). If the requester is a state or local government, the Clearinghouse will simply inform the requester of the determination without initiating mitigation discussions. § 211.7(b)(2)(ii)(B).

²²³ DEP’T OF DEF. SITING CLEARINGHOUSE, U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 2 (2012), *available at* <http://www.acq.osd.mil/dodsc/library/fy2012-rpt-to-congress.pdf>.

²²⁴ DEP’T OF DEF. SITING CLEARINGHOUSE, U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS – CALENDAR YEAR 2012 1 (2013), *available at* <http://www.acq.osd.mil/dodsc/library/fy2013-rpt-to-congress.pdf>.

²²⁵ *Id.* DoD reported to Congress that those 1,730 projects totaled approximately 38 gigawatts of renewable power. *Id.*

²²⁶ *Id.*

²²⁷ *Id.* at 2.

Outside of the OE/AAA and Clearinghouse processes, the DoD has at times sought to collaborate with state officials in the planning and site evaluation for renewable energy projects. For example, in 2011 the DoD entered into a memorandum of understanding with the California Department of Fish and Game, the California Energy Commission, the U.S. Bureau of Land Management, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to participate in California's Renewable Energy Action Team and Desert Renewable Energy Conservation Plan.²²⁸ The parties agreed to:

[w]ork together on the development of additional renewable energy resources in California's Mojave and Colorado Desert Regions, including identifying, as far in advance as practicable, those geographic areas and technical and environmental features that merit heightened consideration so that renewable energy project and transmission line development is consistent with and does not impede DoD's military mission.²²⁹

With one exception, the state siting authorities, wind-specific or otherwise, discussed in the previous section, do not expressly address the consideration of military equities. The upcoming section will examine the sole exception.

V. NORTH CAROLINA'S WIND ENERGY FACILITY PERMITTING STATUTE

On March 28, 2013, N.C. Representative John Bell introduced House Bill 484 ("H.B. 484"), entitled "Permitting of Wind Energy Facilities" to the N.C. General Assembly.²³⁰ H.B. 484 would

²²⁸ CAL. DEP'T OF FISH & GAME, CAL. ENERGY COMM'N, U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., & U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING REGARDING PARTICIPATION AND ENGAGEMENT IN THE CALIFORNIA RENEWABLE ENERGY ACTION TEAM AND THE DESERT RENEWABLE ENERGY CONSERVATION PLAN (2011), *available at* http://www.drecp.org/documents/docs/Renewable_Energy_Action_Team_and_Dept_of_Defense_MOU_Dec_2011.pdf.

²²⁹ *Id.* at 4.

²³⁰ H.B. 484, 2013 Gen. Assemb. Sess. (N.C. 2013), <http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/Applications/BillLookUp/LoadBillDocument.aspx?SessionCode=2013&DocNu>

establish procedures and requirements for any person to obtain a permit from the state Department of Environment and Natural Resources (“DENR”) to construct a wind energy facility in the state.²³¹ Among its comprehensive requirements, the bill would specifically require identifying potential impacts to military activities and engagement with nearby military base officials during the site evaluation process.²³²

On May 1, 2013, the N.C. House of Representatives passed H.B. 484 with 112 votes in favor and only 2 opposed.²³³ Bell touted the passage as “a huge win for protecting our military’s low-altitude training routes, bombing practice ranges and other critical military interests in North Carolina”²³⁴ The North Carolina Senate passed the bill unanimously with minor amendments on May 14,²³⁵ and the House approved the amended bill the next day with 111 in favor and just 1 opposed.²³⁶ Governor Pat McCrory signed the bill into law on May 17.²³⁷ The law is codified in Chapter 143, Article 21C, of the North Carolina

m=2436&SeqNum=0; see also Rep. Chuck McGrady, *Preserving Military Readiness* (May 1, 2013), <http://nchouse117.com/preserving-military-readiness/> (announcing H.B. 484’s passage in the state house).

²³¹ N.C. H.B. 484.

²³² *Id.*

²³³ N.C. Gen. Assemb., *House of Representatives Roll-Call Transcript* (May 1, 2013), available at <http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/gascripts/voteHistory/RollCallVoteTranscript.pl?sSession=2013&sChamber=H&RCS=424>.

²³⁴ Rep. Chuck McGrady, *supra* note 230.

²³⁵ N.C. Gen. Assemb., *Senate Roll-Call Transcript* (May 14, 2013), available at <http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/gascripts/voteHistory/RollCallVoteTranscript.pl?sSession=2013&sChamber=s&RCS=345>.

²³⁶ N.C. Gen. Assemb., *House of Representatives Roll-Call Transcript* (May 15, 2013), available at <http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/gascripts/voteHistory/RollCallVoteTranscript.pl?sSession=2013&sChamber=h&RCS=760>.

²³⁷ Andrew M. Ballard, North Carolina Governor Signs Bill on Siting, *Operating Wind Energy Facilities*, BLOOMBERG BNA ENERGY AND CLIMATE REPORT, May 20, 2013.

General Statutes, “Permitting of Wind Energy Facilities” (“Article 21C”).²³⁸

Article 21C provides that “[n]o person shall undertake construction, operation, or expansion activities associated with a wind energy facility in this State without first obtaining a permit from the [DENR].”²³⁹ Six months before even applying for such a permit, however, the prospective applicant must request a “preapplication site evaluation meeting” through the DENR.²⁴⁰

In the “preapplication package,” the applicant must describe the proposed facility or expansion, provide a construction and operation timeline, list all agencies (local, state, and federal) from which additional permits will be required, describe expected wildlife impacts, and disclose “any known potential impacts of the proposed wind energy project location on civil air navigation or military air navigation routes, air traffic control areas, military training routes, special-use air space, radar, or other potentially affected military operations.”²⁴¹

The DENR must schedule the meeting no later than four months before the applicant files the permit application.²⁴² Article 21C further requires DENR to invite potential outside stakeholders to participate in the preapplication meeting, including “the commanding military officer or the commanding military officer’s designee of any potentially affected major military installation”²⁴³ The purpose of the preapplication meeting is

²³⁸ N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.115 (2013).

²³⁹ § 143-215.116. The term “wind energy facility” is defined as “the turbines, accessory buildings, transmission facilities, and any other equipment necessary for the operation of the facility that cumulatively, with any other wind energy facility whose turbines are located within one-half mile of one another, have a rated capacity of one megawatt or more of energy.” § 143-215.115(2).

²⁴⁰ § 143-215.117(a).

²⁴¹ *Id.* § 143-215.117(b).

²⁴² *Id.* § 143-215.117(a).

²⁴³ *Id.* § 143-215.117(c). The statute also lists the CoE, the FWS, the state Wildlife Resources Commission (WRC), and “any other party that the

to determine if the project will pose a threat to civil or military aviation, other military activities, or natural resources.²⁴⁴ Article 21C requires yet another advance meeting before submitting a perfected application for a permit—this time a scoping meeting between the prospective applicant and the DENR.²⁴⁵ Again, the DENR must invite other participants, including the FAA and the military representatives described above.²⁴⁶

After the site evaluation and scoping meetings, the applicant may then file his or her application for a permit to construct or expand the wind facility in question.²⁴⁷ Among its many required procedural and substantive requirements,²⁴⁸ Article 21C requires applicants to show the extent to which they have complied with OE/AAA or Clearinghouse processes.²⁴⁹ To apply for a permit, a

Department deems relevant.” *Id.* Recall that 32 C.F.R. § 211.8 requires DoD components to forward such matters to the Clearinghouse unless they have been previously designated by the Clearinghouse to engage in discussions on the matter in question. *Supra* note 218.

²⁴⁴ N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.117(a) (2013).

²⁴⁵ *Id.* § 143-215.118(a).

²⁴⁶ *Id.* § 143-215.118(b). The statute also lists the WRC, the FWS, and governments of affected municipalities. *Id.*

²⁴⁷ § 143-215.119.

²⁴⁸ These requirements include a project description with a map, a deed or lease reflecting the legal right to develop the facility, identities of adjacent landowners, a noise impact study, a shadow flicker study, a natural resource a wildlife impact study, a decommissioning plan, a prima facie showing of the permit approval criteria in § 143-215.120 (discussed *infra* at the text accompanying notes 255–58), and a \$3,500 application fee. § 143-215.119(a).

²⁴⁹ Article 21C expressly requires the following items relevant to military installations and operations:

- (5) A description of civil air navigation or military air navigation routes, air traffic control areas, military training routes, special-use air space, radar, or other military operations that may be affected by the construction or operation of the proposed wind energy facility or proposed wind energy facility expansion.
- (6) Documentation that addresses any potential adverse impact on military operations and readiness as identified by the ...

wind farm developer must have either obtained a *completed* OE/AAA determination from the FAA (in which case the DoD would have provided input to the FAA through Part 211's Clearinghouse procedures) or must have initiated an informal review request to the Clearinghouse.²⁵⁰

The statute requires the DENR then to notify military officials at the potentially affected bases as well as the appropriate local government officials.²⁵¹ Along with the notification, the DENR must request feedback on potential adverse impacts.²⁵² Upon request from these parties, the DENR must provide the permit application with all supplementary materials in its entirety, except for confidential or trade secret information.²⁵³

Clearinghouse pursuant to [Part 211] . . . and any mitigation actions agreed to by the applicant.

- (7) Documentation that the applicant has either (i) submitted [FAA] Form 7460-1 for the turbines associated with the proposed wind energy facility or proposed wind energy facility expansion or (ii) initiated an informal review by the . . . Clearinghouse of the proposed wind energy facility or proposed wind energy facility expansion. If the applicant has submitted [FAA] Form 7460-1 in order to fulfill the requirements of this subdivision, the applicant shall provide any determination reached by the [FAA] at the time the application is submitted to the [DENR]. If the [FAA] has not made a determination at the time the application is submitted to the [DENR], the application shall include a description of the status of the applicant's engagement with the [FAA] *and the . . . Clearinghouse*.

Id. (emphasis added).

²⁵⁰ *Id.* Note the statutory language quoted *supra* at note 249 requiring the applicant to "include a description of the status of the applicant's engagement with [the] Clearinghouse" if the OE/AAA determination is not complete.

²⁵¹ *Id.* § 143-215.119(d).

²⁵² *Id.* Regarding the information the DENR requests from military officials, the statute calls for "technical information related to any adverse impact on the installation's operations, training, or mission, including military air navigation routes, air traffic control areas, military training routes, special-use air space, radar or other military operations that may be affected." *Id.* § 143-215.119(d)(2).

²⁵³ *Id.* § 143-215.119(d); *see also* § 143-215.124 (limiting disclosure of confidential information and trade secrets).

Before adjudicating the permit application and within seventy-five days of its submission, the DENR must hold public hearings in every county in which the proposed wind farm is to be situated.²⁵⁴ Besides the standard public notice requirement, the DENR must notify the local military officials of the hearing.²⁵⁵

Article 21C provides extensive approval criteria for wind farm permits.²⁵⁶ The DENR must approve the permit unless it finds that the proposed project would adversely impact the environment (including wildlife and aesthetic considerations associated with state or national parks), obstruct marine navigation, violate local zoning requirements, or violate any other federal or state law or local ordinance.²⁵⁷ Importantly, the DENR may not approve a wind permit if it finds that the project “would encroach upon or would otherwise have a significant adverse impact on the mission, training, or operations of any major military installation or branch of military in North Carolina and result in a detriment to continued military presence in the State.”²⁵⁸ The statute requires the DENR to “consider whether the proposed wind energy facility or proposed wind energy facility expansion would cause interference with air navigation routes, air traffic control areas, military training routes, or radar based on information submitted by the applicant under [the permit application requirements quoted above], and any information received” from military officials in response to the request for adverse impact assessment described above.²⁵⁹

The DENR must adjudicate permit applications within three months of submission or within one month of receiving the FAA’s OE/AAA determination or other follow-up information that the

²⁵⁴ *Id.* § 143-215.119(e).

²⁵⁵ *Id.* § 143-215.119(e)(3). The DENR must also separately notify the North Carolina Utilities Commission, the state Attorney General, and affected municipal governments. § 143-215.119.

²⁵⁶ § 143-215.120(a).

²⁵⁷ *Id.*

²⁵⁸ *Id.* § 143-215.120(a)(2).

²⁵⁹ *Id.*

DENR may have requested from any party, whichever is later.²⁶⁰ The statute expressly requires a Determination of No Hazard from the FAA; no permit may become effective in the absence of such a determination.²⁶¹

Consider a hypothetical scenario in which the DoD, after following Part 211's formal review process,²⁶² takes the position that a proposed wind project poses an unacceptable risk to national security (without agreement for or possibility of mitigation) and conveys that position to the Secretary of Transportation, but the FAA issues a Determination of No Hazard despite the DoD's position. There is no Article 21C prohibition on a permit's issuance or effectiveness if the DoD makes a determination of unacceptable risk.²⁶³ But in the face of such a determination, the DENR would be hard pressed to permit the proposed facility given the law's prohibition on permit approval for projects that "would encroach upon or would otherwise have a significant adverse impact on the mission, training, or operations of any major military installation"²⁶⁴

The statute thus grants the DoD, a federal agency, what might be characterized as "soft veto"²⁶⁵ authority over an ostensibly state-level decision-making process. Under Part 211's requirement that DoD components forward to the Clearinghouse inquiries regarding mission compatibility with proposed renewable energy projects,²⁶⁶ all DENR engagement with local military officials described above should implicate the Clearinghouse and, at a

²⁶⁰ *Id.* § 143-215.120(b).

²⁶¹ *Id.* § 143-215.120(c).

²⁶² *See supra* notes 204–15 and accompanying text (describing the formal review procedures).

²⁶³ *Id.* § 143-215.115–126.

²⁶⁴ *Id.* § 143-215.120(a)(2). Further, in the coastal zone context, the DENR's administrative rules mandate that "the siting of energy facilities and related structures" shall avoid "military air space, training or target area and transit lanes" 15A N.C. ADMIN. CODE R. 7M.0403(f)(10) (2014).

²⁶⁵ *See supra* note 35 (explaining the author's use of the term "soft veto").

²⁶⁶ 32 C.F.R. § 211.8 (2013).

minimum, Part 211's informal review process.²⁶⁷ Part 211 provides for either informal engagement or a formal determination intended for consideration by the Secretary of Transportation.²⁶⁸ It is not readily apparent whether either NDAA 2011 or Part 211 contemplates the DoD executing such a soft veto.

North Carolina is the first jurisdiction at any level to expressly mandate direct engagement with military stakeholders in the course of wind facility permitting. Keeping that novelty in mind, the next two sections of this article discuss Article 21C's federalism and authority implications from the state and federal perspectives, beginning with an analysis of the advantages and disadvantages North Carolina accrues or incurs by essentially making wind farm permits contingent upon the DoD's acquiescence.

VI. A WORTHWHILE CONCESSION OF STATE AUTHORITY?

North Carolina's unsolicited deference to the DoD in wind farm permitting—a function traditionally reserved to state discretion—reflects the depth and importance of the state's relationship with the military installations situated there.²⁶⁹ The state is home to six bases servicing all five branches of the U.S.

²⁶⁷ If the applicant has already submitted an FAA Form 7460-1, initiating the OE/AAA process, then the formal review procedures would apply. *See supra* notes 204–15 and accompanying text (explaining the formal review rules and process). Recall also that, in the context of military review of OE/AAA applications, Part 211 admonishes, “[n]o other process shall be used by a DoD Component.” 32 C.F.R. § 211.4(b).

²⁶⁸ *See supra* notes 196–221 and accompanying text (surveying the Part 211 processes).

²⁶⁹ *See generally* Pat McCrory, *Keeping Military Strong Will Keep North Carolina Strong*, JDNEWS.COM (Dec. 19, 2013), <http://www.jdnews.com/news/columns/keeping-military-strong-will-keep-north-carolina-strong-1.251804> (expressing state governor's appreciation for North Carolina's military bases and resident retirees and affirming his intent “to ensure that the military remains a vital part of [North Carolina's] culture, economy, and . . . future”).

armed forces.²⁷⁰ According to Governor McCrory, those facilities bring \$48 billion and 540,000 jobs to the state's economy.²⁷¹

In this context, it is no surprise that H.B. 484 passed both houses in the General Assembly nearly unanimously.²⁷² When the bill passed the North Carolina House of Representatives, its sponsor, Rep. Bell declared, "[this] vote ensures that North Carolina stays the most military-friendly state in the nation."²⁷³ One month later, the state enacted the Military Lands Protection Act of 2013 (MLPA).²⁷⁴ This statute, which passed both houses unanimously,²⁷⁵ expresses the finding that "North Carolina has a vested economic interest in preserving, maintaining, and sustaining land uses that are compatible with military activities at major installations."²⁷⁶ The MLPA effectively bars local governments from permitting any structure over 200 feet high to be erected within 5 miles of a military base if it "would encroach upon or otherwise interfere with the mission, training, or operations of any major military installation in North Carolina *and result in a detriment to continued military presence in the State.*"²⁷⁷

²⁷⁰ NC.GOV, *Military*, <http://www.nc.gov/government/military.aspx> (last visited Mar. 10, 2014). The state is also home to several Coast Guard facilities. U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., *Sector North Carolina - Sector Units*, http://www.uscg.mil/d5/sectNorthCarolina/other_nc_units.asp (last visited Mar. 10, 2014).

²⁷¹ McCrory, *supra* note 269. This represents ten percent of the state's economy. *Id.*

²⁷² See *supra* notes 229–37 and accompanying text (summarizing H.B. 484's legislative history).

²⁷³ McGrady, *supra* note 230.

²⁷⁴ 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 206 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-151.70 *et seq.* (2013)).

²⁷⁵ N.C. Gen. Assemb., *House Bill 433 Information/History (2013-2014 Session)*, <http://www.ncleg.net/gascripts/BillLookUp/BillLookUp.pl?Session=2013&BillID=h433> (last modified June 26, 2013).

²⁷⁶ N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-151.72 (2013).

²⁷⁷ *Id.* § 143-151.75 (emphasis added). Like Article 21C, the MLPA also requires procedural engagement with local military authorities. *Id.* § 143-151.75(c). Because they are treated comprehensively in Article 21C, wind

But what about North Carolina's interest in preserving, maintaining, and sustaining its unpreempted authority—as a sovereign state—to site electricity generation facilities? The concept of federalism and “states’ rights” is subject to a debate as old as the Constitution, if not older.²⁷⁸ James Madison opined that federal powers would be inclined to defer to state interests:

The prepossessions, which the members themselves will carry into the federal government, will generally be favorable to the States; whilst it will rarely happen, that the members of the State governments will carry into the public councils a bias in favor of the general government. A local spirit will infallibly prevail much more in the members of Congress, than a national spirit will prevail in the legislatures of the particular States. Every one knows that a great proportion of the errors committed by the State legislatures proceeds from the disposition of the members to sacrifice the comprehensive and permanent interest of the State, to the particular and separate views of the counties or districts in which they reside. And if they do not sufficiently enlarge their policy to embrace the collective welfare of their particular State, how can it be imagined that they will make the aggregate prosperity of the Union, and the dignity and respectability of its government, the objects of their affections and consultations?²⁷⁹

On its face, Article 21C seems to represent just the sort of disposition to federal interest that Madison posited “will rarely happen.”²⁸⁰ Of course, given the obvious economic considerations described above, it would be disingenuous to characterize Article 21C's wind farm permitting regime, even given its deference to federal authority, as intended to effectuate “the aggregate prosperity of the Union.”²⁸¹ But irrespective of intent, the effect is to diminish, to some extent, the state's control over wind farm

energy facilities are exempt from MLPA. § 143-151.74(a). As this Article pertains to wind farm permitting in particular, in-depth analysis of the MLPA is beyond the scope of this Article. It is mentioned here simply to emphasize the General Assembly's keen interest in maintaining the U.S. military presence in North Carolina.

²⁷⁸ SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, *THE FALLACIES OF STATES' RIGHTS* 1 (2013).

²⁷⁹ *THE FEDERALIST* NO. 46 (James Madison).

²⁸⁰ *Id.*

²⁸¹ *Id.*

siting. In doing so, North Carolina has not only lessened its power to influence where wind facilities are located, it has also lessened its ability to choose wind as an energy resource over conventional fuels or renewable sources not subject to the consultation requirement.²⁸²

North Carolina is certainly not the only state with interests in both wind power and military presence. Table A compares North Carolina to the top five wind-energy-producing states.

Rank	State	Installed wind power capacity (in MW)	Major military installations
1	Texas	12,355	11
2	California	5,830	19
3	Iowa	5,178	0
4	Illinois	3,568	2
5	Oregon	3,153	0
...			
40	North Carolina	0	6

Table A - Top five wind-energy-producing states (and North Carolina)²⁸³

²⁸² See Stein, *supra* note 123, at 219 (explaining that “the authority to determine whether to approve construction of a new electricity generation facility . . . necessarily entails an assessment of the resources used by the facility to generate electricity, as well as determinations about location”).

²⁸³ AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, AWEA U.S. WIND INDUSTRY FOURTH QUARTER 2013 MARKET REPORT 6 (Jan. 30, 2014) (on file with author). See also U.S. Dep’t of Def., *MilitaryINSTALLATIONS*, <http://www.militaryinstallations.dod.mil> (last visited Mar. 10, 2014) (providing a search tool to view military installations in each state).

Three of the top five states have military bases within their state lines. The top two, Texas and California, each host a significantly higher number of bases than North Carolina's six. Texas and California rely heavily on military presence, just as North Carolina does.²⁸⁴ Yet none of the top five states have wind-specific statutory or regulatory siting authority, let alone military consultation requirements like Article 21C's.²⁸⁵ Texas and California both occupy substantially larger geographic areas than North Carolina, and the topographic characteristics of both states offer drastically larger potential for onshore wind generation.²⁸⁶ With more space and more wind, these states have more flexibility to site wind facilities in areas where they are less prone to encroach

²⁸⁴ See Letter from Paul Paine, Chair, Tex. Military Preparedness Comm'n, to Tex. Governor Rick Perry (2012) (cover letter to TEX. MILITARY PREPAREDNESS COMM'N, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, TEXAS—THE DEFENSE COMMUNITY—BIENNIAL REPORT 2011-2012 (2012), available at http://governor.state.tx.us/files/military/2011-12_TMPC_Annual_Report.pdf (noting "that the military and defense industry is attributable for much of Texas's economic prosperity" including "an economic impact . . . of over \$140 billion with a domestic disposable income of approximately \$54 billion[,] making the military and defense industry one of the largest economic sectors in the state"); Office of Cal. Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr., *Governor Brown Convenes State Military Council* (Mar. 28, 2013), <http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=17973> (statement of California Governor Jerry Brown) ("[M]ilitary bases and activities are vital to our state's economy . . .").

²⁸⁵ See *supra* notes 134–42 (enumerating the limited number of states that have wind-specific siting authorities).

²⁸⁶ See AM. WIND ENERGY ASS'N, TEXAS WIND ENERGY 2 (2014), available at <http://awea.files.cms-plus.com/FileDownloads/pdfs/Texas.pdf> (reporting that Texas's "onshore wind potential at 80 meters hub height is 1,901,530 MW" according to the National Renewable Energy Laboratory); AM. WIND ENERGY ASS'N, CALIFORNIA WIND ENERGY 2 (2014), available at <http://awea.files.cms-plus.com/FileDownloads/pdfs/California.pdf> (reporting California's onshore potential at 34,110 MW); AM. WIND ENERGY ASS'N, NORTH CAROLINA WIND ENERGY 1, available at <http://awea.files.cms-plus.com/FileDownloads/pdfs/northcarolina.pdf> (last visited Mar. 10, 2014) (reporting North Carolina's onshore potential at 808 MW).

on military activities. But wind farm-related encroachment issues may still arise.²⁸⁷

Southeastern coastal states from Louisiana to Virginia have virtually no installed wind power generation capacity.²⁸⁸ Even though their onshore wind potential may be relatively low, their offshore capacities can be several orders of magnitude higher.²⁸⁹ Each of those states hosts military installations.²⁹⁰ They are closer in geographic size to North Carolina than to Texas. Because the U.S. offshore utility wind energy industry is still in its infancy, there is no empirical or anecdotal evidence to suggest that those states' lack of wind-specific siting authority in general, lack of a military consultation requirement specifically, or identifiable military activity encroachment concerns have impeded onshore or offshore wind farm development in any of those similarly situated states.

Nor is there any apparent movement to close specific military bases due to encroachment by wind farms or other renewable energy facilities. But unchecked wind farm encroachment could have an alternative consequence, which is also undesirable from a state's perspective. Rather than closing bases, Congress could act to preempt the states in the field of wind turbine siting altogether. In her article *The Tipping Point of Federalism*,²⁹¹ Amy Stein proposes that "[t]he ability of a federal agency to step in and address the national interest on the margins can create a release valve to reduce the pressure on Congress to act formally to tip the

²⁸⁷ See, e.g., Losco & Collick, *supra* note 85, at 236–38 (relating a case study of wind turbines causing, in the opinion of air traffic controllers, “an immediate and daunting air safety issue” for Travis Air Force Base, Calif.).

²⁸⁸ See AM. WIND ENERGY ASS'N, *supra* note 283, at 6.

²⁸⁹ See, e.g., AM. WIND ENERGY ASS'N, NORTH CAROLINA WIND ENERGY, *supra* note 286, at 1 (reporting North Carolina's offshore potential at 297,456 MW).

²⁹⁰ U.S. Dep't of Def., *supra* note 283.

²⁹¹ Stein, *supra* note 123.

balance of power.”²⁹² Article 21C turns this idea on its ear by inviting the federal agency (in this case the DoD) into the state’s process to act as the release valve.²⁹³

From North Carolina’s perspective, the merits of implementing Article 21C’s novel consultation requirement can really only be assessed by ascertaining the extent that its outcomes align with the state’s values. So what are those values? The MLPA’s “Legislative findings” provision²⁹⁴ expresses the General Assembly’s “utmost concern” over land use that may endanger the military’s “future presence in North Carolina.”²⁹⁵ Article 21C has no findings section or other expression of legislative intent, but after H.B. 484 initially passed in the state House of Representatives, an announcement on Representative Chuck McGrady’s web site justified the bill by noting that “[w]ind farms . . . pose a threat to military training programs”²⁹⁶

In the end, Article 21C indicates a value prioritization by North Carolina: wind energy development may be desirable, but it takes a backseat to keeping military bases and activity in the state. Military bases are a known and present value, while wind energy is in some regards an unproven and not universally favored technology.²⁹⁷ To the extent the General Assembly intended this tradeoff, the new law serves as a reasonable and defensible

²⁹² *Id.* at 271.

²⁹³ Under North Carolina’s state constitution, the General Assembly is prohibited from delegating its legislative authority, but it may enact statutes that delegate to outside agencies the authority to make fact-finding determinations “upon which the application of a statute to particular situations will depend.” *Foster v. N.C. Med. Care Comm’n*, 283 N.C. 110, 119, 195 S.E.2d 517, 523 (1973). See also *In re McClain*, 741 S.E.2d 893, 896 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (applying the *Foster* standard in the context of a state body applying facts determined according to a federal standard), *review denied*, 743 S.E.2d 188 (N.C. 2013).

²⁹⁴ N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-151.72 (2013). The provision’s text is quoted *supra* at the text accompanying note 276.

²⁹⁵ *Id.*

²⁹⁶ *Preserving Military Readiness*, *supra* note 230.

²⁹⁷ See *supra* notes 10–27.

measure, despite its concession of at least some authority over siting.

Establishing that the state may properly concede that authority does not necessarily imply that the DoD can—or should—act on that concession. The following section assesses the propriety of the DoD interjecting itself into a state wind farm permitting action at the level of formality contemplated by Article 21C.

VII. AN UNAUTHORIZED VETO EXERCISED BY A FEDERAL AGENCY?

In evaluating whether the DoD can properly accept the soft veto delegated by North Carolina, two considerations are relevant. The first is whether any U.S. government action in this regard is consistent with federalism principles. The second is whether the DoD itself has the authority to accept the delegated power.

Any discussion of the federalism implications associated with electric generation facility siting must first recognize that, as explained above, the authority to permit such facilities is a state function, not a national one.²⁹⁸ Stein's article examines how "competing federalism virtues," some supporting centralized (national) decision-making while others support state or local control, influence the locus of electric power plant siting authority.²⁹⁹ While Stein argues in favor of a shift to centralized control of electric power resource selection and generation facility siting, her article presents a well-rounded survey of both sides' virtues.³⁰⁰ She lists the following factors that generally favor decentralized control: an increased opportunity for public involvement, better accountability, the learning benefit of different states experimenting with different policies, more effective health and welfare protections, sensitivity to local cultural concerns, and

²⁹⁸ See *supra* notes 118–46 and accompanying text.

²⁹⁹ See Stein, *supra* note 123, at 247–62.

³⁰⁰ *Id.*

“diffused power to protect liberty.”³⁰¹ Ideally, any shift from decentralized to centralized power will not undermine or impinge on the state or local entity’s interests regarding these factors.

Of the decentralization benefits Stein lists, Article 21C most affects accountability and public access. As an executive branch agency, the DENR is accountable to the governor,³⁰² who in turn is accountable to the North Carolina electorate. Citizens interested in wind energy, firms looking to develop wind projects in the state, and other interested parties can participate in Article 21C’s public hearings as well as exert influence over the state’s political processes. But neither the Clearinghouse nor the DoD is beholden to local stakeholders in this way.

U.S. government agencies are obligated to adhere to the federalism principles outlined in Executive Order 13,132 (“E.O.”).³⁰³ While E.O. 13,132 is primarily applicable to formal rulemaking and legislative proposals, it enumerates certain “Fundamental Federalism Principles” to guide federal agencies:

- (a) Federalism is rooted in the belief that issues that are not national in scope or significance are most appropriately addressed by the level of government closest to the people.
- (b) The people of the States created the national government and delegated to it enumerated governmental powers. All other sovereign powers, save those expressly prohibited the States by the Constitution, are reserved to the States or to the people.
- (c) The constitutional relationship among sovereign governments, State and national, is inherent in the very structure of the Constitution

³⁰¹ *Id.* at 257 (internal footnotes omitted) (citing Robert Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, *A Collective Action Perspective on Ceiling Preemption by Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate Change*, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 579, 600 (2008)).

³⁰² N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-9 (2013) (“The head of each principal State department, except those departments headed by popularly elected officers, shall be appointed by the Governor and serve at his pleasure.”).

³⁰³ Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (Aug. 10, 1999).

and is formalized in and protected by the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution³⁰⁴

When the DoD published Part 211's final rule in December 2013, it "certified that [Part 211] does not have federalism implications, as set forth in [E.O.] 13,132. This rule does not have substantial direct effects on . . . [t]he relationship between the National Government and the States[,] or [t]he distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of Government."³⁰⁵ As the regulation was drafted, and as the Clearinghouse is chartered as described above, that is an accurate certification. But by enacting Article 21C, North Carolina introduced the chance that the Clearinghouse could, if it accepts the implied invitation to participate more directly in a traditionally state-centric process, affect that distribution of power. This does not invalidate Part 211, and for that matter does not suggest that it would be expressly illegal or unconstitutional for the DoD to execute the soft veto. But from a policy standpoint, these considerations do inform an analysis of whether that execution would be consistent with federalism principles.

"Cooperative federalism" refers to collaboration between national and subnational governments in matters traditionally reserved to one side of the dual federalism equation.³⁰⁶ This concept is usually understood in the context of power distributed

³⁰⁴ *Id.* at 43,255–56.

³⁰⁵ Mission Compatibility Evaluation Process, 78 Fed. Reg. 73,085, 73,088 (Dec. 5, 2013) (codified at 32 C.F.R. pt. 211).

³⁰⁶ Salkin & Ostrow, *supra* note 10, at 1053–1054. The notion of cooperative federalism dates back to the New Deal era. See Edward S. Corwin, *National-State Cooperation—Its Present Possibilities*, 46 Yale L.J. 599, 601 (1937) (observing that "[t]he two governmental centers may be envisaged as *more or less jealous rivals for power*, or they may be viewed as *mutually supplementing agencies of government*") (emphasis in original). More recently, commentators have used other terms, including "dynamic federalism." See Kirsten H. Engel, *Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law*, 56 Emory L.J. 159, 162 (2006).

from the federal government to the state or local government,³⁰⁷ but less frequently it can describe power transfers in the opposite direction.³⁰⁸ Either way, its proponents argue that rather than undermining dual federalism values, cooperative federalism, or “dynamic federalism” as it is sometimes known, actually protects those values while also promoting comity and beneficial redundancy.³⁰⁹ Recognizing the ascendance of this dynamic theory of federalism allows us to understand Article 21C’s consultation requirement and soft veto element as non-violative of federalism principles generally. After all, the federal government did not coerce North Carolina into transferring this power; rather, the state gave it freely.

This may assuage concerns about the federal government (writ large) overstepping its bounds were it to act as Article 21C may allow, but it does not necessarily follow that the Secretary of Defense, Part 211’s “senior officer,” or the Clearinghouse can, within their own statutory and regulatory authority, properly act in that capacity. NDAA 2011 and Part 211 are ambiguous in this regard, at best.

The statutes establishing the positions and enumerating the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense,³¹⁰ Deputy Secretary of Defense³¹¹ (the “senior officer” under Part 211³¹²), and USD-

³⁰⁷ See, e.g., Salkin & Ostrow, *supra* note 10, at 1054 (stating that “[c]ooperative federalism statutes typically outline the contours of a regulatory program and empower states to implement the program in accordance with federal guidelines”).

³⁰⁸ See, e.g., *Governmental Techniques for the Conservation and Utilization of Water Resources: An Analysis and Proposal*, 56 Yale L.J. 276, 299-302 (1947) (discussing “Delegation of State Powers to other States or to the Federal Government”).

³⁰⁹ Engel, *supra* note 306, at 176 (citing Robert A. Schapiro, *Toward A Theory of Interactive Federalism*, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 288 (2005)).

³¹⁰ 10 U.S.C. § 113 (2012).

³¹¹ *Id.* § 132.

³¹² 32 C.F.R. § 211.5(a) (2013).

AT&L³¹³ (the “senior official” under Part 211)³¹⁴ are generally broad but contain no express or implied authority to intervene in subnational governmental discretionary functions.³¹⁵ With respect specifically to taking advantage of Article 21C’s soft veto, NDAA 2011 and Part 211 invite two competing points of view on those officials’ authority.

The first point of view would be that Article 21C’s consultation requirement and all interactions that flow from it (outside of the coincidental review of any associated FAA Form 7460-1), from the perspective of the DoD and the Clearinghouse, are nothing more than a request for an informal review.³¹⁶ As discussed above, in addition to requiring official determinations for all OE/AAA applications,³¹⁷ NDAA 2011 directs the DoD to “establish procedures for . . . the coordinated consideration of and response to a request for a review received *from State and local officials* or the developer of a renewable energy development or other energy project . . . and ensure a coordinated Department response”³¹⁸ Likewise, Part 211 expressly contemplates that state or local officials can request informal reviews.³¹⁹ If any consultation under Article 21C is, as this point of view would hold, simply a request for an informal review, then the Clearinghouse would be acting within its express authority to respond.³²⁰

The more compelling point of view is that the nearly inevitable ramification of an adverse determination—permit denial—transcends

³¹³ 10 U.S.C. § 133. The Clearinghouse and its parent entity, the DUSD-I&E, are subordinate to the USD-AT&L. Office of the Under Sec’y of Def. for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, U.S. Dep’t of Def., *AT&L Offices*, <http://www.acq.osd.mil/offices.html> (last visited Mar. 10, 2014).

³¹⁴ 32 C.F.R. § 211.5(b) (2012).

³¹⁵ See *supra* notes 310–14.

³¹⁶ See *supra* notes 216–21 and accompanying text (discussing informal reviews).

³¹⁷ NDAA 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 358(c)(2), 124 Stat. 4137, 4199 (2011).

³¹⁸ *Id.* § 358(c)(3), 124 Stat. at 4199 (emphasis added).

³¹⁹ See 32 C.F.R. § 211.7(b)(2)(ii)(B) (2014).

³²⁰ *Id.*

the intuitive scope of an “informal” consultation. Congress empowered the Secretary of Transportation to report the results of OE/AAA aeronautical studies in an official capacity to interested parties.³²¹ While he or she must allow the DoD to review and comment on those studies,³²² there is no corollary requirement or authorization for the Secretary of Defense to report or otherwise promulgate the results of those review or the comments, including determinations of unacceptable risk to national security, except to Congress.³²³

Recall also that, with a formal review resulting in a determination of unacceptable risk to national security, the Deputy Secretary of Defense (in his or her capacity as “senior officer”) must transmit that final determination to the Secretary of Transportation.³²⁴ This responsibility is nondelegable.³²⁵ By contrast, the Clearinghouse conveys the results of informal reviews to the requester, whether the requester is a project proponent or a state or local official.³²⁶

If an Article 21C consultation were truly only an informal review request, this distinction would give rise to an irreconcilable incongruity. For an OE/AAA determination, only the Deputy Secretary of Defense—the second highest-ranking person in the department—has the authority to make a final negative determination and even then may only convey that determination to a co-equal cabinet department *within* the federal government. But for an Article 21C consultation (if it were legitimately an informal review), personnel at a much lower level in the bureaucracy (the Clearinghouse) could not only make a negative determination but also convey that determination to an outside, sovereign government knowing that it will result in denial of a

³²¹ 49 U.S.C. § 44718(b)(2).

³²² *Id.* § 44718(e).

³²³ NDAA 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 358(e)(3), 124 Stat. 4137, 4200 (2011).

³²⁴ See 32 C.F.R. § 211.6(b)(2)(iii); § 211.6(c)(3).

³²⁵ *Id.* § 211.5(a).

³²⁶ *Id.* § 211.7(b)(2)(ii).

permit application. This incongruity suggests that, while NDAA 2011 and Part 211 allow for informal engagement, the scope of that allowance should not extend as far as to allow execution of the soft veto.

A comparison of the standards defining adverse determinations under NDAA 2011, Part 211, and Article 21C also weighs against a conclusion that Article 21C consultations fall under Part 211's informal review umbrella. NDAA 2011 seeks to identify projects that will pose an "unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States."³²⁷ While Congress did not define that term, Part 211 does, but applies the standard only to formal reviews, not to informal ones.³²⁸ Regarding training and operations, the risk must rise to the level of a "significant" impairment or degradation.³²⁹ Article 21C mandates permit denial if the project would "have a significant adverse impact" on military activities.³³⁰

That both standards invoke the qualifier "significant" is noteworthy, especially because the standard applicable to informal reviews only requires the Clearinghouse to ascertain if the project would cause "an adverse impact."³³¹ There is no requirement that the impact be "significant" for the Clearinghouse to report it in a response to request for informal review and use that finding to initiate mitigation discussions. Only the Deputy Secretary of Defense can approve the finding of significance common to the formal review process and Article 21C's standard. Because the Clearinghouse's informal review determinations are held to a lower standard, it is reasonable to conclude that neither Congress

³²⁷ See NDAA 2011 § 358(e)(2).

³²⁸ See 32 C.F.R. § 211.7(b)(2)(ii) (2014) (requiring the Clearinghouse to determine whether "the project will have an adverse impact on military operations and readiness" during an informal review but not requiring that the adverse impact be "significant").

³²⁹ *Id.* § 211.2(l).

³³⁰ N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.120(a)(2) (2013).

³³¹ 32 C.F.R. § 211.7(b)(2)(ii).

nor Part 211's drafters intended the informal review process to serve an end as dispositive as is possible under Article 21C.

So while the federal agency's potential intervention into a state decision-making process may not run afoul of federalism principles, in the case of the DoD, such an intervention, at a minimum, attenuates the federal actors' statutory and regulatory authorities. Because there has yet to be a formal determination by the DoD of unacceptable risk to national security under Part 211 or a permit denial by the DENR under Article 21C, the risks incurred by this attenuation are speculative. But they may include, for example, a claim by the project proponent that DoD execution of the soft veto amounts to a compensable regulatory taking, especially given the lower standard applicable to informal review.³³²

The final section of this article will articulate why, if the DoD implements appropriate safeguards to mitigate the risk of overreach, North Carolina's Article 21C ought to stand as a model wind permitting statute, at least for states in which the DoD maintains a significant installation footprint.

VIII. A MODEL FOR STATES TO EMULATE

In North Carolina, recent experience suggests that military bases and wind energy development can coexist, even after implementation of Article 21C. In January 2012 (long before introduction of H.B. 484), renewable energy development firm

³³² See *Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y.*, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978) (citing *Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon*, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)) (noting that government action "that substantially furthers important public policies may so frustrate distinct investment-backed expectations as to constitute a 'taking'"); see also *Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist.*, 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2600 (2013) (holding that denial of a land-use permit after applicant declined to comply with conditions disproportionate to public benefit resulted in a taking). Inverse condemnation claims are difficult to substantiate, and the merits of such a claim would by nature be case-specific; even a general consideration of this cause of action is beyond the scope of this article.

Invenergy “abandoned” its plan to construct the Pantego Wind Energy facility (“Pantego”), comprising forty-nine turbines, in eastern North Carolina in light of “conflicts between the proposed wind turbines and low-flying F-15E jets” operating near Seymour Johnson Air Force Base.³³³ Two years later (and after Article 21C’s enactment), the Air Force reported that Invenergy agreed to mitigation including relocating certain turbines to distances no less than four miles from the centerline of an air route used to access the Dare County Bombing Range.³³⁴

This success story might have occurred even without Article 21C’s mandatory consultation requirement and the threat of its prohibition on issuing permits for projects that would significantly impair or degrade military operations. But as Stein points out in her article, one of the advantages of decentralized regulation is the opportunity for states to act as public policy laboratories, experimenting with laws and regulations so that other jurisdictions may learn from their efforts.³³⁵ With this in mind, other states, especially those with economies heavily dependent on military bases, may do well to pay close attention to North Carolina’s wind siting experience under Article 21C. If successful, this statute could serve as a model not only for wind siting but also for other forms of development that pose military base encroachment difficulties.

States not willing to go so far as to concede to a federal agency a notional veto over its own permitting practices could draft around

³³³ John Murawski, NewsObserver.com, *Proposed Pantego Wind Farm Stalls*, NEWSOBSERVER.COM (Jan. 12, 2013), <http://www.newsobserver.com/2013/01/12/2600290/proposed-pantego-wind-farm-stalls.html>. Pantego also faced opposition stemming from FWS’s assessment that the facility would kill as many as twenty-one bald eagles each year. *Id.*

³³⁴ Air Combat Command, DOD, *Invenergy reach agreement on Pantego Wind Energy Project* (Jan. 13, 2014), <http://www.acc.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123376558>. See also INVENERGY WIND DEV., LLC, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., & U.S. AIR FORCE, *supra* note 210, at 1–2 (memorializing the terms of the mitigation agreement).

³³⁵ Stein, *supra* note 123, at 257.

that concern. Incorporating balancing language into the permit standards would accomplish this. For example, the relevant standard in Article 21C could be amended with the following italicized language:

(a) Permit Approval. – The [DENR] shall approve an application for a permit for a proposed wind energy facility or proposed wind energy facility expansion unless the [DENR] finds any one or more of the following:

...

(2) Construction or operation of the proposed wind energy facility or proposed wind energy facility expansion would encroach upon or would otherwise have a significant adverse impact on the mission, training, or operations of any major military installation or branch of military in North Carolina and result in a detriment to continued military presence in the State, *to the extent that this detriment would outweigh the public benefit associated with the proposed wind energy facility or proposed wind energy facility expansion.* In its evaluation, the [DENR] may consider whether the proposed wind energy facility or proposed wind energy facility expansion would cause interference with air navigation routes, air traffic control areas, military training routes, or radar based on information submitted by the applicant pursuant to [the permit application requirements], and any information received by the [DENR] pursuant to [the military consultation requirement]. *In determining whether any detriment to continued military presence outweighs the public benefit associated with the proposed wind energy facility or proposed wind energy facility expansion, the [DENR] shall not substitute any assertions made by the applicant or any outside organization for its own independent judgment.*³³⁶

This modification would make clear to all parties, especially the permitting agency, that the DoD's or the Clearinghouse's input is advisory rather than being a potentially dispositive soft veto. This is but one possible solution. Non-legislative alternatives may include drafting administrative rules to eliminate any perceived ambiguity about the weight of the DoD's input into the state permitting process.

³³⁶ N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.120 (2013) (emphasis added to denote this author's original recommended additional language).

From the DoD's perspective, the North Carolina model provides reassurance that the wind energy industry's growth will not outpace the department's ability to protect its training and operational interests. To avert any actual or perceived attenuation of authority by the Clearinghouse or the Deputy Secretary of Defense (acting in the senior officer role), the DoD should consider revising Part 211 to require state and local governments, when initiating a review request, to indicate whether the request is made pursuant to a statutory or regulatory consultation requirement (like that of Article 21C). If it is, an amended process could require the Clearinghouse to treat the request as a formal review rather than an informal one. This would ensure that reviews that may precipitate a permit denial are vetted with the same rigor and against the same standard as an OE/AAA review.

IX. CONCLUSION

The potential of wind farms to encroach on military bases and activities is only one of many competing interests to which state or local permitting authorities must pay heed. Wind turbines pose a very real threat to military aviation and other operations. States hosting military bases are sensitive to the need to expand their energy resource portfolios without jeopardizing bases that are important economic engines. This potential conflict is not unique to North Carolina, but that state has contrived a unique permitting regime to balance those interests.

As this article has shown, Article 21C raises complex considerations regarding federalism principles and the virtues of decentralized control of electricity generation facility siting. And the potential finality of an adverse determination by officials in the DoD responding to an Article 21C consultation invites questions whether such a determination is an overreach.

Each of these issues merits careful consideration, but neither should be considered fatal to the North Carolina model. The state must have the latitude to prioritize its interests and legislate based on those priorities. Article 21C promises to be a worthy experiment in energy facility siting policy. This Article has shown that other states with interests similar to North Carolina will be

well-served to watch the results and be ready to implement or improve on this model.

