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although he appears to have reached his conclusions independently.<sup>12</sup>

Throughout the book and in the article above-mentioned, there is plenty of stimulation for the reader. The text is well filled with cases illustrating the points which the author makes. The analysis of the *Loach case*<sup>13</sup> as involving a situation where the defendant had "the first clear chance," is an artistic stroke. After reading the book and the article, one feels that the problem of proximate cause properly dwindles before the larger problems of policy. For making such an analysis, Professor Green will receive high praise. Moreover, we have here that rare thing, a modern law book which can actually be read, and with interest, by a busy lawyer or student. It runs only to 202 pages and is written in a clear, concise and readable style.

ROBERT H. WETTACH.

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## BOOKS RECEIVED

*The Department of Justice of the United States*. Albert Langelut-  
tig, Ph.D. Institute for Government Research, Studies in Ad-  
ministration. Baltimore, Md. The Johns Hopkins Press. 1927.  
Pp. xvi, 318.

*Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law in the United  
States*. John Dickinson. Cambridge. Harvard University Press.  
1927. Pp. xiii, 403.

*Rationale of Proximate Cause*. Leon Green, Associate Professor of  
Law. Yale University. Kansas City, Mo. Vernon Law Book  
Company. 1927. Pp. x, 216.

<sup>12</sup> "Can't we correctly say that a wrong is not the 'legally blamable' cause of a concrete sequence if the prevention of that sequence did not fall within the purpose of the infringed duty?" Bingham, *Legal Cause*, 9 Col. L. Rev., p. 35.

<sup>13</sup> "Were the chances of occurrence of the consequences which constituted plaintiff's harm within any of the dangers that provoked legal condemnation of defendant's conduct? If they were, he is 'legally blamable' for the harm." Bingham, *op. cit.*, p. 154.

"Legal duties are always concrete; and the determination of the existence and particular extent of duties is an essential function of the judge." Bingham, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

See discussion of Bingham's articles by Professor Green in his book, pp. 130, 131.

<sup>14</sup> *Loach v. British Co. Elec. Ry. Co.* (Privy Council, 1916), 1 Appeal Cas. 719, discussed in 6 N. C. L. Rev., pp. 30, 31, 32.